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RESEARCH QUESTION 
How to conceptualise an affirmative open systems assemblage of landscape design? 
 
ABSTRACT 
An Affirmative Open System Landscape Design Assemblage 
Landscape architectural writers consider that there has been a ‘recovery’ of landscape design since 
the early 1990’s. ‘Open systems’ thinking has been centrally influential in this recovery and started to 
have a determining impact on landscape design by the end of the 1990’s, influenced by a series of 
explicitly open-systems-oriented writings. These writings contributed to the rise of ‘landscape 
urbanism’, now considered the dominant design approach and generally assumed to be the leading 
edge of the ‘recovery’. This tradition tended not to be interested in past landscape design practices, 
often positioning themselves against such practices. These writings originated from academia, 
promoted ambitious practice and made claims for landscape urbanism’s abilities to positively impact 
on the built environment.  
Results of initial fieldwork into how real landscapes function carried out by this researcher agree with 
these writings that open systems thinking is the best way to understand how landscapes function. 
However, this fieldwork led to a significantly different conception of how landscape function than found 
in the dominant conceptions. Gilles Deleuze’s open systems notion of ‘affect’ has been found to best 
explain and most affirm this work.  
So, this research involved a theoretical examination of Deleuze’s notion of ‘affect’, how to understand 
it (‘expression’), and the process of its production (‘assemblage’). This work then informed further 
fieldwork. The results of these two studies were then used to examine a series of late 1990’s writings 
that I term the ‘empirical research’ tradition, produced by European landscape architects who, from a 
practice perspective, wanted to affirm how existing landscape design practice functioned. They were 
obsessed with the determining role of the pre-existing landscape in the design process and 
experimentation, the ‘intuitive’ processes of the designer and were not explicitly interested in open 
systems. Their devotion to precisely understand the processes of practice, however, led certain of 
these to develop conceptions that I found aligned strongly with the Deleuzian open systems notions 
and included a conception of practice which did not rely upon preconceptions or outside abstract 
notions to evaluate how a project proceeds – making their writings the first ‘immanent’ (Deleuze) 
conception of landscape design. All of the previous studies were then used to examine the conception 
of design process found in the explicitly open-systems-oriented design writings to understand and 
account for the negative tendencies of this tradition. This conception strongly tended to involve 
uncritical translations of architectural practices to landscape design and questionable theoretical 
conceptions of open systems. These were associated with the promotion of a series of dominating 
design preoccupations that deferred attention away from what the human landscape does and the role 
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of the pre-existing and how to engage with it. These were directly related to a deferral away from 
landscape-specific critical tools and to a reliance on abstract notions and very ‘traditional’ visual 
means of evaluation. The findings of these studies were brought together to construct, for the first time 
an affirmative (immanent) open systems landscape design assemblage aimed at redirecting the 
recovery of landscape. 
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SOME RELEVANT QUOTES: 
‘There is no imagination outside of technique’,1 Deleuze and Guattari, 1988 
‘In painting... ...the subject or something like it, is held to exist prior to its representation. This 
is not true of architecture, which is brought into existence through drawing. The subject-matter 
(the building or space) will exist after the drawing, not before it (his emphasis)’,2 Robin Evans, 
1986 
‘The landscape speaks prior to the designer’,3 Elizabeth Meyer, 1994  
‘Mapping is already a project in the making’,4 James Corner, 1999  
‘The landscape as such precedes the landscape architect, while, in comparison, a piece of 
architecture under no circumstances precedes the architect’,5 Christophe Girot, 1999  
‘Survey before plan’,6 Patrick Geddes (1854-1932), urbanist, inventor of: the term ‘landscape 
architecture’, the ‘survey-analysis-plan’ approach to design and planning, and a number of 
new notions describing emerging urban phenomena, such as ‘conurbation’. 
‘The landscape is beyond previous conceptions’,7 James Corner, 1999 
‘The formal study of affects is relatively underdeveloped’,8 Manuel De Landa, 2002  
‘It is an ‘on-the-street’ type of knowledge’,9 Deleuze on Spinoza’s idea of the type of 
knowledge required to engage with affect  
‘It’s not easy to see things in the middle’,10 Deleuze and Guattari, 1988 
‘Smooth space’… ‘is a space of affects’11 …it ‘can be explored only by legwork’,12 Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1988 
 ‘The middle… is where things pick up speed’,13 Deleuze and Guattari, 1988  
                                            
1 Deleuze, Gilles and Guattari, Felix, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Massumi, Brian 
(London: Athlone, 1988 (original French edition 1980)). 345. 
2 Evans, Robin, "Translation from Drawing to Building (1986)," in Translation from Drawing to Building and Other 
Essays, ed. Evans, Evans (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT, 1997). 165. 
3 Meyer, Elizabeth K., "Landscape Architecture as Modern Other and Postmodern Ground," in The Culture of 
Landscape Architecture, ed. Edquist, Harriet and Bird, Vanessa (Melbourne: Edge Publishing, 1994). 31. 
4 Corner, James, "The Agency of Mapping: Speculation, Critique and Invention," in Mappings, ed. Cosgrove, 
Dennis (London: Reaktion Books, 1999). 216. 
5 Girot, Christophe, "Towards a General Theory of Landscape," Topos: European Landscape Magazine 28(1999). 
33. 
6 Cited in Hall, Peter, Cities of Tomorrow: An Intellectual History of the Urban Planning and Design on the Twentieth 
Century  (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1988). 142. 
7 Corner, "The Agency of Mapping: Speculation, Critique and Invention." 230. 
8 De Landa, Manuel, Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy  (London: Continuum, 2002). 72. 
9 Deleuze, Gilles, "Lecture on Spinoza 24/01/1978," (Seminars given between 1971 and 1987 at the Universite de 
Paris VIII Vincennes and Vincennes St-Denis).(1978), 
http://www.webdeleuze.com/php/texte.php?cle=14&groupe=Spinoza&langue=2. 
10 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. 23. 
11 Ibid. 479. 
12 Ibid. 371. 
13 Ibid. 25. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Method 
This investigation starts with architect Robin Evans, who taught in both art and architecture schools. He 
famously identified the architectural design assemblage through the way that representations functioned 
in architecture compared to how he found they function in art practice,  
‘in painting… …the subject or something like it, is held to exist prior to its representation. This is not 
true of architecture, which is brought into existence through drawing. The subject-matter (the 
building or space) will exist after the drawing, not before it (his emphasis).14  
This was ‘too obvious’ and the simplest way to think about this too obviousness is that it highlights an 
assemblage, or points to an assemblage and the affects of this assemblage. It refers to, or more 
precisely gives expression to, an architectural assemblage that is determined by a certain use and 
power of representation. There are two assemblages here, the artistic assemblage and the architectural 
assemblage. Evans’ expression affirmed for architects what they already ‘knew’ but Evans had to give it 
expression, had to create it, and in doing so affirmed a whole past and also a whole future new practice: 
think of the notion of ‘projection’, as an instance of such a new practice.  
Assemblage 1: Attempts to conceptualise and affirm the landscape design assemblage (1990’s) 
From the start of the 90’s there is a new assertion of the power and relevance of landscape, landscape 
design and landscape architectural design and that this power needed recovering. This Assemblage (or 
chapter) focuses on a series of influential publications and essays published between 1991 and 1999, 
beginning with the 1990 forum titled ‘Landscape Architecture and Critical Inquiry’, published in 1991, 15 
and culminating in and including the publications of James Corner’s edited collection, Recovering 
Landscape: Essays in Contemporary Landscape Architecture16 and his equally influential essay on 
Mapping, both published in 1999.17 This span of time might be seen as the first period of the ‘recovery’ 
of landscape. The earliest use of the notion of the ‘recovery’ of landscape that I can identify was by 
Elizabeth Meyer in 1994.18 It was then later used in the title of James Corner’s edited collection.19 This 
period is chosen as it represents the period up to the serious emergence of ‘landscape urbanism’. 
Corner’s Mapping essay, his book and the entries for the international design competitions for 
Downsview Park in Toronto in 1999, amongst other things, mark some sort of critical shift toward what 
we know as ‘landscape urbanism’, and which might be understood as the second period of the ‘recovery 
of landscape’.  
                                            
14 Evans, "Translation from Drawing to Building (1986)."  
15 Mcavin, Margaret et al., "Landscape Architecture and Critical Inquiry," Landscape Journal 10, no. 2 (1991). 
16 Corner, James, ed. Recovering Landscape: Essays in Contemporary Landscape Architecture (New York, New 
York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1999). 
17 Corner, "The Agency of Mapping: Speculation, Critique and Invention." 
18 Meyer, "Landscape Architecture as Modern Other and Postmodern Ground." 20 and 33. 
19 Corner, Recovering Landscape: Essays in Contemporary Landscape Architecture. 
an affirmative open systems conception of how to design landscape  Connolly, Peter  
3 
 
These essays are chosen for their attempts to articulate a conception of how to design landscape – and 
in the process contributing to what can be termed the ‘problematic of landscape design’. Central to the 
recovery of landscape are such writings and the influence of such writing. I have found that these 
writings are also valuable for the way that they are attempting to think afresh key problems – and so 
have a ‘wholeness’ about the way that they are written: where, amongst their arguments, they attempt 
to be clear about what is at stake in the wider sense and to present themselves in ways where their 
conceptual constructions, assumptions and the relationship to their designerly preoccupations are more 
obvious than in later writings. They might also, as first attempts tend to do, be more open and fluid in 
their approach in comparison to later more rigid conceptualisings.  
I have found that this selection of essays provides a good representation of the dominant strands of the 
design discourse of the nineties, are together highly influential and as a collection it is a conveniently 
small and researchable literature.20  
This selection of essays and their influence also points to the power of writing to affect designing. The 
recovery of landscape cannot be worked on by designing alone. This recovery occurs through writing, 
thinking and publishing as well. This thesis, like these writings, is focused on the processes of 
designing, in ways that just the processes of designing cannot itself do.21  
This thesis argues that the most precise and powerful way to think about how to conceptualise the 
designing of landscape is by considering the landscape design process as a landscape design 
‘assemblage’, even if the writers I am examining have not tended to use the notion of assemblage. 
Assemblage (Deleuze and Guattari) is an open systems notion which gives expression to a flexible set 
of interrelating relations in time and space inseparable from the wider open systems relations it is 
enlivened by that produces powers (affects). Assemblage will be discussed in more detail shortly and 
throughout the thesis. Assemblages spontaneously form in open systems and some of these we start to 
work with and develop as part of life.  
The key to using assemblage-thinking as a research tool, as it is used here, comes via discerning or 
identifying a power (affect), then attempting to give expression to this power (affect) - and then to seek 
out the interrelated ‘connections’ (or relations or processes) that make up the assemblage that produces 
that power (affect). Assemblages are such that the action of starting to connect to the particular power 
(affect) of interest itself spontaneously starts to draw attention to the processes that produce this power, 
which also in turn folds back to further specify or determine the power - and which further specifies the 
assemblage, and so on, machinically. Such a co-determining of affect and assemblage ‘machinically’ 
                                            
20 There are of course many other writings that could have been referred to but they tended to have been published 
in the academic journals and such journals seem to get writers to focus on other things or at least not openly 
embrace the problem of designing. These writings were chosen as each tended to both construct the wholeness 
of the problematic of designing and provide detail about design assemblages. The influence of these writings is 
probably reflected in this open embrace of the problematics of design of these writings, which designers identify 
with. They tend to be more relevant to design. It is important to mention that a number of these essays can be 
found in Recovering Landscape, underlining the timing, intelligent construction and influence of this collection. 
21 This can be proven in this thesis through one single notion (amongst others), that of expression. Expression 
(Deleuze and Spinoza) is, as this thesis argues, central to the power of designing yet design practice has not 
embraced it and hence not embraced the full power of design practice. Of course, these words in themselves do 
not tell you what expression is and for that you will need to start with Assemblage 2 (refer Appendix) then move 
onto the Federation Square case study. 
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opens up ways into the system, its powers, power-machinery and the associated sense-making 
machinery that accompanies them. Working from affects to assemblage is the reverse of how design 
processes are normally thought of. Assemblages when operating well bypass presumptions about what 
is relevant and also highlight such assumptions. Assemblages make you more attentive to what you are 
doing and what is involved in this doing? 
As suggested in the thesis abstract, the notion of assemblage has been employed in a number of ways 
beyond being used as a research tool: as the medium or material of design (landscape assemblages), 
and as the processes of designing (landscape design assemblages).22 It is also used here as a research 
device. This thesis attempts to re-construct landscape design assemblages (processes of designing), 
very much driven by a reconstruction of landscape assemblages (how landscape works). I argue that if 
we grasp how landscape really works then this has profound implications for how designing should be 
thought of. And further, that to grasp how landscape really works is an ‘aesthetic’ task, involving an 
aesthetics of affects. Similarly, to grasp how landscape design works also involves an aesthetics of 
affect – and that both of these are entwined – the affectuality of the landscape machinically connecting 
to and determining the affectuality of landscape designing. These notions are both central to the strong 
practice of landscape architecture and yet foreign to the dominant conceptions. An examination of these 
writings draws out that there was a range of thought in the nineties, which had interests in producing an 
affirmative conception of landscape design. 
Assemblage 1 examines a series of short selections of writings from a certain juncture in the history of 
the discipline, where the writers are attempting a centrally important disciplinary problem – to 
conceptualise and affirm the basic components of a landscape design assemblage. Just as Evans’ 
highlighting of the particular power of architectural drawings also inseparably points to the particular 
power of the architectural design assemblage.  
Each essay describes something of this assemblage that is not conceptualised and affirmed and 
attempts to turn this around and project it forward. Each of these quotes has been teased apart, the 
associated problematics identified and the implications followed through. They sometimes come with 
internal tensions, contain contradictions or identify problems. I tend to find them singular access points 
to the discourse and problematics of the landscape design assemblage. Part of the method used here is 
to tap into something of the singular ‘ecological’ nature of each of these quotes in a way that identifies 
potentials and dead-ends and seeks to develop the former and bypass the latter. In terms of the thesis 
document connections need to be made in advance to later ‘Assemblages’. The style of argumentation, 
or thought, that I discovered to be most suitable and which this writing moves in and out of, is a sort of 
ecological argumentation—a sort of ecological machinery that starts with the specifics and singularity of 
a quote, including what it appears to be attempting to do – and then with the aid of the theoretical tools 
that will be discussed in more detail later in the thesis (very often Deleuzian-Guattarian in nature) – work 
out how such thinking can be understood or reformulated to contribute to the collective task of 
constructing a landscape design assemblage. 
                                            
22 Also as the processes of production of the physical landscape or the processes of urbanisation (urban 
assemblages). 
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How the various concepts are introduced is important to mention. For, instance where a way beyond a 
conceptual limit in Assemblage 1 requires a concept introduced in Assemblage 2 then this concept will 
be introduced in Assemblage 1 in a way that is very introductory in comparison to how it will be dealt 
with later in Assemblage 2. The way it is introduced in Assemblage 1 will hopefully suggest something 
of how it may be conceptualised more fully later in say Assemblage 3 or the Conclusion. It would be 
impossible to fully introduce many of the notions during the text of Assemblage 1, for instance, but it 
seems valuable to point toward how they may be relevant. The structure of the thesis presented some 
key problems. There was not a logical, linear way to connect the 4 Assemblages of the thesis (including 
the conclusion): the 90’s landscape design assemblage, the fieldwork, the re-reading of Deleuze and 
Guattari’s ideas about affect / assemblage / aesthetics, and the recent open systems oriented 
landscape design assemblages. Each part contributes to each other and so an unfolding linear narrative 
seemed unworkable. 
The arguments here also rely on experience with the whole problematic of landscape design 
assemblages that I have been engaged with over many years with many others, usually graduate 
students. This work is continually engaging in and departing from the greater landscape design 
discourse. It would be wrong to assume that the arguments flow simply from the internal logic of the 
texts analysed. Hopefully, I have introduced enough of the relevant context to make sense of the 
arguments for the uninitiated.  
The overriding task of the writers in Assemblage 1 was the construction of an affirmative conception of a 
landscape design assemblage. I am interested in what their constructions have to offer an open 
systems landscape design assemblage.  
‘Pre-Landscape Urbanism’ 
For the purposes of an open-systems landscape design assemblage there turns out seems to be two 
distinct strands of writing relevant to engaging with open systems conceptions (and some other writers). 
The first of these I have termed ‘pre-landscape urbanist’ writings, produced between 1992 and 1999.23 
The second, I have termed the ‘empirical research’ writings. The ‘pre-landscape urbanism’ writings 
articulated conceptions of a design assemblage of landscape design that either reflected a greater 
emerging mode of thinking that eventually became known as ‘landscape urbanism’, contributed key 
conceptions to such an emergence (Waldheim and especially Corner) or helped popularise such ideas 
(Czerniak). These essays tend not to show interest in past landscape architectural practice and 
generally actively oppose themselves to past landscape architectural practices. The influences on this 
tradition are more architectural and this tradition is seen as being as much architectural as landscape 
                                            
23 Corner, James, "Representation and Landscape: Drawing and Making in the Landscape Medium," Word & Image 
8, no. 3 (1992); Corner, James, "Recovering Landscape as a Critical Cultural Practice," in Recovering Landscape: 
Essays in Contemporary Landscape Theory, ed. Corner, James (New York, New York: Princeton, 1999); Corner, 
James, "Eidetic Operations and New Landscapes," in Recovering Landscape: Essays in Contemporary 
Landscape Theory, ed. Corner, James (New York, New York: Princeton, 1999); Corner, "The Agency of Mapping: 
Speculation, Critique and Invention; Corner, James, "Taking Measure: Irony and Contradiction in an Age of 
Precision," in Taking Measures across the American Landscape, ed. Corner, James and Maclean, Alex, S. (New 
Haven: Yale, 1996); Waldheim, Charles, "Aerial Representation and the Recovery of Landscape," in Recovering 
Landscape: Essays in Contemporary Landscape Theory, ed. Corner, James (New York, New York: Princeton, 
1999); Czerniak, Julia, "Challenging the Pictorial: Recent Landscape Practice," Assemblage 34(1998). 
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architectural, with architects and architectural thinking being important. It is very ‘projection’ and 
‘program’ oriented and tends not to dwell on or emphasise the pre-existing landscape. These essays, as 
the decade progresses are increasingly explicitly or strongly implicitly open and complex systems 
oriented, and to be more interested in ambitious large-scale designing. The particular writings discussed 
by James Corner might be considered the strongest expression of this line of writing, and the more 
populist Czerniak’s writing might reflect how such thinking tends to find itself influencing others. 
The following produced the writings examined in this line of inquiry: 
Charles Waldheim, US architect, the architect most identified with ‘landscape urbanism’ – one 
essay published in Corner’s, Recovering Landscape 
James Corner, US practicing landscape architect, landscape architectural academic, and the 
landscape architect who is most identified with ‘landscape urbanism’ - a series of essays, from 1992 
and including essays in his collection, Recovering Landscape 
Julia Czerniak, US landscape architect and academic - one essay published in 1998 in, 
Assemblage journal. 
 ‘Intuitive or Empirical Research’ 
The other important strand of writings, all produced around 1999, might be termed ‘intuitive research’ or 
‘empirical research’.24 This strand of writings is obsessed with the relationship of the designer to the pre-
existing landscape / the site. It is ‘intuitively’-oriented and wants to affirm strong present and past 
landscape design practices. It has a tendency to conceptualise landscape design assemblages via 
contrasting them with architectural design assemblages. These writings tend to want to affirm and 
conceptualise strong practices from within existing practices and build on these - and also to identify 
weak practices within pre-existing practices and steer away from these. As I will argue this literature is 
best exemplified by two fairly uncelebrated and short essays by Marc Claramunt and Catherine 
Mosbach, who articulated the notion of ‘intuitive’ or ‘empirical research’, and like the other texts in this 
style of thought come from attempts to, in contrast to the more academically-based pre-landscape-
urbanists, express the workings of existing practice. The European and especially the French writers 
are central here. This tradition paid little attention to open and complex thinking and yet, I will argue, 
their thinking may be best understood in such terms—and that in such terms has a great deal to offer 
open and complex systems thinking in the design of landscape. I argue that understanding such work 
highlights key limitations with the pre-landscape urbanism / landscape urbanism trajectory and provides 
ways beyond such limitations.  
                                            
24 Meyer, "Landscape Architecture as Modern Other and Postmodern Ground; Descombes, Georges, "Shifting 
Sites: The Swiss Way, Geneva," in Recovering Landscape: Essays in Contemporary Landscape Theory, ed. 
Corner, James (New York, New York: Princeton, 1999); Hoyer, Steen A. B., "Things Take Time and Time Takes 
Things: The Danish Landscape," in Recovering Landscape: Essays in Contemporary Landscape Theory, ed. 
Corner, James (New York, New York: Princeton, 1999); Claramunt, Marc and Mosbach, Catherine, "Editorial," 
Pages Paysages: Landscape Review no. 9 (Embodied: Figures in the Landscape) (2002); Claramunt, Marc and 
Mosbach, Catherine, "Nature of a Landscape Project," Pages Paysages: Landscape Review, no. 7 
(Anamorphose) (1999); Girot, "Towards a General Theory of Landscape; Girot, Christophe, "Four Trace Concepts 
in Landscape Architecture," in Recovering Landscape: Essays in Contemporary Landscape Theory, ed. Corner, 
James (New York, New York: Princeton, 1999); Girot, "Towards a General Theory of Landscape."  
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I should stress that the two identified categories are focused on writings and are not person-exclusive. 
For instance, some of James Corner’s thinking, found in these writings, is relevant to the ‘intuitive line of 
inquiry and will be discussed in such terms. I should highlight that it was Corner’s book, Recovering 
Landscape that introduced or foregrounded, at least for non-Europeans, the thinking of the Europeans 
that I have identified with the ‘intuitive line. 
Essays included in Corner’s Recovery Landscape collection: 
Steen Hoyer, Danish architect, artist who practices in the landscape, and head of landscape 
architectural program  – on essay in Recovering Landscape. 
Christophe Girot, French architect and landscape architect academic and landscape architectural 
practitioner – on essay in Recovering Landscape plus one other. 
Georges Descombes, architect who practices landscape architecture and landscape architectural 
academic in Switzerland – on essay in Recovering Landscape. 
Essays included in Pages Paysages journal. 
Marc Claramunt, French landscape architect, landscape architectural academic and co-editor of 
Pages Paysages – two co-written essays. 
Catherine Mosbach, French landscape architect and co-editor of Pages Paysages  – two co-written 
essays. 
Others who are relevant to this discussion include: 
Stan Fung, Australian architectural academic who focuses on architectural and landscape 
architectural history - one essay published in Recovering Landscape (1999). Fung’s work is relevant 
to both strands, and this relevance comes from his interest in gardens whilst being an architectural 
historian-theorist. 
Elizabeth Meyer, US landscape architect and landscape architectural academic - one essay 
published in 1994 in Edge Too: The Culture of Landscape Architecture. Meyer’s interest in the 
representational relationship to the pre-existing and her interest in affirming past landscape 
architectural practices aligns here with the intuitive line. 
Andrea Kahn, US architect and urban design academic – an interview in Kerb: Journal of 
Landscape Architecture in 1996. Kahn’s is included for her being a very site oriented urbanist; she 
makes observations in the essay included about the differences between architecture and 
landscape. 
Sebastien Marot, philosopher and commentator on architecture, landscape architecture and 
urbanism and academic in landscape architectural programs – one essay in Recovering 
Landscape, 1999. Like Kahn, Marot is included for providing something of an outsider view of 
landscape design, in comparison with architectural design.  
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Myself, an Australian landscape architect and urban design academic – a series of essays 
published between 1994 and 1999.25 I have refrained from discussing my own writing here. I shared 
an interest in open and complex systems (highly influenced by fieldwork) and large scaled urbanism 
and these would align my writings with the pre-landscape urbanism line, but I also take what 
Claramunt and Mosbach call ‘intuitive research’ seriously. I have produced a series of critiques of 
landscape urbanism. My relevant writings share much with what I argue in this thesis.  
The examination of real examples of how landscapes function in Assemblage 2, in the light of Deleuze-
Guattarian thinking, and an examination of both of the these landscape design traditions, traditions will 
show that on one hand, the ‘pre-landscape-urbanist’ tradition and landscape urbanism in general have 
effectively commandeered the contemporary designer conception of open and complex systems 
thinking, and that the ‘intuitive researchers’ have showed little interest in such ideas and is not known 
for any such interest. Moreover, the ‘intuitive research’ tradition, by being dedicated to being ‘empirical’, 
affirms and even conceptualises aspects of the open and complex systems nature of landscape design 
in ways that the pre-landscape urbanists barely begin to think. This thesis will attempt to tease apart 
both of these traditions and I will argue that the investigations of the ‘intuitive research’ tradition produce 
critical tools which draw attention to key weakness’ of the ‘pre-landscape urbanism tradition’ and 
provide ways to move beyond them – and contribute to an affirmative open systems-oriented landscape 
assemblage. In doing so, Assemblage 1 also has much to offer the predominantly open and complex 
systems approaches examined in Assemblage 3, which tend to accept and often intensify many of the 
same weakness’ of the pre-landscape urbanism tradition. I also argue that the pre-landscape urbanists 
and later landscape urbanists, as well as the intuitive research line are all important to the recovery of 
landscape. However, each will be approached differently. The full value of the ‘intuitive research’ line 
needs to be more fully conceptualised and affirmed whilst the pre- and landscape urbanism approaches 
need to be reconstructed, taking on board insights from the intuitive line of inquiry.  
This thesis argues that the 1990’s pre- and 2000’s landscape urbanist traditions have failed to embrace 
the importance of assemblages and affects to open and complex systems - and that the intuitive 
research tradition has, by seriously close attention to practice, unconsciously came close to an embrace 
of assemblages and affects, especially in the uncelebrated writings of Claramunt and Mosbach. As a 
result, I will argue, landscape urbanism has therefore so far only been tentative in its embrace of open / 
complex systems in design. The ‘intuitive research’ tradition has despite itself developed something of a 
valuable embrace of open and complex systems, and as a result something of a unique embrace of the 
design of landscape. The rise of landscape urbanism has, however, been accompanied by a decline in 
attention being given to the intuitive emphasis. Assemblage 1 has not concentrated on making claims 
for the power of the pre-landscape urbanist tradition or landscape urbanist design assemblage as this 
has already been more than generously done elsewhere. Instead it seeks to recover for an open-
systems landscape design conception what is much more obscure - what was valuable from the more 
                                            
25 I have decided not to provide any significant discussion of my own texts in this thesis. My texts do however 
continually engage with the question of an affirmative landscape design assemblage (and an affirmative open 
systems landscape design assemblage) – and many of the issues that are involved in this problematic.  
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humble site-oriented tradition that has been pushed aside in the general, and I would suggest relatively 
uncritical shift toward landscape urbanism and landscape urbanism influenced designing.  
Assemblage 2: What Landscapes Do and How they Do it: Landscape Affect? 
(Comprising Deleuze’s Aesthetics of Affect and four Case Studies.) 
2.1. Deleuze’s Aesthetics of Affect (refer to Appendix: Deleuze’s Aesthetics of Affect) 
Affect  
Parallel (from 1993) to the historical developments discussed above, and as part of a project to develop 
a landscape architectural urbanism,26 I have been undertaking fieldwork into how landscapes function—
what they do and how they do it. It has involved 15 years of field investigations into, what I found to be, 
a surprisingly unexplored area—direct studies of what landscapes do. The development of conceptions 
and techniques have developed with my understandings of what landscapes do – and has had a very 
significant affect on how I approach the design of landscape. This has been and is still the most 
sustained attempt to conceptualise how landscapes function. This thesis argues that a significantly 
different account of how landscapes function has emerged from this work than is found in the landscape 
urbanist literature (and existing landscape architectural conceptions). In the course of this work, Gilles 
Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s27 open systems notion of ‘affect’28 was found to be the most affirming tool 
for what was emerging, and most liberating for further development of my thinking.29 Despite the 
repeated claim that landscape urbanism has moved beyond traditional conceptions of landscape and 
statements that suggest fieldwork is important, it appears, from the perspective of the findings of this 
fieldwork (and design work), that landscape urbanism has instead been seriously inattentive to what real 
landscapes do. This seems odd considering that the first principle of open systems is to take the real 
and examples seriously. If real examples do get attention it seems to be in a very restricted or 
presumed manner.  
                                            
26 Charles Waldheim has been credited with coining the term, ‘landscape urbanism’, in 1996. This researcher 
separately used the same term as the initial title of his RMIT Masters of Urban Design major project proposal in 
1994. I do not identify my use of the term very closely with the dominant conception. The conception I was 
proposing was one focused on an urbanism that affirmed landscape architecture’s abilities. I would suggest, as I 
argue in Assemblage 3 that the dominant version may not in general have this focus.  
27 The influence of the thinking of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari can be found throughout the landscape urbanist 
literature. What was most useful from their work for us turned out to be significantly different from how the 
dominant models of landscape urbanism found their ideas useful. We, like landscape urbanists, embrace the 
general Deleuze-Guattarian motto of ‘what things do’ (rather than what they mean or how true they are) but vary 
in what this means 
28 Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of affect is explored across a number of their texts, each carefully investigating a 
different aspect of affect or the particular affects of different art forms, as part of their larger project of difference—
and, from my perspective, the practical issue, beyond any disciplinary boundary, of how to conceive of an 
operativity suited to the open system condition of Life. Notions such as problem, ethics and immanent evaluation, 
which are central to this project and to their idea of open systems operativity receive very light treatment in the 
existing open system landscape design literature. 
29 An examination of Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of affect also strongly suggests that landscape urbanism has 
not embraced what Brian Massumi and, independently, myself call the ‘problematic of affect’ – which has only just 
started to be investigated, and it seems, only seriously by myself with respect to the landscape in a manner useful 
to a designer. The geographer Nigel Thrift’s ‘non-representational theory’ and Psychologist J. J.Gibson’s notions 
of ‘ecological physics’ and ‘affordance’ are directly relevant also. The ‘problematic of landscape affect’, as it has 
to be called, presents challenges that receive little attention in the landscape urbanist literature.. 
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The field work involved the development of conceptual, fieldwork, interpretive and representational 
techniques for understanding, engaging with and communicating the nature of what landscapes ‘do’ 
(which I call ‘landscape affects’) and the process that produces such affects (which I call ‘landscape 
assemblages’). 
Assemblage 
Conceptions of affect, in its various modalities, are an essential part of the schema to be presented in 
this thesis. The notion of assemblage, directly or more obscurely, has been important in the recent 
open-system-oriented landscape design discourse (i.e Corner’s mapping essay and the whole 
Architectural Association program, for instance). The Deleuze-Guattarian notion of assemblage evolved 
from Spinoza’s notion of bodies, first elaborated on by Deleuze in his Expressionism in Philosophy. The 
conception of affect, which is central to the notion of assemblage has, it will be argued later, been far 
less embraced in the discourse of open systems oriented landscape design, than the notion of 
assemblage. I argue that affect, because it has to, has tended to be either ignored or in certain ways 
manifested, confused or obscured within other notions as they may be found in the discourse, such as 
diagram, agency, emergence, program, indeterminacy etc. This deferral away from affect undermines 
the usefulness and power of assemblage and, less obviously, contributes to a deferral away from the 
value of the sorts of common designer notions mentioned. 
The Aesthetics of Affect: Affect, Expression & Immanence 
Much more obscure to the discourse of open systems-oriented landscape design, Deleuze’s 
Expressionism in Philosophy charts Spinoza’s attempt to produce a mode of understanding adequate to 
the power of Nature, without having to rely on a transcendent God. How to affirm the power of Nature 
without recourse to outside rules, judgements or criteria? To affirm the power of Nature, Spinoza 
constructs, as it seems to be demanded, an open systems understanding of how things work. What is 
striking about reading this text is how it offers a much wider conception of open systems than tends to 
be found in the recent design discourse. For Spinoza, his conception of expression (or ‘understanding’) 
is the means to achieve ‘immanence’ (from within). For this (which will be explained in the text) to occur 
Spinoza constructs a single dimensional universe with two ‘folds’ and powers, being and understanding. 
Following from this, the later chapter on open-systems-oriented design assemblages will aim to 
demonstrate that recent approaches of such designing have only attended to one ‘side’ of this open 
system, that of being (as becoming). They have not attended in any serious way to ‘understanding’ or 
the ‘aesthetics’ of open systems. Assemblage 2 will therefore return to the Expressionism in Philosophy 
to clarify the relationship between these two folds of Nature. It will demonstrate that Spinoza conceived 
becoming in terms of affect (which he termed ontological expression) and understanding as also a kind 
of expression (which he termed epistemological expression) and that these two become together, 
‘machinically’”. Without the latter, the aesthetic part of an open system, ‘understanding’ (expression) 
being ‘the only capacity to perceive what is expressed’,30 the former will strongly tend not to be affirmed. 
                                            
30 Deleuze, Gilles, Expressionism in Philosophy, trans. Joughin, Martin (New York: Zone Books, 1990, original 
French edition: 1968). 62. 
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Without expression affect, assemblages and what open systems do will tend to fail to be affirmed. The 
power of the world (being) is diminished - as the power of the world that understands the power of the 
world (understanding or expression) will be diminished. The case studies in this thesis are intended to 
employ expression to gain access to assemblages and the affects they produce. The first part of 
Assemblage 2 will explore the implications of Spinoza’s two-sided conception of open systems for the 
one-sided, unquestioned and thinner version that predominantly exists. Spinoza’s overall schema will 
provide a critical dimension to open systems designing which cannot be affirmed without expression. 
This schema will also be investigated as part of the case studies.  
Spinozan aesthetics is also an ‘ethics’ as has been stressed by many thinkers. Recent attention has 
been given to the ethico-aesthetics of assemblages but little of this attention has been given to more 
spatially dispersed assemblages (landscapes, geographies, cities), which this thesis hopes to contribute 
to. Along with the second part of Assemblage 2, focused on Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition, the 
first part will effectively argue for the embracing of the forgotten aesthetic dimension of open systems. 
Notions developed in Assemblage 2 inform the analysis in Assemblage 3. 
How Open Systems Function and the (Aesthetic) Relationship between Difference, Problem, Sensation 
and Affect 
The writing of James Williams is important to this study for producing what is probably the most effective 
examination of the Gilles Deleuze’s pivotal and difficult work, Difference and Repetition, written over 40 
years ago. This research does not hesitate in largely relying on Williams’ account as the argument and 
power of Deleuze’s book is communicated much more clearly in the way that Williams approaches 
Deleuze’s book. The particular significance of Williams’ understanding is his reading of Deleuze’s book 
aesthetically (and ethically), of teasing out the obscured ethico-aesthetic dimension of the text. 
Williams clarifies the function of the various key concepts of: difference, repetition, Ideas, sensation, 
becoming, problems, individuals, representation, intensities, etc., and then patiently draws out how 
these terms work together in Deleuze’s attempt to construct a conception of ‘difference-in-itself’, the 
techniques required to engage with it and critiques of past models of difference. The examination 
departs from Williams a number of times, mostly back to Deleuze himself, in particular to his account of 
how open systems function, including Deleuze’s significant debt to Gilbert Simondon. Again this account 
places a very different stress on open systems than found in the very Deleuzian inspired open systems 
oriented design discourse: much more about affect, significance, problems, aesthetics and concrete 
relations. 
What is most important from this part of Assemblage 2 for the argument of this thesis flows from 
Williams’ attention to the enigmatic notion of ‘Ideas’ (a very misleading name) that plays such a central 
role in Difference and Repetition—he highlights that Ideas are to be understood in terms of becomings 
and intensities. This then provides Deleuze a clear way to understand how extensively (spatially ) 
representable spatio-temporal relations (spatial and temporal relations) may be concretely related to 
sensation and becoming (affect) in a problem. This account provided a very clear affirmation and 
clarification of ten years of field study findings – where the relationship between interpretation 
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(expression), spatial and temporal relations, sensation and affect found themselves to be a central 
preoccupation. Deleuze’s conceptions in Difference and Repetition31 contributes to his later notion of 
assemblages, understood here in terms of an aesthetics of affect – where the relationships between 
affect, assemblages, difference, sensation, problems and intensities are clarified, something which is 
very obscured in landscape urbanism. This thesis attempts to put affects and aesthetics back into 
assemblages and open systems. 
In contrast, it will be argued, contemporary open systems oriented design approaches (most notably 
‘landscape urbanism’) defer from or fail to affirm the function of sensation and affect in the design 
process, notably with respect to ‘the pre-existing landscape’. Hence such approaches fail to affirm the 
aesthetic and critical dimension of the process of the design of the landscape and will strongly tend to 
fail to affirm or connect to the power of the landscape and the nature of landscape problems. This thesis 
will aim to provide, with findings from the case studies, valuable tools to draw out the limitations of key 
contemporary conceptions and their role in recent open systems landscape assemblages, most 
particularly via a critique of dominant conceptions of process, indeterminacy, change and movement. 
So, this thesis will, for the first time for the environmental arts, in a way suited to the environmental arts, 
produce a conception of Deleuze-Guattari’s32 complex notion of affect: what affect is, how it functions, 
how to engage with it and what is at stake with it. To make full sense of their notion of affect it needs to 
be seen that Deleuze and Guattari construct a ‘problematic of affect’. This problematic consists of 
various sub-problems. To make most sense of this notion of affect requires characterising the various 
relevant concepts that they employ and understanding the relations between them and what they are 
designed to do, and in so doing build up a sense of the various sub-problems and the whole 
‘problematic of affect’. 
- 
Next, I will present four case studies of real existing designed landscapes focused on what landscapes 
(or rather assemblages of heterogeneous open system geographic continuums) ‘do’ and how they do it, 
in terms of what I call ‘landscape affects’,33 the affects and affectuality specific to landscape, in a form 
relevant to designers of landscape. This will involve the construction or reconstruction of conceptions, 
concepts and principles and the identification of what I term the whole ‘problematic of landscape affect’, 
and some of the key concepts I have developed to engage with this problematic. Alongside these case 
studies will be presented the some of the assemblage of concepts, techniques, ways of working and 
principles that I have invented to engage with what they do. 
The last two case studies were added late during the construction of this thesis, as examiners 
suggested I utilise simpler case studies as well. The last two are much shorter. I would suggest 
engaging with the four case studies in the following order: 
                                            
31 Deleuze, Gilles, Difference and Repetition, trans. Patton, Paul (London: Athlone, 1994 (original French edition 
1968)). 
32 And, largely, others influenced by them, such as Brian Massumi.  
33 Just as there are affects and realms of affects specific to architecture, painting, the mass media and political 
activism. 
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2.4. Case Study 3: Melton Suburban Creekline Assemblage 
2.5. Case Study 4: Schulykill River Adventurous Ecology Assemblage  
2.2. Case Study 1: Federation Square  
2.3. Case Study 2: Royal Park  
These case studies are included as separate files. 
 
2.2. Case Study 1: Federation Square (refer to separate file) 
This case study of an existing landscape, Federation Square in Melbourne, is intended to communicate 
an example of what a landscape can do and how it does it –what affect is produced by an assemblage 
associated with Federation Square. It aims to do this as concretely as possible, using plain language as 
much as possible during the account of the landscape. It is presented in the form of an introductory and 
overview lecture, much like this researcher has delivered to students. It also discusses or engages with 
theoretical notions relevant to Deleuze’s aesthetics of affect (including concepts developed by myself): 
such as assemblage, affect, expression, heterogeneity, urban ecologies, human bodily integration, 
differentiation, sense, vectors or orientations or rhythms, and bodily integration of worldly relations as 
part of the production of affect. It is structured around a walk-through, using a series of images 
corresponding to views experienced during this walk-through. It might appear to be focused on a 
description of the conscious experience of a walk-through of this space. The intention is, however, that 
the conscious and visual are employed to get to the more involuntary functioning of Federation Square, 
to get to the affectuality of the square and the assemblage involved in the production of this affectuality. 
This lecture-powerpoint is an experiment in the communication of a landscape affect and the relevant 
assemblage. Ansell Pearson reminds us that the Deleuze-Guattarian term ‘assemblage’ is a translation 
of agencement…a word that stresses that an assemblage is a process not a thing….and the spatially 
dispersed nature of this process. Assemblages function in time and space or what physicists call 
‘spacetime’. Key to getting to the involuntary dimension of the landscape (affect and sense) is the ability 
of the example to give expression to the sensation of the experience, to the sensation of the space 
doing what it does. At all times this is the intention with this case study and the following one. The 
sensation aimed at is the sensation of the affect, of the action of the world. Inseparable to this affect is 
the sense or significance of the affect. Both landscape affect and the sense associated with affect 
function involuntarily and before consciousness, and tend to escape consciousness. Expression can 
bring them to consciousness. These two examples are, with many other examples (each of them very 
different) preoccupied with not just connecting to the anonymous power of a landscape that we are part 
of, beyond our conscious thoughts, they are also preoccupied with strategies to build the sense of such 
affects. The power of the landscape and the significance of this power. 
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2.3. Case Study 2: Royal Park (refer to separate file) 
Again, this study of Royal Park in Melbourne, is an attempt to understand and communicate something 
a ‘does’ (landscape affect) and the processes involved in the production of this doing (landscape 
assemblage). This case study focuses on an affect or affectuality associated most closely with what is 
called the ‘circle area’ of Royal Park, and only with a certain range of ‘uses’ of this area.  
Why Royal Park? 
The landscape that is the subject of this case study is like any other landscape, and any other 
landscape that open-system-oriented landscape design might be engaging in, in that it is part of the 
same open system, the same Nature. As I have said elsewhere, Nature does not discriminate. I say this 
as Royal Park might seem somewhat irrelevant to many landscape urbanists, for instance. Two things 
might be said about this particular landscape, which make it a different proposition from most 
landscapes that recent landscape oriented open systems designing engages with. 
First, it would be regarded by landscape architects who know it as a highly ‘experiential’ landscape. 
‘Experience’ tends to be largely outside of the purview of recent open-systems landscape design 
assemblages, generally being seen as ‘too subjective’. Of ‘experiential’ landscapes, this particular 
landscape is one of the most challenging to grasp. In this regard, it is therefore something of a test case 
for recent open systems oriented design assemblages – and something of a test of the ability of the 
techniques I have developed to engage with human-involved open systems of the landscape – 
landscape assemblages. It certainly has been challenging. 
Second, relatedly, Sebastien Marot said that landscape architecture’s urbanism should be an urbanism 
of site and not architectural program.34 In a lecture, Christophe Girot said that landscape is not produced 
by objects but by the body. James Corner said that landscape is a series of befores and afters. Whilst 
the functioning of the body in architecture has been obscured by the operative notions of program and 
typology in opennes, I will argue such operative notions are far less useful. In openness, the body-in-
the-landscape will tend to be the best way to engage with the landscape and Royal Park takes this to 
extremes. How does a landscape function through the integration by a (human) organism?35 How does 
affect function autonomously through human integration? This is a key issue, which common sense and 
common theories do not cope with very well. How does openness function?  
At the same time as engaging with a landscape that wildly tends to escape our grasp, this case study is 
different from the Federation Square case study in the commitment given in this case study to producing 
a set of extensively referential (spatially and temporally) representations – i.e. drawings that are 
spatially referential, as designer drawings are. How to bring such drawings, such lines and imagery to 
life? The Federation Square case study relied on a series of walk-through photographs as the main 
spine of the representations, which is one ‘remove’ from the sorts of extensive-relations that designers 
employ. This case study uses photographs as part of a wider repertoire (or assemblage) of 
                                            
34 Marot, Sebastien, Sub-Urbanism and the Art of Memory  (London: Architectural Associaton, 2003). 
35 Architecture also functions through the integration of the world by the body (as body-architecture assemblages 
approached or operationalized through program or typologies). 
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representations, custom constructed to suit Royal Park. The serious challenge of the case study was to 
take this very experiential landscape and get to a set of affectually expressive and extensively 
referential representations that did justice to the experiencing.36  
It will, in doing so, communicate something of the techniques, conceptions, principles and practices that 
have been developed by myself (with the help of many others) for engaging in landscapes as open 
systems. This case study should be read/viewed after the Federation Square case study. It should be 
read in the page order encountered ( This is stated as design drawings are not always presented or 
read in this manner. ) The text assumes that the reader-viewer has little or no knowledge of Australia, 
Melbourne and Royal Park, the landscape in question. Concepts employed here have either been 
explained elsewhere in the thesis or their explanation can be found here. So, this case study is 
examining and ‘trying to do justice to’ a doing of the world at or associated with Royal Park.  
This case study is large.  
Ideally it would be one page long. However, it is trying to bring together a number of things. It attempts 
to include or involve: 
discovering and communicating the relevant bodily interactions – in the ‘middle’ - in time and 
space involved in the production of affect. 
communicating the extensive dimensions of such interactions. Just bringing the relevant 
dimensions of the world of the landscape to the reader is a very demanding task. It is not like 
looking at a painting or even a building. A photograph or even many, for instance, do not ‘give’ you 
most landscapes in a form that allows you to engage with ‘what they do’. Part of the size of this 
case study comes results from what is required to communicate the relevant relations involved in 
the affect. 
communicating the intensive dimension of such relations as experienced through sensation. 
A transition in a landscape is the easiest form of intensive relation to grasp. To communicate what 
makes a transition a transition – how it functions requires describing its part in a system. For 
Deleuze, sensations have to be ‘dramatized’ (given expression) and this requires being able to 
connect the singular situation of the case study – extensively and intensively - to the worldly 
‘experience’ (connection with life) of the reader. A transition is only a transition through sensation, 
and only a sensation because it is a significant shift of relations in the landscape – how to 
communicate the shift of relations and the significance of them (how they function) is again – for this 
landscape, a challenge? 
communicating the interactions of such sets of relations – extensively and intensively. The 
extensive and intensive unfold in space over time.  
discovering and communicating the relevant relations and forces and factors beyond the more 
immediate bodily-environment relations that would make sense of and determine (as part of) this 
assemblage. What might reductively be termed ‘context’ is part of the assemblage as the ‘virtual’ or 
                                            
36 One landscape architect that I spoke to had a great respect for Royal Park and ‘took their analytical hat off when 
they were there. 
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‘sense’, and for a landscape such as Royal Park what it ‘does’ is more like a geographical 
spacetime inflexion in a spacetimeorder that needs to be discovered.  
communicating the involuntary workings of affect. Affects may be best understood as involuntary 
workings of the world and to be able to communicate this requires engaging in a realm that has 
barely been touched on in the discussion of landscape. To communicate affects requires the 
production of parallel sensations to what is being experienced – sensations of involuntary 
movements that we are part of. Most of the text attempts to communicate the involuntary part of the 
landscape (or the involuntary part of experience, if you like). Affect is a challenge to communicate in 
a discourse that finds the notion of affect and expression unfamiliar. 
relating this to what is consciously experienced. The conscious is part of the landscape and 
feeds back onto the involuntary. The text veers into the conscious when this is needed to highlight 
the involuntary. To communicate what a landscape does requires an intensity of description of the 
landscape to be able to start to do so (an odd situation in the arts). This can make accounts of 
affect challenging in themselves, especially given how designers expect to look at or discuss 
landscapes or landscape drawings..  
communicating the relation between the extensive, intensive, sense and affect. How it all works 
together.  
communicating all of this is a way that can be engaged with by someone who has not (or has) 
experienced Royal Park. 
The size of this case study is no doubt a problem for a reader/viewer. The commitment to constructing 
the affect and the sense of the affect – through an opening up of the heterogeneous dimensions of the 
particular assemblage has not yet been matched by the distillation that would make this easier to 
process. I believe that it gives expression to various aspects of the assemblage in question (through 
recreating the sensations involved with a degree of singularity. It also investigates many methodological 
and conceptual avenues related to the particular Case Study and to the problematic of landscape affect 
in general. The case study is constructed to give expression to the experience of the inner circle area 
and so there is something of a build-up of sense till we reach the centre. A degree of patience will be 
required as the construction of sense is somewhat slow (especially for the fist part of the example) and 
the overall sense of the landscape risks not being given expression as a result. This is an intensive 
affair. How can whatever is relevant in time and space to the affectuality and sense of this Royal Park 
experiencing express itself through the account, in the end, of the circle?   
Words and images 
This case study employs lots of words. This researcher has found that ‘drawings’ (graphic 
representations) have their own abilities to connect to the extensive, intensive, sense and affect – and 
words have theirs. Graphic representations are central to communicating body-space relations and 
space-space and space-time relations extensively – and intensively. Graphic representations are much 
better at the extensive end of a sort of ability-spectrum and words tend to be much better at the 
intensive-sense-affect end of this fictional spectrum. Each on their own is, however, tend to be much 
weaker at engaging with landscape assemblages. Together they can very productively connect to the 
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power and process of a landscape assemblage. Such an importance given to words (and language and 
thought) as in this example, will certainly be seen as improper by many. It is important to affirm the 
potential power of language and thought in this case study and thesis – and in doing so the power of 
graphic representations is also affirmed. They have separate and conjoined powers. Design has its own 
powers as well. 
Dimensions 
This case study, like Federation Square (and others) tends to work by identifying particular ‘dimensions’ 
of the assemblage (or what seem relevant to the assemblage) and then attempting to determine how 
they are relevant. A ‘dimension’ might be: the relationship between tipping points in walking effort and 
transitions along paths; the relationship between the size a space and when you feel separated from the 
edges of the space etc. Dimensions are variabilities that have an intensive dimension that connects to 
the affectuality of the landscape and extensive dimension that can be represented extensively and 
intensively (usually with more than one representation and often requiring multiple.). 
Vector-singularity 
This case study like many I have produced has employed a strategy of focusing on one ‘vector’ (first 
discussed in the Federation Square example) and using singular events that would relate to such a 
vector. The particular vector will be referred to as an ‘experiencing vector’, and just as with Federation 
Square this vector cannot be simply be defined ‘up front’, though it can be posited to some degree, like 
architectural program. How it actually functions, however, unfolds, through Case Study. A very 
important finding of this research is that assemblages can probably only be connected to through the 
singular. Through the singular you are able to connect to the singularity of the assemblage. It is what 
makes connection. Expression is connection to the singular nature of affect. There seems no general 
connection. No general and singular. No general assemblage. No general affect. You only get 
connection through the singular, stronger and stronger connection or singularity. More and more 
‘adequate’ to use Spinoza’s term. There is no summary, though there can be more-or-less singular. It is 
from making a singular entry point into a system, into an assemblage, that you are able to then access 
other parts of the system, other singular dimensions, vectors, assemblages. This is something to follow, 
empirically, and it goes against common sense.  
Walk-through as a structuring device 
The first two case studies employed in this thesis use walk-throughs as structuring devices. This has 
seemed valuable for many examples simply because landscape assemblages function through bodily 
integration of bodily perceptions and the world of those perceptions, which happens through time. What 
spaces ‘do’ is produced through such integration. 
Parallel dynamism 
Before reading Deleuze’s book on Spinoza I had developed a notion that representations relevant to 
landscape function best through what I termed a ‘parallel dynamism’. Representations aimed at 
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engaging with a landscape assemblage do not each represent any-thing but function in parallel, cross-
reference and communicate through resonance. Affirmation, expression, tells you when you are ‘onto 
something’, tells you what to do. The repertoire of representations produces an expressive material that 
parallels the relation between the extensive, intensive, sense and affect. Deleuze/Spinoza’s notion of 
‘epistemological parallelism’ really affirmed why.  
Cross-referential representations / spatially and affectually referential  
The walk-through part of the case study is preceded by a series of maps and text that attempt to 
connect together, intensively, the factors beyond the immediate site of Royal Park itself that are relevant 
to it, in time and space. The walk-through employs a series of sheets, each of which corresponds to a 
noticeable transition (intensive shift) in the landscape. Within each sheet are a repertoire of 
representations (images and text) that each attempt to capture the relevant relations involved in a 
particular ‘dimension’ (a set of relations that are found to be relevant to the particular case study) for 
that shift or location.  
Pragmatics 
This case study was approached pragmatically. If an available representation (map etc.) could itself 
communicate what was needed to be communicated it would be employed or altered. If such available 
forms of representation, some very simple, were not able to do what was required we would custom 
construct forms of representation that would be able to engage in the relevant relations.  
Format 
This case study was initially constructed as an A1 sized hardcover portfolio. Most of the drawings were 
A1 size. They were this size to allow the various changing body-environment spatial relations to be 
clearly referenced. On most computer screens the viewing size of these pdfs will be considerably 
smaller than A1 and hopefully still somewhat effective. The aim of the way that each sheet was 
constructed allowed the images to cross-reference to each other – both within a sheet and between 
sheets. This allows the reader the ability to see the relevant changes in bodily-landscape spatial and 
temporal relations and these to the intensity and affectuality of the landscape. The portfolio was also 
laid out so that many of the drawings were preceded by framing and/or expressive text and the 
viewer/reader could read the text and be able to, at least partly and simultaneously cross-reference to 
the image behind the text. The format of this case study is different from this. It is a linear sequence of 
images and text, with a more clumsy cross-referentiality. Being a linear pdf document, where one 
drawing must disappear before another appears does allow some of the files to cross-reference more 
freely than in a hardcopy portfolio. 
For many, the representations used here would be considered ‘traditional’. Maps, plans, sections, text, 
photography etc. They are not ‘new media’ and do not fit into what might be expected that ‘progressive’ 
uses of representations might look like. How they are employed is very different from ‘traditional’ and 
progressive uses of representation, however. For instance, any single representation is nothing in itself 
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and ‘represents’ nothing. It is ‘something’ only in how if functions, and if it functions well it will contribute 
to the greater system of representations and their ability to parallel the functioning of the open system of 
the landscape, both extensively (spatially and temporally) and intensively-affectually. This makes it very 
different from previous representations – and also for the fact that this system of representations is 
attempting to engage with the intensity and affectuality of the landscape – as opposed to ‘representing’ 
landscape or something. 
Sense-production-machine 
Assemblages are affect and sense-production-machines. Affect always comes with sense or 
significance. To get at the particular realm of things that Royal Park does has required (as all 
landscapes require) a sense-making exercise, which in this case study is particularly involved. In trying 
to makes sense of what was being discovered there was a going back and forward between what the 
landscape seemed to be doing and how to account for it and this involved opening up the various 
dimensions of the assemblage, some of which were close at hand within the park and others might 
normally be thought of as more ‘contextual’. The way that the case study is structured involves a 
sizeable component, mostly earlier on in the case study, attempting to discover and communicate what 
is involved beyond what happens bodily ‘in’ the park itself. On reflection this part could be distilled down 
somewhat. 
The original ambition was to communicate the process of production and the affectuality in a way that 
the process was part of the product, to communicate what was involved and how in an efficient manner. 
As Spinoza says an ‘effect is “immanate” in the cause’. ‘The effect remains in its cause no less than the 
cause remains in itself’.37 However, our ability to integrate the world and make sense of it involuntarily is 
infinitely fast and complex and the final result is much less efficient than I had hoped for.  
All of this is experimental. This case study was developed over six years with a great deal of trial and 
error. Trying to work out what was involved and how and trying to work out what it was doing and 
communicate it were slow and involved. How to bring it all together required a great deal of trialling of 
techniques and formats etc. Landscape intensity, sense, affect and making extensive representations 
‘come to life’ intensively, affectually and in terms of sense is a very unexplored area, with very little 
precedent, especially in the environmental realms.  
On reflection, despite such limitations, I persisted with this example as it seemed to do much of what I 
was hoping for, and it was a very valuable vehicle of learning. The struggles with it are reflected in the 
case study as many methodological/ and conceptual issues. It seems valuable to share these – as they 
touch on the whole problematic of landscape affect in a way that the Federation Square example does 
not. I am confident that most dimensions discussed in this case study are concretely relevant to what 
happens at Royal Park, even if they might be argued to work differently that I have portrayed. I feel I 
have touched on something of the singularity, affectuality and sense-production of the example. I am 
certainly satisfied with what it is able to open up with respects landscape and open systems oriented 
understandings of landscape.  
                                            
37 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy., 171. 
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2.4. Case Study 3: Melton Suburban Creekline Assemblage (refer to separate file) 
This was my first published landscape assemblage. I have included here as it very quickly, in two 
pages, communicates a found landscape assemblage in a very ordinary suburban situation. It is less 
successful in its ability to express the affectuality of this assemblage but I think it describes something of 
the dispersed functioning of landscape assemblages. It employs one simple illustration. 
2.5. Case Study 4: Schulykill River Adventurous Ecology Assemblage (refer to separate file) 
This was an early case study that also describes a pre-existing landscape assemblage. It is a little 
larger than Case Study 3 but smaller than the other two case studies. I have found that others find it to 
be expressive of the functioning of the landscape and the dispersed nature of the assemblage.  It 
seems to express the autonomous nature of affect and describes how the heterogeneous nature of the 
landscape produces and is expressed in this affect. It is employs representations constructed by one 
student as part of a design studio I led at the University of Pennsylvania. 
Assemblage 3: Explicitly Open Systems Oriented Landscape Design Assemblages 
With the aid of the findings of the field studies and examination of Deleuze-Guattari’s notions of affect 
and assemblage this assemblage will interrogate the influential landscape urbanist assemblages 
through a strategic focus on selected leading notions that they champion: such as ‘mapping’, ‘machinic 
landscape’, ‘territory’ etc. It will consider if these assemblages are constructed to engage with what 
landscape does and how it does it. A series of questions have been found to be useful to this task and 
different combinations of them were asked of each assemblage. 
These included: 
what is it claimed to be able to do?  
how is it constructed and what does it actually seem to be able to do?   
is there are difference between what is claimed and what seems to be the case?   
what are the conceptual and operative preoccupations?  
are the relevant theoretical notions adequate to real landscapes? does it matter if they are not? how 
are the particular understandings of such terms productive? 
Is it likely able to engage with landscape affectuality and  produce representations that engage with 
the relevant spatial and temporal relations involved in the relevant landscape affectuality? 
is there a mode of critical evaluation?  
what is the rationale or sense for how it is constructed? including what is at stake for these writers 
and how do they position their work? what is the relationship between the positioning and the 
assemblage?  
is there enough information provided to be able to make an evaluation of this assemblage (i.e. is 
there more than evocative conception and imagery)?  
taken as a whole (argument, presentation, layout, images, captions etc.) what is the model of an 
assemblage being presented/championed here? 
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how is this assemblage constructed to be ambitious? what aspects of this ambition need to be 
reconstructed to suit the way that we find that landscape functions? what is the new image, if any, 
of ambition resulting from this reconstruction?  
This analysis will allow this thesis to position itself in relation to the existing open systems-oriented 
landscape design assemblages. It is suggested that this analysis will highlight key issues with these 
conceptions. The following list of questions might suggest some of the key themes that are engaged 
with: How relevant is the notion of ‘programming the urban surface’ to a real landscape? What is the 
relationship between ‘self-organisation’ and ‘organisation? What are the implications of ‘partitioning’ for 
open systems oriented landscape design assemblages? Is there an urbanism specific to landscape 
architecture not focused on architectural program (or program at all)? What is the relationship between 
open systems, affect and program? Is program relevant to landscape architectural urbanism? What is 
Corner’s notion of mapping really conceived to be able to do? Can it engage with the power of large 
scaled maps as well as connect to the life on the ground that it claims to do? What is the relationship 
between the way diagrams have been discussed in recent designing and landscape affects? What is 
the relationship between performativity and landscape affect? What is the nature of an ‘aesthetic-
representational assemblage’ suited to landscape design? Is the notion of ‘organisation’ problematic in 
the landscape? Are Stan Allen’s fields relevant to urban space? Is Manuel De Landa’s influential notion 
of Deleuze’s ideas of open systems and form useful for the design of landscape and the design of 
landscape in digital space? How does the Architectural Association’s notion of a machinic landscape 
relate to the real landscape and what would it tend to do to it? What is the notion of indeterminacy in the 
work of the AA?  
This study restricts itself to the early 2000’s. This was partly a practical choice, to focus on the founding 
operational thinking of landscape urbanism. Later writings were considered, but examination of these 
revealed that most of what has been discovered and discussed here, in relation to these efforts to 
conceptualising open-systems-oriented-design-assemblages, does not change very much from the 
earlier writings. The assemblages described here seem to endure. In this regards, these studies seem a 
suitable way to examine the dominant open-systems-oriented-design-assemblage, generally associated 
with the term ‘landscape urbanism’. 
(Refer also to the Appendix for ‘a list of preoccupations of recent open systems oriented landscape 
design assemblages that only ‘indirectly’ engage with landscape affect.’ This is included as it puts on 
the table many of the recent designerly preoccupations of recent open-system-oriented landscape 
design assemblages. After sufficient engagement with this thesis, this list should make it obvious how 
important that open-systems thinking is to the recent discourse and practices, how open systems tends 
to be understood, how the open systems nature of the landscape tends to be understood, how such an 
interest is operationalised, and that these preoccupations strongly tend not to engage with landscape 
affect (they are ‘indirect’ in this sense) and, for anyone familiar with recent open systems oriented 
landscape design assemblages (i.e. landscape urbanism), that such indirect preoccupations make up 
the bulk of the preoccupations of recent practices. 
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Conclusion 
The investigations from the first three assemblages will be drawn together in the conclusion to produce 
a series of principles and findings that will inform the construction of an affirmative open systems 
oriented landscape design assemblage. 
Clarification of Key Terms Used in this Thesis  
‘Affirmation’ 
‘Affirmation’ has an everyday sense, as these dictionary definitions (Webster Miriam) attest to: 1. act of 
affirming: an assertion of support or agreement. 2. something affirmed: a positive statement or 
declaration of the truth or existence of something. An affirmation of his love. It also has a stricter and 
more important Nietzschean-Deleuzian sense for this thesis. Which is to be found, for instance, through 
a use of representation that affirms the functioning of an affect through the way that the representation 
is used.  An affirmation is an ‘expression’ in the Deleuze-Spinoza sense (Deleuze, 1990). Expression is 
both the ‘only form of understanding’ ‘capable of’ engaging with affects according to Spinoza and has 
been totally ignored in recent open systems-oriented landscape design discourse. An expression is not 
a re-presentation, but a creative act that ‘connects’ to the power of something from Nature and this 
connection is experienced as a resonance. To give expression to the power of something in the world 
through expression (or affirmation) is also, and this is very important, to give expression to the power of 
understanding. The powers of the world (affects) and the power of understanding (expression or 
affirmation) are the two powers of Nature. The first half of the section on Deleuze and Guattari’s notion 
of Affect, in the Appendix, which concentrates on Deleuze’s Expressionism in Philosophy (A study of 
Spinoza’s notion of expression), is largely devoted to developing a detailed account of the aesthetics of 
affect – one that would hopefully be accessible to at least some designers of landscape - which is really 
about what expression is and how it functions. 
‘Open systems’ 
I use the term ‘open systems’ as it both refers to the condition of the world, of Nature, that recent 
approaches to designing have attempted to take seriously, and that such a term is fairly widely and 
generally used to discuss this condition. The term ‘complex systems’ might also have been used. 
However, one of the findings and arguments of this thesis is that the understanding of ‘open systems’ 
and the open system functioning of the landscape and cities that is commonly used in the discourse on 
landscape design are not very useful for the understanding of how landscapes function in terms of 
human life (or even the life of any organism). This points to what I also argue in the thesis, that there is 
almost wholly accepted myth in design discourse that ‘open’ and ‘complex’ systems are the province of 
science, and that Deleuze / Deleuze and Guattari’s theorising which has been centrally important in 
design discourse, is (especially with Manuel De Landa’s version of Deleuze/Deleuze and Guattari) a 
scientifically oriented understanding. An example of this idea about open and complex systems and 
Deleuze / Deleuze and Guattari’s use of it may be found on John Protevi’s website, under the name 
‘Complexity Theory’. I will quote from it in a little detail. 
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‘Complexity Theory’ 
In the late 60s, Gilles Deleuze began to formulate some of the philosophical significances of what is 
now sometimes referred to as “chaos/complexity theory”, the study of “open” matter/energy systems 
that move from simple to complex patterning and from complex to simple patterning. Though not a term 
used by contemporary scientists in everyday work, it can be a useful term for a collection of studies of 
phenomena whose complexity is such that Laplacean determinism no longer holds beyond a limited 
time and space scale. Thus the formula of chaos/complexity might be "short-term predictability, long-
term unpredictability." (I leave it at "predictable," an epistemological term, because people get nervous 
with "indeterminate," an ontological term. Thus we're only talking epistemology, or at best heuristic 
ontology.) 
The ground-breaking works in identifying Deleuze's (and Deleuze & Guattari's) interest in this field are 
Brian Massumi's A User's Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia and Manuel De Landa's "Non-organic 
Life" in Incorporations: Zone 6. Although post-modern appropriations of science--to say nothing of 
critiques--have been the focus of much negative attention, due to the notorious Sokal hoax, there does 
seem to be good cause to take seriously the work of Deleuze and Deleuze & Guattari.”38 
Brian Massumi says that Gilles Deleuze reopened the path to a whole series of authors (Spinoza, 
Leibniz, Bergson etc.) who could ‘profitably be read together with recent theories of complexity and 
chaos’ (Deleuze also read them with early complexity theorists, such as Whitehead, Thom, Ruyer etc.). 
‘It is all a question of emergence, which is precisely the focus of the various science-derived theories 
that converge around the notion of self-organisation (the spontaneous production of a level of reality 
having its own rules of formation and order of connection)’.39  
This thesis will argue that there certainly is good cause to take the work of Deleuze and Deleuze and 
Guattari seriously, that Deleuze / Guattari throughout their writings are grappling with open systems 
and, apart from the fairly limited locations when they discuss aspects of open/complex systems that do 
not involve organisms and in particular human organisms, they treat the engagement as requiring an 
aesthetic evaluation, more precisely an aesthetics of affects. Their point of departure for this is Leibniz 
and Spinoza’s ideas about infinity and Nature. As I elaborate in the thesis, it is commonly appreciated 
that these philosophers are important for the later development of scientific understandings of open and 
complex systems. However, it seems not to have been appreciated, in the design world at least, that 
Spinoza’s interests were certainly not just scientific and through his development of a theory of affect, 
which was centrally important to Deleuze / Deleuze and Guattari, that this was understood as distinctly 
non-scientific and distinctly aesthetic. Deleuze credits Spinoza with inventing the important notion of 
‘expression’ (or the most useful version of it). For Spinoza, as Deleuze points out, expression, functions 
only aesthetically. As Spinoza says, ‘understanding’ (Spinoza’s term for expression) is ‘the only capacity 
for perceiving…’40 what Deleuze later identifies more fully as affect. Spinoza was in The Ethics and 
                                            
38 ‘Some Remarks on the Philosophical Significance of Complexity Theory’, 1999, 
http://www.protevi.com/john/DG/PDF/Remarks_on_Complexity_Theory.pdf, accessed June 1, 2012. 
39 Massumi, Brian, Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation, ed. Jameson, Stanley Fish and Fredric, 
Post-Contemporary Interventions (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002). 32. 
40 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy. 61-2. 
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other key texts principally concerned with the place and powers of the mind in Nature, and the type of 
knowledge that most fully affirms the powers of the mind in Nature. As Steven Shaviro says, Deleuze ‘is 
unrepentantly aesthetic’.41 So, although the scientific understanding of open and complex systems and 
Deleuze / Deleuze and Guattari’s ideas are no doubt important this thesis finds and argues that open 
(and complex) systems, Deleuze / Deleuze and Guattari’s notions of them and Deleuze / Deleuze and 
Guattari’s thought itself, should be, for this thesis and for open-systems-oriented approaches to the 
design of landscape understood in aesthetic terms, involving an ‘aesthetics of affect’ and not scientific 
terms. As a result, this thesis sees no need to focus on scientific understandings of open and complex 
systems, unless they are relevant. It will, however, be particularly focused on drawing out the whole 
nature of the open systems as aesthetically understood realms through the investigation of Deleuze / 
Deleuze and Guattari’s aesthetics of affect. It will argue that there are serious problems with following 
the scientific route as my analysis of Manuel De Landa’s ideas, as one important example, aims to 
show. 
 ‘Assemblage’ 
This term, which is central to the thesis, deserves greater individual attention than it receives directly 
here. The account of it is dispersed throughout this thesis, in particular in the case study section and the 
Deleuzian theory of affect section. The Deleuze-Guattarian notion of assemblage is really just an 
elaboration of Spinoza’s notion of the ‘body’ (which is discussed in the Appendix). Although Deleuze 
and Guattari distinguish assemblage and machine I will treat them as synonymous. Briefly, an 
assemblage produces affects. In non-Deleuzian terms in an open system involving (for our purposes, 
human) organisms affects or powers are spontaneously produced. These involve the involuntary 
coordination by the body of the organism of an heterogeneous array of forces and relations. When, say, 
a person or designer is able to give expression to a landscape assemblage they are able to ‘perceive’, 
‘see’ or ‘feel’ this power. They no longer see, as with common sense, that there are, for instance the 
separation of the (human) organism and the environment as the (involuntary) power involves ‘both’ of 
them, but can for practical purposes be understood from the perspective of the (human) organism (‘what 
I found myself doing’) or the environment (‘this surface affords…’) or even from wider perspectives such 
as the city (‘the city gets this space to do this’) or even the Earth (‘This is what Nature does here’). For 
the classic introductory account of assemblage the wild chapter on ‘The Rhizome’ in A Thousand 
Plateaus is a good place to start. The chapters titled ‘1730: Becoming-Intense, Becoming-Animal, 
Becoming- 
Imperceptible’ and ‘1227: Treatise on Nomadology—The War Machine’ provide the richest contribution 
to a Deleuzian theory of assemblages. Manuel De Landa’s version of Deleuze’s notion of assemblages 
is very misleading for designers due to the total disregard (and this is not an exaggeration) of the 
                                            
41 Art theorist, Steven Shaviro wants to problematise the opposition between aesthetics and politics with reference 
to Deleuze however he only discusses examples from art, whilst it is very obvious that Deleuze is aesthetically 
focused throughout his writings when not discussing art. One only has to think of an assemblage, which can only 
be known aesthetically. Shaviro, Steven, "The 'Wrenching Duality' of Aesthetics: Kant, Deleuze, and the 'Theory 
of the Sensible', Unpublished Conference Paper, Delivered at the Forty-Sixth Annual Meeting of the Society for 
Phenomonology and Existential Philosophy, Hosted by Depaul University with Northwestern University,"  
http://www.shaviro.com/Othertexts/SPEP.pdf. 
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aesthetic dimension (the aesthetics of affect) of Deleuze and Guattari and A Thousand Plateaus, as I 
argue in the Appendix. 
A Note about the Content of the Thesis 
Of particular importance to me was providing an account of Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari’s ideas 
that were both scholarly and accessible enough to be useful to the discourse of landscape design. 
Extended discussion of their ideas is located in the Appendix: Deleuze’s Aesthetics of Affect. To gain 
the barest introduction to affect and relevant other concepts I would suggest reading the first 11 pages 
of the Appendix. This starts with, and includes, ‘What is Spinoza’s Notion of Immanence’, and finishes 
with (and includes), ‘Open Systems and Individuals: Real Distinction requires Expression’. This does 
risk not engaging theoretically with Deleuze’s (Spinozan) theory of Expression, which is by far the most 
foreign aspect of this thesis for the open systems oriented landscape design discourse. Expression 
plays a central role in the argument of this thesis. His aesthetic ideas about sensation, difference, how 
open systems function, the different types of affects he identifies, and the nature of problems are also 
important to this thesis, and will be found in the Appendix. 
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ASSEMBLAGE 1: ATTEMPTS TO CONCEPTUALISE AND 
AFFIRM THE LANDSCAPE DESIGN ASSEMBLAGE OF THE 
90’S 
What follows is a series of quotations from a certain juncture in the history of the discipline (with its 
relations with other disciplines), where the writers are attempting a centrally important disciplinary 
problem – attempting to conceptualise and affirm each in their own way adds something towards the 
basic components of a landscape design assemblage. Just as Evans’ highlighting of the particular 
power of architectural drawings also inseparably points to the particular power of the architectural 
design assemblage – and allows even further conceptualisation (i.e. projective theory and practice etc.) 
– these landscape architectural quotes point to the key determining power involved in engaging with the 
pre-existing landscape. The act or actions of engaging with that which pre-exists the designer involve a 
power or powers and this engaging with the pre-existing empowers, determines and structures the 
design assemblage beyond this engaging. Such an assemblage is a process, and an affectual 
dynamism. 
The Rediscovery of the Power of Design of Landscape 
Both the identified traditions and all of the writings have sought a recovery or affirmation of the power of 
the designing of landscape. In terms of the ‘intuitive research’ tradition, long-time European 
commentator on architecture, urbanism and landscape architecture, Sebastien Marot,42 commenting on 
the period between the twenties and the eighties in France says there “has been a forgetfulness of the 
power of design in making new landscapes.”43 His comments can easily be taken to reflect the situation 
beyond France more broadly. Corner, typically points this recovery ambitiously forward and injects it 
with carefully crafted and serious ambition in his appropriately titled essay about mapping: The Agency 
of Mapping: Speculation, Critique and Invention; he begins: “Mapping is a fantastic cultural project, 
creating and building the world as much as measuring and describing it.”44 Mapping for Corner in this 
essay was a key tool in the recovery of landscape, not only affirming what designing can do but 
proposing what it can do in newly empowering ways. It was common for designers in the nineties to 
exclaim that ‘design begets design’, as an affirmation of the productivity of designing itself, owing 
nothing to other forms of knowledge and requiring its own ‘internal’ understanding and forms of 
evaluation. Corner is the most well known affirmer of such productivity 
Technique and Representation 
Both of these traditions share a common emphasis on the centrality of conceptualising technique and 
conceptualising the use of representation as pivotal in this task. For instance, Corner does this by 
                                            
42 Marot is not a landscape architect or even a designer, but a close observer and commentator on architecture, 
landscape architecture and urbanism. 
43 Girot, "Four Trace Concepts in Landscape Architecture." 46. 
44 Corner, "The Agency of Mapping: Speculation, Critique and Invention." 213. 
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affirming, somewhat polemically, that designing has its own logic, stating that, “while theorists and 
historians focus on the object or the idea, designers focus on the actual activities of creativity, with the 
‘doing’ and with the often bewildering effects of bodying forth things neither foreseen nor 
predetermined.” 45 His discussion of imaging, as opposed to picturing, communicates something of this 
power of the use of design representations. He states that “the ability to intentionally construe and 
construct designed landscapes is enabled through various forms and activities of imaging”46 and that 
“imaging always exercises agency actively unfolding, generating, and actualising emergent realities.”47 
Central to affirming the power of design representations is a critique of traditional uses of 
representation. Corner, for instance, says, “images in traditional design practice tend more toward the 
wholly technological, strictly denotative, the explicit, and the immediately intelligible.”48 Designers in both 
traditions attempt to affirm and conceptualise the re-investigation of the conventions of representation. 
Corner’s essay on mapping49 is exemplary for drawing careful, and somewhat ignored, attention to the 
conventions of mapping and imaging in a manner where manipulation of such conventions becomes 
part of the toolkit of the recovery. Elsewhere he points to other more commonly used forms of 
representation – and to “both the difficulties and potentials that underlie representational technique in 
landscape architectural design”, “especially those conventions—such as plan, perspective, and 
rendering—that have become so institutionalised and taken for granted that we fail to appreciate their 
force and efficacy in shaping things.”50 Both Meyer and Corner are exemplary in attempting not just 
critiques but positive affirmations of the power of representation. Her conceptualisation of what she 
terms the ‘figured-ground’,51 as one example, gives expression to this hitherto weakly engaged-with 
dimension and to hitherto obscured uses of representation. It is important to note that this expression of 
positivity goes beyond the negativity of critique52 in how it is critical. It not only points to something that 
is left out but expressively affirms what might be able to be embraced. In this sense there might be two 
types of critique, negative and positive. To be a little historically simplistic, negative critique as a style of 
                                            
45 Corner, "Eidetic Operations and New Landscapes." 160. 
46 Ibid. 153. 
47 Ibid. 160. It is worth noting that agency is without a doubt best understood as affect.  
48 Ibid. 163. 
49 Corner, "The Agency of Mapping: Speculation, Critique and Invention." 
50 Corner, "Eidetic Operations and New Landscapes." 162. 
51 Meyer, "Landscape Architecture as Modern Other and Postmodern Ground." 21. The work of landscape 
architectural theorist Elizabeth Meyer attempts to affirm the landscape and landscape architectural uses of 
representation through an analysis that explores what common forms of representation tend to do to central 
dimensions of the landscape architectural medium. This essay touches on what I call ‘partitioning’, though Meyer 
does not talk in terms of architectural ‘partitioning’, which I discuss in detail in this thesis. It is from such a critique 
that Meyer affirms central and positive dimensions of the landscape that could not be affirmed by the world 
constructed from the perspective of the partitioned. Partitioning tends to promote the gross and prevalent 
conceptual and representational affect that Meyer refers to as ‘landscape-for-architecture’, where typical and 
received plan forms of representations tend to construct a binary condition of a ‘discrete, cubic object on a 
neutral, open ground plane’. This condition denies centrally important landscape architectural ‘languages’ that she 
terms the ‘figured-ground’, ‘articulated space’ and the ‘minimal garden’. For Meyer, these are important formal 
dimensions of landscape architecture that because of the propensities of representations (including words) tend 
to exist only as ‘unspoken languages’. What Meyer approaches, but does not directly say, sharply clarifies and 
extends her analysis, and to put it simply – landscape-for-architecture is effectively and wholly born of the 
abstract space of representation. What is not already objectifiable or happens to be readily objectifiable in the 
plane of representation tends also to be unspoken for. Meyer also refers to the landscape cyborg, which common 
forms and uses of representation and thought tend to be unable to think or affirm. 
52 Some of this negativity can be found in Meyer’s own essay, drawing attention to what of the landscape is lacking 
in architectural representations and conceptions 
an affirmative open systems conception of how to design landscape  Connolly, Peter  
28 
 
thought reached a high point in the eighties and nineties partly through exhaustion but also because 
positive critique started to be affirmed through Deleuze’s recovery of the notions of ‘affect’, ‘difference’ 
and ‘expression’, which have been discussed in detail in this thesis. The positive relies on real examples 
(and an aesthetics of affect). Corner’s championing of mapping is strongly affirmational of the power of 
mapping and representation and one only has to think of his conception of the ‘instrumentality’ of 
mapping as an even more specific example of the positive affirmation of his notion of mapping.53 
Corner’s Conception of Representations Suited to How Things Work 
Corner’s work is central to a positive conception of representation. He continually pushes away from 
any sign of negativity always seeking out the most powerful and affirming conception of the design of 
landscape. He has a series of attempts to affirm the use of representation and his Eidetic Operations 
and New Landscapes54 essay from his Recovering Landscape book attempts to construct a way to think 
about ways to use representation in landscape design that transcend the great tendency of landscape 
architecture to restrict itself to the visual and formal and that allow landscape designers ways to engage 
with ‘how things work’. This essay is a valuable one to focus on as it provides some clarification about 
the preoccupations of the later, landscape urbanism tradition. 
Landskip 
In this quest he develops a carefully constructed opposition between two historical senses of 
‘landscape’, landskip and landschaft. He draws on the work of historians to construct his argument. The 
former, the Old English term landskip, which “at first referred not to land but to a picture of it, as in the 
later, selectively framed representations of seventeenth-century Dutch Landschap paintings. Soon after 
the appearance of this genre of painting, the scenic concept was applied to the land itself in the form of 
large-scale rural vistas, designed estates, and ornamental garden art.” He takes this further, “indeed, 
the development of landscape architecture as a modern profession derives, in large measure, from an 
impulse to reshape large areas of land according to prior imaging.” 55 In this probably overneat history of 
the development of landscape architecture the visual and scenic dominates.  
Corner notes that it is not only the viewer that is displaced with the visually-scenic but the objects of the 
viewing. There are characteristics of landscape itself that align with and promote the tendencies of the 
scenic. He cites the geographer Jonathon Smith who explains that, “the ‘durability’ and autonomy of 
landscape cause its physical appearance to move further and further away from the agency and scene 
of its creation” and “assumes the purity of nature.”56 Amongst other things that Corner discusses, the 
scenic overview “transports one back into collective memory” and “recollection” and the scene keeps 
them at “a safe and uninvolved distance.” For Corner, with the scenic, both “evil and invention are 
hidden.”57 Landscape “can often obscure from its inhabitants the ideological impulses that motivated its 
formation and instead foster in them the feeling that they are in possession of a beautiful and innocent 
                                            
53 Yet, as I argue in Assemblage 3, it is certainly not as affirmative as it could be. 
54 Corner, "Eidetic Operations and New Landscapes." 
55 Ibid. 153. 
56 Ibid. 156. 
57 Ibid. 156. 
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past, that they have escaped from the inequities and problems of the present.”58 He gives some 
attention to the pervasiveness and multiple ways that commodification is associated with scenic visuality 
of contemporary landscapes. 
Landschaft 
He then discusses the Old German landschaft and opposes it to landskip. The former, he says, “actually 
preceding landskip”.59 Landschaft referred “not to scenery but to the environment of a working 
community, a setting comprising dwellings, pastures, meadows, and fields, and surrounded by 
unimproved forest or meadow. Moreover, “the word meant more than an organisation of space; it 
connoted too the inhabitants of the place and their obligations to another and to the land.”60 It comprises 
a “deep and intimate relationship” among buildings, fields and “patterns of occupation, activity, and 
space,” each often “bound into calendrical time.”61 “To the degree that everyday inhabitants experience 
landscape, they do so in a general state of distraction, and more through habit and use than through 
vision alone.”62 He makes reference to Denis Cosgrove’s geographical notion of an ‘insider’ where 
“there is no clear separation of self from scene, subject from object.”63 
For Corner, the visual and scenic are, in contrast, related to or resonant with, Cosgrove’s notion of 
‘outsiders’ and the types of viewing associated with outsiders. The outsider—the tourist, the spectator, 
the state, the administrative authority, the  designer and planner—views landscape as an object, a thing 
to behold, and not only scenically but instrumentally and ideologically. Enterprises such as tourism, 
planning, and resource management are predicated precisely on such a synoptic management of land. 
Total vision affords a powerful set of instruments to not only describe the world but also to condition and 
control it.”64 “Synoptic, radiating vision extends a gaze that makes the viewer the master of all 
prospects, a scopic regime of control, authority, distance, and cool instrumentality. Much of the 
so-called postmodern critique is targeted at exposing the authoritarian and alienating characteristics of 
synoptic objectification, including master planning (aerial regimes) and scenography (oblique and 
perspectival regimes). Extended to landscape, this critique suggests that a too narrow concern for 
landscape as object (whether as formal composition or as quantifiable resource) overlooks the 
ideological, estranging, and aestheticising effects of detaching the subject from the complex realities of 
participating in the world.”65 
Constructing a sense of purpose for pre-landscape urbanist preoccupations 
Corner’s account of the characteristics associated with landskip and landschaft are employed to provide 
a rationale for his conception of the ‘landscape project’ and for certain pre-landscape urbanism 
designerly preoccupations he champions. Corner says that his concern is less with “a further critique of 
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scenography” than with drawing the distinction between landskip and landschaft, the former associated 
with certain negative overall and important tendencies:  
 it forestalls “confronting the problems of contemporary life” through continuing “the practice of 
landscape as the creation of seductive and beautiful settings; 
 it “conceals the agendas of those who commission and construct” the products of the pictorial 
impulse; 
 it may retard—“the performance of authentic public life” in contemporary cities “through a 
preoccupation with “largely scenic” reconstructions of “European-inspired streets and squares;” 
 it “denies deeper modes of existence, interrelationship, and creativity,” and, 
 it “seriously limits the design and planning arts in more critically shaping alternative cultural 
relationships with the earth.”66 
So, he is pointing on one hand to the negative tendencies of the scenically-visual and on the other to 
ambitious potentials available to designers if they can escape the negative tendencies of the scenically-
visual. 
Landschaft as a working landscape? 
Corner places very particular and complex emphasis on the ‘working’ in ‘working community’ of the 
landschaft. He quotes Raymond Williams’ remark that “a working country is hardly ever a landscape.” 
Williams’ neo-Marxism largely follows traditional Marxist notions of ideology as involving a socio-
economic reality being obscured by an ideological image. Corner aligns with the sense of the 
reality/image-ideology opposition invoked by Williams. For Corner, Williams  “evokes the necessary 
detachment, contrivance and focused attention necessary for the formation of landscape.”67 Corner, 
similarly to Williams, wants to identify a more real and significant level beyond or below the superficial, 
seductive and ideological visual landscape. The notion of landschaft provides him with the opportunity 
to do so.  
The working landscape to drive the landscape project 
He then asks: “is it possible to realign the landscape architectural project toward the productive and 
participatory phenomena of the everyday, working landscape?”68 The working landscape, modelled on 
his conception of landschaft, and in opposition to landskip, is to become the model for the designing of 
landscape in general. So, what is his notion of a working landscape?  
Corner’s notion of the working landscape 
To elaborate on his notion of a working landscape, Corner first points to and posits a series of defining 
characteristics of landscapes which hitherto, it would seem, have been obscured by more superficial, 
scenically-related preoccupations with the landscape. For Corner, “gardens are defined less by formal 
                                            
66 Ibid. 158. 
67 Ibid. 154-155. 
68 Ibid. 159. Corner uses the term participatory, which in the context of this essay appears to suggest the 
participation of humans in the landscape.  
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appearances than through the activities of gardening, just as agricultural fields derive their form from the 
logistics of farming, and cities from the processes, and forces of urbanisation. In the working landschaft, 
performance and event assumes conceptual precedence over appearance and sign.”69 
This list is followed by a list of design preoccupations and emphases that Corner champions; 
preoccupations and emphases that went beyond and before Corner; and those that Corner has 
participated in the emergence of. Corner champions “a return to complex and instrumental landscape 
issues” involving “more organisational and strategic skills than those of formal composition per se, more 
programmatic and metrical practices than solely representational. Under such an operational rubric, 
issues such as program, event space, utility, economy, logistics, production, constraints, and desires 
become foregrounded…”70 This suggests a certain approach to designing: one where “the role of the 
landscape architect is less to picture or represent these activities than it is to facilitate, instigate, and 
diversify their effects in time, then the development of more performative forms of imaging (as devising, 
enabling, unfolding techniques) is fundamental to this task.”71 It is worth teasing these listings out a little 
as there is a great deal implied in these few words, made sense of by the way that such notions are 
used in the essay as a whole. In general these preoccupations involve an opposition to and deferral 
away from the formal-compositional, the visually-scenic & the self-expression of designers. 
These preoccupations72 include: 
 (more broadly) an attention to seeing landscapes from the perspective of this ‘performative’ and 
‘operational rubric’; 
 attention to the types of landscape and conditions that are considered organisational / operational / 
performative (and it seems deferral of attention from other types and conditions); 
 attention to the processes of the production of the built landscape including the processes of 
urbanisation that produce urban form;  
 the organisation and maintenance of processes, organisations, operations and technical and other 
internalised systems; 
 the design and management of proceedings over time; 
 ‘diversifying effects’ of ‘processes in time’ – which no doubt refers to what happens over time and 
designing for and with change: the operation of metrically understood processes and systems, the 
production of urban and landscape form from these processes and ‘prosaically’ and relatively 
metrically understood program - as Corner does not give attention to or affirm anything else; 
 metric  and quantitative concerns; 
 a strong suggestion that we are now dealing with worldly open systems, systems that determine 
what happens (‘how things work’) in the landscape, and are greater than the designer’s intentions; 
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 an attention to the economic – as a key force or determinant in worldly open systems; 
 attention to constraints and more ‘prosaic’ things, which usually require engaging with everyday 
landscapes, the technical, problem-solving and that such things would not, at that time more 
broadly, have been regarded as particularly interesting to a designer; 
 an attention to ‘desires’ in Corner might, on one hand, be a reference to how the functioning of 
cities and landscapes is driven by bottom-up desires and choices of actors as opposed to the top-
down intentions and plans of designers; 
 an attention to ‘desires’ might also be a reference to the importance of developing ambitions and 
imaginative designs that gain their agency through connecting to the forces of the landscape and 
urbanisation not designer self-expression or the internalised tendencies of ‘traditional’ approaches; 
 strategic design within greater situations; 
 program understood in more 'prosaic' ways – strongly tending to be associated with the metric, 
utility, 'function' etc.;73 
 greater attention to the unfolding processes of using representation, embracing that the use of 
representation is a process occurring across time, and, 
 forms of representation and the agency of representational processes aimed at the sorts of 
‘effects’ outlined above (the production of form, the working of systems / operations / prosaic 
program / economic). 
These preoccupations align with his notion of a working landscape, a notion that draws together a 
number of senses of work and working. ‘Work’ as: a functionalised and systematised activity; a primary 
activity; the engine of economies; the production process of capitalism and opposed to leisure and 
domesticity. ‘Working’ as the functionalised activities of production, processes and systems. Working as 
a mechanism or system working. Work is employed to suggest the real and productive versus the 
superficially scenographic. Working as the working of the real and productive. Working as the more 
primary open systems self-organisational working of the world. A little reflection on history might 
suggest that some of these ideas of work and workings may not sit easily with the medieval world of the 
landschaft.  
It may be that the landschaft, as Corner is portraying it as a working landscape, is utilised by Corner as 
a convenient foil, one that allows him some sort of historical authority, something in history that points to 
a more real aspect of the landscape, which has hitherto been obscured by more scenically-visual 
assumptions of, and practices with, the world around us. This more real aspect that Corner constructs 
aligns with what Andre Gorz describes as the ‘modern conception of work’.74 Gorz points out, however, 
that the modern conception of work as the ‘productive purposeful aspect of any activity’ does not exist in 
the subsistence-oriented medieval world, where there is no clear distinction between work and leisure, 
consumption is not separate from production and labour is not directly connected to a modern capitalist 
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system. This subsistence-oriented world is the world where we may find landschafts. This is 
foregrounded here to suggest that the notion of the landschaft as a ‘working landscape’ may very well 
be a convenient modern reading of what was not modern at all and that there may be a sort of odd 
romanticism of the medieval together with the productive purposeful modern conception of work. 
What is notable within Corner’s construction is how quickly and effectively he moves between and 
conflates one sense of working landscape with another. At the beginning of his discussion of the 
landschaft he provides a further conception of the working landscape, which can be easily forgotten in 
his overall movement of his essay. It is here that he says that a landschaft referred “not to scenery but 
to the environment of (what he calls) “a working community”, a “setting comprising dwellings, pastures, 
meadows, and fields, and surrounded by unimproved forest or meadow”. As he says, “the word meant 
more than an organisation of space it connoted too the inhabitants of the place and their obligations to 
another and to the land.”75 It comprises a “deep and intimate relationship” among buildings, fields and 
“patterns of occupation, activity, and space,” each often “bound into calendrical time.” 76 “To the degree 
that everyday inhabitants experience ‘landscape’, they do so in a general state of distraction, and more 
through habit and use than through vision alone.”77 As ‘insiders’, the inhabitants of a landschaft 
experience “no clear separation of self from scene, subject from object.” (my emphasis added) 
It first should be acknowledged, and Corner would no doubt agree, that the modern relationships 
amongst things, people and world is very different from the relationships of the world of the landschaft. 
What is relevant about this early description of a landschaft is that it is a spatial-anthropological 
conception focused on the ‘workings’ of the community-space, where what is enabled is human 
occupation – and that as such is just as relevant to the modern world as to the medieval world. 
What Corner is describing, or what can be understood from what he says, is an affiliation between 
humans and their environment where the product of the affiliation is the production of human 
occupation, not just the production of the physical form of associated with occupation, but an 
empowerment produced by the interaction of humans and their environment, an occupation-power. 
Such an empowerment is certainly more than the organisation of space, involves patterns of occupation 
and activity, involves an intimate relationship between the human and the various relevant parts of the 
environment, involves a lack of separation between humans and their environment bound in their own 
time and in a largely involuntary manner. Occupation, occupation-power, is produced by this affiliation. 
To jump ahead, Corner’s anthropological description more than adequately suggests what Deleuze and 
Guattari call an ‘assemblage’.78  
Corner’s description of landschaft, at the start of his essay, is aimed at distinguishing the ‘more 
evolved’, more real and significant landschaft from the less evolved and more superficial landskip. He 
certainly suggests the anthropological assemblage of the landschaft as being that which is more real 
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76 Ibid. 154. 
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78 Their attention, as I will show in Assemblage 2 (refer Appendix) and despite myths that have been created within 
design discourse, is most firmly on human-involved assemblages and these are intensive and affectual 
productions, which to repeat involve more than the organization or even organizing of space.  
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than the landskip, and for good reason. It is this anthropological functioning that is common to medieval 
and modern, or whatever landscape, and can be found ‘behind’ the imagery of the landskip. 
However, what is most telling is that his later lists of the characteristics of the working landscape and 
the design preoccupations he refers to barely suggest any attention to such assemblages, such human-
world-empowerments. The working of a working-land-community assemblage has provided an abstract 
sense or rationale for his championing of the ‘organisational’ rubric yet in his listings has been replaced 
by the workings and the working of systems, processes and the other things that he lists as fitting into 
the ‘organisational rubric’. His careful theorising about the landscape posits and relies upon the 
anthropological, and yet he defers away from it as soon as designing appears.79  
The clearest way to describe the difference between the organisational and the occupational or 
anthropological, and this is pointing way ahead in this thesis,80 is that the preoccupations he associates 
with the ‘organisational rubric’ are predominantly understood or engaged with in an ‘abstract’ (Lefebvre) 
representational space, whilst human-environment assemblages or anthropological-landscapes 
involving human-environment power, affect and intensity, cannot be. The organisational, involving the 
sorts of systems and organisations that can be understood or read-off in an abstract space of 
representation - not constructed to engage with the open systems of human life, anthropological open 
systems if you like - is more capable of engaging with relatively ‘closed’ non-human-connected systems, 
involving metrically and visually representable processes. The operational preoccupations have been 
conflated with open systems forces. Non-human-involved relatively-closed-systems have been 
conflated with human-involved-open-systems. Like with much of the argumentation that occurs in the 
championing of the organisational in general there is very little attention to anything but the relatively 
closed and certainly no affirmation of anything beyond it. 
In the ‘organisational rubric’ Corner portrays, program is not presented in a manner that suggests it is 
dealing with the anthropological. It is certainly pushed toward that which is understood in abstract 
space. However, it might be argued that program might be assumed to play a role in connecting to the 
anthropological. In architecture this is the means for engaging in ‘experience’ or ‘social life’ – the 
anthropological. Yet, as I argue in some detail in Assemblage 3, in relation to Schumacher’s notion of 
an aesthetics of datascapes, that architectural program has two dimensions, even if this has been 
obscured in architectural discourse (and simply avoided in landscape architectural discourse) - these 
are affectual and non-affectual dimensions. I discuss how these functions together in the viewing of 
architectural plans – where Schumacher says architects can read ‘experience’ and ‘social functioning’ 
                                            
79 For those after Corner they are not even interested in something equivalent to the anthropological assemblage 
he attempts to theorise. Corner’s theorising has a ‘wholeness’ about it that later landscape urbanists lack. 
80 An understanding of assemblage may be found in Assemblage 2 (refer Appendix) and Assemblage 3 where the 
notion of abstract space is discussed in relation to assemblages and affects. ‘Abstract space facilitates space 
perceived and conceived as ‘purely visual’. This is ‘a space of reference’ and the instrumental; a space in thrall to 
knowledge being, power and capital; it is a space which promotes homogeneity and is continually co-produced by 
forms of representation and conception.’ Lefebvre, Henri, The Production of Space, trans. Nicholson-Smith, 
Donald (Maiden, MA: Blackwell, 1974,  Editions Anthropos, 1991, English translation). To point ahead in the 
thesis even more fully would allow us to affirm the distinction between the organizational and the anthropological 
even more through the expression of affect. This is beyond the scope of this chapter, and will be discussed in 
Assemblage 2 (refer Appendix) and in the case study. The pure visuality of abstract space provides very weak 
engagement with affect and especially landscape affect as I argue in Assemblage 3. 
an affirmative open systems conception of how to design landscape  Connolly, Peter  
35 
 
off of a plan, and that architects assume such read-off-ability functioning as part of day-to-day practice. I 
also then argue that such a well-practiced aesthetic machinery which functions well with architectural 
plans cannot be assumed to function anywhere near as well ‘out’ in the landscape. The aesthetic 
functioning of program – reliant on the affectuality of program - is one of the beautiful and somewhat 
forgotten bits of architectural design machinery.  
Landscape architects, especially from the nineties onwards, have employed the notion of program - and 
the associated assumption of a read-off-ability of experience or social function associated with 
architectural program. The read-off-ability of experience of program simply parallels and supports a 
general landscape architectural assumption of read-off-ability of experience that pervades landscape 
architecture and pervaded landscape architecture before program became so important. This 
assumption of the read-off-ability of experience is, I would contest, shared with the tendency of 
traditional landscape architectural practices, as Corner and others argue, that promotes treating 
landscape in a predominantly scenographic manner. What would allow designers to distinguish 
anthropological-experience from scenographically-understood-experience? I would argue – as I do in 
some detail in Assemblage 3 - that program when ‘taken out into the landscape’ will be very weak at 
being able to distinguish between the two, and will tend to have strong generalising and scenographic 
tendencies: the very argument that provides much of the rationale for both pre-landscape urbanism and 
landscape urbanism writings returns to undermine those who employ it. 
So, in design terms the inattention to the distinction between the anthropological and the organisational 
might be understood in three ways: 
1. That to engage with the organisational is engaging with the anthropological. That these are the 
same thing, or; 
2. that the two are not the same yet the organisational is a strategically powerful way to influence or 
correlate with the anthropological – and that engaging with the anthropological landscape is 
unproblematic and can effectively and simply be read-off the design work; 
3. that just dealing with the organisational without reference to, or any assumption about, the 
anthropological dimension is enough.  
The first of these is very crude, though not uncommon. The second recognises that the organisational 
has powerful role to play in a design project yet makes the mistake of not problematising the connection 
to the anthropological. The third is strangely and uncritically common. 
So, I would argue that Corner seems to go along with the read-off-ability assumption, probably program-
related (though we can’t be sure) – and that this would allow him to, in principle, ‘cover’ the 
anthropological-dimension of the landscape which plays such a major role in providing a rationale for 
the preoccupations he champions. What can also be said is that the emphasis of his preoccupations is 
certainly not on the problematic of engaging with the anthropological. It is certainly strongly skewed 
toward the organisational. His eidetic essay recognises the importance of the anthropological dimension 
of the landscape yet beyond the initial positing does not problematise or even acknowledge that 
engaging with the anthropological dimension of the landscape is any sort of challenge itself. Such a 
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practice is not of course uncommon and Corner’s work is simply representative in this regard – and as I 
would suggest, somewhat alone it would seem, is entwined with the tendency to the scenographic in 
recent design. His work does not affirm preoccupations that would engage the anthropological and does 
not affirm any critical means to distinguish the anthropological from the organisational. His 
preoccupations are elsewhere, even if he wants to suggest that he is engaging with ‘more’ than 
organisation. In this current design era, where open systems have habitually been understood in terms 
of systems and self-organisation in terms of organisation it has become commonplace to defer attention 
away from the human dimension of the environment and to not understand open systems involving 
human as being something distinctly different from ‘systems’. Again, this distinction will be discussed in 
more detail further into this thesis. 
Corner’s notion of a working landschaft is employed to point to his conception of a working landscape, 
to a more real dimensions and forms of understanding of and engaging with landscape, and his listings 
above flesh out what he means by this. The preoccupations/examples he enlists as good examples of 
engaging with this level of understanding of how landscape really works. His argument is structured to 
provide a rationale for his ambitious conceptions and for the organisational design preoccupations he 
champions. He claims that such preoccupations allow designers to engage with “how things work, what 
they do, how they interact and what agency or effects they might exercise over time.”81 It seems that, in 
the light of the field studies of this thesis and Corner’s discussion, that ‘how things work’ in the 
landscape cannot be simply seen in the organisational terms that Corner’s preoccupations suggest – 
and that ‘how things work’ is much closer to what he talks about in his introduction – or that there are 
two forms or dimensions of ‘how things work’, and that one of them has been given lots of attention and 
the other, that Corner only points towards generally yet relies upon in his argument, has been ignored in 
the enthusiasm to embrace the organisational rubric. 
The above listing of designerly preoccupations remains general, suggestive and introductory. Corner 
then follows this with a discussion of the sorts of uses of representation that would enable designers to 
engage with what he has been constructing as a more real dimension of the landscape: uses of 
representation that allow designers to engage with the working landscape rather than the scenically-
visual landscape. He refers to these as ‘eidetic operations’.82 
What does he mean by eidetic? 
He uses the term ‘eidetic’ to refer to a “mental conception that may be picturable but may equally be 
acoustic, tactile, cognitive, or intuitive.”83 No doubt targeting the scenically visual he says that, “unlike 
the purely retinal impression of pictures, eidetic images contain a broad range of ideas that lie at the 
core of human creativity.”84 The eidetic refers to the ability of images, “speech, verbal description, 
                                            
81 Corner, "Eidetic Operations and New Landscapes." 159-160. 
82 A term he does not use after this essay. 
83 Corner, "Eidetic Operations and New Landscapes." 153. 
84 On a cursory glance Corner’s 1992 essay ‘Representation and Landscape’ appears to simply transfer what Robin 
Evans discovered about architectural drawing almost without alteration into landscape design. With hindsight, 
post Deleuze and Guattari, what Evans discovered was the specific affectuality of architectural representation 
(and the specific assemblage of architectural drawing in contrast to the assemblages associated with artistic 
drawing). As this thesis argues, particularly through the case studies, affects produced by assemblages come 
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gestures, and other rhetorical figures” to “conjure up otherwise invisible images, allowing one to see an 
idea.” So, what he terms ‘eidetic operations’ are ‘operations’ with ‘eidetic’ images and he opposes these 
to the use of pictures and the scenic impulse. For Corner, “designers need to more fully equip their 
arsenal of” what he terms “eidetic operations.”85  
At the end of his essay Corner sums up in a manner that suggest that the examples he employs 
exemplify how eidetic operations should function in that they concentrate on “how things work, how they 
go together, and how the projects makes sense” and that they “accord priority to the working of 
inhabited ground as opposed to the formalisation of scenic landscapes.” These examples should 
provide some idea of what he means by eidetic and what he means when he refers to “how things work, 
how they go together and how they make sense”.86 They include the associative possibilities of collage 
and montage. Here he refers to Picasso’s bicycle seat and handlebar assemblage and Duchamp’s 
collage or assemblage, Genre Allegory. “Such eidetic images are fundamental stimuli to creativity and 
invention….by contrast images in conventional design practice tend more toward the wholly 
technological, the strictly denotative, the explicit, and the immediately intelligible.”87  
His understanding of the eidetic functioning of such collage and montage seems focused on their 
connotative power. This may be what Corner is interested in when he discusses eidetic operations. It 
might be pointed out that Deleuze and Guattari attack the notion of connotation as being part of a 
system of signs referring to itself only, probably obscuring (by ‘atmospherising and mundanising’)88 the 
singular and affectual nature of the assemblages involved. They would be dismissive of the ability of 
connotation to engage with the sorts of anthropological functioning of a landscape ‘out there’ that 
Corner initially discusses.  
He refers to David Leatherbarrow’s discussion of the eidetic image power of orthographic representation 
in architecture, Tschumi’s work with notations and indexes, the development of datascaping by 
Koolhaas, MVRDV etc., and “hybridised and composite diagram techniques.”   He also points to 
                                                                                                                                          
with sense or expression (not linguistically understood ‘meaning', it must be said). Though Corner’s conception of  
‘eidetic’ is somewhat ambiguous, it is presented as being centred on how images produce ideas or associations 
and how these then produce ‘effects’. His discussion of ‘agency’ evokes affects and assemblages, even if his 
theorising falls back onto the effects-of-mental-ideas-generated-by-images. This thesis suggests that the 
limitations of Corner’s confusing sense of eidetic (and ‘eidetic operations’) can be bypassed if ‘agency’ and 
‘effects’ are seen as affects - and that the mental ideas generated by images are not the cause of agency or 
effects (or affects) but the involuntary sense or expression that accompanies affect produced by assemblages. In 
this sense such ‘mental conceptions’ are not mental or conscious conceptions, nor ideas in the traditional sense. 
Sense involuntarily is part of involuntary affects. Corner’s highly suggestive statements and arguments, fed by the 
far-reaching and authoritative tone of his essays, sometimes are enigmatic and in some instances are really only 
suggestive or ambiguous: for instance, his idea that “eidetic images contain a broad range of ideas that lie at the 
core of human creativity.” Corner, "Representation and Landscape: Drawing and Making in the Landscape 
Medium."153.  
85 Corner, "Eidetic Operations and New Landscapes." 163. 
86 Ibid. 163.  
87 Ibid. 164. 
88 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. 112. Duchamp’s readymades have 
been discussed by Stephen Zepke in terms of assemblages and affects, in Zepke, Stephen, Art as Abstract 
Machine: Aesthetics and Ontology in Deleuze and Guattari  (London and New York: Routledge, 2005). 163. 
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Koolhaas’ reformulations of progam and form, and argues for “thinking through a program—not a 
description—that outlines the performative dimensions of a project’s unfolding.”89 
As I discussed earlier, there is no doubt that orthographic representations, program, datascaping, 
composite diagrams, notations and indexes would, with respect to architectural plans, allow a 
connection to – or at least a relation to - the anthropological assemblages of architectural plans, to the 
‘experience’ and ‘social functioning’ of architectural plans. Again, they may be much more limited in the 
open landscape.  
Corner’s account of the characteristics associated with landskip and landschaft are employed to provide 
a rationale for his conception of the ‘landscape project’ and for certain designerly preoccupations he 
champions as important to the development of the landscape project. In the process he develops a 
criticism of landskip that he aligns with the great tendency of landscape architecture toward the visually 
scenographic and away from what he constructs as a more real or significant level of the landscape. At 
the start of his essay this more real / significant dimension of the landscape is conceptualised as 
strongly anthropological (which I would argue would be best thought as an anthropological assemblage 
of landscape) yet once past this part of the essay what is strongly presented as more real, shifts 
markedly and is now associated with all of what he refers to under a ‘organisational rubric’. The 
preoccupations he champions are presented as providing a means to move beyond the limitations of 
the visually-scenographic and to allow designers the ability to engage in a more real level of the 
landscape. Does he achieve what he sets out to achieve and does he escape what he criticises? Does 
his rationale stack up? Does he engage with what he wants to affirm? 
To begin with, it is obvious and worth noting, that Corner’s essay, like many landscape architectural 
writings of the time, is distinctly architectural in leaning. The only discussions of representations, uses of 
representations that he is championing, are of architectural examples and most of the conceptualising is 
driven or inspired by architectural thinking.  
Related to this observation, and unlike other landscape architectural writers examined here, he gives no 
serious attention in this essay to the representational relationship to that which pre-exists the designer, 
which as we will see was a major consideration for other landscape architectural writers at that time. He 
gives no attention in the essay to the acts of: interpreting the pre-existing landscape, representational 
appropriation from this landscape and transformation of that which has been appropriated. His attention 
was given to eidetic ‘operations’ performed on what could be considered, post Robin Evans, the 
‘projective plane’.90 
Corner wants to champion the ‘organisational rubric’ and the working landscape but is conscious that 
the emphasis on the working landscape might suggest a purely functional or instrumental landscape 
only. His championing of the organisational rubric, as I have argued, certainly focuses attention on all 
                                            
89 Like program and datascapes, I have also discussed diagrams, notations and performativity in some detail in 
Assemblage 3, and will not discuss this in detail here. 
90 As I argue in Assemblage 3 Corner’s influential mapping essay attempts to engage with the potential of what 
happens on the ground and what the landscape really does on the ground from the perspective of the (single 
large) map. (Corner, "The Agency of Mapping: Speculation, Critique and Invention." His 1992, essay also, despite 
impressions, is mostly focused on what can be done with landscape through projection. Though it does provide a 
very useful and early account of the characteristics of landscape that are a challenge for representation. 
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that can be engaged with in the abstract space of representation (Lefebvre) – the metric, the 
quantifiable, the logistical, the organisational etc. Even his attention on the programmatic seems to 
skew the programmatic toward the metric. As discussed, the programmatic, may have serious aesthetic 
limitations in the openness of landscape.  
Beyond the doubts about program, there seems no attention to providing any critical dimension that 
would allow us to distinguish between that which works well in abstract space and that which cannot be 
understood in an abstract space – that which is the more real level of landscape that Corner only 
alludes to. 
It is either presumed that the architectural aesthetic-representational apparatus functions well in the 
open landscape or that which can be engaged with in abstract space alone – the organisational - is 
effectively the more real level of landscape. It seems that for Corner the former might be the case. 
On top of this lack of affirmation there does not seem to any consciousness of a need for such a critical 
distinction to be made. This is not something restricted to Corner. It may also be the case that there is 
something of a designerly strong sense of the anthropological landscape (what I will argue would be the 
affectual dimension of the landscape) and that this can have a strong relationship to the organisational 
rubric (which is probably most precisely characterised in this context as being non-affectual) but no such 
relationship is tendered. The relationship between the anthropological and the organisational is left up in 
the air. 
Most overtly he seeks to move beyond the scenic / scenographic tendencies of landscape architecture. 
He wants to avoid scenographic objectification, synoptic distancing, the dangers of ‘outsider’ 
perspectives and the aestheticising of scenic vision amongst other characteristics of the 
scenographically-visual. Even though his essay claims to be focused on eidetic operations and all that is 
discussed in the essay is meant to fall under this umbrella, it seems that there are three somewhat 
distinct emphases discussed, which may not be so easily lumped together. The first of these might be 
the closest to what Corner considers the eidetic (though I cannot be certain), and this I will term the 
‘connotative’. Whilst the connotative might exceed the scenographic it will be very limited with regards to 
engaging with the anthropological functioning of the landscape.91 The second of these, which Corner 
gives significant attention to, is the organisational rubric, which to the degree that it focuses on that 
which can be engaged with in the abstract space of representation is also the degree to which it is 
dealing with the visually understandable, even if what is being represented are ‘processes’. Just 
because processes ‘function in time’ does not make them any less scenographically oriented—they 
simply involve what Bergson refers to as a ‘spatialising of time’, something that seems to be missed on 
most landscape urbanists. This seems particularly confused in recent thinking. When processes are 
                                            
91 Deleuze and Guattari refer to the semiological ‘connotative’ as the realm of the significant, and correctly align this 
with linguistically oriented models of culture, which they say are ‘abstract but not yet abstract enough’. By this I 
understand that affect, sense/territorialisation and problem are infinitely more abstract. Force being more abstract 
than the abstract relating of signifiers and sense making the abstract nature of affect related to all past and 
anticipated affects and senses of affects – and territory as the bringing into relation with affect the relevant spatio-
temporal relations to affect and the sense of affect – so that any particular part of a territory is engaged with as a 
sensation of how it relates to the affect-sense it is part of and helps produce. One way to consider the limitations 
of the connotative is that it is the product of a system of relations that is produced by culture and for Deleuze and 
Guattari this system is a system of cliché. Affect and sense are not constrained by this system. 
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talked about in most organisationally oriented writings it is the visually recordable or notatable that is 
usually presumed. Program has already been discussed. To the degree that it is not being used to 
engage with the affectuality of the open landscape is also the degree to which is likely succumbing to a 
scenographic reading of the landscape. The third dimension in Corner, which I have referred to as the 
anthropological is really only suggested in Corner’s essay, and to move beyond the scenographic, I 
would argue, requires an embrace of the assemblages and affects of the open landscape, something 
that Corner might seem to suggest with words such as ‘agency’, but never seriously approaches. 
By not embracing the anthropological that he introduces, and yet does not affirm, he seems to rely upon 
an idea of program for the open landscape. If my analysis of program in Assemblage 3 is correct then it 
cannot be assumed that the architectural notion of program can be transposed into the openness of 
landscape. In which case, it is doubtful that his eidetic operations are able to engage with the human-
involved functioning of the landscape.  
This has consequences for some of the ambitions he paints. His claims that eidetic operations will allow 
designers to move beyond the scenographic tendencies of traditional practice to engage with “authentic 
public life”, “deeper modes of existence, interrelationship, and creativity” and “more critically shaping 
alternative cultural relationships with the earth,” start to sound very hollow. That the operational rubric 
has become so dominant since the nineties and that public space and human occupation and 
experience, for instance, rarely receives significant attention apart from organisationally seems to be a 
telling symptom of how the dominance of the organisational rubric in pre-landscape urbanism (and 
landscape urbanism) promotes types of designing that cannot deal with human-involvement. It would be 
easy to get the feeling that the human dimension of the landscape is not a proper or strong 
preoccupation when it seems more likely that the dominance of the organisational, in not being capable 
of engaging with the human-involved or the anthropological landscape, has deferred attention away 
from that which even Corner half-heartedly, identifies as the rationale for designing landscape. What the 
organisational is capable of engaging with becomes what is real. This is certainly how contemporary 
landscape design often seems. 
Overall, the intended effect of the essay is to suggest that the preoccupations at the end of essay allow 
a designer the ability to engage with how a landscape ‘really functions’, and that this is done somewhat 
in the name of the anthropological but seems really to support the organisational. Corner says that his 
concern is less with “a further critique of scenography” than with drawing the distinction between 
landskip and landschaft, the former associated with certain negative overall and important tendencies 
and the latter the focus of all that is beyond the scenographic. Why is he so concerned with drawing this 
distinction? Most obviously, drawing this distinction, and Corner puts a great deal of effort into doing so, 
produces an exclusive either / or choice between the visually-scenic and the organisational (and 
something of the connotative)—one of them presented as more superficial and one as more real or 
significant. This opposition and, that the visually-scenic being on one side of the opposition makes the 
other side the only available, and effectively reasonable and proper, choice - a choice constructed by 
Corner to seem to engage with the more real dimension of the landscape, beyond the scope of the 
scenically-visual. This choice and the way Corner presents it does not suggest other options.  
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This thesis will suggest that landscape assemblages/affects are just such an option and escape either 
end of this opposition. They also affirm Corner’s general sense of the anthropological and bring it to life. 
Such a choice, it might be added, also frees up the visual to not only be restricted to the scenographic 
but to play an active role in the production of the anthropologically functioning landscape. 
The feeling the reader gets from this essay is that the general anthropological notion he introduces is of 
much lesser importance to the essay than the promotion of the organisational rubric. The 
anthropological seems there to provide a sense and rationale to the preoccupation with the 
organisational that is not matched by any attention to fleshing out the anthropological. The attention to 
the organisational seemed to align with – and no doubt contributes to - what were emerging conceptions 
from architecture at the time. It seems that largely architectural preconceptions about what the ‘more 
real’ aspect of the landscape involves may have taken over from some other senses of what might be 
more real about the landscape, such as a stronger and more concrete sense of the functioning of the 
anthropological landscape or even landscape assemblages. To the degree that Corner’s essay 
succumbs to such preconceptions it might be said that his work succumbs to preconceptions from 
elsewhere, or to use his words to a sort of ‘prior imaging’ that he wished to avoid. 
Another of Corner’s essay, ‘Taking Measure: Irony and Contradiction in an Age of Precision’, an essay 
from his earlier co-authored 1996 book, ‘Taking Measures Across the American Landscape’, makes an 
important contribution to the ‘pre-landscape urbanism’ line of development, but is also relevant to the 
‘intuitive research’ line. 
The emphasis on often large-scale aerial photography and associated ‘map-drawings’ in this coffee-
table looking book and its essays and the focus on ‘measure’ in this particular essay make this book 
appealing to, and inciting of, the ambition-oriented leanings of pre-landscape urbanist thought. His book 
is graphically constructed to make evident the products and production that results from modern 
‘measure’, as he refers to it. He dwells on both the negative and positive powers and tendencies of 
technomathematical measure, or modern measure, in the modern world but rather than repeat the 
criticisms he wants to see where modern measure can be taken. Corner, importantly, wants to ‘critically’ 
appropriate and imaginatively redirect the “mute efficiency of modern measure” to fully explore the 
“social purposes” and “the creativity and freedom it affords”.92 I do not need to repeat the very 
successful communication of the great productivity of modern measure, which his book achieves.  
What seems obscured in this essay, or obscured by its reception, as we will see, is that he places great 
importance on ‘traditional’ forms of measure and what he terms ‘qualitative determination’. He does this 
as the metric alone, as he argues, is not enough in itself. He describes key aspects of traditional 
measure. First, “was the capacity of measure to relate the everyday world to infinite and indivisible 
dimensions of the universe.” Second, is that it is developed “through the relationship of the human body 
to physical activities and materials.” The latter meant that “traditional units of measure derived from the 
interrelationships of labor, body, and site.”93  Traditional measure was “practical and place-specific” and 
                                            
92 Corner, "Taking Measure: Irony and Contradiction in an Age of Precision." 25. 
93 Corner continues, in his attempt to champion the organizational, to identify the real with ‘work’. Why isn’t it all 
activities, body and site? 
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involved “the world generally conceived as an organic whole, lending a representational and socially 
interactive unity to life.” “Such measures made coherent the relationships between people, place, 
activity. Morality and beauty.”94 Traditional measures are not simply separate from modern measure and 
he refers to examples of ‘qualitative determinants’ to show that much of our current day measure is 
“quite different from that of the technomathematical.”  
With reference to a number of examples of situations that a landscape architect might encounter in 
everyday practice he argues that these spatial and material determinations are “qualitatively 
negotiated”; “they are the outcome of informed experience and the ‘feeling out’ of those phenomena 
believed to be the most appropriate given the circumstances.” They involve a “culturally grounded form 
of accuracy, a qualitative precision,” very different from the metric. These “intuitive determinations of 
measure are always peculiar to and right for their contextual circumstance.” With this sense of precision, 
“quantities, limits, spacings, and tolerances are always situated within a complex milieu of social, moral, 
and aesthetic implications.” For Corner, employing his style of argument, there is the “instrumental, 
calculative, objective, standardised, and formulaic” on one hand and this is incongruous with the 
“sensual, poetic, subjective, and contingent” on the other.95 He argues that neither should dominate but 
they need to “be brought into a greater form of reciprocity.” 96  
These intuitive, felt, culturally-grounded, complexly situated measures reference back to human beings 
and their situatedness in the world. Corner quotes Albert Hofstadter in saying that “Man’s measure is 
not a quantity that can be calculated. Only man’s being itself can tell what its measure is by the fiery test 
of the living encounter of the human self with reality.”97 A human self-reference through situatedness in 
the world, it would seem. For Corner, this means that measures relevant to humans are only relevant in 
being measured relative to humans-in-their-situatedness – and that such a measure only functions with 
humans-in-their-space-time-relatedness. The technomathematical / metric may have its own form of 
measure but it is ultimately evaluated in relation to this worldly-human-self-reference.  
These qualitative measures are the measures of the anthropological or human realm. Corner’s 
discussion of the landschaft relied on his conception of what I am calling the ‘anthropological 
landscape’. Whilst Corner attempted to identify a more real level of the landscape with the landschaft (in 
comparison to the landskip) as a working landscape he was really relying on the anthropological 
dimension98 of the landscape as the ultimate reference and rationale for his strong emphasis on the 
‘organisational rubric’. Just as human-worldly-self-reference provides the ultimate reference for the 
metric so does the anthropological world be the measure of the organisational. The qualitative 
                                            
94 Corner, "Taking Measure: Irony and Contradiction in an Age of Precision." 27. 
95 Such an opposition looks odd from the perspective of hindsight and affect: instrumentality being sided with the 
“calculative, objective, standardised, and formulaic” and opposed to the “sensual, poetic, subjective, and 
contingent”. From the perspective of affect, instrumentality and affect are little different in both being about the 
ability to do things. For Deleuze, ‘sensation is the ground’ and from Corner’s perspective ‘subjective’ but from 
Deleuze’s perspective does not involve a subject, and is asubjective. Affect messes up this neat and probably 
convenient opposition. 
96 Corner, "Taking Measure: Irony and Contradiction in an Age of Precision." 33. 
97 Ibid. 34. 
98 It might be argued that program is the architectural equivalent of the anthropological or the means to connect to 
it, however, at all points in Corner’s accounts program is pushed toward the metric and away from the 
anthropological. More precisely the anthropological is not affirmed in Corner’s account of program in relation to 
landscape. 
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determinations of this human-self-reference are the measures relevant to the anthropological landscape 
and world. His earlier essay identifies a pivotal dimension of space – the anthropological. This later one 
identifies the measure (or evaluation) that accompanies it and allows a designer to engage with it. 
Corner identifies qualitative determinations, like others of his time, in ‘cultural terms’. They are culturally 
grounded. That they involve intuition and a ‘feeling out’ of the phenomena within a milieu of 
circumstances and a worldly self-reference certainly aligns with the worldly self-reference of the 
pragmatics and ‘intuition-in-action’99 of Deleuze and Guattari’s assemblages. Identifying such qualitative 
determinations in terms of affects, sense and sensation seems a more adequate way to conceive of 
Corner’s qualitative determinations, one which recognises that culture is really only indefinite and 
powerless without the power and sense of affect. Culture needs something to work on or with or through 
to be culture. 
Corner’s essay is not normally remembered for his emphasis on qualitative determinations. Julia 
Czerniak’s reading of the Taking Measures book, in her widely read essay Challenging the Pictorial: 
Recent Landscape Practice100 does not engage with Corner’s qualitative determination. Her essay was 
influential in constructing pre-landscape urbanism conceptions and it effectively represents commonly 
held pre-landscape urbanism (and landscape urbanist) conceptions. In this essay Czerniak reviews 
books that treat landscape as a “physical and cultural process with varied spatial and temporal scales”. 
She is explicit in her sense of process as “a continuing activity and set of relations that change over 
time.” For Czerniak, picture (retinal image) is opposed to such process – and - process is “how a 
landscape works.” Her account steers clear of qualitative determination and instead effectively aligns 
her opposition of picture and process with what Corner really seems to emphasise: the opposition 
between landskip-as-picture and working-landscape-as-the-organisational - for instance by citing Corner 
and Maclean that landscape is seen as a “complex network of material activity” rather than a “static and 
contemplative phenomenon.” It is easy to read Corner this way as there is such a stress on the landskip 
/ landschaft distinction, and that Corner himself attempts to effectively provide the rationale for the 
organisational by conflating it with the occupational or anthropological 
Corner’s writing and emphasis promotes such a reading. The opposition picture/process seems to fit 
straight onto Corner’s distinction. Czerniak glosses over that the anthropological in Corner - which he 
equates or conflates, loosely or mistakenly, with the organisational, provides the rationale for the 
organisational. Such an emphasis would confuse Czerniak’s distinction. Czerniak’s reading is much 
more one-dimensional and lapses into (the now common) generalities about process. Czerniak presents 
an either/or option between picture and process and that the latter is presented as superior. There is no 
sense of qualitative measure or how such process is evaluated. Or if it can possibly be inferred in 
Czerniak she does not affirm any such mode of evaluation or anything that makes more than ‘process’ 
                                            
99 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. 409. 
100 Czerniak, "Challenging the Pictorial: Recent Landscape Practice." 
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being simply abstractly understood as valuable in itself. To employ process in design or engage with 
process in design is good in itself and for her better than what she constructs as ‘picturing’.101 
Charles Waldheim’s 1999 essay, Aerial Representation and the Recovery of Landscape,102 from 
Corner’s collection, Recovering Landscape shares much with Corner’s 1996 essay and Czerniak’s 1998 
essay. He also goes along with or sets up an opposition between the scenic and the metric. Scenic 
approaches are opposed to the “metric, instrumental and programmatic conditions”. He constructs a 
history where there is an historical tension between the scenic and the metric and that there has been a 
subsequent “privileging of the pictorial in contemporary landscape architecture”. For Waldheim there 
has been an historical shift from the idea of landscape as “scenic and pictorial imagery to a highly 
managed surface best viewed, arranged, and coordinated from above”. Waldheim is, despite this, 
interested in embracing image-making. In particular he wants to conceptualise and affirm aerial 
photography. He believes that aerial photography, as a “representational and projective mechanism”, is 
“capable of reconciling the pictorial with the metric.”103 His main focus in the recovery of aerial 
photography is via a “shift from a purely visual representation toward an indexical trace,” so that aerial 
photography now functions “as a kind of map”.104 What does this mean? Like Corner’s emphasis on the 
(culturally) connotative as being beyond the scenographic, Waldheim’s idea of the indexical trace is 
understood ‘semiologically’. To think of reading a “visual representation as signifying semiologically 
rather than optically shifts the site of reception from the retinal field to that of culturally accrued 
language.”105 Whilst a semiological reading is commonly, post-Roland Barthes, thought of as a cultural 
reading, Waldheim’s says, “the interpretation of remote satellite imagery for purposes of military 
surveillance operates under similar assumptions.”106 For Waldheim these images can be read 
“semiologically for the indexical clues they hold with regard to movement patterns, human construction, 
and changes in environmental processes.” So, for Waldheim the reconciliation between the metric and 
pictorial he points to involves “the conflation of the recording of the earth’s surface and its reading as 
cultural content.”107 Whilst semiologists would probably think of Waldheim’s “reading of indexical clues” 
(movement patterns….etc.) as involving a very, very limited sense of culture, it seems that Waldheim 
employs it to move beyond the pictorial. There is no realm beyond the pictorial/metric opposition, for 
Waldheim, apart from this light or allusional version of the cultural. More importantly, Waldheim, even 
more extremely than Corner himself does in his mapping essay of the same year, engages with the 
landscape from the perspective of the aerial photograph itself, and as such will tend to have a very 
limited ability to engage with the anthropological realm that Corner pointed towards. From these essays 
it is difficult to tell if connection to this anthropological dimension of the landscape is simply not seen as 
a problem and that they assume that, say, (architectural) program effectively deals with this realm and 
that (architectural) practices of program can be simply carried into the landscape. This assumption 
                                            
101 Meyer, Elizabeth K., "Sustaining Beauty. The Performance of Appearance – a Manifesto in Three Parts," Journal 
of Landcape Architecture 1, no. 6 (2008). Meyer’s essay is partly a critique of Czerniak’s reductive opposition, 
and tries to resurrect the visual in landscape itself from being reduced to the pictorial. 
102 Waldheim, "Aerial Representation and the Recovery of Landscape." 
103 Ibid. 131. 
104 Ibid. 132. 
105 Ibid. 135. 
106 Ibid. 135. 
107 Ibid. 135. 
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seems the most likely way to explain the unproblematising nature of much of the writing in this pre-
landscape urbanists line of inquiry. 
Immanence, Synopticism and Urban Open Systems 
Before the thesis moves into a discussion of the ‘intuitive’ or ‘empirical research’ line of investigation 
about how to conceptualise an affirmative landscape design assemblage. It is worth looking back even 
further, very briefly. The relationship to the pre-existing is not a new concern for landscape architecture. 
It is determining of the discourse and can be traced back to the earliest modern thoughts about the 
design of landscape. One pithy line from one of the first people to use the term ‘landscape architecture’ 
as a professional title, Patrick Geddes (1854-1932) is illuminating. Geddes exclaimed, ‘survey before 
plan’, and in doing so championed a newly modern way of designing. This represents an early modern 
conception of urban or landscape problems. Another related well-known phrase was ‘diagnosis before 
treatment’. His approach was an embrace of modern problems and any survey was championed to 
discover potential that existed before any abstractly imposed ideas of designers took over. He was very 
influenced by French geographers, with their notion of ‘modes de vie’ (modes of life) and it is not 
surprising that he was the inventor of the modern notion of the ‘region’, as a natural-cultural unit of 
modes de vie.108 This notion of Modes de vie was, effectively, the first anthropological notion of a 
working landscape. Geddes’ attention to modes de vie was combined with the championing of 
conceptual and literal synoptic viewing of such modes de vie.109 This sets in train a problematic that only 
barely starts to come to consciousness again with some force with the discourse in the nineties, of on 
one hand, a desire for working with the social-natural logic of regional life and that the tools to do so (big 
map) strongly tended to, without you realising it, take you away from the life your were interested in. 
This problem will be discussed with respects to James Corner’s notion of mapping and touched on in 
Assemblage 2 (refer Appendix). Geddes is known for making fresh observations about modern 
urbanisation. He is known for coining the term ‘conurbation’. He might be seen as the equivalent of a 
Marx or Freud of the environmental planning world, such were his incisive and freshly thought-out 
discoveries and thoughts. The notion of conurbation also suggests the fertile contemporary design 
problematic of political-economic forces tied to and produced by human life but having their own (open 
systems) movements, and the design question of how to engage with the relative autonomy of such 
urban forces and human life together. Modes de vie and, say, conurbations are both produced by 
modern urbanisation and may be powerfully engaged with through modern synoptic techniques in ways 
undreamt of prior to such techniques, but these same techniques might – often without realising it – no 
differently than in Geddes day, disconnect the designer and planner from the very modes de vie that 
they seek to engage with as a result. In some ways little has changed with this problematic. How to 
have the synoptic powers that designers can employ and connect to the anthropological landscape at 
the same time? 
                                            
108 As Paul Rabinow says ‘French geography is known for its emphasis on modes de vie: embedded, long-term, 
patterned interaction between natural and social life.” Paul Vidal de la Blanche introduced the concept of genres 
de vie modes. Rabinow, Paul, French Modern: Norms and Forms of the Social Environment  (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MIT, 1989).139. 
109 Which included the idea that Geddes would be able to have a synoptic understanding of Glasgow and the region 
from his ‘Outlook Tower’. 
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Recent Attempts to Conceptualise the Designer’s Relationship to the Landscape that Pre-Exists 
the Designer 
‘in painting... ...the subject or something like it, is held to exist prior to its representation. This is not 
true of architecture, which is brought into existence through drawing. The subject-matter (the 
building or space) will exist after the drawing, not before it (his emphasis), 110 Robin Evans, 1986 
‘the landscape speaks prior to the designer’,111 Elizabeth Meyer, 1994  
‘mapping is already a project in the making,112 James Corner, 1999  
‘the landscape as such precedes the landscape architect, while, in comparison, a piece of 
architecture under no circumstances precedes the architect’,113 Christophe Girot, 1999  
 
From the early nineties there emerged a number of, largely, landscape architectural (and pre-landscape 
urbanist) writings that were especially influential in the discipline of landscape architecture through their 
conceptualisations of design technique and an inseparable affirmation of the particularity and powers of 
both the medium of, and the process of the designing of, landscape. Initial examination of this literature 
has found that these authors gave great emphasis to the relationship between the designer (and their 
use of representation) and the landscape that pre-existed the designer.114 This included what has been 
identified here as the ‘intuitive research’ tradition as well as others, such as James Corner and Elizabeth 
Meyer. They asserted that this dimension of landscape architectural design operativity strongly tended 
to be determining of particular design trajectories—and central to what is particular and powerful about 
both the designing of landscape and the design medium of landscape. The great influence of many of 
these writings is directly related to their contributions to conceptualising this dimension. However, at the 
same time, despite these contributions, this dimension was found by these authors to be as perplexing 
as it was pivotal. With the rise of landscape urbanism and open-systems-oriented approaches to the 
design of landscape, this discussion has probably taken a ‘ back seat’ and still remains in serious need 
of conceptualisation and affirmation, not only for ‘traditional’ landscape architecture, as some landscape 
urbanists might think, but for landscape urbanism itself. I will argue that, partly by wanting to oppose 
themselves to what went before, that the recent open systems oriented approaches to the design of 
landscape (notably ‘landscape urbanism’) failed to seriously investigate this issue and thus, I argue 
seriously undermine the developing an affirmative open systems assemblage of the design of 
landscape. 
                                            
110 Evans, "Translation from Drawing to Building (1986)." 
111 Meyer, "Landscape Architecture as Modern Other and Postmodern Ground." 
112 Corner, "The Agency of Mapping: Speculation, Critique and Invention." 
113 Girot, "Towards a General Theory of Landscape." 
114 The term ‘pre-existing’ has been chosen here in preference to other terms, such as ‘site’ or ‘analysis’. ‘Site’ 
might be too delineated or restricted for urbanistic and geographical uses. At the same time as these writers were 
stressing the relation to the pre-existing they were also critical of how ‘analysis’, as it is often called, had in the 
past strongly tended to be highly conventionalised, disregarding of how they constructed the landscape, and not 
treated as a design act itself. These writers strongly affirmed reconstructing analysis as an active design moment. 
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Essentialising the Difference of the Materials 
There is a tradition of theories, speculation and anecdote, about what is different about landscape 
architectural design.115 There is, it seems, more pondering of the question of the difference of one’s own 
discipline in landscape architecture than in say architecture. Most commonly, and not unreasonably, 
these theories or musings assume that an understanding of what is the potential of landscape 
architectural design can be determined by isolating out that/those factor/s that make it different. Almost 
invariably this involves a focus on the characteristics of the actual landscape itself, as the material or 
medium of landscape architecture. Further, examples in this tradition are generally understood in 
relation to another discipline, most notably architecture. For instance, and often in comparison to 
architecture, examples of such difference of materials include: no horizon versus the horizon of an 
object, nature and not culture, evolving vegetative form versus static architectural form, processes and 
not form, space and not objects, spacing and not objects in space, relationships and not things, 
immersion versus objectifying interest, the earth versus the city, Nature versus the city etc.116 This 
tradition, and it goes on and on, tends to essentialise such factors – thereby essentialising landscape 
architecture around some essentialising difference, identified in relation to architecture. It therefore limits 
and reduces the potential of landscape architecture - at the very moment that it tries to explore the 
potential of landscape architecture. The other side of this tradition, given the impossibility of locating 
difference, is to deny any difference. This choice of essentialising difference and denial, I will suggest, is 
again a symptom.117 Maybe such speculation and theorising is a waste of time. After all, there is nothing 
more tedious and unuseful than how such musings defer almost automatically into discussions about 
‘definitions of landscape architecture’. Beyond this, comparisons with, especially, architecture, via some 
essentialising difference of materials not uncommonly, are used to posit some sort of (moral) 
superiority.118 Not being able to define the difference may be taken as meaning that no difference exists 
or such academic definition-seeking ‘kills what it loves’ by reduction and is of no practical use. Any such 
definition or characterisation of what it is that distinguishes the two practices is quickly countered by 
exceptions to the definition to the point that what distinguishes may be ridiculously narrow or even 
disappears. This tradition ends by denying the difference and potential of landscape architecture and 
the real landscape and also by denying the ongoing sense of the difference of practices. The isolation of 
certain defining dimensions of the landscape has, nevertheless, been a dead-end in understanding 
what is particular to landscape architectural design. Attempts to articulate what we simply ‘know’, if you 
like, seems to have failed or have been reductive and unproductive. 
                                            
115 Most notably beginning with authors such as Claude Henri Watelet and Quatramere de Quincey, for whom the 
issue was an important aesthetic discussion. See discussions of Quatramere de Quincey’s Encyclopedie 
methodique and Watalet’s Essai sur les jardins (1774), in Lavin, Sylvia, Quatramere de Quincy and the Invention 
of a Modern Language of Architecture, MIT, Cambridge, Mass., 1992, pp. 137-147. 
116 Whilst something of each of these, and others, is relevant to the greater problematic, they are not in themselves 
very useful. Additionally and hypothetically a possible compilation of all of the generalities each in their own 
generality, would only contribute to a comprehensive vagueness rather than a useful model.  
117 How to think both that there are issues that are simply design issues or issues that cross architecture and 
landscape architecture and that at the same time there are issues that are solely landscape architectural issues? 
It is probably the case that even the common issues are inflected or even radically redirected by what is particular 
to landscape architecture. 
118 See Girot’s essay cited in this essay, Girot, "Towards a General Theory of Landscape." for an academic 
example. There is no shortage of anecdotal examples. 
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I would suggest that the self-understanding of landscape architecture has always been constructed, and 
is continually reconstructed, in relation to, most notably, architecture - negotiated with architecture, or 
really, with landscape architectural ideas about architecture, and more recently also in relation to 
architectural and architecturally-related ideas about landscape.119 Such historical comparisons draw 
attention to the asymmetry of such an ongoing negotiation. This asymmetry is sometimes seen as one 
of power, about domination ‘by’ architecture, or that architecture is an ‘older’ or ‘bigger’ discipline. There 
has been a tendency to defer to aspects of architectural practice that somehow seem to offer a 
difference that seems to be lacking in landscape architecture. This continual renegotiation, in the 
modern world of functionally-oriented disciplinary separation, is central to all disciplines and ‘borrowing’ 
or ‘stealing’ from other disciplines is a centrally important aspect of the development of potential of a 
discipline. Such appropriation is part of affirmation yet the productivity of appropriation is weakened if 
affirmation is not focused on the very real differences between practices and of particular practices.  
It is in a sense natural to make such comparisons. The productivity of eighteenth century discussions 
about the arts used comparisons between the arts to ascertain differences of each art. As one 
commentator of that time said, “one medium invites another”. 120 In an open system there is no 
privileged position outside or above the world where the essence of a practice may be discerned. In 
openness we are always in the middle, as Deleuze and Guattari say, and in the middle the differences 
that emerge in comparison of relatively similar (and less similar as well) entities are centrally important.  
Alongside largely anecdotal theories about essentialising material differences between practices there is 
a recognition that landscape architects do things differently and anecdotal theories seem to assume 
this. Such recognition probably is and can be assumed to be a corollary of the difference of materials. 
Most landscape architects would assume both materials and technique to be important, yet there seems 
to be a limited number of serious accounts of the difference of techniques, apart from implicitly in the 
essays discussed in this thesis. 
A Better Entry Point? 
One potential entry point can be found, uncelebrated, at the beginning of an essay by the French 
landscape architect, Christopher Girot, titled ‘Towards a General Theory of Landscape’.121 Unfortunately 
                                            
119 To the point where landscape sometimes seems (at the time of this essay) to be the current model or trajectory 
for architecture. And this is not just restricted to architecture. A number of times in the recent past I have 
mentioned, in lectures to interior design students and academics, that interior designers ‘wants to be landscape 
designers’ or have a great desire for landscape – and this has been received with the laughter of recognition. 
120 Citation from an interview with an unidentified art historian, ‘The Comfort Zone, Radio National, Australia, 2000. 
It is relevant here that the most powerful and productive discussions on aesthetic issues occurred in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries through comparisons between the arts. The earlier aesthetic 
discussions warrant re-visiting, whilst the later discussions became academic and reductive. It is telling to me that 
issues of technique in landscape design – the how-to’s – became dominant at a time later than the productive 
discussions on aesthetics. A discussion that nature, the landscape and landscape design were central to. It was 
this fluid time before the hardening into separated disciplines and discourses that the aesthetic issues of 
landscape played a central role in the invention of modern aesthetics. There is very possibly an historical 
separation of aesthetic issues from issues of technique that I am effectively re-addressing in this thesis. 
121 Girot, Christopher, ‘Towards a general theory of landscape’, Topos: European Landscape Magazine, No. 28, 
September 1999, pp. 33-39. I would like to acknowledge Karl Kullmann for drawing my attention to this short and 
convenient essay. 
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what comes after this beginning very quickly collapses into moralising oppositions to architecture - 
oppositions that suggest the superiority or inferiority of architecture or landscape.  
However, Girot makes a valuable, if seemingly obvious point – as part of showing the ‘benefits’ of 
landscape architecture - and in relation to architecture  - that: 
‘The landscape as such precedes the landscape architect, while, in comparison, a piece of 
architecture under no circumstances precedes the architect’.  
To repeat, in reverse, and unlike for the architect, it could be assumed he means, that under all 
circumstances the landscape precedes the landscape architect.122  
How the landscape precedes the landscape architect becomes the basis or departure point for how to 
design the landscape. In making this move this essay potentially avoids the pitfalls of explanatory and 
empty essentialising. Whilst there may be some concern about this as a totalising proposition it does 
contain something much stronger than that of the ‘essentialising difference’ model: without denying and 
strongly suggesting that the characteristics of the landscape materials are involved in its particularity. 
Such a model indeed requires being open to whatever difference the landscape has to offer design. 
However, I would suggest that Girot makes the wrong move by regarding the implications of this as 
’uncertain terrain’, in comparison to the architect, and suggests therefore that ‘a general theory of 
landscape is yet to be written’. Whilst the generality of a ‘general theory’ is exactly what I am not 
interested in, the generality and resignation of this ‘uncertain terrain’ is not just the result of failing to 
explore the implications of the proposition. They are also the failing of a practice and disciplinary culture 
that has not come to terms with the difference of landscape architecture,123 continually deferring to the 
authority of other disciplines and to the authority of repetition of practice and thought. Such deferral is a 
symptom of a lack of clarity about, and therefore lack of affirmation of, the medium. So, in response I 
would like to suggest that the dead-end that Girot creates may be bypassed. It is worth considering 
momentarily that it is not just the concrete situation of the landscape preceding the landscape architect 
that is important to grasp here, but what Girot registers yet fails to open up is the whole problematic of 
this situation. 
Girot’s surety and conviction register that the eternally repeated moment he refers to is of the order of 
an event.124 Openness confronts the landscape architect. This involves at least two dimensions. The 
first is representation. This is an event of representation. The difference of landscape architectural 
design is bound up with representation in a way that is radically different to how representation is central 
                                            
122 Girot, "Towards a General Theory of Landscape." 33. 
123 With reference to Deleuze, as discussed in the Appendix, the difference here refers to the ‘singular power of…’ 
rather than the ‘difference from…’ 
124 As Deleuze says ‘an event does not just mean that a man has been run over’. Following Whitehead he says that 
‘events are produced in a chaos…(but) chaos does not exist; it is an abstraction because it is inseparable from a 
screen that makes something – something rather than nothing – emerge from it’, Gilles Deleuze, The Fold: 
Leibniz and the Baroque, translated by Tom Conley, Minneapolis: Minnesota Press, 1993, 76. An event registers 
an interaction at the level of sense, of the interaction of the forces and relations that make sense of concrete 
situations. An event is an expression of an open system, and involves changes in bodily interactions that are 
associated with changes in the sense of things. For further reading on events see Massumi, Parables for the 
Virtual, 221-223, and Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, translated by Mark Lester, New York: Columbia Press, 
1990, especially 52-57. Also, Sanford Kwinter, Architectures of Time: Toward a Theory of ‘the Event’ in Modernist 
Culture, Boston: MIT Press, 2001. 
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to architecture. So, Girot is partly bypassing the essentialising of materials by considering the way that 
landscape architects design, and representation is central to this. 
At that time there were only limited forays into the particular relationship that landscape architectural 
representations have with the ‘real’ landscape, what they can do with, and to, the ‘real’ landscape; and 
also what representations do to landscape architectural design. Two of the most well known, already 
discussed, are the essays by Meyer and Corner. I would argue that though these works are important 
for landscape architecture, they do not fully grasp the radically different role that design representations 
play in landscape architecture. In previous work the author began to articulate a different way to look at 
this question.125 To continue here I will also make a comparison with architecture, but not as a way of 
discovering some essentialising difference in the so-called real landscape, and/or finding some reason 
to show which one may be superior or inferior. Such a comparison, as an entry point, starts to be 
valuable if it concentrates on the difference in the functioning of representation. This comparison is 
aimed to affirm the positive and negative relative propensities of both architectural and landscape 
architectural designing. However, this inquiry is in the end less concerned with the difference between 
disciplines. It is instead constructed to clarify, with respect to design technique, what is particular to 
landscape architectural design – (following Deleuze) the difference of landscape architectural design, 
not the difference between landscape architectural design and architectural design. So, to begin with 
how does representation function differently in the two ‘types’ of design? 
How Does Representation Function Differently in the Two ‘Types’ of Design? 
As I have suggested in the past,126 there is something peculiar to landscape architecture, something I 
have termed the ‘landscape condition’.127 This is both something to encounter or ignore, and for the 
purposes here it is effectively a problematic related directly to the different functioning that 
representation plays in landscape architecture. Such a ‘condition’ is most readily understood when we 
compare it with what could comparably be called the ‘architectural condition’. Such a comparison 
echoes Girot here, but Girot taken a step further. Put simply: an architect, when provided with a site for 
a proposed architectural construction can, in effect - with or without a strong regulating ‘reading’ of the 
nature of that site, and with commonly strategic or basic recording of the ‘site’ conditions in 
representations - bring into being and transform form virtually wholly and solely within the abstract 
space of design representations. A landscape architect, in contrast, is predominantly required and in 
fact obligated to bring into being the very material that they are to transform by appropriating from the 
                                            
125 The author has also given considerable attention to representation through various published and unpublished 
writings. For instance (at that time), 'Negotiating with suburbia: Exploring the centrifugal nature of public space', 
published in 38 South: Journal or Urban Design, RMIT University, 2000 (project completed in 1996); 'What is at 
hand: A re-evaluation of technique in landscape architectural design', Kerb: Journal of Landscape Architecture, no 
6, Melbourne: RMIT University Press, 1999; Jo Russell-Clarke, Simone Slee, Kirsten Bauer, Julian Raxworthy 
and Peter Connolly, ‘Discussion with Andrea Kahn, Columbia University, about her notion of site and site 
analysis’, Kerb: Journal of Landscape Architecture, no 4, Melbourne: RMIT University Press, 1997. Significant 
attention has also been given to representation (and self-organisation) in two large, unpublished, essays titled: 
‘The particularity of landscape architecture’ and ‘What is a critical landscape architecture?’ See also Peter 
Connolly and René van der Velde, Technique. 
126 See previous footnote for reference relating to particularity. 
127 More actively I would now consider that this condition is an assemblage, an assemblage involving the 
combination of materials and techniques suited to the materials. 
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real landscape, or from some relation to the real landscape, into the abstract realm of design 
representations. So, an architect can bring into being design form virtually wholly within the space of 
representation - whilst a landscape architect must abstract from the world into the space of 
representation as part of the process of the construction of design representations required for design 
transformation.128 So, in landscape architecture what is transformed in the abstract space of 
representation tends to be a transformation of what has been appropriated from something prior to or 
outside of this abstract space. It involves a construction that is an abstraction from what is prior to 
representation—the pre-existing landscape, site, situation, world, life. The very material of design 
transformation is produced via a process of abstraction. 
This has two major implications for the two assemblages. What results from architects bringing into 
being design form wholly in the space of representation is what can be referred to as an effective 
‘partitioning’ off of the architectural form from what it is transformed in relation to – site, situation etc. In 
contrast to the partitioning set up by architectural representation, landscape architectural uses of 
representation tend to construct a continuum of abstraction. Partitioning versus abstracting. The 
partitioned versus the open. Partitioning versus openness. Partitioning is one of the defining aspects of 
architectural designing, and where the landscape is given attention can open up its own powerful 
interactions with the landscape. Such partitioning may certainly be constructed in singular relation to, or 
to construct a singular relation to, the rest of the world. Such a relation may be richly focused and / or 
singularly powerful. The notions of the ‘armature’ and ‘intervention’ and even ‘siting’ suggest such an 
art. Conversely, just as partitioning may afford a productive relation to the world, such a relation may 
also be weak, restricted or irrelevant. Partitioning is also centrally part of landscape architectural design, 
yet—relatively—tends to play a minor role in the landscape architectural production process. 
Architectural design will always produce an interaction with the landscape / world etc. – whether the 
designer gives attention to it or not. The openness of landscape architecture, however, opens up a very 
different plane of interaction with the landscape than that found in architecture. Partitioning is both 
constitutive of architecture and highly determined. The partitioned architectural object or architectural 
organisations have been the focus of a whole practice, representational and aesthetic practice, theory, 
history, tradition, discipline, discourse, technology, legal jurisdiction, visuality, the types of problems 
addressed, and imagination. The assemblage associated with partitioning just as the assemblage 
associated with openness is a ‘multiplicity’ (Deleuze).129 Architects strongly tend to see the world from a 
partitioned perspective, obsessing through it, highly privileging it, and all this is as it should be. Likewise 
landscape architects strongly tend to see the world in certain ways. The affects of partitioning tend to be 
very palpably ‘felt’ from outside architecture, in landscape architecture, but not clearly understood. The 
process of partitioning gets architects to practice in an architectural way and the process resulting from 
openness gets landscape architects to practice in landscape architectural ways.  
Just as in Girot this is in one sense very obvious - yet that it has remained obscured is striking and 
telling. The radical difference of each condition has been felt (as affects produced by an assemblage) 
                                            
128 As the landscape architect, Kirsten Bauer says to students: ‘you need to design the landscape before you can 
design’. 
129 Refer to Assemblage 2 (refer Appendix). 
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but also, because expression (Deleuze)130 of it has been obscured. This needs clarification for to begin 
with neither condition is exclusively restricted to architects or landscape architects or architecture or 
landscape architecture. They always co-exist, are not strictly separable, and designers of whatever 
discipline have, depending on the situation, varying degrees of freedom to position themselves in 
relation to these two conditions, or along, what may be considered a fictional continuum or range of 
mixes and mixings of these two conditions. They are both inseparably intertwined yet effectively 
different. The difference occurs partly because of the predominance or great tendency or ‘attractor’,131 in 
concrete situations, of each condition or assemblage for the respective design discipline. Only partly as 
other tendencies, self-organisationally, make each end ‘attractors’. Both architectural and landscape 
architectural design are, in fact, an inseparable mix of both conditions, inseparably involving the arts of 
the partitioned and the open. 
The radical difference of the landscape end of the continuum needs expression as from an architectural 
or normative perspective; not being able to simply ‘project’ may be seen negatively and as a problem. 
Certainly what gets called ‘analysis’ tends to be seen as a problem in contemporary landscape 
architecture.  
More positively, this condition/assemblage involves the radical connivance of what may be abstracted 
from what precedes the landscape architect with what happens to this within the abstract space of 
representation. What ‘precedes’ conniving within and with what ‘proceeds’. That of the world with that of 
representation. Construction and appropriation (abstraction being both a construction and an 
appropriation) in relation to openness. A movement of abstraction and movement of a transformation-of-
such-an-abstraction. Appropriation and transformation. Analysis times design, but only if we no longer 
see ‘analysis’ as separate from design. A map is ‘already a project in the making’,132 as Corner says. 
What we tended to call ‘design’ is possibly given stronger expression and transformed as 
‘transformation’. Whereas it was rightly said in the early nineties that ‘design begets design’ and ‘lines 
lead to lines’, thus newly recognising the affectivity of what happens in representation itself—it may 
instead be asked how does and can the world beget design? What needs to be affirmed now also, and 
this is pointing ahead, is the affectivity of the world, and the affectivity of the world in design.133 
‘Traditional design’ had traditional ways of begetting design. It had very strong tendencies for 
standardising the approach to what precedes the landscape architect, as ‘analysis’. ‘Progressive’ 
landscape architecture, I would suggest, has the tendency to treat what may be more suitably a 
landscape condition as if it were an architectural condition, thereby denying the potential connivance 
with what precedes the landscape architect. Both tend to deny the radically different nature of 
landscape architectural design. The radical difference of the landscape architectural condition, however, 
                                            
130 Refer to Assemblage 2 (refer Appendix). 
131 For a discussion of attractors, as tendencies of the system, see Massumi, Brian, A User's Guide to Capitalism 
and Schizophrenia: Deviations Form Deleuze and Guattari  (London: The MIT Press, 1992)., 60.  
132 Corner, "The Agency of Mapping: Speculation, Critique and Invention." 216. 
133 It is important to note that the affectivity (though not using that name) of representation was starting be given 
serious attention post Evans (and Deleuze and Guattari, 1988), but the affectivity of the landscape has not even 
now been given serious attention. This thesis seeks to redress this. 
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is only really affirmed when the implications of this difference are explored. To do this requires some 
further exploration of the ‘analytical’ dimension. 
The ‘traditional’ (rational site-planning model) of design process still existed in the nineties as a central 
reference or departure point for landscape architecture, and it is still important. It implicitly half-
recognised the ‘landscape condition’, with an emphasis on a certain type of ‘analysis’, highly 
standardised and conventionalised, that engages with the world in a very limited and standardised type 
of way134- infinitely variable and hence it could be claimed to not be limited, but not limited in a very very 
certain way. This was often, ‘on the ground’, associated with, or parodied with, the phrase ‘analysis 
paralysis’, where what is termed ‘analysis’ tends to be both standardised and almost an end in itself, 
seemingly more to legitimate rather than facilitate design exploration. It was seen that this resulted in a 
deferral from ‘design itself’. Analysis itself seemed centrally part of the problem. It is no wonder that 
architectural models and notions started to seem attractive. So there is a need to distinguish analysis in 
this standardised sense, as the almost unconsciously prescribed repertoire and style of representation 
of the ‘traditional’ model or assemblage, from what I would call the ‘analytical’ moment of design - that 
moment of the interpolation of some relevant or potentially relevant relation to the world into the graphic 
system of representation for the purposes of transformation. Analysis in this sense is central to 
landscape design in a manner that it is not in architecture. My experience with architects has shown that 
the word ‘analysis’ means something different. It has a different function. ‘Analysis’, if affirmed, might be 
the most strategic entry and starting point to what constitutes the radical difference from architecture—
and the radical difference of landscape architecture. However, it is easy to counter that ‘analysis’ in 
traditional design, albeit standardised, is still analysis. It still involves an abstraction from what precedes 
you. This thesis argues that, the landscape, this openness, itself provides the means to affirm 
appropriation.  
Situation as Event 
The difference of openness, being an infinity of differences, the source of potential, confronts the 
designer. The event of this confrontation is not just a confrontation with the perplexity of such an infinity 
in all of its confusion. This event is co-ordinated. An event is a spontaneous interaction of differences 
that occurs in an open system. Nature or openness co-ordinates its own difference. This event might be 
called the situation, the design situation. A situation is an event. The situation is not momentary and 
unfolds through the actions of design just as the situation resonates with such actions, steering and 
selecting them as such actions move the investigation forward into a trajectory of investigation.  
3 Dimensions: Appropriation, Regulation and Transformation 
This draws out that a situation is not just a representational event but also a ‘regulative’ or ‘aesthetic’ 
event. This is the second dimension of the confrontation with openness that is landscape architecture. 
Even more than the appropriative, the regulative or aesthetic is an unaffirmed dimension of landscape 
architectural technique. The regulatory serves a number of functions in the greater dynamism or 
                                            
134 That you would find in any site planning text of the sixties or seventies. 
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assemblage that is landscape architectural design. The situation, firstly, registers what is at stake, being 
both negative and positive tendencies. This is a registration of both the ‘war and famine’135 and the 
potential that can be discerned in any event - both of which themselves may become potential in 
openness. This potential involves affects and events that are produced by the interaction of concrete 
relations in time and space. This potential may start to be registered as a hunch or as small excitement 
during a site visit or during any of the other moments of design. Events are problematic. A design 
problem is a design response to a situation—a plane or trajectory of investigation of difference or 
potential. The potential needs a leading edge and design actions provide this, largely through graphic 
actions. This is a two-fold process. What anyone seeks in an open system are affects that emerge in 
such openness. The particular openness of landscape architecture, prone to the obsessional, has its 
own difficulties and therefore requires its own devices to see beyond what it tends to get you to see.136 
All affects are ‘imperceptible’137 (not invisible), and in openness this imperceptibility is its own 
problematic. In contrast, there already are at least some disciplines of affects in architecture, even if the 
term ‘affect’ is rarely used.138 Landscape architectural theorising has not affirmed the submerged open 
systems disciplines of practice and so practice tends to veer from such affects, deferring elsewhere. 
Disciplines, devices and thinking to match are being explored yet this is largely an unconceptualised 
realm.139  
These three dimensions: appropriation, regulation and transformation are here identified to start to 
suggest the particular difference of the landscape design assemblage and start to suggest its difference 
from the difference of the architectural assemblage.140 Architectural projection as the transformation of 
what has been constructed in abstract space versus a transformation of what has been appropriated 
into the abstract space of representation from the landscape that pre-existed the abstract space of 
representation. Such transformation is radically different from projection. Appropriation is centrally 
determining – and radically different - in this trajectory in a way that it is not in architecture. Regulation 
or the aesthetics of this assemblage (of landscape and design affects) is an almost entirely obscured 
                                            
135 Deleuze citation source remains undetermined. 
136 One highly ignored technique for helping to see the obvious is the comparison and contrast of concrete 
examples in reality. Please refer to p.15 of ‘Embracing Openness’ Part 2, Connolly 2004 
137 See Assemblage 2 (refer Appendix). 
138 Traditionally through the devices of typology and program in architecture, though type and program do not get 
discussed with reference to affect.  
139 The first cohort of the graduate program in landscape architecture (research by design project) at RMIT 
University, founded by this researcher, began with an extensive mapping project of greater Melbourne looking at 
the interaction of various dimensions of the urban landscape which led onto an exploration involving considerable 
field-work of the reconstruction of the notion of landscape typology between 1995 and 1996. Through comparing 
and contrasting many real world examples of landscapes this research group explored how when particular urban 
relations came together this produced particular affects, understood as being the particular affects associated 
with engaging in a particular type, and which lead onto later work into continuous variations, events, mechanisms 
and connectivities. The particular affects may be experienced as a ‘character’ or ‘quality’; however, these are a 
sign of, and mask, the workings of urban relations, a sign that such urban relations instead produce affects. I 
would suggest that it was this venture which first seriously and systematically engaged with landscape as an open 
and complex system – a system that produces landscape affects. Some of the products of the first era of this 
program are to be found in Peter Connolly and René van der Velde (eds), Technique: Landscape Architecture 
Graduate Research at RMIT University 1995-2002, Melbourne: RMIT University Press, 2002, 27. 
140 Partly through the use of compare and contrast as being an essential tool in field work I have become very 
interested in two types of comparison – one that is focused on the difference between and one that is focused on 
the difference of. Comparison itself does not have to fall into the shackles of mediation or representation that 
Deleuze refers to. Obsessionally looking at / examining something without reference to other things is no more a 
guaranteed solution to getting to the difference of something than comparison. 
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realm. 3 unaffirmed realms and when taken together are part of an unaffirmed assemblage, which we 
will examine further here. 
Girot’s initial quote has other things to offer. In more detail he says: 
One has to argue for the benefits of landscape architecture over and over again, especially with 
architects who often have no clear idea of this profession. In so doing, one often has to take 
recourse to commonplaces and obvious facts. The landscape as such precedes the landscape 
architect, while, in comparison, a piece of architecture under no circumstances precedes the 
architect. The fundamental difference explains the theoretical ambivalence of the former in contrast 
to the ideological determination of the latter. It is, therefore, on this uncertain terrain that a general 
theory of landscape architecture remains to be written. 141 
To be clear, by saying that “the landscape as such precedes the landscape architect, while, in 
comparison, a piece of architecture under no circumstances precedes the architect,” Girot is not saying 
something ‘academic’ or ‘intellectual’, he is describing two different ‘physical’ actions. ‘Physical’ in the 
sense that they are affectual. This action is composed of a complex structure of affect and sense, a 
dynamism of affect and sense. An assemblage. 
The notion that “the landscape as such precedes the landscape architect” is a centrally determining 
action of landscape designing and this action of designing is determining of and associated with a 
power, with designing affects specific to landscape architecture. The landscape design assemblage that 
Girot is attempting to think is (or strongly tends to be) determined by this action of designing, this 
relationship to that which precedes the designer. 
According to Girot (and other landscape architects), architects tend not to see the determining nature of 
this action and also tend not to see the associated design power from their perspective – they have ‘no 
clear idea’ of the nature of landscape design assemblages and their powers. Architects tend not to 
understand the power of landscape architecture – because they engage with a different realm of power. 
Their own particular power is approached or constructed differently, and so from their (bodily) 
experience of design they tend not to see the power of landscape architectural design assemblages. 
Of course, just as landscape architects can be surprised by – and sometimes envious of - the power of 
the architectural design assemblage, so architects can be surprised by the power of landscape design 
assemblages. There are moments of surprise that make a designer open up to the powers of another 
discipline. Such moments tend to fade away again. Though, Girot’s comments probably attest that there 
is an asymmetry between the way each discipline sees the other’s power (or does not see it). Girot’s 
comments suggest that architects tend to not affirm the power of the landscape design assemblage 
more than the other way around. Architects do not seem to note that landscape architects fail to 
appreciate the power of architecture. It is not an issue for them. This is no doubt partly an historical 
aspect of the relations between the disciplines, but is no doubt, I would also suggest, to do with the 
relative obviousness of the power of the architectural design assemblage and the relative obviousness 
                                            
141 Girot, "Towards a General Theory of Landscape." 33. 
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(when looking at a piece of architecture or an architectural drawing) of the power of the products of the 
architectural design assemblage – the assemblages of, or associated with, architectural constructions.  
Some architects have given space to the differences between the ways that the two disciplines and 
practices approach sites and designing. One architect and urbanist who is interested in how architects 
engage with sites is Andrea Kahn. In an interview with Kerb: Journal of Landscape Architecture, Kahn 
reflects openly and informally about the differences between the different relationships to site between 
architecture and landscape architecture. “One thing that I've noticed with the landscape design process 
is that it's hard to distinguish where the analysis stops, and where the design really begins… somehow 
the 'real' at a  particularly dusky moment becomes the 'idea', but you can't ever figure out exactly where 
that happens. That's how I understand the relationship between analysis and landscape design.”  
Here, Kahn is describing her surprise that the ‘real’ determines the ‘idea’, instead of the architect’s idea 
determining the design. She notes further, “… there seems to be a sort of continuity which is different to 
the architectural approach to site. You do the analysis stuff, then you put away those particular types of 
pencils, and maybe you pin the drawings up and look at them, and then you pull out your other pencils 
and new paper to start designing. Somehow, it's just a continuous roll of trace in landscape - its this 
scroll thing.”142 Design in landscape, as I will further develop in Assemblage 3, is more of a 
transformation of something existing than a design produced from an idea (and this takes away nothing 
from thinking). The ‘continuity’ Kahn speaks of is the continuity of something of what preceded the 
designer into the final design. This continuity is a transformation, a transformation of an abstraction of 
the pre-existing.  
Kahn’s observation or surprise at how landscape architects design aligns with the way that many of the 
landscape architects of the nineties talked about the differences between the disciplines. However, 
architects might say the same thing – that architectural design is a transformation of the pre-existing. 
Kahn, as an architect, attempts to clarify that it is different for landscape design: “the materials you work 
with are similar to the materials you're working on. It sounds really stupid because you could say that 
about architecture, but (in architecture) you get instead a gross-grained site diagram and something 
gets plonked down on it. You could probably say that about a lot of landscape projects too, but there is 
a particular architectural conceit with regard to materials.” Kahn identifies that landscape architects are 
not immune to ‘ignoring the site’ but more importantly she identifies a key difference: Literally (my 
emphasis)…. “for landscape design, the material for shaping the site is the material of the site.”143 In 
reverse, for architecture the material for shaping the site (as a design produces a different site) is not to 
be the material of the site. For Kahn, this material is, as I draw out in Assemblage 3, the pure product of 
the abstract space of representation. So, for landscape design there is one material, literally the material 
of the site that is transformed to become the design. For architecture, there is the material of the site 
and also a material outside of this, being the pure product of the abstract space of representation. Both 
architecture and landscape architecture shape the site. Landscape design’s shaping of the site involves 
transforming a previous site material. Architectural design’s shaping of the site involves the construction 
                                            
142 Bauer, Kirsten et al., "From a Discussion with Andrea Kahn," Kerb: Journal of Landscape Architecture, no. #4 
(1996). 
143 Ibid. 5. 
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and transformation of a separate material, set in relation to the site (if it is). This construction and 
transformation of a separate material comes with its own wondrous powers. The relationship between 
the separate material of architectural design and the site material and site produced by this separation 
of materials, is also an architectural concern and source of great and wondrous power as well. It is not 
the same as the wonder and power of the landscape designer’s approach to shaping of sites. Two 
assemblages. Two powers or sets of powers. Two ways of understanding design.  
One key reason that Kahn is interested in the designer’s relationship to sites is, as she reflects in this 
interview, because she commenced teaching in an urban design program. She says, “I became 
interested in issues of site analysis when I started teaching urban design, because it became really 
clear that, at the simplest level, techniques of site analysis which have been taught or utilized in 
architecture programs, were not immediately applicable to urban scale problems. We were seeing a lot 
of students simply transpositing methods that they’d learnt in architecture, to urban scale sites. All of a 
sudden there were huge gaps.”144 This Assemblage does not dwell on urbanism, however, Kahn’s 
observation of the ‘transpositing’ of methods becomes entirely relevant to what happens with open 
systems-oriented landscape urbanisms in the following decade and beyond. 
 
Someone who is neither and architect or a landscape architect but a close observer of architecture, 
landscape architecture and urbanism is Sebastien Marot. After writing about urbanism for many years, 
Marot saw that architecture had developed well-circulated and expressive conceptualizations of an 
architectural urbanism and that landscape architecture, at least in relative terms, had not. In his 1999 
essay in Corner’s collection, he gives attention to the experimentation with approaches to landscape 
design carried out at the Versailles School, in France,145 in the context of the increasingly important role 
landscape architects were taking in urbanism and masterplanning in France. The Versailles school was 
producing a way of approaching urban and public projects. “Such a view is less focused on the program 
of a proposed building project than on exploring the possibilities of site characteristics and hidden 
phenomena.”146 “The specific qualities of sites and their situations provide both the rationale and the raw 
material for making new projects.”147 So, not only does the site material become the design material, but 
it also provides the rationale or sense to such projects. The whole logic and way of understanding such 
projects is determined in relation to the found qualities of the site, instead of in relation to a proposed 
program. The site material becomes the design material just as the design material is understood or 
regulated in relation to the site material. Marot feels that such an understanding has not been 
conceptualised and affirmed and that urbanism tends to be seen in terms of the architectural conception 
of proposed program, even if as Marot finds that landscape architects are increasingly playing leading 
                                            
144 Ibid. 3.  
145 The Versailes National School of Landscape Arcitecture or, in French, The Ecole Nationale Superieure du 
Paysage, Versaille. 
146 Marot, Sebastien, "The Reclaiming of Sites," in Recovering Landscape: Essays in Contemporary Landscape 
Theory, ed. Corner, James (New York, New York: Princeton, 1999). 48. 
147 Ibid. 49. 
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roles in masterplanning and public projects. Marot follows this championing of an urbanism specific to 
landscape architectural in a later 2003 book.148 
Andrea Kahn also points to how each assemblage comes with its own ways and powers of seeing. The 
architectural ways of seeing tend not to connect with the powers of landscape design assemblages and 
the powers of landscape – though, as discussed there are always surprise moments, partly because of 
the general expectations that have been set up being undermined or even shocked by actual instances 
of the obviousness of power. 
When Girot is referring to “commonplaces and obvious facts” he is, without conceptualising it and 
affirming it, referring to affects and assemblages, the affects and assemblages of the landscape design 
assemblage (in comparison to the affects and assemblages of architectural design assemblages). They 
are ‘facts’ in the way that the affects and diagrams of Bacon’s paintings are facts, not meanings. They 
are ‘commonplace’ in that they are simply part of everyday practice, perpetually. They are ‘obvious’ in 
the sense of being obvious, factual, when they are given expression – too obvious – and yet 
imperceptible to our preconceptions. Imperceptible from the perspective of common sense, and the 
assumptions about the world that go along with it. Such designing affects, and hence the assemblages 
that produce them, are always ‘too obvious’. To see them requires the development of a perception, a 
way of seeing, to allow us to see more. Girot and Kahn provide some of this perception. 
That the benefits of landscape architecture have to be argued “over and over again” attests to 
something of an hegemony of conception – hegemonic in terms of what architects and architecture think 
and that notion of an “uncertain terrain” attests to how landscape architects have not and do not 
satisfactorily affirm the landscape design assemblage to themselves and to others – and that landscape 
architects tend to internalise their own version of architectural thought.   
For Girot, as I’ve already discussed, a ‘general theory’ has yet to be written. To get at this sort of power 
does not require general frameworks or general categories. It requires expressive conceptions and 
perceptions. So, ‘general’ for Girot is not gross, universal or imprecise, it is to be affirmative of what he 
seems really to try to do, to be expressive – and for conceptions to be expressive. A general theory of 
landscape architecture, in this sense, would be a theory, in its conceptions that expresses the powers of 
landscape architecture and the functioning of the processes that produce this power (effectively the 
powers of the particular processes that produce the power of design). A general theory would account 
for the power of landscape design and propel it further. A general theory in this sense would not be a 
one-time-for-all-explanatory-theory, it would, instead, open up theorising and practice. It, itself, would be 
experimental, for in Deleuze and Guattari’s terms ‘experiment’ is only experimentation with power. A 
general theory would produce an expression of what is too obvious and hence tends to go under the 
radar. This thesis also argues, especially through Assemblage 3, that the dominant open systems 
                                            
148 Marot, Sub-Urbanism and the Art of Memory. The cover notes to this book say: “Sub-urbanism: a subversion of 
urbanism, a new approach to shaping territory that recognizes the suburb as the setting for most people's daily 
lives. This book is a sub-urbanist manifesto. Its author, Sebastien Marot, is editor of Le Visiteur, the Paris journal 
of 'city, territory, landscape and architecture'. Challenging the dominant role of the (architectural) program in 
regulating the design project, Marot argues that instead attention should be redirected towards the site -- the site 
read in depth, with an active regard for memory.” This theme of memory is reflected in most of the European 
landscape architectural writers in this Assemblage.  
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conceptions effectively contribute to deferring away from the affirmation of the power of the landscape 
design assemblage. It should be said that an affirmation of the landscape design assemblage, via 
general theory, will be an affirmation of all landscape design assemblages in their individuality.149 A 
good ‘general theory’, in this sense, would do that, just as Evans provides a singular introduction to a 
general theory of architecture. It will be a general theory in the sense that it expresses the singular 
landscape architectural power that ‘returns’ (Nietzsche)150 during expressions of the landscape design 
assemblage, during examples of the effective functioning of the landscape design assemblage.  
The construction of an affirmative conception involves two related challenges or moves: positively 
conceptualising an affirmative assemblage – and also identifying where and how there is deferral away 
from an affirmative conception. The two feed off each other ‘machinically’. It is with experience and 
highlighted by Deleuze and Nietzsche that the stronger the affirmation the more (involuntarily or 
machinically) obvious it is where there is a deferral and the more obvious the path away from deferral 
might be - and which in turn feeds back into further positive conception (and practice). Affirmation leads 
you forward by itself, machinically. The whole assemblage is about such leading forward, and to not 
affirm this is to not affirm what an assemblage is. As Spinoza affirms, only power is something. Lack of 
power is nothing. Lack of power cannot be affirmed, even if it can be identified through comparison with 
the experience of power or a ‘memory’ of the experience of power. This is because affirmation is 
affirmation of a power and it is the experience of the affirmation of power that tells you when it is not 
being affirmed. Power is, in this sense, the ultimate critical mechanism. In a sense there can be no 
critique without affirmation. The powers of landscape and landscape design assemblages are 
experienced continually in practice (student, academic, professional etc.). They must be. They are 
affirmed less than experienced. They tend to escape affirmation.  
Girot identifies a ‘theoretical ambivalence’ of landscape architecture versus an ‘ideological 
determination’ of architecture. This certainly seems to refer to the idea that architects can, from 
‘nothing’, ‘have an idea’ and then project ‘from’ that idea to produce architecture. Ideas, ideologies 
determine the architecture. It is often said by architects that ‘Architecture is about ideas’. Architecture is 
determined by the ideas of architects, projections resulting from the conscious ideas of the architect.151 
                                            
149 An affirmation of the landscape design assemblage will also result in an affirmation of the architectural 
assemblage – even if it comes with a more sober appraisal of the powers of the architectural assemblages to 
design landscape. 
150 Refer to Assemblage 2 (refer Appendix) for a discussion of ‘the eternal return’ of difference. 
151 An (self) expressionist form of this sees that the ideas of the architects are what is expressed in the architecture, 
and that a ‘projective’ version of this that the ‘ideas’ determine a projection which has its own expression. 
Architects very often tend to want to consider the architect’s ideas associated with the architecture as the 
important way to understand the architecture. The Barthesian notion of the author / artist only weakly entered 
architecture. A problem of Barthes’ notion, however, is that it never had a strong conception of expression, relying 
on the interplay of cultural codes or the fluidity of the open work. The notion of the Death of the Author comes 
back with a force with the autonomous expression of assemblages. This allows for a positive expression of the 
designer ‘genius’, where the designer is able to produce an autonomous expression, one that stands up by itself 
as Deleuze and Guattari say, where the designer is not the endpoint of the expression but the ‘cosmic artisan’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari) or craftsperson of an expression separate from themselves, an expression that must be 
embraced for how it functions expressively and not lazily explained by the designer as source or their ‘ideas’. In 
this regard, Charles Waldheim conflates or confuses indeterminacy-as-autonomous-self-organisational 
functioning with the Death of the Author, the latter referring to the ‘death’ of the conventional idea of the 
author/designer being the way to understand a text/work/design and the openness to the autonomous expressive 
capacities of texts/works/designs, in his Waldheim, Charles, "Indeterminate Emergence: Problematised 
Authorship in Contemporary Landscape Practice," Kerb: Journal of Landscape Architecture, no. 15, Landscape 
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Whilst this notion has been criticised from within architecture itself, it is still strikingly important within 
architecture. From this perspective the relationship to the pre-existing, where the pre-existing is 
determining in some way outside of the control of the designer, seems a compromise, a weakening of 
the power of a designer. Kahn’s surprise that in landscape design the ‘real determines the idea’ rather 
than the idea determining the design, is one expression of surprise at the difference of designing 
between the disciplines. 
How not to judge landscape design via this ‘prior image’ (to use Corner’s term)? The designers here 
mostly have no problems doing just that, but occasionally they fall back into understanding landscape 
architecture in reference to such an image. Girot, for one, might seem to do this through the conception 
of ‘theoretical ambivalence’ and the resulting ‘uncertain terrain’. However, this example and such 
conceptions point to weak disciplinary conceptions rather than a weakness of the landscape design 
assemblage. The degree to which landscape architects judge the power of landscape architecture 
relatively negatively through comparison with architecture is the degree to which they are not affirming 
the power of landscape architectural design assemblage. To affirm the power of landscape architecture 
is to make the comparison irrelevant.152 Girot’s comment is recognition of both the challenge and the 
importance of embracing the design assemblage of landscape on its own terms. This thesis sets out to 
do this through reconceptualising landscape design as an assemblage, an open systems machinery. A 
reconfiguring of the dominant open systems conceptions of landscape design assemblages is the aim, 
and open systems thinking and findings about what landscapes ‘really do’ and how designer work are 
the means to do this. An open systems conception is the target and open systems conceptions provide 
the means. 
Just as Girot asserts that the landscape exists prior to the designer, Corner, in his discussion of 
‘mapping’, identifies that we tend to not appreciate how much our actions of mapping or analysis 
determine what we do. For him, as we have already quoted: “mapping is already a project in the 
making,”153 and so affirms how much analysis or mapping is a determining dimension of design that 
needs to be denaturalised and be seen for the potential that it might offer. By saying this, James Corner 
registers that there was (and no doubt still is) a tendency for analysis or mapping to be considered 
anterior to and outside of ‘design’ (proper) and the creativity of design. Corner identifies analysis or 
mapping as part of designing, as a determining part of design, a design action, and to be taken 
seriously. 
Similarly for Marc Claramunt and Catherine Mosbach, “to understand the milieu is one of the reflexes in 
a landscaping project.”154 What initially seems like it might be an issue of translation turns out not to be. 
The idea of ‘the reflexes in a landscaping project” seems to not fit into English, with its divisions 
between nouns and verbs. The ‘project’ is normally seen as a thing (a landscape), the reflex would be a 
doing that might produce a landscape. However, a project in this sense is not a thing or a doing, it is an 
                                                                                                                                          
Urbanism issue (2007). Such a conflation simply goes along with the general deferral away from the affective and 
expressive nature of real landscapes. 
152 Though comparison, as I’ve suggested already, can be used, if used artfully and rigorously, to point to the 
singular and affectual. 
153 Corner, "The Agency of Mapping: Speculation, Critique and Invention." 250. 
154 Claramunt and Mosbach, "Nature of a Landscape Project." 6. 
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assemblage, an affectual production process. It is a substantial entity itself, the substantial entity – it is 
to-understand-the-milieu as a substantive, as a doing itself. ‘Understanding’ here is not necessarily 
intellectual or conscious. As with Girot, understanding that which pre-exists is important but for 
Claramunt and Mosbach it is a reflex, something much more than the conscious decision of a designer, 
more like the automatism, the involuntary power, of the assemblage when it can be seen for what it is. 
This is an involuntary power that we feed-off – and feed-back and feed-forward into – an involuntary 
functioning of the assemblage. How to only see the power of the landscape design assemblage as 
purely positive and how to achieve this power, rather than bemoan that it does not compare with, say, 
architecture, or, as I will point to, does not compare with the image that landscape urbanism constructs 
of an empowering landscape design assemblage. 
This ‘reflex’ highlights that the assemblage of landscape design is a co-becoming, always already a co-
becoming, both long-term-historical and immediate-situational, of designer and the material of design in 
this substantive single dynamism. Each discipline and practice has a particular material. The history of a 
discipline is the history of the co-becoming of this relationship (not the history of a profession). Each 
transforms the other. Each is not each, in that the relationship itself is the substantive, the relationship is 
an assemblage, a power. The singular nature of each material limits, produces and determines the 
singular nature of the discipline. The material becomes with the assemblage. 
To understand that the milieu is one of the reflexes of the landscape design assemblage is for Girot to 
see this action of the relationship to what preceded the designer as what the landscape gets you to do if 
you are a landscape designing, what landscape designers tend to do and an autonomous movement or 
power produced by the and part of the landscape design assemblage, a power itself liberated by the 
joining of the designer with the landscape in the design problem, and so, in a sense, leaving the 
designer and the landscape behind. 
Unlike Girot, Claramunt and Mosbach stress ‘milieu’ instead of site as the way that they understand that 
which pre-exists the designer. A milieu suggests something much wider – all that is relevant to the 
power and situation of the landscape project and all that could be. A determining part of a landscape 
project is understanding – or rather having an understanding – of all that pre-exists the designer that is 
or could be relevant. ‘Understanding the milieu’ might sounds like an impractically infinite task. 
However, it is not some sort of total knowledge of everything that is or might be relevant but is a 
practical and targeted understanding of all that is or might be relevant: relevant to a design problem, to 
a design project. The assemblage of designer-landscape-problem itself determines the relative 
relevance of anything that seems relevant. A relative relevance which is driven by the limitations of the 
designers i.e. there is only so much time to spend on the analysis or the project. The assemblage 
determines what might be worth spending time on, how to go about it and when it is reasonable to stop, 
as there are other things to do also. Communication between, and evaluation of, parts of the design is a 
reflex of the landscape project, of the landscape assemblage, a power of the assemblage. 
Understanding the milieu is a confrontation or event that a designer must undergo. What is it to find 
yourself in the openness of landscape design, typically not knowing what you are for, how you might 
find it, where you might start, what you might work with and why? Claramunt and Mosbach say that 
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understanding the milieu requires “mental and physical tools that cannot leave the person who 
questions at a loss,” and this involves “an apprenticeship of the landscape”.155 
For Girot, “the important thing is that attention is always focused on what already exists in situ. In this 
way, the designer may carefully and knowledgeably assess what really needs to be recovered 
(anew)…”156 Girot here acknowledges that there is a mode or means of evaluation of the relevance of 
what already exists in situ. Of course there are ‘careful and knowledgeable’ well-trodden well-taught 
rational, technical and scientific aspects of analysis and evaluation, but Girot realises that such types of 
analysis do not tell you how relevant they are. He is talking about a means to evaluate beyond this, one 
that functions ‘carefully and knowledgably’ differently. The technical-systems-scientific might be precise 
or come with degrees of precision. How to decide what rational-technical-scientific analysis to 
undertake? The rational-technical would then be evaluated in terms of what is beyond the technical-
systems-scientific. The higher purpose of evaluation that the scientific and technical make sense within 
and are in the service of designer-evaluation – where the evaluation of a particular milieu has its own 
form of functioning. 
To identify something or some aspect that pre-exists the designer is to open up the potential to produce 
something new in a way that honours the potential that is understood to exist – a potential that tells you 
that it is significant (needs to be recovered). Newness in landscape design, a power that is significant, is 
something that is and can only be understood in relation to the site /situation / milieu / pre-existing. 
Newness is not that something is newly different from that which went before. Newness is something to 
recover, where recovery involves the relationship to what pre-exists the designer, what exists in situ (‘on 
location’). More specifically, the new comes: ex loco (from the location), a relatione cum locus (from the 
relation to the location) and is evaluated ex hoc affinitas (on the basis of this relationship). The 
‘important thing’ involves these three dimensions: the substantiveness and potential of what already 
‘exists’, the relation to itself, and the discovery and aesthetic evaluation of newness on the basis of this 
relation—and that what needs to be recovered, points to this important interrelationship, and that it also 
‘really needs to be recovered” strongly suggests an imperative, or a communication of the significance 
of that which ‘needs’ to be recovered. So, not only does this relationship to the pre-existing able to 
identify what to recover but it also identifies the relevance or significance of this for the designer and the 
design problem. Girot is suggesting a strongly self-sufficient relationship here. Deleuze would use the 
term ‘immanence’ to describe this relationship. That the Latin in situ is not just about the site but the 
location points to the locatedness, in time and space, of the site / pre-existing etc. This immanence has 
an internal problematic functioning that connects the designer and the site into the situatedness of this 
relationship in time and space.157  
The term in situ (on location) has a number of interrelated senses for different disciplines: in place, in 
the field, in real world locations (as opposed to an abstract idea/design separated off from the real 
world), under operating conditions, with what is available, carried out at the building site using raw 
                                            
155 Ibid. 58. 
156 Girot, "Four Trace Concepts in Landscape Architecture." 61. 
157 Deleuze’s beautiful account of the ‘objective problematic unity’ of a problem describes a problem, 
experimentation and the immanence involved in such experimentation, an immanence that does not require 
outside criteria or judgment. 
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materials, referring to a work of art created specifically for a host site… These may start to suggest what 
Girot was talking about or could be. Such situatedness in time and space, locatedness, is not merely 
abstract. The immanence that is suggested by Girot involves an internal aesthetic functioning that 
connects the designer and the newness that they are drawing out and to whatever the singular and 
situated spacetime relationships might be relevant. 
Girot dwells on this and goes on to discuss his four stage description of the design assemblage of 
landscape design: involving ‘landing, grounding, finding, founding’. “Whatever the case founding…” (the 
final stage) “…is always a reaction to something that was already there.”158 The final stage is a reaction 
to what was already there, is understood in Girot as a reaction itself. Girot is here positing an aesthetic 
relationship between an initial aesthetic reaction and the final aesthetic reaction involved with the 
finished or constructed design. An aesthetic relationship between an initial reaction and a later one. A 
self-referential aesthetic relationship between (at least two) aesthetic reactions: one of the ‘pre-existing’ 
and one of the future. Not only is the immanence he suggests internal but it is internal to the designer’s 
reactions. In being internal to the designer’s reactions, in its concrete locatedness in time and space, it 
is also singular and in relation to the worldly situatedness, significance and relevance of the landscape 
and the design project. Intimate and fully and widely connected to whatever might be relevant and to the 
future. It is through this ‘intimacy’ that it is fully and relevantly connected. The something that ‘was 
already there’ had to of course be given expression by the designer to exist, through what and how they 
informally or formally ‘record’ or note it, how they analyse it. The creative act of analysis brought what 
pre-existed the designer to existence in a manner that suits the purposes of the designer and situation. 
The expression of the initial response, singularly, sets up and sets itself in relation to the unfolding 
response-trajectory and eventual ‘founding’ response in drawn or final constructed design (which are 
likely to be somewhat or significantly different as well.) 
Corner, in an overview essay, Recovering Landscape as a Critical Cultural Practice,159 in his Recovering 
Landscape book, says that “a topic of particular importance to landscape architects with regard to these 
theories of recovery is the specificity of site. Landscape architecture has traditionally sought to recover 
sites and places, employing site phenomena as generative devices for new forms and programs.”160 The 
specificity of site is determining of the process of design. The specificity of a site (‘site’ is certainly here 
not being used to refer to some clearly delimited piece of land but more about the relevant landscape 
and situation that pre-exists the designer) is a uniqueness or particularity of site, situation or milieu – 
which Deleuze discusses (with others) as a singularity which is centrally determining and generative of 
design trajectories. Such a singular uniqueness is not a timeless essence, a summary or even ‘just 
subjective’. Singularities are determining by their nature. A singularity sets in train and a singularity is an 
event. The determining nature of a singularity therefore is a singularity of the assemblage where what 
pre-exists the designer is no less real for being brought into existence by the assemblage. The 
‘specificity of the site’ notion honours that there is a reality to what pre-exists the designer. It also 
                                            
158 Girot, "Towards a General Theory of Landscape." 64. 
159 Corner, "Recovering Landscape as a Critical Cultural Practice." 
160 Ibid. 12. 
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highlights that our conceptions are not good at affirming that what pre-exists design is both real and that 
it is also constructed by the design act.  
“Site phenomena act as generative devices,” in the sense that the interaction between the designer and 
that which pre-exists the designer, being a substantive itself, an assemblage, functions involuntarily, 
autonomously, what Deleuze and Guattari call ‘machinically’. This interaction, this assemblage is purely 
machinic, purely productive – if the designer is able to ‘construct it’. Deleuze and Guattari refer to 
‘following’ when they talk about experimentation and this following is a following of the machinic 
productivity, of working with what is opening up and opening it up more. This interaction or assemblage 
machinically produces newness amongst its productions, that the designer may or may not be strong 
enough to identify, tap-into, manage or intensify. The ‘specificity of the site’ is a challenge for the 
designer – a challenge to conceptualise. How to think about it so as to honour the reality and singularity 
of the site and to simultaneously honour the power and singularity of designing, what designs can do 
and where they could be taken. How do these become one thing, one honouring? The very language 
seems inadequate – is it best to talk about a site, a situation, a milieu, the pre-existing landscape, that 
which pre-exists the designer etc. Some designers refer to ‘going to site’, suggesting both a real 
‘physical’ entity and this place of this perpetually determining event of landscape design. The specificity 
of the site also refers to specificities of sites. It is usually the case that there is ‘something’ that provides 
a way into the site-problem, something that gives expression to all else, something that is the place to 
start or to concentrate on, something that seems to hold the key to the site or is at least perplexing. 
The most precise way to characterise what pre-exists the designer, and this is certainly pointing forward 
in the thesis, is as a singular virtuality, a pre-existing virtuality, a ‘multiplicity’ producing affects, intensity 
and singularities all of which may be sensed and evaluated for their significance – and the relevance of 
each to each other and the emerging sense of the situation – and to point towards the potential means 
to investigate them further through analytical or transformative means.161 
When Elizabeth Meyer says that “the landscape does not sit silent waiting the arrival of the architectural 
subject…the site speaks prior to the act of design,”162 she is identifying how architecture tends to 
consider a site passive until constructed by the architect and that even though such construction can 
release what is singular in the site-architecture assemblage it can also mean what really gets attention 
is the intervention, itself or for its ability to intervene or for its ability to use that which is intervened in as 
a useful foil for its own formal or form-oriented attention. The site speaks prior to the design. The site (or 
milieu, situation…) has a reality beyond designers that the designer must negotiate with to be able to 
engage with. The site also speaks in the sense that it expresses something already. It always already 
does. The site also speaks already in the sense that it is not only an actuality but a virtuality, which as 
Deleuze says, that to engage with in the right way, is to experiment with it. It is the weakness of cultural 
constructionist thought of the eighties and nineties that would allow the potentially and sometimes 
valuable idea that ‘architecture-‘, ‘an intervention-‘ or ‘infrastructure-‘… ‘constructs the site’ to be taken 
to tend to mean that the architecture, intervention or infrastructure are what determines the site or the 
                                            
161 Refer to Assemblage 2 (refer Appendix). 
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design – and that the ‘site’ or what pre-exists the designer is not an active player and ‘itself’ determining 
in this construction.  
This virtuality brings to life the actuality – or rather we live the virtual and consciously think and act as 
though the actual exists itself and that this is what we inhabit. It is common sense, conscious thought, 
theory, assumptions, representations and scenographic vision which tend to treat the world as actual. 
The actual, in its useful obviousness, is of course how we are engage with the virtual. The actual is not 
dead as might be thought, as it is always enlivened by the virtual, if we are able to ‘see’ it. Thus 
experimentation is only an experimentation – only an experimentation ‘in contact with the real’, as 
Deleuze and Guattari say, when it engages this virtuality.163 Each designer and design act become part 
of the becoming of a virtuality at the same time as a virtuality is something way beyond the designer, 
something that a designer can only get to know by experimenting with. That which pre-exists the 
designer can only be unfolded through experimentation. Analysis is, in this sense, already 
experimentation – assuming it is engaging with the affectuality, intensity, sense and potential of that 
which pre-exists the designer. Likewise, design acts, acts ‘beyond’ what I term appropriation or 
abstraction (or analysis) are only experimentation themselves to the extent that they also engage with 
this virtuality. There is an important but also often romantic and weak notion that ‘analysis’ is 
questionable and that ‘design’ is substantive. Design per se is not guaranteed to engage with the 
virtuality of the site or the problem. Neither analysis or design are guaranteed to involve experimentation 
in contact with the real. The display of design iterations in landscape design, for instance, is not 
experimentation per se. The suspicion of ‘analysis’ allows all sorts of ‘design’ to escape scrutiny.164 This 
is an issue at the moment, and one related to ‘analysis. An experimental analysis, in Deleuze and 
Guattari’s terms, facilitates an experimental transformation. Transformation with little regard for what is 
pre-existing tends to defer away from experimentation. Tends to. 
 “Landscape architecture is not about monologues.” …”As such the intersection of geometry and 
geomorphology, of past site and present project, requires a dialogue between the site as a speaking 
figure and the design intervention relative to the site.”165 For Meyer, “landscape architecture is not about 
monologues,” in one sense means that the design of landscape does not just involve the expression of 
a designer’s ‘idea’ onto or in a landscape. Meyer is partly speaking about the relations between design 
interventions and the site. For Meyer, as part of this interaction, an intervention “requires a dialogue 
between the site as a speaking figure and the design intervention relative to the site”. For Meyer, it is 
less that the intervention constructs or determines the site, and that it has the strong tendency for this to 
occur relative to the intervention – than there is a dialogue between the site as speaking and the design 
intervention – relative to the site. The site, for Meyer, is cast as speaking and the intervention as yet-to 
be determined until the intervention, and then the intervention is determined in relation to the site. To 
even consider an intervention already requires the site to have started to determine the intervention. 
                                            
163 ‘What distinguishes the map from the tracing is that it is entirely oriented toward an experimentation in contact 
with the real.’ Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. 12. 
164 This is an issue at the moment for ‘theory’. Whilst there are good reasons to be highly suspicious of theory, there 
are good reasons to believe that the actions of designing are almost ‘sacred cows’, so much do they tend to 
escape evaluation of their ability to make a difference. 
165 Meyer, "Landscape Architecture as Modern Other and Postmodern Ground." 32. 
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Intervening comes with iterations of alteration, continual determinings by the site. The site constructs 
the intervention?166 This would seem to be strongly counter to accepted architecturally-influenced 
design wisdom. 
It would often be assumed that the specifics of an intervention actualises something from a site. It might 
equally be said that sites are always speaking, in the various senses (and we have not discussed 
affects and assemblages here yet), always the most located and complexly determined of ‘things’ and 
that the same intervention in different locations will produce a different intervention. It is worth noting the 
shift in language that this last sentence reveals. An intervention is theoretically/conceptually about how 
something intervenes in / interacts with / combines with something else (a context, a site, situation etc.) 
– an intervention is conceptually a combination. The intervention is that which does the intervening in 
this combination, in this intervention. It is pretty obvious, and probably one of the attractions of the 
notion of intervention, that it shifts between (at least) these two senses. The notion of an intervention 
itself is already sliding toward privileging that which intervenes. The intervention is that which 
intervenes. An intervention, conceptually a combination, therefore, in use, slides even faster toward 
that-which-does-the-intervening. The interest in the notion of site in an intervention tends to focus on 
how the relationship to the site folds attention back onto that-which-intervenes. 
Relatedly, in talking about the “intersection of geometry and geomorphology”, Meyer touches on her 
notion of unspoken languages, which will be discussed in Assemblage 3, where the medium of 
landscape, not being the pure product of the abstract space of representation, tends to escape the 
ability of representation to engage with it or represent key dimensions and characteristics of it (which I 
will not discuss further here as it tends to be understood). At the same time this intersection is of interest 
to Meyer for less explicit reasons, more like Robert Smithson’s notion of the Picturesque, where that 
which is the pure product of representation, that which flows from designers using representation 
interacts with what comes before the design/er, which tends not to be the pure product of representation 
and involve all manner of worldly characteristics, relationalities and forces that tend to escape 
representation… Smithson thought Central Park to be the greatest work of art. Central Park was 
Picturesque to Smithson, his notion of the Picturesque, departing from the original landscape theorists 
involved a fluctuating dialectic between that which can be represented, remembered, learnt etc. and that 
which cannot be represented, remembered etc. With Central Park, Smithson was interested in 
muddiness, the weight of rocks, entropy, the fact that the earth was opaque and couldn’t be viewed into, 
the massive-material characteristics of the glaciated geology of Central Park combined with and 
contrasting to the orders of designers, the sylvan plenum of the forest vegetation meeting the park 
geometries. Meyer rebukes the great tendency in architectural discussions of landscape to consider 
sites and Nature as amorphous or as a chaos that architecture then brings an order to. It would seem to 
be that, in contrast, that rather than architecture (etc.) bringing an order to the chaos that it might very 
well be that there is instead an inability to engage win the intensive complexity of the ‘orders’ of sites 
and landscapes. Meyer’s real target, however, is not the inability associated with such common notions 
but the machinic process of the dialogue between the speaking figure of the site and the intervention. In 
                                            
166 In Assemblage 3 I will discuss a famous example of how infrastructure has been seen as constructing a 
particular site, and with a closer look it might be working the other way around (or a much more two way thing).  
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such a dialogue there is no presumed site or intervention but the dialogue, this opening up of an 
interactivity, is what is real itself. To affirm the site is not to affirm an intervention over the site but to 
affirm the machinic connection. By not engaging with the site is to defer away from the machinic 
potential of intervention. The designer or design act does not just construct the pre-existing landscape – 
it has to negotiate with it, come to terms with it. The ‘site’ constructs the act of design as much as the 
act of design constructs the site. There is a co-construction, a co-becoming of designing and site. A 
joint-becoming of designer, designing and site.  
From an architectural perspective having an emphasis that is away from idea-projection might seem 
disempowering, but only from that perspective or any perspective that is itself not strong enough (as 
Deleuze would say) to give expression to this co-becoming of designing and site, design and site, 
designer and site, site and design. The prevalence of the architectural perspective highlights a certain 
conception of designer power that is problematic in relation to landscape.  
It is interesting to note that Koolhaas’ notions are often constructed to identify forces of the world that 
hitherto have not been given expression or noted. The attraction that Koolhaas produces is that these 
forces are not produced by us and that we might be able to tap into them. Evans’ notions of 
representation are exactly that as well: the affect of Koolhaas’ world and the affects of representation for 
Evans. These thinkers-designers give expression to the involuntary power of the world and the-use-of-
representation. It is no wonder that they have been so empowering for architects and others. The 
relationship with a site, ‘with site’, is just as machinic and involuntary. It gets designers to do things. 
Landscape affects, which the case studies in this thesis focus on are just such involuntary actions of the 
world. The whole process of the relationship to a site has its own involuntary dynamic. As a teacher it 
has become very obvious that engaging with a landscape has two sides: an involuntary side where you 
are swept up into a relation and a conscious side. One of the key challenges is how to shift from the 
conscious to connect with the involuntary. Landscape gets designers and others to consciously notice 
something whilst enabling, orienting and limiting them in other less conscious ways, partly as it is all 
encompassing in space and time.  
James Corner’s mapping essay167 straddles the two lines of development in this Assemblage, even if its 
‘heart’ and emphasis are much more with the pre-landscape urbanist line. His mapping essay attempts 
to join the emphasis on the pre-existing to an explicit open systems conception, at the same time as 
moving beyond the ground to vaster ambitions. His notions that pertain to the pre-existing attempt a 
large scaled ambition of the pre-existing. This is discussed in considerable detail in Assemblage 3. 
Corner’s writings have tended toward what can be done with and through representation. This has 
already been discussed here. Both Meyer and Corner’s 1990’s writings are more academically-inspired 
than the Europeans here, entwining theoretical investigations into the use and nature of representations 
with their design investigations, which until the late 90’s were predominantly academic. Corner’s 
emphasis on the representational relationship to the pre-existing is centrally important. For Corner, “the 
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capacity to reformulate what already exists is the important step.”168 In this he is focused on large-scaled 
mapping, but reformulation of the pre-existing is just as relevant to the more site-oriented European 
emphasis. Reformulation as Corner discusses it in his mapping essay is a much ‘cooler’ affair. The 
emphasis is not from response-to-site to representation but from seeing the site or study area from the 
perspective of representation, The various ways that representation is constructed and utilised provide 
various ways to reformulate the pre-existing. For him this step is determining of the trajectory of design 
investigation. This is evident as much in his earliest writings169 as it is in his mapping essay (and later 
writings, though they give less attention to representation). The shift to the large scaled map has the 
affect of shifting the perspective of seeing-the-landscape-from-the-perspective-of-representation to 
doing so from the air. The mapping essay conceptualises a plane of representation that the landscape 
is reformulated from.  
Corner gives significant attention to the processes of the use of representation. Mapping occurs over 
time involving a range of conventions an processes and participation by designers. Like Girot’s four 
‘Trace Concepts’ (landing, grounding …),170 which have been discussed, he denaturalises the act of 
design and opens it up as a whole dynamic process. For him, “the unfolding agency of mapping may 
allow designers and planners not only to see certain possibilities in the complexity and contradiction of 
what already exists but also to actualise that potential.”171 The power of mapping is to be found in the 
process of mapping. 
Corner’s and Girot’s essays are two of the first clear accounts of the landscape design process as an 
assemblage: Corner’s, from the perspective of representation and Girot’s, from the perspective of the 
experience of designing in relation to the site. Corner’s concretely focuses on the processes of the 
construction and use of representation. Girot’s on his four stages of the process of engaging with a site. 
These four stages - landing, grounding, finding and founding – are parts of an unfolding designer’s 
relationship to site, each one determining the other, and all determined by the relationship to the site.172  
Claramunt & Mosbach’s ‘Intuitive Research’ 
Marc Claramunt and Catherine Mosbach wrote two small pieces of writing in the late 1990’s that might 
be the most sophisticated and expressive accounts of the landscape design assemblage as understood 
through the ‘empirical’ or ‘intuitive research’ stream of thought. These were the authors who both 
conceptualised this notion of empirical or intuitive research, and also, with the same writings, provide 
the most sophisticated examples of such research.  Their short texts, possibly because of their English 
                                            
168 Ibid. 214. The architect and urbanist, Andrea Kahn, in an interview in 1996 was critical of the way that architects 
tended to pay little attention to the pre-existing site and tended to assume, if they do give serious consideration to 
the site, that site analysis was of some neutral data. Kahn stresses, like Corner’s notion of reformulation, that “the 
very act of looking at a site actually constitutes it,” and that “one is constructing the site through the process of 
observation”. Reformulation is conceptual and constructive. Kahn, like Corner and Girot, wants to affirm that 
“analysis” of an urban site is “a design act”. Bauer et al., "From a Discussion with Andrea Kahn." 3. 
169 Corner, "Representation and Landscape: Drawing and Making in the Landscape Medium." 
170 Girot, "Four Trace Concepts in Landscape Architecture." 
171 Corner, "The Agency of Mapping: Speculation, Critique and Invention." 214. 
172 Corner explicitly conceptualizes a method of mapping in his ‘mapping essay, however, this actual conception 
has not itself proved to be the influential as much as other aspects of his essay: opening up the conventions of 
representations and maps, developing an ambition for landscape architectural design and his open systems 
conceptions to name three. 
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translation, and difficult to read layout, are somewhat challenging to fully grasp, and require continual 
cross-checking with other parts of their text.  
Also, like all writers they are limited by the theoretical means and assumptions available to them—more 
particularly their work reflects the assumptions of their time and the wider design discourse. However, 
what is striking is their great effort to be as (aesthetically) empirical as possible – in the sense that the 
Enlightenment landscape thinkers (Gilpin, Payne-Knight etc.), the artist Robert Smithson and Deleuze 
and Guattari attempt. In doing so, I would argue – without an explicit conception of assemblage - that 
they continually circle near a conception of landscape designing as an assemblage, one that, like 
Deleuze and Guattari, emphasises the aesthetic-creative dimensions of an assemblage, more than 
other writers in the ‘intuitive research tradition’ and much more than in the pre-landscape urbanism and 
landscape urbanist traditions. In reverse, Deleuze-Guattari’s notion of assemblage affirms Claramunt 
and Mosbach’s conceptions.173 Their efforts to be as aesthetically ‘empirical’ as possible make their 
understandings ‘expressions’ in the Deleuze-Spinoza sense. For Spinoza, according to Deleuze, 
expression is the ‘only form of knowledge capable’ of engaging with assemblages involving human 
organisms. What is very telling is that they even tender their own theory of expression, probably as 
more traditional ideas had to be surpassed to do what they wanted to achieve. 
Because of the limitation of their theoretical means their thinking occasionally comes to an impasse and 
betrays their ambitions and empiricism.174 This analysis intends to move beyond such impasses by 
interpreting what they say in a passage according to what they have said elsewhere – and also in terms 
of the Deleuzian-Guattarian notion of assemblage and related notions, where it seems that such notions 
express better what they are attempting – and hence allow such impasses to be bypassed. This means 
that the following text jumps forward to Assemblage 2 (refer Appendix), and possibly requires a back-
and-forward reading of Assemblage 1 and 2. In the process they touch on a number of dimensions of an 
assemblage specific to landscape design. Where this occurs, the relevant understanding of these 
Deleuze-Guattarian notions can usually be found in significant detail in Assemblage 2 (refer Appendix), 
if not it is carried out, at the very least, briefly in the text.175 Their attention to being empirical, to giving 
                                            
173 It should be noted that the conception of assemblage as an aesthetic conception (an aesthetics of affects) is not 
necessarily the norm in design discourse. The AA’s Machinic Landscape, certainly spares little time on 
assemblages as aesthetic entities, tending to seeing them more as vast structures or infrastructures of movement 
and change systems, as I have discussed in Assemblage 3. See Mostafavi, Mohsen and Najli, Ciro, eds., Manual 
for a Machinic Landscape (London: Architectural Association, 2003). Manuel Delanda, the populariser of Deleuze 
and Guattari’s thinking in the architecture and landscape design discourse, as I argue in Assemblage 2 (refer 
Appendix), certainly is wildly averse to considering Deleuze and Guattari’s work in affectual / aesthetic terms 
(Protevi and Bonta tend to follow Delanda as well.), preferring to pull Deleuze and Guattari’s work into a scientific 
frame, which might make some sense for the places where Deleuze and Guattari discuss physical or bio-
chemical examples – but is highly limited at accounting for Deleuze and Guattari’s examination of assemblages 
involving organisms and the human organism in particular, which just happens to represent the vast bulk of 
Deleuze and Guattari’s interests. 
174 I would suggest that the impasses they experience are common to others at the time and reflect common 
weakness’ of such prevalent thought – weakness’ that the notions of assemblage, affect, sense and expression 
provide the means to move beyond. 
175 Assemblage 2 (refer Appendix) does not give serious attention to Cinema 1 & 2 by Deleuze, which are important 
to this section. The notions of Cinema 1 & 2 have been central to the thinking of this thesis and practical limits 
(space and time) meant that discussion of them was not in the end included. The Federation Square case study 
also draws heavily on those works. Deleuze, Gilles, Cinema 1: The Movement Image, trans. Tomlinson, Hugh 
and Galeta, Roberta (London: Athlone, 1983 (original French edition 1985)). Deleuze, Gilles, Cinema 2: The Time 
Image, trans. Tomlinson, Hugh and Habberjam, Barbara (London: Athlone, 1985 (original French edition 1983)). 
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expression to the landscape design assemblage pushes them beyond others – and this also pushes 
them to reflect on the problematics of the discourse of landscape design in a manner that others do not. 
Where this is relevant to producing an affirmative landscape design assemblage it will be discussed 
here. One of the arguments of this thesis is that many of the issues touched upon in this thesis with 
regards to the disciplinary problem of how to conceptualise an affirmative landscape design assemblage 
are issues of the discourse of landscape design – and hence they are shared, and therefore also tend 
to be relatively invisible even if the frustrations of them are palpable. 
The first of these texts is barely a page long, an editorial for the 2002 ‘Embodiment’ issue of the French 
journal, Pages Paysages.176 In the space of three paragraphs they attempt to conceptualise what it is to 
be embodied. They do this to attempt to conceptualise how the body and the landscape are inseparable 
and co-constructed and how knowledge of landscape is, relatedly, an embodied form of knowledge. It 
seems to me that the Deleuze-Guattarian notion of assemblage best affirms the fine and nuanced 
conception that they produce in this essay. In the Deleuze-Guattarian language of this thesis they have, 
in this discussion, attempted to account for both what I have called the ‘landscape design assemblage’ 
(what designing does and the processes involved in this) and the workings of ‘landscape assemblages’ 
(what the landscape itself ‘does’ and how it does it). What landscape designing and the landscapes do 
and how they do it. Embodiment, as the human involvement in an assemblage, is central to both and to 
the whole notion of assemblage.177 Accounts of assemblages, as Deleuze and Guattari have shown, 
can start anywhere, partly as they are a re-thinking of the whole landscape of conceptions relative to 
experimentation. Claramunt and Mosbach begin with the relationship between embodiment and 
perceptions. 
What is embodied is the imprint of perceptions that cross the threshold of being to shape the 
sensations of life as it is lived. Between construction, knowledge and alteration, these perceptions 
turn into so many representations which they invest with the power to transform. 178 
As per Deleuze’s Cinema 1 and 2, these authors make a connection between the input of perceptions 
(of all of the senses) associated with the power of transformation (affects) and that these perceptions 
‘turn into so many representations’ (the sense associated with affect) with the power to transform (inputs 
lead to a response – affect with sense – and the transformative difference involved). For the moment 
this power of transformation will be understood as affect and the process of how perceptions will be 
understood as the process of the production of affect associated with affectual production – the process 
                                                                                                                                          
Cinema 1 & 2 are particularly notable for the way they allow us to escape traditional notions of, and relations 
between, perception, sensation, affect, sense and problem - through how the ‘centre of indetermination’ senses 
present and anticipated affects in relation to all past and anticipated sensing of affect/sense. This allows Deleuze 
and Guattari to criticise, say, semiology, in its deferral to a system of signs, and acknowledging that it is 
abstract… ‘but not abstract enough’. In this Deleuze and Guattari are referring to the particular imperceptible 
abstractness of affect and how inseparably this is sensed in relation to all past and anticipated affects and 
senses-of affect and the relevant extended relations associated with it – and all occurring before we are even 
conscious of it. 
176 Claramunt and Mosbach, "Editorial." 7. I mistakenly believed this essay to be published in 1998 and so it fitted 
into the criteria for inclusion into this section. At the ‘last moment’ I discovered that it was, in fact first published in 
2002 (and then later in a slightly altered edition of the journal in 2003). Given the late stage of the writing of this 
section I have, inconsistently, taken the liberty to keep the discussion of this essay in this thesis.  
177 One that assemblage has been thought of, with regards to human-involved assemblage, treats the environment 
as an appendage of the organism. 
178 Claramunt and Mosbach, "Editorial." 
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that turns these perceptions into powers and representations Deleuze terms ‘psychophysical 
expression’. Other parts of the text will make the case that affect and sense (or expression) would be 
the best way to express what they are discussing with this ‘power of transformation’ and 
‘representations’ that these perceptions ‘turn into’. Affect-sense, a power with an associated sense or 
significance of that power, as the product of embodied perceptions. Such embodiment provides a way 
for them to think beyond the traditional, unitary, notion of the body. 
The body, given over completely to its occupation, as though lost in it, in the shaping of one by the 
other, is then depleted of its substance. What it lives in contact with ends up by forming part of the 
configuration of what it is.179 
Here Claramunt and Mosbach make the connection between what we customarily call the body, the 
unitary body, with its ‘occupation’ – and that in doing so the unitary-body becomes ‘depleted’ or lost, lost 
as part of the body-as-newly-configured, ‘given over completely to its occupation’, a body which seems 
from our customary perspective to be a combination of body and occupation but for them the 
(traditional) body now forms part of ‘the configuration of what it is’. What it is, this new conception of the 
body, certainly seems better understood as equal to Spinoza’s notion of body, which is equal to Deleuze 
and Guattari’s notion of assemblage. This new body, this assemblage, is an affiliation between what we 
customarily think of as a separate body and a separate environment. This new body is the affiliation 
itself. The affiliation is the substantive. What is lived. What we might normally understand as a separate 
environment becomes part of this assemblage through the way that perceptions ‘shape the sensations 
of life as it is lived’. The body becomes lost in its occupation or, if we are able to let ourselves sense it 
and give expression to it, positively abandoned to occupation, to the sensations of occupation, 
sensations that pass through all that the body, in the extended assemblage-sense, sensations of the 
environment. The sensations of an assemblage do not recognise our customary boundary between a 
‘body’ and an ‘environment’. We live these sensations that do not recognise boundaries even, though 
when we talk or think or theorise we separate out body and environment. These are sensations that 
accompany the body-occupation assemblage, sensations extended in time and space. They pass 
through (refrain) the whole occupation (territory), and each relevant part of it. Sensations register and 
point to the relevance and role of each dimension of this occupation and its relation to other sensations. 
The assemblage, as this new body, feels the relevance of all that is relevant in time and space. What 
has happened and what is up ahead; the relationship between here and there; all that is around, all that 
is involved in this unfolding middle – a middle defined by the relevant sensations, intensity and sense – 
all that is involved in the production of affect is this occupation. Embodiment involves extended 
sensations (in time and space), the sensations of occupation, of the middle. The power to transform, 
involving the affects of the landscape, is inseparable from, reliant upon and connected to the extended 
sensations of occupation.  
The never-ending construction of the body in space goes hand in hand with the construction of a 
self. A self which, subject to human time, finds its place within the space of its own transformation. 
180 
                                            
179 Ibid. 
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As if spoken by the Deleuzian-Guattarian translator, Brian Massumi, the authors’ succinctly summarise 
the construction of the self as that which emerges in the space of its own transformation, the space of 
its own power of transforming, an intensive space that sets all past transformations of power in relation 
to all current and anticipated powers.181 The current feeling (sensation) of power (affect) produced by 
sensory inputs (perceptions) is connected to all past and anticipated sensations of affect. The ‘self’, as 
that which emerges in the space of its own self-relation, is such a sense-making machinery, constantly 
evaluating its own transformation with reference to all past and anticipated transformations. Sensation is 
sensation because of this sense-making. The relation to all past and anticipated situations abstractly 
determines present and anticipated affects. The self might involve consciousness and this 
consciousness feeds-off, feeds-back into or feeds-forward into future sensations and affects. From the 
perspective of the self (in a Deleuzian reconstructed sense) there is a constant evaluation of its own 
transformation. From the perspective of space – being a designer’s way of looking at this assemblage - 
there is a constant evaluation of the power of space. We are constantly and involuntarily evaluating the 
power of landscape – what landscape does. 
The body is this space then, buffeted by the emotions, which impart to it their fluidity.182 
As with Spinoza, the body is continually subject to chance encounters, encounters which through 
perception produces what Deleuze in Cinema 1 and 2 terms ‘centres of indetermination’, selves which 
have their own power to affect and be affected, centres with their own ‘receptivity’ (ability to receive / 
ability to be affected) and ‘spontaneity’ (ability to do / ability to affect). It is better to think of affects here 
rather than ‘emotions’.183 The particular ‘indeterminacy’ that Deleuze refers to here is not the 
indeterminacy that is discussed in recent landscape urbanism texts. It is not change, changeability or 
flux, but an indeterminacy, receptivity and spontaneity, of power, a shiftiness of power. A shiftiness of 
power perpetually depending on shifting inputs or perceptions, a shiftiness of power that comes with a 
shiftiness of the significance of this power.  
The sensing of this ‘self’ (this centre of indetermination) “is not confined to objects but” as Claramunt 
and Mosbach identify “creates a ductile” (the ability to be distanced and yet stay connected) 
“relationship to time and to situations.” The power that this self senses might be ‘animal’ and bodily in 
                                                                                                                                          
180 Ibid. 
181 Massumi defines intensity as self-relation. “It’s simply this: sensation is never simple. It is always doubled by the 
feeling of having a feeling. It is self-referential. … It is an immediate self-complication. It is best to think of it as a 
resonation, or interference pattern… This complex self-continuity is a putting into relation of the movement to 
itself: self-relation. The self-relation is immediate – in and of itself, only its own event – even though it requires 
distance to occur. The best word, once again, for a complicating immediacy of self-relation is “intensity”. 
Resonation can be seen as converting distance, or extension, into intensity. It is a qualitative transformation of 
distance into an immediacy of self-relation.” Massumi, Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation. 14. 
182 Claramunt and Mosbach, "Editorial." 
183 As Eric Stouse says, ‘although feeling and affect are routinely used interchangeably, it is important not to 
confuse affect with feelings and emotions. Stouse, Eric, "Feeling, Emotion, Affect," MC Journal: A Journal of 
Media and Culture 8, no. 6 (2005). As Brian Massumi’s definition of affect in his introduction to Deleuze and 
Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus makes clear, affect is not a personal feeling. Feelings are personal and 
biographical, emotions are social, and affects are prepersonal. For Massumi, translator of A Thousand Plateaus: 
AFFECT/AFFECTION. Neither word denotes a personal feeling (sentiment in Deleuze and Guattai). L’affect 
(Spinoza’s affectus) is an ability to affect and be affected. It is a prepersonal intensity corresponding to the 
passage from one experiential state of the body to another and implying an augmentation or diminution in that 
body’s capacity to act. L’affection (Spinoza’s affection) is each such state considered as an encounter between 
the affected body and a second, affecting, body … Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia. xvi. 
an affirmative open systems conception of how to design landscape  Connolly, Peter  
73 
 
being biologically forceful, ‘physical’ or brute in a sense, but it is simultaneously infinitely ‘abstract’ 
through the ‘brain’s’ (in Deleuze and Guattari’s sense) involuntary and perpetual capacity to evaluate 
and ‘specify’ the significance of this bodily power in relation to all past and anticipated affects/powers (or 
more precisely affects-senses or powers-with-significance)—and if we add this then it should be added 
– and this is particularly worth emphasising with respects to landscape - all past and anticipated 
occupations (the sensations of the relevant extended space and time relations associated with the 
affect). The evaluation of landscape involves the evaluation of all past and anticipated evaluations (or 
sensings and the sensings of significance) of all that is extended in space and time involved in what 
landscape does. All past occupations and all past affects and the sense/significance of affects comes to 
meet the particular affects and occupations being evaluated or sensed. The abstracteness of this 
production has been given little attention in writing and none in landscape and makes concrete the 
process of producton of landscape sense and weak any previous conception of ‘meaning’ or 
semiology.184 
 As Claramunt and Mosbach says, “we observe” (involuntarily) “our occupations” (occupations as 
embodied-assemblages) “which give way and time to other operations.”185 Such a perpetual and 
involuntary ‘observation’ (sensing) of our occupations provides a means to comprehend and evaluate 
the relevance and significance of present and anticipated occupations and all that is relevantly involved 
in them – and the relevant affects leading to further affects (operations)—being in a landscape, 
understanding a landscape, designing a landscape. The apprenticeship with landscape bodies and their 
occupations and the design of such bodies-occupations leads to ‘other operations’. Claramunt and 
Mosbach give significant explicit attention to the notion of an apprenticeship with landscape. Deleuze 
and Guattari see that an apprenticeship to the world as central to experimentation. 
This is a challenge for designers, and Claramunt and Mosbach suggest that when we are able to rise to 
this challenge, “when the whole of our living being is engaged, an echo is revived in our minds of a 
revived memory through which we recognise the lineaments of that which lies outside ourselves.” As 
per Cinema 1 & 2, the abstract and involuntary memory of all past empowerments comes to meet 
whatever is relevant in the present and past empowerments. When we are able to ‘connect’ to – give 
expression to – how our whole living being is engaged, then we cannot help (because it is involuntary) 
but start to connect to the various dimensions in time and space (lineaments…) relevant to the power of 
landscape. This connection is registered through the resonance of expression, a feedback or echo that 
tells us how precise our expressions are, opens us up to the indeterminacy of the relevant affects we 
are engaging with, opens us up to the various dimensions of the relevant assemblage and the various 
lineaments of the abstract and involuntary (revived) memory that make sense of what this assemblage 
does.  
Such a process, Claramunt and Mosbach identify as providing us a means to avoid preconceptions that 
take us away from ‘our power’. The self-relation or the ‘space of its own transformation’ “protecting us 
                                            
184 However, as we are so attuned to the idea of meaning, Massumi uses the word instead of ‘sense’, noting that in 
doing so it has nothing to with intention or semiology and is produced force on force: this empowerment made 
meaningful in relation to all past empowerments, if you like. 
185 Claramunt and Mosbach, "Editorial." 
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from the ideologies which, by turning the stuff of life into abstractions, shroud it in  terror and 
forgetfulness.”186 This affective evaluation, involving an evaluation of this affect in relation to past 
relevant affects, bypasses the ‘mediations of representation’,187 the ‘cliché system’ of representation that 
Deleuze warns against – and that such abstractions are associated with ‘terror and forgetfulness’, just 
as Spinoza warned half a millennium ago, and Deleuze develops further. Spinoza pointed out that 
abstractions and properties are like signs, where signs point to something else but are not expressive. 
Attached to signs are conventionalised and “imperative” words and thoughts, ‘commandments’. “When 
one takes a sign for an expression, one sees mysteries everywhere”—touching on the ‘terror’ 
associated with such signs and the forgetting of the life of affect and landscapes.188 More positively, 
Massumi says that beyond such abstractions and preconceptions is the embrace of affect, and “the 
stakes are the new”.189 Claramunt and Mosbach identify what is at stake and the limits of abstraction 
even if they have not, because they didn’t have the concepts, fully given expression to affect.  
Immediately after this they assert that the means to do this, as if directly quoting Spinoza or Deleuze, 
the means to experience, understand, evaluate and do – beyond preconceptions - is in terms of our 
self-relation to our own empowerment: “for on the basis of our own form we register all forms.” Deleuze 
says, paraphrasing Spinoza, that ‘everything we understand within the third kind of knowledge, including 
the essences of other things and that of God, we understand on the basis of conceiving our own 
essence (that of our body)’.190 As I detail in Assemblage 2 (refer Appendix), the ‘third kind of knowledge’ 
(Beatitude) is the form of knowledge where we are able to directly see the power (affect) of the world. 
For Spinoza/Deleuze, we do this on the basis of our own body, on the basis of the sensations of our 
own body. This is the surprising ‘closeness’ that Deleuze-Spinoza discover is the basis of bodily 
knowledge, embodied knowledge, and knowledge of other assemblages and affects—certainly 
surprising in terms of recent landscape design discourse which seems to evade anything so close, as 
‘too subjective’ – and presenting imagery that the power is somewhere else. 
By Claramunt and Mosbach affirming the body (assemblage) we-are-part-of at the moment when the 
“whole of our living being is engaged”, “we then” (involuntarily) “physically form a piece with it, to 
understand....”. “We gain access to that point where the substance of our body achieves new 
dimensions by incorporating a sense of place”.191 In this way the old notion of ‘sense of place’ is revived 
and reconstructed through the Deleuzian notion of sense, as the abstract and rich significance of the 
present occupation understood in relation to all past and anticipated occupations and all that is relevant 
to them. Sense of place would then be the more consciously accessed quality or effect associated with 
                                            
186 ‘Most men remain, most of the time, fixated by sad passions which cut them off from their essence and reduce it 
to the state of an abstraction.’ ’Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy. 320. The expressive self-relation protects 
us from ideologies and Spinoza’s distinction between abstract ideas from affects (what a body is capable of) 
highlights the difference between expression and abstract notions or abstractions. ‘If you consider beasts, 
Spinoza will be firm in telling us that what counts among animals is not at all the genera or species; genera and 
species are absolutely confused notions, abstract ideas. What counts is the question, of what is a body capable?’ 
Deleuze, "Lecture on Spinoza 24/01/1978".  
187 Refer to the fuller discussion of the ‘mediations of representation’ from Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition in 
Assemblage 2 (refer Appendix). 
188 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy. 57. 
189 Massumi, Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation. 27. 
190 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy. 304. 
191 Claramunt and Mosbach, "Editorial." 
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what needs to be given expression: affect and sense. All past empowerments therefore coming to meet 
and ‘specify’ the current sense of place, the current quality/affect-sense of a ‘place’. ‘Sense of place’ for 
Deleuze, following Spinoza, could be limited to being an ‘effect’ or quality associated with a more 
obscure affect and sense, as sense-of-place is normally understood, however, Claramunt and Mosbach 
want more than this, by suggesting that ‘sense of place’ is something to achieve when we form a piece 
with it (the relevant landscape assemblage of that ‘place’ and of that designing). It is at this moment that 
we achieve ‘new dimensions’: we start to get to the singular, the territorial, the problematic, the whole 
assemblage. To go beyond the commonly understood conception of sense of place, Claramunt and 
Mosbach would need to give expression to the difficult to achieve affect that the more passive effect 
provides a more easily accessed entry point for.  
They also give expression to the experimentation with problems where an emergent idea or motivation 
bypasses “attempts to pin down movements” and leads endless efforts towards “beings that inhabit the 
world”. Such beings they see as something beyond what we know already, as autonomous powers and 
products of the world. Such beings – not us or the environment – not ‘just subjective’ in the conscious 
‘mind’ or scientifically objective ‘in the environment’ - seem to have the autonomy that Deleuze / 
Guattari demand of affect – an autonomy that is not that of the self or the environment, not ‘just 
subjective’ in the conscious mind or scientifically ‘objective’ in the world. Such ‘beings’ seem to be 
products of the world, of Nature and seem to include both what we customarily understand as the body 
and its occupation, seem to be both autonomous and shared between the body and its occupation. 
The second essay by Claramunt and Mosbach discussed here is a short article, whose original 
published translated title was ‘Nature of a Landscape Project’, but is probably better translated and titled 
as ‘The Nature of the Landscape Project’. It was published in the same journal, Pages Paysages, three 
years before the editorial.192  This essay is the location where they propose that ‘intuitive’ or ‘empirical’ 
research is what was needed in the discipline at that time (and I would argue still is). From the 
beginning of the essay they set out what they see as the task and something of the methods required. 
For them it required a ‘starting from scratch’. “Not starting from scratch in the physical sense: 
geography, city, countryside were still there… but the blank page of the human experience of the art of 
landscaping.” For them they wish to treat the ‘human experience of the art of landscaping’ as something 
real itself, as for them it seems to offer the only way to move beyond the inability of past thinking about 
landscape designing. 
They firstly give what seems to be a beautiful description of a design assemblage - as the 
“instrumentation of a know-how”. They then propose “it should be possible” to “decompose” this 
“instrumentation of a know-how” and “recompose” it “with other substances.” In doing so they posit a 
parallel understanding that can reflect the nature of the instrumentation or assemblage. Such a parallel 
                                            
192 Claramunt and Mosbach, "Nature of a Landscape Project." The title as shown in this citation is the English 
translation that the journal, which they edited, provides for the French title: ‘De la Nature du Projet de Paysage’. 
Possibly a more linguistically accurate and intellectually useful translation would be ‘The Nature of the Landscape 
Project’. It would give clearer expression to the idea that the landscape project if the focus and that it is an 
assemblage, an autonomous thing beyond specific examples but subsuming specific examples and it defers 
away from ‘Nature’ understood in the nature/culture sense. It also alludes to ‘the landscape project’ as a 
disciplinary project, somewhat like the ‘Recovery of Landscape’. 
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understanding seems best understood as an expression. So, it should be possible to give expression to 
the design assemblage in thought, words and text. Not re-present but give-expression-to. They 
continue, that “in this sense, the capacity for exchange, for allowing things to permeate, is the basis for 
the hypothesis of an ‘ecology of the mind’”.193 “This quality” (capacity for exchange or capacity for 
expression)194 “refutes any intangible point of view from which one might be able to place oneself and 
thus avoid any real physical or mental contact with the present.” They seem to be proposing a 
conception of assemblage as the best way to give expression to the landscape design assemblage and 
a conception of expression as the means for this to occur – and this leads to an understanding of an 
‘ecology’ of the mind’. 
In so doing, I would suggest, they wish to avoid such things as ‘subjectivism’, ‘objectivism’ or ‘cultural 
constructionism’ – that the ‘design assemblage’ as the “instrumentation of a know-how” is, on one hand, 
‘just subjective’ or its correlate ‘can only really be understood scientifically’ or that it is (mystically or in 
some way) beyond the ability of thinking or words to engage with. So, they wish to take the ‘ecology of 
the mind’, the ‘mental contact with the real,’ seriously. However, on the other hand, they wish to 
embrace the physical reality, the physical ‘contact with the real’ seriously. In this regard they wish to 
embrace the ‘ecology of the mind’195 and the physical reality involved in a design assemblage. That this 
writing was inspired by an Deleuze-Guattarian inspired conference theme of an ‘Ecology of the Mind’196 
seems highly relevant – and it might just have easily be inspired by Spinoza’s thinking which, according 
to Reidar Due, and this is discussed in Assemblage 2 (refer Appendix), is “mainly concerned with the 
problem of determining the place that the human mind and its activities occupy within the structure of 
reality.”197 As I point to there, Bergson also has similar concerns. In his Matter and Memory, he states 
that “the brain is part of the material world; the material world is not part of the brain.”198 Bergson denies 
the weak options of subjective/’in-there’ or (more) objective/’out-there’. Spinoza aims to connect to the 
great power of this organ - being part of the world, as a way to connect to the power of the world. For 
Spinoza, the power of the brain comes from its relationship to the body. So, as Claramunt and Mosbach 
suggest, it might also be better to conceive of the brain-world relationship as the ‘instrumentation of a 
know-how’ to avoid the mentalism that goes with the common conceptions of brain. So, it might be that 
Claramunt and Mosbach wish to examine the functioning and powers of the brain-as-part-of-the-world in 
the ‘instrumentation of a know-how’ that is the design project (the landscape design assemblage). I 
would suggest that others in this line of inquiry have certainly been engaged with this know-how but that 
                                            
193 This essay was followed by a note: ‘Ce texte pris forme a un axe de reflexion initie par les membres de la revue 
Chimeres (fondee par G. Deleuze et F. Guattari) sur la notion d'Ecologie Mentale, en ferrier 1995.’ This roughly 
translates (Google Translate) as: ‘This text taken shape has an axis of reflection initiated by members of the 
review Chimeres (founded by G. Deleuze and F. Guattari) on the concept of Mental Ecology, Ferrer (?) in 1995.’  
194 This ‘quality’ is better understood as a ‘process’ and a ‘power’: it is one of the ‘two powers of nature’ according to 
Spinoza: the power of Nature (affects) and the power of understanding (expression), as discussed in Assemblage 
2 (refer Appendix) in some detail. 
195 See the previous footnote. 
196 There is a good reason why JJ Gibson’s essay on affordances – where affordances might be seen as a form of 
affect or a (slightly reductive but powerful) way of seeing affect – has its ‘ecological’ title and champions an 
‘ecological physics’ (an involuntary power associated with the relations of an organism with the world and not a 
‘physical physics’). Gibson, James J., The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception  (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 
1979). 
197 Due, Reidar, Deleuze  (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007). 38. 
198 Bergson, Henri, Matter and Memory, trans. Paul, Nancy Margaret and Palmer, W. Scott (Brookyn, N.Y.: Zone 
Books, 2005). 19. 
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Claramunt and Mosbach do not, in particular, want to shy away from taking the ‘mental’ or ‘know-how’ 
or ‘experience’ part of this totally seriously. Claramunt and Mosbach are also not the first to discuss 
design in terms of ‘know-how’. So, it seems to me that embodiment involves a sensing assemblage 
requiring a sense-giving brain that is inseparably connected to the material world. Such an assemblage 
produces representations (affects with sense) and that such representations are part of the connection-
to-the-world. In Deleuze’s terms they wish to give such brain-world-embodiment expression.  
Their discussion of an ‘ecology of the mind’ – involving the ‘capacity to exchange’ ‘matters’ (‘grey 
matter, emotions’…’physical, intellectual or emotional phenomena’) is ultimately aimed at the process of 
designing, but for them conceptualising the various dimensions of the  ‘ecology of the mind’ seems 
relevant to this process of designing. There are good reasons for them to approach the problem of 
rethinking the design assemblage through the ‘ecology of the mind’, and this is to jump ahead to 
Assemblage 2 (refer Appendix). As part of this Deleuze identifies in Spinoza three realms of 
expression,199 three realms of ‘exchange’, that help Claramunt and Mosbach express regarding this 
ecology of the mind: these are ‘ontological’, ‘epistemological’ and ‘psychophysical’ expression.  
‘Ontological expression’ is associated with the realm of autonomous ‘beings that inhabit the world’ (as 
affects) involving the expression of the various dimensions of time and space (lineaments) that produce 
such beings, such bodies, such affects. The world expresses itself both as these beings and in these 
beings or bodies. These beings are expressions of Nature and ‘in them’ Nature is expressed. 
Ontological expression is about the process of exchange of that which seemingly lies outside the body-
occupations of the landscape being expressed in the body-occupations that inhabit the world. It is about 
the process of how the relevant relations of the world (in time and space) are expressed in the 
landscape. The relationship of a system to its products is very weakly understood in the discipline, 
despite the ecological and systemic nature of the landscape being constantly invoked. Not having the 
notions of affect and expression makes it impossible to really move beyond generalised invocation. An 
affect is the expression of the world and the connection between the (human) organism part of 
assemblages and the spacetime of the world.  
Second, ‘psychophysical expression’ is the ‘capacity for’ and process for ‘exchange’ between what 
Spinoza termed the body and the soul. To the parts of the body ‘there corresponds faculties of the 
soul’.200 A process of exchange between the sensing and sense-making part of an assemblage (soul) 
and the empowering part of the assemblage (body). The soul is the ever-present expression of the 
body’s power. The notion of affect is foreign enough: the notion that the soul gives expression to the 
power of the body is even more foreign to the common sense preconceptions of the discipline. Sense is 
the expression of power of the body’s power in relation to all past and anticipated powers. Sensation 
registers and lives this sense. This sense is a registration of the power of the assemblage that the 
(human) organism is part of, the sense or significance of this power. 
                                            
199 Associated with three types of ‘parallelism’, discussed in detail in Assemblage 2 (refer Appendix): ontological, 
epistemological and psychosocial parallelism. 
200 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy. 311. 
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Third, ‘epistemological expression’ is, instead, about ‘understanding’ such beings of the world, such 
affects (or the assemblages and their affects) and other beings of the world. As Michael Hardt says, 
‘only expression can open up our knowledge of being.’201   
The soul …(has)… ‘an eternal intensive part, which is so to speak, the idea of the body’s essence’. 
The soul thus has a faculty, a power, ‘the power of understanding things through the third kind of 
knowledge’. ‘Insofar as it expresses the body's actual existence in duration, the soul has the power 
to conceive other bodies in duration...202  
The soul includes the idea of the body’s essence (power). It is the ‘capacity for exchange’ (expression) 
between other bodies and understanding, on the basis of soul’s power of understanding, which 
produces an expression of the power of the body. On the basis of the soul’s power it is capable of giving 
expression to other bodies. Or, as Claramunt and Mosbach also say: “on the basis of our own form we 
register all forms.”203 It is about how such understandings, such expressions, don’t so much re-present 
something as express something. How an understanding can connect to and express another being, 
without subjectivity in the weak sense. Giving expression to these autonomous beings is giving 
expression to their liveliness, their affectuality. If we want to re-use the notion of subjectivity (just as 
Massumi re-uses the notion of ‘meaning’ in terms of force) then expression is a strong form of 
subjectivity. The soul has the capacity, expression, the only capacity (Spinoza and Deleuze would 
agree) able to understand landscape assemblages. The four case studies of this thesis attempt re-
expressions of what landscapes do. 
The idea of an ‘ecology of the mind’ is a recognition that the brain is part of the world, part of the 
expressions of Nature. This is not the conscious mind but the involuntary perpetually connected brain, 
which consciousness might feed off and feed back into. Consciousness is an essential part of the 
process of expression (epistemological expression) through the way that it plays a part in giving 
expression to the involuntary abilities of an assemblage: only if it connects to the involuntary workings of 
assemblages. An ‘ecology of the mind’ is about the connectedness of the brain to the material world and 
involves each of the three realms of expression: what Nature or landscape does (affects); how what it 
does that we are part of makes sense to us (‘turns into so many representations’ or sense) and how we 
understand Nature or the landscape (and designing). Each of these forms of expression are foreign to 
previous conceptions and each says something important for an ‘ecology of the mind’, and ‘intuitive 
research’ into landscape design. 
From here let us return to Claramunt and Mosbach’s starting point. Starting ‘from scratch’, they start 
from: 
…the blank page of the human experience of the art of landscaping. It was not a question of 
observing, of understanding, of imitating or of criticising, but rather of creating from the position of 
the Self. This was rather like a new human being who no longer had a past, only a future confronted 
with this element of the unknown: the landscape of tomorrow. This exercise accepted only the 
                                            
201 Hardt, Michael, Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy  (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2002). 
65. 
202 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy. 317. 
203 Claramunt and Mosbach, "Nature of a Landscape Project." 
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references of the landscape as a guide, the horizon, the roofs of houses. the outline of certain 
historical parks from some distant past, the quality of certain leaves, of grasses... Our search for 
knowledge was borne only by these sparse elements.204 
So, in the task of creating the landscape of tomorrow, “only the references of the landscape” are to be 
taken “as a guide” and this future landscape should be created “from the position of the self”. To begin 
with there is here a strong attack on past approaches and a very notice-able and notable faith in the 
functioning of the designer. A faith in the position of the self, but not the traditional self, for them the self 
is an embodied self and the connected brain of the embodied self. The self with the body extended in 
spacetime and the self with the brain connected to the material world through the body (via 
psychophysical expression). 
As discussed, like others, they are also preoccupied and perplexed by the centrality and opposition of 
two types of thought for landscape designers:205 the subjective thought of the artistic individual and 
reductive findings of scientific knowledge, and they are critical of the compartmentalisation that flows 
from such divisions.  
The first category gives a succession of singular, raw states without any ultimate realisation. The 
second aims towards something arbitrary coming from an individual perception and proceeds by 
exacerbating the senses. Neither of the two series is  able to produce the framework for a 
landscape project alone.206 
The ‘framework for a landscape project’, a conception of a landscape design assemblage, is their target. 
For them, neither of these two ‘categories’ is able to produce a landscape design in the way that they 
want to affirm – and that these two types of thought are incapable of producing a conception of 
landscape designing.207  
For them, “the development of a project wavers between the intelligible and the emotional. Such a 
position may resemble a halfway point in which the requirements of none of the categories would be 
satisfied.” They recognise the limitations of being restricted to these two categories – and their halfway 
point seems to identify that an alternative might exist – but to present it in terms of the other two 
categories, as a ‘halfway point’ seems no solution.  
                                            
204 Ibid. 55. 
205 This opposition has not disappeared and has just appeared again in what is designed to be an important 
gathering: "Thinking the Contemporary Landscape - Positions and Oppositions, 20-22 June 2013, Herrenhaussen 
Palace, Hanover, Germany," ETH Zurich and the Institute of Landcape Architecture, 
http://girot.arch.ethz.ch/blog/conference-at-herrenhausen-palace-hanover-june-2013. One session summary 
begins: ‘There exists a schism between the way landscape is understood scientifically either as a functional 
normative network or an ecological system, and the way the same place exists cognitively, poetically and 
emotionally for people.’…and ends asking the invited guests ‘to take position on the subject of a possible 
reconciliation of science and memory in contemporary culture.’ Christophe Girot penned this text. 
206 Claramunt and Mosbach, "Nature of a Landscape Project." 
207 It is striking to this researcher that the discipline talks as if these are the only reference points in thought and 
knowledge. Striking also that for instance within the essay that they propose the ‘instrumentation of a know-how’, 
which is a wonderful description of design-thought-action, or of the design assemblage, and yet do not see this as 
something substantive itself. In actuality science plays little role in even the most ‘hard-nosed’ landscape design. 
It probably plays more of a legitimating function for the discipline, and that the artistic/subjective/emotional must 
also be there, as a representative of all that science cannot engage with.  
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Their later idea of the “instrumentation of a know-how”, of a design assemblage, is far from the scientific 
‘category’ and yet also points well away from the ‘artistic’-subjective ‘category’ toward something more 
embodied and involuntary, in the sense that the body always comes with its own occupation, and the 
very stress on ‘embodiment’ suggests a ‘physical’ substantiveness that is not simply ‘subjective’, and 
best expressed as the designing affects of the landscape design assemblage and the landscape affects 
of landscape assemblages. The actual know-how of the landscape design assemblage involves the 
abilities or affects of landscape designing and the abilities and affects of what landscape designing is 
designing – the affects of the landscape and the machinic interplay between these. 
For Claramunt and Mosbach, the body is “given over completely to its occupation”.  Occupation is not 
restricted to a conception of a body occupying a space or landscape – as part of a landscape 
assemblage. Occupation is part of a design assemblage as well. The occupation is part of the design 
assemblage just as ‘we’ are. It is just as easily thought of as the design process-landscape. The whole 
occupation is involved in the power of the assemblage. Just as we sense the various parts, in time and 
space, of a landscape assemblage as relevant and inseparable from the affects produced so to we 
sense the various parts of a landscape design assemblage, constantly able to adjust any part of it that 
seem to be the most effective to adjust. 
The ‘sparse elements’ of the landscape are the only acceptable references and it is expression, as the 
only acceptable form of knowledge capable of engaging with affects, assemblages and the role of such 
elements in them, that allows us to engage with what Nature does, what landscape does. This is an 
intimate form of knowledge, a surprisingly intimate and close form of knowledge, too obvious and 
already with us, being the soul’s faculty of understanding. Equally surprisingly, it is on the basis of soul’s 
connection to its own body that it is able to understand other bodies. Creating from ‘the position of the 
self’ is creating from the position of the soul or the evaluative part of design assemblages. The sparse 
elements of the landscape are the only guide as they are the means to connect to other beings. So, the 
‘basis’ of creating landscape design relies only on these sparse elements and only from the position of 
the self. Claramunt’s and Mosbach’s faith centres squarely on such a position.  
This is not to dismiss the ‘scientific’ or the ‘emotional’. For Claramunt and Mosbach, it must have 
“something to do both with scientific exactitude and human experience”. The ecology of the mind, 
understood in terms of expression and affect, also allows us to reconcile the seemingly separate 
artistic/subjective and the objective/scientific, which almost all of the writers in the tradition find 
irreconcilable (whilst simultaneously managing to give at least some expression beyond these two 
extremes208) and desiring to move beyond. To make it a little over-simple we might consider the 
‘scientific’ as the realm of the ‘physical’, linear cause and effect, functions (as this changes then this 
changes) and ‘measure’ – and the artistic / subjective the realm of qualities and effects (not affects) (in 
Deleuze-Spinoza’s sense), or how something effects me. These are only irreconcilable without a notion 
of affect. Assemblage 2 (refer Appendix) allows us to see the connection between qualities / feelings / 
                                            
208 It is striking how expressive such writers are without recognizing that they are giving expression to something 
substantive itself, something substantive beyond the subjective (which is barely regarded as substantive) and the 
scientific. This simply highlights the lack of the ability of the discipline to conceptualize landscape and landscape 
designing. 
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emotions / effects and affect. The former are much more readily accessed, that is easily accessible to 
consciousness - and that the more involuntary and ‘imperceptible’ affect is less accessible to 
consciousness – yet can be reached from qualities / feelings / emotions / effects. used as starting points 
- ‘if we are able to’, through expression. On the other ‘side’, ‘measure’ (etc.) or that which can be 
recorded in the abstract space of representation has a connection to affect in that affect in itself cannot 
be directly re-presented, even if it can be given expression: yet it is the product of the concrete (open 
systems) interaction of relations in time and space, some of which can be represented. The subjective 
can even then be connected to the scientific – if you have affect to enable the connection. Without the 
expression of affect they remain irreconcilable, and the value of both categories and the value of affect 
are all lost or weakened. Effect becomes a powerful opening and measure comes to life. The whole 
realm of knowledge comes to life or is made relevant. However, whilst Claramunt and Mosbach point 
this way they do not go that far. 
Beyond their theorising of an ‘Ecology of the Mind’, and more concretely, Claramunt and Mosbach posit 
a trajectory for a landscape design project:  
a revealing landscape project brings to the surface what the milieu has which is implicit from a 
technical and a sensitive point of view. It (the project) is an intellectual and a material 
instrumentation conducted by the landscaper and one which reveals an internal coherence of the 
milieu which is felt beforehand.209 
It is important to note that their use of the word ‘project’ seems to refer to the ‘project’ as both the built 
work and what it does and the process of getting to the built work, which is intimately tied to the built 
work and to ‘what the milieu’ has. In the second sense the project is an investigation something to 
embark upon, and a challenge. 
The trajectory of the project, in the sense of the investigation or the landscape design assemblage, 
involves the movement from an ‘internal coherence of the milieu’ which ‘was felt beforehand’ to ‘a 
revealing landscape project’ which ‘which brings to the surface what the milieu has’ (from a technical 
and sensitive point of view). In this they posit not only an internal coherence of the milieu but an internal 
relationship between this the ‘internal coherence of the milieu’ and the resulting ‘revealing landscape 
project’. They, like other landscape architects, value that it is ‘revealing’ of the milieu and that this is to 
be understood in relation to the initial internal coherence of the milieu.  
This trajectory also involves the project finding: 
its origin in a human will, but nonetheless … takes on its full amplitude in the fitting return to the 
nature of things, vitalised by the layout of a physical and mental system. This disposition to blending 
back into a "Nature" might well afford works of art their timeless character.210 
Not only does it seem to have an origin in ‘an internal coherence of the milieu felt beforehand’ but also 
in ‘a human will’. The project is discussed as somewhat virtual or undetermined until it is fully 
determined and brought to life by returning to ‘Nature’, to being realised and experienced physically and 
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210 Ibid. 55-56. 
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mentally and connected to all of Nature in time and space. In this they emphasise both the determining 
nature of the origin in the human will and then the fully determining nature of Nature’s reality to which it 
returns. Again there is posited what might be a determining origin in the human will or an internal self-
referential relationship between the origin in the human will and the return to Nature, which appears 
different from the initially described self-referential relation. 
Before returning to this difference it is worth stressing that they highlight that it is commonly assumed 
that there would or should be criteria of evaluation for landscape design and landscape design 
assemblages. They, instead, champion that landscape design assemblage function best outside of the 
need for any such preconceived criteria.  
It is difficult - in a society which maintains a traditional relation to knowledge - to recognise and 
accept a form of knowledge which ignores discursive criteria of demonstration. However, what is at 
stake here has less to do with the notion of "saying" than of that of "showing".211  
They suggest that this is a challenge, in being beyond what we expect and that they propose a process 
of evaluation that does not require preconceived criteria, and that this process, which they champion, is 
itself challenging. What would it mean to be evaluated without preconceived criteria – in a world where 
we become nervous at the idea that there is not a solid and acceptable way to judge or evaluate? They 
wish to embrace such a condition, yet they want to avoid any ‘intangible points of view’. At this stage 
they refer to a ‘showing’ as the means to evaluate, and distinguish this from a ‘saying’. Showing might 
be seen as another way of saying ‘testing’ in the way that it is often heard said in design criticism, 
influenced by architecture, as being about the evaluation of realised form (or on the basis of realised 
form). However, they place considerable stress on a self-referential relation beyond such visual ‘testing’ 
and will propose their own notion of ‘testing’. 
The landscape design assemblage involves a form of internal evaluation involving a ‘showing’, a 
showing that is in terms of or involves this internal self-referential form of evaluation. ‘Saying’ would, 
presumably, be to evaluate the design in terms of something that it is not, with a particular emphasis on 
concepts and intellectual ideas or ‘theorising’ it would seem, and that this would defer away from what 
‘showing’ produces. To reconcile the relation between the human will as origin and the ‘internal 
coherence of the milieu’ felt beforehand it is important to point out that Claramunt and Mosbach wish to 
avoid the simple romanticism of the design being determined by the artist originator, partly by their 
stress on the ‘internal coherence of the milieu’ and partly by how the project only really comes to life, 
when it returns, when found ‘back’ in reality, in Nature. In ‘showing’ they “hope to render visible what is 
inherent to the landscape: its efficiency which is always being tested.”212 In this they again point to a 
different conception of testing, not based on the realised form, but one preoccupied with ‘an efficiency 
which is always being tested’. To test is to get to the functioning of difference, the power that is ‘making 
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a difference’. Their notion of efficiency seems to touch on a machinic functioning. Spinoza referred to 
‘necessity’ in the way that Nature works.213 
For them: 
“to understand a milieu is one of the reflexes in a landscaping project: as though, before using ones 
brain, there had to be a primitive relation between one and the landscape, reproduced by hand, or 
thanks to a camera, on paper through the act of drawing or of producing a picture… The relation to 
the landscape concerns the whole being and all of the space that surrounds it. lnterwoven with 
virtuality, with what is not immediately apparent. Interwoven with time and vital energy, the visible 
and present space is subjected to everything which is not there, human memory, vegetal, mineral 
and animal memory.214  
Here they offer something vastly different from a romantic determinism. This relation between the 
designer and the milieu is a pre-conscious involuntary relationship. It involves a ‘primitive relationship 
between one and the landscape’ that occurs ‘before using one’s brain’. Such a relationship is no doubt 
an event, and an opening onto the designer-landscape relationship, an opening onto this body, which 
might form the basis for the evaluation of other bodies, as per Spinoza. This primitive relation seems a 
determining moment in the greater determining role of the machinic reflex of ‘understanding the milieu’. 
This moment is not just experienced but is connected to in ‘the act of drawing’ or reproduction of a 
picture. So to understand this positively, and this is one aim of this writing, it would seem that the 
‘primitive relationship between’ the designer and the landscape is primitive in the sense that it is 
machinic, just as is the relationship between this primitive relation, the landscape and these initial acts 
of representation. These acts of representation respond to the initial machine relation or event and in 
doing so both set up a relationship to this primitive relationship and set in train the ability of the relation 
to relate to future design acts. Central to this machinic relation in such acts of representation is their 
ability as marks on the page to setup an expressive connection to the initial primitive relation – or 
operationalise, make designerly or unfold the design assemblage from this primitive relation in relation 
to this primitive relation, a relation that has been transformed by being brought into the design 
assemblage. In doing so they point to what might, unsurprisingly, be called ‘design expression’ or 
‘landscape design expression’, a future-oriented expression of an opening into the design of landscape, 
set-off by the initial primitive relation between the designer-body and the landscape, and continued 
through the machinic relation that acts of representation provide. Expression here, it seems, involves a 
problematic. 
This primitive relationship is not of one body and the landscape as two ‘things’. This: 
relation to the landscape concerns the whole being and all of the space that surrounds it. lnterwoven 
with virtuality, with what is not immediately apparent. Interwoven with time and vital energy, the 
                                            
213 According to Deleuze, Spinoza asks “What does "understands himself" mean? God …understands the necessity 
of his own nature.”  Thus referring to the understanding as expression or affect. Deleuze, Expressionism in 
Philosophy. 100.  
214 Claramunt and Mosbach, "Nature of a Landscape Project." 56. 
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visible and present space is subjected to everything which is not there, human memory, vegetal, 
mineral and animal memory.215  
This involuntary or machinic relationship, when it is achieved, concerns the whole being, which as 
previously described moves across the connection between a body and its occupation. The whole being 
of the body is no longer restricted to the unitary body and is subsumed by the occupation. This 
occupation is only an occupation through its relation to what is beyond the occupation. The (human) 
organism in concert with the landscape provides the mechanisms for this occupation to be connected to 
what is beyond what might seem to be the immediate occupation. The event-introduction to the 
affectuality that is such a body-occupation relationship is an event-introduction to the whole virtuality of 
landscape affect. To connect to the primitive relation is to connect to the functioning of all that is 
involved with this affect, the various affects or powers and the sensations of all that is relevant in time 
and space, and how they are significant or make sense. Deleuze and Guattari use the term ‘territory’ 
(which is actually a process) to describe this ‘whole being and all of the space that surrounds 
it…interwoven with virtuality’. Territoriality (or the spatio-temporal sense-making process) describes the 
whole extended assemblage and points to all that is involved in the assemblage – and what this is, 
where to discover it and how to engage with it are part of the unfolding landscape design assemblage. 
Claramunt and Mosbach suggest just some ways that landscape designers start to ‘open up’ the 
territorial nature of the landscape design assemblage, beyond the initial primitive relation. 
To gain an intimate knowledge of the site through all the senses so as to understand it better, then 
to create an external prolongation of it. Its translation is also obtained through geometric figures: 
contour lines, houses, streams, bridges, woods,... the procession of a technical memory. Lastly, old 
photographs, maps, drawings and texts complete the work of reconnoitring the terrain. And lastly 
comes the relation to the human element: the ingenuousness of traditions, the feats of high 
technology, the imagination of the writer, the expression of the artist... as many materials taking part 
in the human performance at the time of the project.216  
For them this ‘translation’ is an intimate ‘human performance at the time of the project’ involving an 
initial knowledge of the site through all of the senses, and then an external representational 
prolongation of it. This translation involves an array of acts of interpretation and representation, a 
teasing out of the various dimensions of the site – all in relation to the initial machinic or primitive 
relation of occupation concerning the whole being.  
The greater machinic efficiency of the project does tend to escape their expression, and the: 
development of a project wavers between the intelligible and the emotional. Such a position may 
resemble a halfway point in which the requirements of none of the categories would be satisfied. But 
it can also have something to do both with scientific exactitude and human experience and thus 
proceed from an order inherent to the landscaping project.217 
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So, “the development of a project wavers between the intelligible and the emotional”, and that both 
‘scientific exactitude’ and ‘human experience’ are both important. This wavering pointed, as I argued 
following Claramunt and Mosbach, to affect as being what these categories fail to connect to. Such 
‘categories’ are still useful as I also have argued, as the authors assumed. For Claramunt and Mosbach 
not only is there a primitive or machinic relation produced and machinic representational relation to this 
relation and a prolongation of this relation through further interpretive and representational acts – the 
metric,218 scientific and intelligible machinically connect with the emotional and the affectual. The 
subjective-emotional provides entry points that may be turned into affectual knowledge partly through 
further interpretation and expression and partly through interactions with what in itself is not affectual, 
the scientific and representational. Starting to represent the relevant relations of a site sets in train a 
machinic interplay between a developing understanding of the affectuality of the site and a developing 
understanding of what is involved (in time and space) in this affectuality, which interpretation can only 
start to do by itself. Thus there is a machinic interaction between the metric and the non-metric that runs 
through the whole process from the original primitive relation all the way to the return to Nature. This 
machinic metric/affectual relationship is particular to the project and forms the ‘order’ of the project: a 
machinic relation between the particular unfolding metric–affectual machinic relationship set-in-relation 
to the original primitive-machinic relation. A machine of two machines. To slightly misquote Deleuze and 
Guattari, [the metric is about ‘doing’ and the non-metric is about ‘life’] in any creative assemblage. 
Affects can start to be given expression outside of graphic representations but graphic representations 
set in train the design expression, the discovery and expression of the relation of the milieu to the future. 
They continue that “this order results from the combining of the forms and uses which are never 
anything more than specific solutions.”219 This order emerges from the ‘site’ and in relation to the 
‘primitive’ relation to the site. This ‘order’ is a machinic relation of the metric and the non-metric in 
relation to the primitive relation. 
This machinic conception of the landscape design assemblage which can be sensed in Claramunt and 
Mosbach’s writing has, I would argue, a parallel expression in architecture: Robin Evans’ notion of 
projection,220 which in hindsight was an originary expression of the affectuality of architectural 
representation: what architectural drawings do, their ability to project. Claramunt and Mosbach produce 
what possibly should have an equivalent function in the design of landscape.  
For them, “discovering a site in its relation with a nature and a culture is a starting point tor the 
landscaper's work. "Projecting" can be defined as testing the material forms and social ties of a context. 
The experience of the project therefore, seeks to establish coherence that time (or the indifference of 
men to their environment) has tested.”221 Projection involves setting up architectural design 
assemblages for their ability ‘to project’, (relatively) ex nihilo, in the abstract space of representation, in 
                                            
218 All that can be measured, comprehended, recorded or read-off in an abstract space of representation. This is 
opposed to the non-metric and affectual which involves intensive and ‘imperceptible’ communication which is felt 
or sensed and has to be given expression for it to be comprehended. That landscape design involves a relation to 
the pre-existing intensive, affectual and problematic realm means reading-off the drawings only functions in 
relation to this pre-existing intensive, affectual and problematic realm. 
219 Claramunt and Mosbach, "Nature of a Landscape Project." 56. 
220 Evans, "Translation from Drawing to Building (1986)." 
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relation to posited programs and typologies. The testing of the products of such projections, the 
evaluation of what they are doing, being typically in relation to posited programs and typologies (or 
emergently posited programs and typologies). Such projections develop a sense in relation to what has 
been posited. 
Claramunt and Mosbach’s landscape design ‘projecting’, as opposed to Evans’ architectural design 
‘projection’, may or may not be named to distinguish this obscured landscape design assemblage (of 
projecting) from the dominant architectural assemblage (of projection). The latter predominantly 
evaluated and machinically made sense of in relation to posited program and typologies. The former 
evaluated or made sense of in relation to a primary machinic relation of designer-landscape. They frame 
this initial primary machinic relation, similarly to other landscape architectural designers, in terms of 
nature and culture, the whole virtuality of the nature and culture of such a relation. The ‘testing’ of ‘the 
material forms and social ties of a context’ is this evaluation. Testing in relation to program and or 
typology versus testing in relation to the relation to the initial-relation-to-the-pre-existing. Projecting for 
them “fulfils the precise demands of the relation of the intelligible and the emotional”, the ‘precise 
demands’ of the order (original machinic relation) of the landscape. The ‘precise demands’ precisely 
characterises the nature of machinic functioning of (design or any) problems. Any potential or affect 
produced comes with its own emergent issues, motivations and problems. That is why we have 
sensation. Sensation, as Assemblage 2 (refer Appendix) discusses (in relation to Deleuze’s book 
Difference and Repetition), is a sign of something significant for something. An event, a relation, a 
potential, an affect…in relation to some (probably emergent motivation or problem. ‘Precise demands’ 
are in no way preconceived or predetermined and have to be seen as emergent and pragmatic and 
about making a difference. ‘Precise demands’ are the ‘demands’ or regulation provided by the 
resonance of expression. 
For Claramunt and Mosbach,  
“the project can be nothing else than instrumental and adopts a critical attitude in which the divisions 
between forces present are open to other possibilities. The problematic is not simply that of things 
and relations, but of how to manage them and to conceive them in the best way.”222 
It should be obvious that their idea of ‘instrumental’, ‘adopting a critical attitude’ is about ‘being 
instrumental’. It is about ‘making a difference’ through doing design rather than passively doing things 
that a method demands or only seeking one-dimensional utilitarian solutions. The critical facility is 
provided by the machinic relation between the emerging investigation or solution and the pre-existing, 
where the pre-existing is not a thing but the relation between designer and the landscape – itself an 
event, and a machinic relationship or potentially machinic relationship. This former relationship is not a 
fixed relationship, but a constantly enriching event and machinic relationship, one that is determined by 
the design trajectory just as the trajectory is determined by the relationship. What the revealing 
landscape project reveals is not a thing or something but precisely the individual revelation of the 
virtuality of the situation. This virtuality can only be engaged with through experimentation and 
experimentation is only experimentation if it engages with the affectuality and significance (sense) of the 
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affectuality for some motivation or problem. It is only experimentation if it is at least leaning towards or 
touching on making a difference. There are no criteria for such difference. The mode of evaluation 
emerges with the design trajectory, understood in relation to the original machinic relationship and 
event. 
Affects or forces, as Nietzsche (after Spinoza) described, can be seen as the product of the interaction 
of other affects or forces. The critical relation to the pre-existing, itself a relation of affects or forces, 
provides the means to evaluate or test the progress of a project. Such a knowledge is not at all 
descriptive or passive but pragmatic – and is about how to practically manage the trajectory emerging 
from the machinic relation to the site to make a difference. It is about the whole practice and art of the 
design of landscape. It is about the ‘whole experience of the art of landscaping’, the landscape design 
‘project’. 
If we return to Spinoza’s notion that Nature is self-causing and that such self-causing involves the 
spontaneous production of organism-involved open systems of affects by bodies or assemblages, we 
have shifted significantly away from the dominant conception of Nature, of what landscape does, as 
found in more recent landscape design discourse, which has been preoccupied with processes of 
change or variation in time, space or organisation. For Deleuze such conceptions would be considered 
‘diversity’ (in time and or space), and ‘diversity is not difference’.223 This shift cannot be made, and the 
significance of it will not be made without the other great Spinozan discovery about Nature, that Nature 
is not just self-causing but self-knowing. Whilst the first shift has tentatively and weakly been 
conceptualised, the second is conceptually invisible. The way that Claramunt and Mosbach discuss the 
design of landscape gives expression to this self-knowing of Nature, this self-knowing of assemblages, 
in particular the self-knowing of landscape design assemblages, just because they have seriously 
attempted their intuitive or empirical research. 
The effectively complete their argument by arguing that: 
The project becomes a work224 when the man in the street perceives that the same landscape, 
which was insignificant for him at one time, will appear to him as animated at another time.  
They quote Robert Musil in suggesting that a landscape can be like thought: 
“something that suddenly comes alive and which, in a flash, recasts a collection of feelings, in such 
a way that, all of a sudden, one understands it, one understands oneself and understands the world 
differently”.225  
                                            
223 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. 222. That ‘difference is not diversity’ is given significant important attention 
in Assemblage 2 (refer Appendix). 
224 Claramunt and Mosbach propose that a “ landscaping project” “does not only induce aesthetic processes, it 
serves to contain social motivations which imply, in the long term, relations between beings and things.” 
Claramunt and Mosbach, "Nature of a Landscape Project." 56. In this they still fall back onto traditional categories 
such as the aesthetic and the social. Deleuze and Guattari’s observations about assemblages allows such 
categorisations to be bypassed. Assemblages do not recognise such divisions, and Guattari’s notion of an ethico-
aesthetics goes part way to doing so. Guattari, F. (1995). Chaosmosis: An ethico-aesthetic paradigm. Sydney, 
NSW: Power. 
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Landscape design has the somewhat unaffirmed characteristic of generally being part of everyday life, 
and that it tends mostly to be part of the workaday rhythms and be ‘insignificant’. But ‘all of a sudden, 
one understands it, one understands oneself and understands the world differently.’ Whilst this is 
exactly how the four case studies in this thesis were found to sometimes function, Claramunt and 
Mosbach might more humbly be pointing to a difference between the way experience is reduced in 
workaday mode, and that there is always difference beyond this mode of life and experiencing, and that 
some assemblages and some landscape assemblages are more capable of such difference or of 
moving us out of the workaday modes. The way that Musil states this almost exactly parallels Spinoza’s 
notion of Beatitude, which is discussed in detail in Assemblage 2 (refer Appendix). 
For Spinoza, Beatitude, the highest form of knowledge, has three elements. It involves an ‘adequate 
idea’ of: 
1. ‘ourselves and our own essence (or power)’.  
2. ‘the greatest number of possible things’ (the various affects that are produced by Nature) 
3. of God (Nature), ‘as containing all essences, and comprising all in the production 
4. of each (and so in the production of our own essence in particular)’.226 
Beatitude is probably generally presumed to be a reflective sort of knowledge – but Musil’s quote 
suggests that there is something like a Beatitude of experience, which a thought (or a landscape) 
promotes. For landscape, this highest form of experience (or something beyond the workaday at least), 
will tend to remain obscured by the workaday, but that some landscapes make this more accessible, 
and sometimes within the workaday, as is fairly readily evident to most at Federation Square, in 
Melbourne. Achieving a machine that more than arbitrarily (you can see God in a blade of grass) or 
haphazardly opens us up to the virtuality of the everyday requires something like a designer’s Beatitude, 
a designer’s know-how, the effective management of design assemblage. Claramunt and Mosbach 
provide a very effective, original and expressive conception of such a landscape design assemblage. 
They not only describe this assemblage, but in the very precision with which they describe this 
assemblage they touch on one of the most obscured characteristics of assemblages, immanence. In 
their conception of the machinically self-causing assemblage of landscape design and the self-knowing 
of this assemblage they provide the first serious account of the immanence of the landscape design 
assemblage, one that relies on the machinic relationship between the emerging trajectory of design with 
the ever-enriching originary machinic relationship of the designer to the site. Immanence joins 
productivity with criticality. It is about knowing when you are working with difference, with the future, in a 
way that makes a difference.  
The machinic self-knowing of Nature, the functioning of expression, can be found in the interplay of 
images and landscapes. Claramunt and Mosbach discover that the relationship between experience 
and the image associated with it can be a critical relationship, involving what they term ‘recycling’. It is 
worth quoting at length here. For them: 
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the notion of "recycling" is engaged by the difference between what is experienced – the real and 
the representation – the Image - which functions in a spiral chain. Let us took at it in at simplified 
way, in which experiences and their representation are perceived as a succession of distinct 
segments of time. We suppose, without taking much of a risk, that there is no representation without 
there having been an experience.227  
For them, there is no critical representation without there being an experience, and the relation between 
them is a machinic process: 
According to the logic of successive segments of time, the representation takes shape when one is 
in a subsequent fragment of experience. This subsequent moment becomes aware of the 
representation of the previous moment in which it wishes to recognise itself. The second moment of 
experience rendered unnatural by the representation of the first moment composes the matrix of the 
subsequent representation and so on...228  
It is a process that has its own immanent self-criticality: 
The time lag or the distance from the Image to reality prevents the effect - the subsequent reality - 
from being directly linked to the cause – the preceding reality, the first one taking the detour of the 
Image to reach the second.229  
It involves a communicating relationship between image and experience:  
Reality borrows from the plane of the immanence of the Image, and this Image does not remain 
suspended above reality but feeds off its material plane. The work is carried out in both directions 
with a first stage being that of experience which, when it moves on to the following moment, always 
divests the representation of its pretension at curbing it. The Discourse on representation is 
something that operates in time, the present: the time of a reality and of an Image.230  
They show how this ‘discourse of the image’ also highlights any distance from this relationship between 
image and experience: 
Outside the looping together of an Image and a reality, this discourse reveals the distance and 
denounces the risk of autarchy that a blind inter-influence may result in.231 
This ‘critical position’ allows them to produce a critique of media images of landscape design: “The 
landscape is becoming a media product, that is to say it passes through an Image of its discourse.”232 
For them, the “distance between” the discourse on representation (or the discourse on its image) and 
the “image of its discourse” found in media is constantly ranging.233 However, this critique is not 
restricted to media imagery. They propose that the ‘discourse on its image’ facilitates and involves 
images that “become versatile representations, which are critical and open to criticism in that they show 
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228 Ibid. 
229 Ibid. 
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- but do not really exist in themselves—realisations which exist - but only through real Experience.”234 
The ‘discourse of the image’ also comes with the ability to discern the distance between the ‘discourse 
on the image’ and the ‘image of the discourse’: the distance between the image-experience relationship 
and images that depart from this relationship. Such a criticality facilitates and involves a “fine 
discrimination”. This process not only is useful in relation to media imagery of landscape design, which 
strongly tends to be “reduced to the sole faculty of being transmissible”235 – it also provides the means 
to critique all landscape design imagery. 
Both of these faculties or abilities of the image-experience relationship are essential to the 
contemporary landscape design assemblage, which firstly has, unconsciously steered well away from 
engaging with any critical mechanism, or assumed that landscape design criticality is provided by the 
something like the aesthetic-representational machinery of architectural program—and second, is so 
dependent now on media imagery of landscape. This situation of contemporary landscape design 
discourse seems so obvious to me yet I have not seen any discussion of it anywhere else. Claramunt 
and Mosbach’s discussion is simply important. 
                                            
234 Ibid. 
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ASSEMBLAGE 2:  WHAT LANDSCAPES DO AND HOW 
THEY DO IT: LANDSCAPE AFFECT 
 
2.1  Deleuze’s Aesthetics of Affect  
The first part (the first 18 pages) of this section is located here and the second part in 
the Appendix. 
 
2.2  Case Study 1:   Federation Square   (Refer to separate file) 
2.3  Case Study 2:  Royal Park    (Refer to separate files) 
2.4  Case Study 3:  Melton Suburban Creekline Assemblage 
        (Refer to separate file) 
2.5  Case Study 4:  Schulykill River Adventurous Ecology Assemblage 
        (Refer to separate file) 
 
 
2.1  DELEUZE’S AESTHETICS OF AFFECT  PART 1 
The case studies in this research function with the chapter on Deleuze’s Aesthetics of Affect to allow me 
to construct the first full account of landscape affect and how to engage with it. This section aims to 
provide a landscape design-oriented reading of Deleuze and Guattari’s central notion of affect, a notion 
that is complexly dispersed across their writings. To understand this notion requires understanding a 
small ecology of notions. These will be introduced where they are relevant. 
An Introduction to Deleuze’s Spinozan notion of Affect (and Expression) 
First, how to start to key the reader in, theoretically? A convenient, and not uncommon place, to begin is 
with Deleuze’s 1978 lecture on Spinoza, partly as it attempts to communicate the nature and 
significance of affect in one lecture to a ‘mixed audience’.236 In this lecture Deleuze starts his lecture 
with a ‘terminological caution’. He says that in Spinoza's principal book, which is called The Ethics and 
which is written in Latin, one finds two words: ‘affectio’ and ‘affectus’, and notes that some translators 
“translate affectio as ‘affection’ and affectus as ‘feeling’ [sentiment], which is better than translating both 
by the same word, but I don’t see the necessity of having recourse to the word ‘feeling’ since French 
offers the word ‘affect’. Thus when I use the word ‘affect’ it refers to Spinoza’s ‘affectus’, and when I say 
the word ‘affection’, it refers to ‘affectio’”.237 
                                            
236 Deleuze, "Lecture on Spinoza 24/01/1978". 
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Affectio and Affectus 
Half of the problem of attempting to engage with affect involves understanding what affect might be. 
Communicating affect to others once you have a grasp on it is equally a notoriously tricky affair. 
Examples play a central role in understanding and communicating affect.  
This section on Deleuze’s notion of affect will be unashamedly academic, even philosophical most of 
the time. It seems the only way to make the shift of thinking needed to embrace key dimensions of the 
problematic of affect and to be adequate to the case studies and the significance of them to an 
affirmative assemblage of landscape design. It will, at all points try to do this as efficiently as possible.  
The concreteness of Affect 
Affects are surprisingly concrete, but differently than if you have not connected the notion of affect to an 
affect. Without bringing the experiencing of affect, which tends to happen pre-consciously, to 
consciousness the texts of Spinoza and Deleuze-Guattari make little sense. 
Examples are the only way to communicate affect. Some textual examples work. Deleuze draws upon a 
small number of examples and this section will begin with some of the ones he employs in his St. 
Vincennes lectures on Spinoza.238 It is worthwhile drawing on Deleuze’s discussion of these examples 
in some detail. 
In his first lecture Deleuze begins to discuss affect through a comparison with an idea. For Spinoza, an 
idea is a mode of thought defined by its representational character. “This already gives us a first point of 
departure for distinguishing idea and affect (affectus) because we call affect any mode of thought which 
doesn't represent anything.”239 
Love & Hope: Affect as a non-representational mode of thought240 
 “…a will implies, in all rigor, that I will something, and what I will is an object of representation, what I 
will is given in an idea, but the fact of willing is not an idea, it is an affect because it is a non-
representational mode of thought.” In order to will it's necessary to have an idea, however confused or 
indeterminate it may be, of what is willed. Even when one says, ‘I don't know what I feel’, there is a 
representation, confused though it may be, of the object. There is a confused idea. In this lecture he 
discusses how in the 17th century there was an assumed primacy of the idea over the affect “for the very 
simple reason that in order to love it's necessary to have an idea, however confused it may be, however 
indeterminate it may be, of what is loved.” That the affect presupposes the idea above all does not 
mean that it is reduced to the idea or to a combination of ideas. “We must proceed from the following 
point, that idea and affect are two kinds of modes of thought which differ in nature, which are irreducible 
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to one another but simply taken up in a relation such that affect presupposes an idea, however 
confused it may be.”241  
“Take at random what anybody would call affect or feeling, a hope for example, a pain, a love, this is not 
representational. There is an idea of the loved thing, to be sure, there is an idea of something hoped for, 
but hope as such or love as such represents nothing, strictly nothing.” Every mode of thought insofar as 
it is non-representational will be termed affect.242  
A Will: Affect has a relationship with ideas 
 “…a will implies, in all rigor, that I will something, and what I will is an object of representation, what I 
will is given in an idea, but the fact of willing is not an idea, it is an affect because it is a non-
representational mode of thought.”  
In order to will it's necessary to have an idea, however confused or indeterminate it may be, of what is 
willed. Even when one says, “I don't know what I feel,” there is a representation, confused though it may 
be, of the object. There is a confused idea. 
In this lecture he discusses how in the 17th century there was an assumed primacy of the idea over the 
affect “for the very simple reason that in order to love it's necessary to have an idea, however confused 
it may be, however indeterminate it may be, of what is loved.” 
That the affect presupposes the idea above all does not mean that it is reduced to the idea or to a 
combination of ideas. “We must proceed from the following point, that idea and affect are two kinds of 
modes of thought which differ in nature, which are irreducible to one another but simply taken up in a 
relation such that affect presupposes an idea, however confused it may be.”243 
Pierre and Paul: Continuous variation of the power of existing 
Deleuze, in his lecture, tells us that there is a fundamental difference between idea and affect. What 
happens concretely in life?  
“…our ideas succeed each other constantly: one idea chases another, one idea replaces another 
idea for example, in an instant. A perception is a certain type of idea.... Just now I had my head 
turned there, I saw that corner of the room, I turn...it's another idea;”244 
                                            
241 Deleuze, "Lecture on Spinoza 24/01/1978". 2. He then discusses how ideas are modes of thought that are not 
only representational, but they are also something themselves. “Now I come to define the idea by the following: 
every idea is something, not only is it the idea of something but it is something, that is to say it has a degree of 
reality which is proper to it. Thus at this second level I must discover a fundamental difference between idea and 
affect.” Ibid., 3.This will become relevant later in the thesis. 
242 Nigel Thrift, a key affect theorist, employs the term ‘non-representational theory’ to point to what he sees as a 
vast realm and an associated realm of theory that has barely been articulated. Thrift, Nigel, Non-Representational 
Theory: Space, Politics, Affect, ed. Urry, John, International Library of Sociology (Oxon: Routledge, 2008).  
243 He then discusses how ideas are modes of thought that are not only representational, but they are also 
something themselves. “Now I come to define the idea by the following: every idea is something, not only is it the 
idea of something but it is something, that is to say it has a degree of reality which is proper to it. Thus at this 
second level I must discover a fundamental difference between idea and affect.” This will become relevant later in 
the thesis. 
244 Deleuze, "Lecture on Spinoza 24/01/1978". 3. 
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In passing it should be noted that here he wants to shift our idea of what an idea is and to shift the 
traditional privileging of ideas – by widening idea out to include perceptions, and perceptions which are 
less than or not conscious perceptions. So, again, what happens in life? 
I walk down a street where I know people, I say ‘Hello Pierre’ and then I turn and say ‘Hello Paul.’ I 
pass one person then another and so on. Two instances or states of how things appear.…it is thus 
a series of successions, of coexistences of ideas, successions of ideas. But what also happens? 
For Spinoza, two things happen. Firstly, a series of ideas... however, “our everyday life is not made 
up solely of ideas (perceptions…) which succeed each other. Spinoza employs the term 
‘automaton’: we are, he says, spiritual automata, that is to say it is less we who have the ideas than 
the ideas which are affirmed in us”.245 What also happens, apart from this succession of ideas? 
There is something else, that is, something in me never ceases to vary. There is a regime of 
variation which is not the same thing as the succession of ideas themselves. 
Deleuze introduces the word ‘variations’ to “serve us for what we want to do”. He takes up his example 
again:  
in the street I run into Pierre, for whom I feel hostility, I pass by and say hello to Pierre, or perhaps I 
am afraid of him, and then I suddenly see Paul who is very very charming, and I say hello to Paul 
reassuredly and contentedly. Well. What is it? In part, succession of two ideas, the idea of Pierre 
and the idea of Paul; but there is something else: a variation also operates in me, a (variation) of my 
force of existing, or another word he employs as a synonym: vis existendi, the force of existing, or 
potentia agendi, the power [puissance] of acting, and these variations are perpetual.246 
For Spinoza, apart from the succession of ideas, there is a continuous variation—“and this is what it 
means to exist—of the force of existing or of the power of acting.”  
When the idea of Paul succeeds the idea of Pierre, it is agreeable to say247 that my force of existing 
or my power of acting is increased or improved; when, on the contrary, the situation is reversed, 
when after having seen someone who made me joyful I then see someone who makes me sad, I 
say that my power of acting is inhibited or obstructed. At this level we don't even know anymore if 
we are still working within terminological conventions or if we are already moving into something 
much more concrete.” In other words there is a “continuous variation in the form of an increase-
diminution-increase-diminution of the power of acting or the force of existing of someone according 
to the ideas that s/he has.248 
For Deleuze, and there is good reason for his insistence, this “really is existence in the street, it's 
necessary to imagine Spinoza strolling about, and he truly lives existence as this kind of continuous 
                                            
245 By saying “it is less we who have the ideas than the ideas which are affirmed in us”, Deleuze is pointing beyond 
the immediate point that he follows on with – that of drawing attention to the existence of this too-obvious-yet-
obscured level/realm of the continuous variation of my power of existing’) - to the relationship between ideas 
(and/or perceptions) and this continual variation - an involuntary automatistic affirmation process (and to 
expression and an aesthetics of affect). He leaves this centrally important process in mid-air till later in the lecture 
and other places. 
246 Deleuze, "Lecture on Spinoza 24/01/1978". 3. 
247 It might be easy to miss the continual stress on the evaluative dimension of thought in Spinoza and Deleuze. 
248 Deleuze, "Lecture on Spinoza 24/01/1978". 3. 
an affirmative open systems conception of how to design landscape  Connolly, Peter  
95 
 
variation: to the extent that an idea replaces another, I never cease to pass from one degree of 
perfection to another, however miniscule the difference, and this kind of melodic line of continuous 
variation will define affect (affectus) in its correlation with ideas and at the same time in its difference in 
nature from ideas.”249 
The affect is not reducible to an intellectual comparison of ideas, “affect is constituted by the lived 
transition or lived passage from one degree of perfection to another, insofar as this passage is 
determined by ideas; but in itself it does not consist in an idea, but rather constitutes affect.”250 The idea 
and the affect are two things that differ in nature. “We are no longer in the domain of so-called nominal 
definitions, here we already acquire a real definition, that is a definition which, at the same time as it 
defines the thing, also shows the very possibility of this thing.” 251 
Deleuze makes a case for the perpetually prevalent yet hidden reality of affectus. Nominal definitions 
are not ‘adequate’. Central to this is his stress on the everydayness of affect is the stress on adequacy 
of ‘definition’. Adequate definitions, when they are adequate enough, bring things into existence.  
“According to Spinoza, we are fabricated as such spiritual automata.” “Within us there is the whole 
time of ideas which succeed one another, and in accordance with this succession of ideas, our 
power of acting or force of existing is increased or diminished in a continuous manner, on a 
continuous line, and this is what we call affectus, it's what we call existing.” It's a question of “a kind 
of slide, a fall or rise in the power of acting.”252 
For Deleuze there is a parallel movement between ideas and affectus, where ideas do not determine 
affectus but where affectus corresponds with ideas. Affectus is “not reducible to the ideas one has, it is 
determined by the ideas one has” It is not reducible to an idea. “It is of another order.”253 It is only later 
when the notion of expression is discussed will this type of determination make sense. 
The three types of ideas 
For Spinoza there will be three sorts of ideas. The first kind that Spinoza identifies are affection 
(affectio) ideas. Affectio ideas, which is what we have been talking about as an idea so far as—have 
been presented as “opposed to affectus”, is the first kind of idea. Affectus is, as has been said, 
determined but not reducible to affectio.  
An affection is what? It's “a state of a body insofar as it is subject to the action of another body”. What 
does this mean? “I feel the sun on me,” or else “A ray of sunlight falls upon you”; it's an affection of your 
body. Affectio is therefore an effect.254 
It seems that a first reading of the preceding passages is often accompanied by an empowerment 
experienced with the notion of affectus in the Paul and Pierre example.255 What becomes fascinating, 
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however, is that despite this empowerment (felt with the movement of continuous variation) which 
comes with the recognition that this continuous variation exists and is prevalent. Spinoza considers 
affectio (associated with affectus) the “lowest” form of knowledge. For Spinoza, the aim is, to instead, to 
escape affectio as much as possible and achieve higher forms of knowledge. There are two of these.  
So, next we arrive at the ideas that Spinoza calls ‘Common Notions’ and then thirdly, “we come to have 
essence ideas”. He insists on the primacy of this series. “Before everything else there are these three 
sorts of ideas.”256 
An effect, or action that one body produces on another, always implies a contact, and is even a 
mixture of bodies. Affectio is a mixture of two bodies, one body which is said to act on another, and 
the other receives the trace of the first. Every mixture of bodies will be termed an affection. Spinoza 
infers from this that affectio, being defined as a mixture of bodies, indicates the nature of the 
modified body… the affection indicates the nature of the affected body much more than it does the 
nature of the affecting body.  The first sort of idea is every mode of thought which represents an 
affection of the body... trace of another body on my body will be termed an idea of affection, an 
effect. It's in this sense that one could say that it is an affection-idea, the first type of ideas. And this 
first type of ideas answers to what Spinoza terms the first kind of knowledge [connaissance], the 
lowest.257 
Why is it the lowest? It's obvious that it's the lowest because these ideas of affection know [connaissent] 
things only by their effects: I feel the affection of the sun on me, the trace of the sun on me. It's the 
effect of the sun on my body. But the causes, that is, that which is my body, that which is the body of the 
sun, and the relation between these two bodies such that the one produces a particular effect on the 
other rather than something else, of these things I know [sais] absolutely nothing. Affection-ideas are 
“representations of effects without their causes, and it's precisely these that Spinoza calls inadequate 
ideas. These are ideas of mixture separated from the causes of the mixture”.258 Affectus is only one of 
three of the modalities of affect that Spinoza identifies. The others will be discussed later. Affectus is 
possibly the easiest way into the world of affect and Deleuze/Spinoza’s account does enough to open 
up a realm, which Deleuze (and Guattari continue to open further). Affect will remain for all of this 
surprisingly everyday and prevalent, even if it alters the sense of the everyday, in a manner where what 
is concrete about the everyday becomes simultaneously and newly abstract, in relation to what we 
would normally expect, whilst becoming a very newly concrete and obvious, in a manner where these 
are the same thing. As Deleuze says, philosophers can invent ways of perceiving. Not only does this 
realm of affectus suddenly appear from its hiddenness but the everyday suddenly appears afresh from 
its hiddenness. 
                                                                                                                                          
255 One graduate almost involuntarily exclaimed ‘wow, that is so empowering!’ after I read this example out in a 
seminar. The force of existence communicated in the example not only comes with a perception of a power in or 
of the world it also comes with an empowerment of the reader/listener/perceiver. 
256 Deleuze, "Lecture on Spinoza 24/01/1978". 5. 
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It would be easy to skip over that ‘cause’ here is not used how it normally is used. Cause here refers to 
the relation between the two bodies. This is starting to point toward the superior forms of knowledge, 
which have little in common with everyday cause and effect understanding. 
As a sort of summary it is worth stressing that beyond easily achieved effect is the very concrete realm 
of affectus, a perpetually and continually varying force of existence which may be reached through 
changing our perceptual abilities, to perceive that which seems is already there. 
Expression & Affect: Methodological Implications 
This part of the text, comprising the bulk of this section, will concentrate on one book, Expressionism in 
Philosophy.259 To repeat, this section like the other sections in the ‘Affect’ chapter, are aimed at 
identifying, clarifying and affirming key dimensions of assemblages that are not so apparent if you have 
only read, or more likely for designers, only dipped into, A Thousand Plateaus or second hand versions 
of it.260 It will follow the argument of this book in some detail focusing on concepts that have been found 
to be most affirmative and clarifying of the case studies (and design practices resulting from or engaging 
with them) – and most useful for the argument that will emerge through and following this part of the 
text. Other texts will be drawn upon for how they further clarify and affirm the argument extracted from 
Expressionism in Philosophy. 
They are aimed at reconstructing the notion of assemblages to not only do justice to what has been 
obscured, but also to make it more suited to an open systems landscape design assemblage. This 
section will focus on the relationship between two ‘things’, expression and affect. The investigation of 
this relationship has a number of implications. To suggest, possibly lightly, that there might be 
something in this relationship consider the previous part of this section, on the examples. Here, for 
instance, Deleuze paraphrases Spinoza:  
Within us there is the whole time of ideas which succeed one another, and in according with this 
succession of ideas, our power of acting or force of existing is increased or diminished in a 
continuous manner, on a continuous line, and this is what we call affectus, it's what we call existing. 
It's a question of a kind of slide, a fall or rise in the power of acting.261 
By introducing the notion of affectus with the example and the characterisation of affectus as a ‘slide’ 
and a “continuous variation of the force…”262  Spinoza / Deleuze introduces us to something that had 
been obscure in life and thought before this. Something is felt with the introduction of this new term. 
Spinoza actually introduces two things here. Two important things that work together. Expression and 
Affect. The introduction of the notion of affectus starts to give expression to affect. Or gives expression 
to one of affect’s ‘modes’, affectus.263 It starts to open up the realm that is affect or affectivity. At the 
                                            
259 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy; ibid. 
260 Deleuze, Gilles, "Anti-Oedipus and a Thousand Plateaus, Cours Vincennes - 14/01/1974,"  
http://www.webdeleuze.com/php/texte.php?cle=176&groupe=Anti%20Oedipe%20et%20Mille%20Plateaux&langu
e=2.  
261 Deleuze, "Lecture on Spinoza 24/01/1978". 5. 
262 Ibid. 4. 
263 Seigworth, Gregory J., "From Affection to Soul," in Gilles Deleuze: Key Concepts, ed. Stivale, Charles J. 
(Durham: Acumen, 2005). 
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same time it starts to open up another of the powers of assemblages, the power to connect to the power 
of things that are or could be relevant to them. This is the same as starting to open up the power of an 
assemblage. Such an opening is in practice, and it is continually being opened, tends not to be 
recognised as an opening and is usually shut down without realising after it is opened a little. It is not 
recognised as it does not tend to fit into our expectations, be they philosophical or designerly. I hope to 
keep this opening open and open it further and to move from a light and general opening into a ‘new’ 
realm onto, eventually, the power and singularity of specific landscape affects and affectuality. 
So, affect and expression go together. Twinned. More precisely they function together machinically, as 
an assemblage, and as part of larger assemblages, any assemblages, all assemblages. Assemblages 
requires that they must. ‘How things work’ has been the bottom-line and the main preoccupation for 
much recent and Deleuzian and post-Deleuzian philosophy and certainly the bottom line for recent 
traditions of the design of cities and landscapes. The case studies in this research will be used to argue 
that affect and expression are likely the most ‘adequate’ and affirmative way to consider ‘how things 
work’. This is what will be argued that Deleuze and Guattari mean when they say ‘how things work’.  
The notion of affect affirms what I have been finding in the case studies. These case studies also affirm 
the affect-theory of Deleuze/Guattari as well as providing ways to shift and extend such theory. I will flag 
here, to show my intentions with the case studies, that the case studies attempt to give expression to 
what landscapes do in a manner that probably only occurred haphazardly prior to them.  
Our expectations make Spinoza’s idea of expression seem a foreign and mysterious notion. Expression 
is central to Deleuze/Guattari’s thought and how open systems function yet expression or expressionist 
thinking is almost totally absent from recent design thinking. One of the oddities, and one of the most 
wonderful characteristics of expression is that it involves an impersonal precision that might be 
expected in science and it inseparably involves a creativity. To introduce the notion of affectus is 
capturing or defining or characterising something that had not been noticed before—something that the 
word ‘affectus’, when connected to what it is opening up, conjures up as prevalent and already existing 
and needing the notion of affectus (with the example and the characterisation) to make it visible. Yet, as 
should become more evident in the case studies, such expressions or acts of expression are creative 
acts—in the sense that they do not just re-present or ‘describe’ ‘what was already there’, and that the 
style of doing so is central. One of the theses of this thesis is that the introduction of the notion of 
expression introduces us to an unexplored (or previously haphazardly explored) practices, arts, styles 
and modes of operation that are central to an assemblage. By unexplored is meant that expression is 
always part of design and stronger and weaker expressive-practices are part of the furniture of the 
landscape design world, yet the lack of conscious conceptualising of expression is directly related to 
how haphazardly designing connects to ‘what landscape does’. I use the term ‘haphazard’ to describe 
the ability to connect to what things do without strong expressive practices or strongly affirmed 
expressive practices – to only partly connect to ‘what things do’. 
Affect opens up a vast realm that has seemingly been obscured. Expression also opens up a vast realm 
that has seemingly been obscured. ‘What things do’ and how you work with ‘what things do’, are both 
actually about ‘what things do’. They are both doings. What things do is not just what things do ‘out 
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there’ in the landscape. Expression-affect asserts what, I will argue later, has been very obscured and 
even actively pushed aside in recent landscape design thought and practice – what can most precisely 
be termed the ‘aesthetic’ dimension of landscape design assemblages. Assemblages will be shown to 
produce affects or even to be affects. The aesthetics of assemblages is an aesthetics of affects. This 
has little to do with beauty or taste or ‘what I like’ – yet may also return force and make useful such 
figures. The involuntary sense to the ‘word’ assemblage itself might tend to promote this. I will argue, 
and I am not alone, that A Thousand Plateaus is a very aesthetic book and assemblages are aesthetic 
machines. The pragmatic-experimental orientation of this text does not eschew aesthetics but instead 
tries to have no separation of the aesthetic from any doing, that doing is inseparably aesthetics. 
Aesthetics in more traditional philosophical writings and common sense might be seen as a separate 
and more-distant-considered realm from doing. In A Thousand Plateaus the aesthetic dimension or 
moment is part of doing. The experimentation and pragmatics of A Thousand Plateaus is inseparably 
and immediately aesthetic. The chapter on open-systems-oriented approaches to the design of 
landscape will draw attention to a strong anti-aesthetic dimension in recent design thinking, which is 
perverse given the way that Deleuze (and Guattari) discuss open systems and what things do. 
We will therefore define the artisan as one who is determined in such a way as to follow a flow of 
matter…To follow the flow of matter is to itinerate, to ambulate. It is intuition in action.264 
Intuition-in-action could just as easily be termed aesthetics-in-action. Or perception-in-action. The way 
that an artisan ‘follows’ is in the doing. Experimentation is following in this sense. Feeling your way with 
how things work. Feeling how what design is doing and feeling what the landscape is doing – in a way 
where they become the same thing. 
If ‘how things work’ is to be understood through affect’ what does experimentation with landscape 
design look like? There are a range of emerging models, mostly associated with landscape urbanism. 
How do they conceive of and practice ‘how things work’? Do they engage with the affectuality of 
landscape? Is this important, central, essential? Do they engage with affect but not under that name? 
Are strong things that they do being missed because affect is not affirmed or other things distract 
attention from affects? These questions will be discussed later, but some of the key tools to allow this 
discussion to occur will be introduced here. Is affect ‘just’ subjective? Is it just a fashionable interest? 
Expression is not just, even if the philosophical Expressionism in Philosophy could be mis-read as 
suggesting this, about words or language but it is also about perceptions and actions. Actions express 
as much as words and language. This is obviously central to a design assemblage. 
Another way to discuss ‘following’ or aesthetics is as evaluation. Evaluation is here the evaluation of the 
ability or emerging ability of something. It also suggests criticality. Knowing the significance of what you 
are doing? How critical are the recent open systems models landscape design models? This 
investigation will later seek to establish that assemblages are critical machines.  
So, words and actions are expressive. Spinoza draws out the power of words and language in a way 
that shifts how these forms of representations are understood and is able to revalue them for design 
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disciplines that currently have operative biases against them, in ways that disempower words – and, it 
will be argued in turn, images. Expression relates just as much to other forms of representation as well. 
Drawings, in whatever sense, are or can be and should be expressive. What does this mean? I would 
suggest that it is central. The notion of expression introduces a whole new function for representation, 
maybe the ultimate function of representation, which like affectus, was no doubt ‘already there’ in a 
sense, but needs a creative intervention to give it expression.  
The types of expression introduced above, for Spinoza, all come under the title of ‘epistemological 
expression’. There are two other forms of expression identified in Expressionism in Philosophy.265 The 
second of these is ‘ontological expression’. To really understand this we need a strong idea of 
immanence, which will have to wait. However, ontological expression might be understood as the world 
or Nature expressing itself. In this sense affects are expressions of the world, of Nature. What the 
landscape does is an expression. With the notion of immanence such expression involves the whole 
world. So that an affect is not just a single simple thing as the saying of the word suggests. It is an 
expression of the world. This is the realm of individuality. The world is only individuals. What does it 
mean to work with landscape individuals? What are the implications? How do notions of program and 
indeterminacy, for instance, relate to individuality? 
What is Spinoza’s notion of immanence? 
“Along with Merleau-Ponty, he sees seventeenth-century thought generally as “an innocent way of 
setting out in one’s thinking from the infinite” “Starting with the infinite is not impossible, but rather quite 
natural, for Deleuze. We should be careful, though, not to misread this innocence—infinite does not 
mean indefinite; the infinite substance is not indeterminate”. 266  
Nature and Expression: Spinoza’s schema  
Spinoza wanted to produce a theory of God or Nature that did not rely upon a transcendent God at a 
time (the seventeenth century) when to do so was decidedly dangerous. Just as for Spinoza’s purpose 
God was Nature, for the purpose at hand here, as we are little concerned with questions about God per 
se, God is Nature.267 Spinoza wanted to return some of the power to Nature that he considered had not 
been affirmed by past philosophies that had in various ways deferred from the power of Nature, usually 
to a transcendent realm. For Spinoza, “to be is to belong to Nature.”268  
Open systems-oriented approaches to designing landscape would probably not quarrel with the idea 
that to be is to belong to Nature. However, they might, as will be shown, find Spinoza’s emphasis on the 
mind as the means to connect with such being more foreign or troublesome.  
                                            
265 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy. 113-114. 
266 Hardt, Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy., 60. 
267 It was improper for Spinoza to clearly substitute God for Nature.  
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Spinoza’s schema is, according to Due, “mainly concerned with the problem of determining the place 
that the human mind and its activities occupy within the structure of reality.”269 
Strangely, or not, no such concern exists in the recent design discourse. It is as if the landscape is just 
‘out there’. That open systems are just out there ‘to map’, to organise etc. The ‘mind’s relation to reality’ 
- ‘subjectivity’, ‘experience’, perception’ etc. - will tend to be improper concerns in this discourse. Of 
course Spinoza’s conception of mind is somewhat different from everyday conceptions. 
Looking ahead in this thesis, Bergson, has similar concerns. In his Matter and Memory, he states that 
“the brain is part of the material world; the material world is not part of the brain.”270 Bergson also denies 
the weak options of subjective/in-there or (more) objective/out-there. Spinoza aims to connect to the 
great power of this organ, which is part of the world, as a way to connect to the power of the world-. 
Spinoza and Deleuze are both concerned with the relation of the brain to the world. Both approach this 
relation through the body by embracing the body (and machines / assemblages). This will require some 
explaining. To get to the power of Nature Deleuse, following Spinoza, has to work hard constructing a 
set of key concepts: univocity, immanence, individuality… 
Univocity: To be is to belong to Nature. 
What does it mean that Nature expresses itself? That this is the realm of individuals? What is the 
relationship between Nature and Individuals? For Spinoza, the nature to which anything that is has to 
belong is a divine “absolutely infinite substance”.271 To belong to this substance means to be produced 
or generated by and within it. According to Due, “Substance itself is divine because it is a cause of itself; 
it is, in other words, self-generating”272 or according to Spinoza, and in reverse, “as substance” is “cause 
of itself”, it “is therefore necessarily infinite”.273 What does it mean to be ‘cause of itself’ and what does it 
mean to be therefore necessarily infinite? It is this infinite self-causing which will be the focus of this 
chapter, of the way that affect functions, and the way that it most immediately seems relevant to 
contemporary design concerns, with their focus on self-organisation and emergence. 
Reidar Due says, that “it is important for Deleuze that it is the same structure of being that governs both 
substance (which is infinite) and anything that is produced by substance (which is finite). Thus, the 
distinction between what is finite and what is infinite does not introduce a break or a discontinuity within 
being.” “This sameness in the meaning of the term 'being' which is called its 'univocity' is a defining 
feature of Spinoza's principle of immanence. Univocity means that nothing, not even God, exists in a 
reality that would lie beyond the reality of the world, as a separate transcendent”, and determining, 
“realm that we could only think about and refer to in indirect or symbolic terms.”274 Univocity was an 
heretical position at the time of Spinoza for it was to put a frog, a chair and human beings on the same 
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level, of the same type of being. For equivocists275, in contrast to univocists, there was something above 
or outside the everyday world, the world of humans that controlled or influenced the everyday / human 
world. 
Transcendence: Deferring from the power of Nature 
May succinctly outlines what is at stake with transcendence.  “Transcendence freezes living, makes it 
coagulate and lose its flow”…”It submits all difference to the judgment of … a perspective that stands 
outside difference and gathers it into manageable categories.” “That which transcends stands outside of 
or above. It is beyond.”276 This turns out to be “a dual transcendence, of subjectivity from the world and 
of God from both the subject and the world. The first transcendence gives birth to the mind-body 
problem: if the mind transcends the body, then what is their relationship? The second transcendence 
carries on the ancient and medieval tradition of the transcendence of God. In time, the first 
transcendence displaces the second one.”277 
Transcendence, according to May, requires two commitments: first, if God (or Platonic forms or the 
human subject) transcends the world it cannot be made of the same substance as the world; and 
second, it also requires that one of these substances are superior to the other. “Superior in power and 
superior in value.”278 What are the implications of this? For Deleuze most important is “what is to be 
denigrated: the physical, the chaotic, that which resists identity.”279 It involves a denial of or deferral from 
the power of the world itself, of Nature, of the here and now. It might be added, from Difference and 
Repetition, that “we tend to subordinate difference to identity in order to think it.”280 This may sound like 
a relatively arcane philosophical argument. The word ‘transcendence’ might suggest this. We rely upon 
common habits and strategies to try to think difference. Difference is not only subsumed directly under 
identify, but indirectly, by opposition, analogy and resemblance, other ‘mediations’ (“the four shackles of 
mediation”)281, which have a relation to identity. These strategies defer from the power of difference 
through understanding the power of something in terms of something else. How to have difference 
itself? Such mediations are deferrals and it may open out the everyday relevance of such mediation if 
mediation is seen as including a whole rich range of ways that we tend to defer from the power of 
difference to more easily processed ways of thinking. This involves deferring away from what presents 
                                            
275 But “being is equivocal” meant a precise thing: being is said in several senses. That means: being is said in 
several senses of that of which it is said.”…” One assumes that a table is not in the same manner as an animal 
and that an animal is not in the same manner as a man; that a man is not in the same manner as God. Therefore 
there are several senses of being.” Deleuze, "Anti-Oedipus and a Thousand Plateaus, Cours Vincennes - 
14/01/1974". 2. 
276 May, Todd, Gilles Deleuze: An Introduction  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 28. 
277 Ibid. 28. 
278 Ibid. 29. 
279 Ibid. 30 
280 “We tend to subordinate difference to identity in order to think it (from the point of view of the concept or the 
subject: for example, specific difference presupposes an identical concept in the form of a genus). We also have 
a tendency to subordinate it to resemblance (from the point of view of perception), to opposition (from the point of 
view of predicates), and to analogy (from the point of view of judgment). In other words, we do not think difference 
in itself.” Deleuze, Difference and Repetition., xv. An account of difference (and repetition) later in this chapter will 
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itself to you or deferring to something else to grasp, understand or classify what it is that presents itself 
to you. 
How to move beyond transcendence and achieve immanence? 
So how not to denigrate through such mediation? Deleuze attempts to produce a modern notion of 
immanence, divested of its religious or theological dimensions.282 
To move beyond transcendence, to construct or achieve immanence, Spinoza, according to Deleuze, 
employs the concept of ‘expression’. To do so he has to also move beyond past notions of expression 
(creation and emanation) associated with theological understanding.283 Spinoza constructs a 
philosophical schema that relies on the notion of expression to get to immanence.  To motion toward the 
aim of this chapter, to contribute to a reconstruction of the notion of assemblage of relevance to the 
design of landscape, it should be pointed out that Deleuze and Guattari’s attempt to avoid 
transcendence is most fully expressed in Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus. The very notions of 
machine and assemblage starts to express immanence. 
How Spinoza’s Conception of How Nature Functions: Substance, Attributes & Modes 
Spinoza’s philosophical schema is a variation on past philosophical schemas, with important 
differences.  
In Spinoza’s time the concepts of substance, attributes, and modes are the standard fare of 
philosophy. Attributes are the characteristics or essences of substance, modes their concrete 
appearance in reality. An attribute of mental substance is that it thinks; a mode is a specific thought. 
An attribute of physical substance is that it is extended. My body is one of its modes. God’s 
attributes are omniscience, omnipotence, etc.: it has no modes. The relationship between substance 
and mode, particularly the divine substance of God, is one of either creation or emanation.284 
                                            
282 A cursory examination of various dictionary entries for immanence reveals the contrast with transcendence and 
that immanence is often contrasted with transcendence: “the state of being within or not going beyond a given 
domain”, “derived from the Latin in manere "to remain within", refers to philosophical and metaphysical theories of 
the divine as existing and acting within the mind or the world. This concept generally contrasts or coexists with the 
idea of transcendence. That the “belief in the immanence of the transcendent God is a distinguishing 
characteristic of Christianity and Judaism” draws attention to the relation between what is beyond and what is 
within, that the question is historically rich and that there is no clear within and without. (askdefine.com, accessed 
September 16, 2011.) 
283 Emanation and creation have affinities with expression. “In creation, God exercises his omnipotence in order to 
put something in place that did not exist before. The Genesis story of the creation of the physical universe is 
usually interpreted in this way. There was nothing but God, until God brought the universe into being. The usual 
way of thinking about the relationship between what exists and God is along the lines of creation. Emanation is 
like creation in that there remains a distinction between the creator and the created. The difference is that what is 
created comes from the substance of the creator, emanates from it. If I were an artist who was able not only to 
mold the material before me but also to will the very material to appear, I would be engaging in creation. If my art 
were instead torn from my flesh, I would be engaged in emanation…In emanation, what is created is distinct from 
the creator. Moreover, the creator remains privileged in regard to its creation.” … “Emanation thus serves as the 
principle of a universe rendered hierarchical...each term is as it were the image of the superior term that precedes 
it”. “Emanation, like creation, preserves the two commitments of a philosophy of transcendence: the existence of 
two substances and the superiority of one of those substances”. May, Gilles Deleuze: An Introduction. 33-34 
284 Ibid. 33. 
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His schema, as understood by Deleuze, can be briefly described, as it will be in the next page or so, but 
requires some further elaboration to get to how it really functions and why it might be useful, which the 
text following this account focuses on.  
One thing which will distinguish this text from previous designer accounts of Deleuze / Guattari ideas is 
how much it takes account of their larger project and range of ideas. What has become obvious in the 
immersion with their ideas is that the prevalent designerly use of their ideas might be considered more-
immediately pragmatic in its use, aiming to find what can be immediately and readily ‘applied’. There is 
nothing wrong with this in principle as is often argued in design discourse but that such tendencies tend 
to forgo what might be gained by embracing the whole problematic or the greater problematics that their 
particular concepts are constructed to serve within. Embracing the greater problematic and ecology of 
their concepts transforms each of their concepts into what the more immediate use will strongly tend to 
not to get to. Of note it is fair to say that there is a whole problematic of affect that is effectively ignored 
in recent design literature, especially landscape urbanism, that will if engaged with shift radically the 
usefulness, significance and power of Deleuze / Guattari’s ideas. 
Spinoza’s divine substance is characterised by producing an infinity of finite 'modes'. The differences, 
which allow him to move beyond previous philosophical schemas, beyond creation and emanation, start 
to emerge in how he views substance, attributes and modes. A finite mode, for Spinoza, (as will be 
discussed later) is ‘a body’. It is characterised by a degree of power (essence) corresponding to a ‘very 
great number’ of extensive parts and a ‘characteristic relation’ (in which the degree of power expresses 
itself).285  
Such modes (or bodies - or with later elaboration, ‘assemblages’ in A Thousand Plateaus) are parts of 
this substance, as modes (or modifications), and they are parts in the sense of being produced by this 
infinite substance. The modes that are relevant to human beings, that human beings are a part of, exist 
within the attributes of thought and extension.286 My body, in contrast to the more traditional 
philosophical conception, is not itself a mode, but something/s of my body or what it does are parts of 
modes. 
“These attributes which divide and define human reality are at the same time the attributes of 
substance. Attributes are expressions of substance”, (or as Spinoza has it, “God, or substance”) which 
Metcalf describes as ‘unformed’ matter, does “not exist outside of production and can only produce 
within definite attributes.”287 “Attributes are infinite and indivisible qualities.”288 “…each attribute-quality 
has an infinite quantity that is for its part divisible in certain conditions. This infinite quantity of an 
attribute constitutes a matter, but a purely modal matter.”289 ‘Quantities’ here refers to “intensive modal 
quantities” or modal essences or degrees of power.290 “A modal essence is a physical reality, a pure 
physical reality.” “Essence, qua essence, has an existence.” “A modal essence has an existence distinct 
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289 Ibid. 191. 
290 Bains, Paul, "Subjectless Subjectivities," in A Shock to Thought: Expression after Deleuze and Guattari, ed. 
Massumi, Brian (London: Routledge, 2002).ibid, 198-9. 
an affirmative open systems conception of how to design landscape  Connolly, Peter  
105 
 
from that of the corresponding mode.”291 Substance produces degrees of power. Spinoza diverts 
attention from identity and concrete appearances to degrees of power and the way that great numbers 
of parts are involved together in a characteristic relation. 
Deleuze points out that “the status of modal essences relates to a strictly Spinozist problem of passing 
from infinite to finite.”292 The “finite is neither substantial (of substance) nor qualitative…It is modal, that 
is quantitative.” “Each substantial quality has intensive modal quantity, itself infinite, which actually 
divides into an infinity of intrinsic modes. They are “part of God’s power.”293 The finite is power. 
Expression, ontological expression, is this passing from the infinite to the finite. It involves the 
expression of the infinite in or through the finite, as power. Substance only exists through production 
within attributes. This production is of a modal matter.  
Thus modes are in their essence expressive: they express God’s essence each according to the 
degree of power that constitutes its essence. The Individuation of the finite does not proceed in 
Spinoza from genus to species or individual, from general to particular; it proceeds from an infinite 
quality to a corresponding quantity, which divides into irreducible intrinsic or intensive parts.294 
Substance expresses itself through modes as power. ‘Proceeds from’ does not mean moving from 
quality to quantity but coming to be in modes. This coming into being is what is important to Deleuze. 
May says that, “we must remove ourselves from the temptation of seeing substance as an object or 
thing”. “Substance is not like a thing that gives birth to other things. It is more like a process of 
expression.” “Substance has a temporal character. It is bound up with time.”295 This will require a later 
discussion of Bergson to clarify the significance of this. 
Spinoza gives importance to Substance, however Deleuze for his purposes says, “what interested me 
most in Spinoza wasn’t his Substance, but the composition of finite modes.” This involved the hope of 
“making substance turn on finite modes, or at least seeing in substance a plane of immanence in which 
finite modes operate.”296 Deleuze, through Spinoza, wants to understand the operation of modes.  
So, Nature produces bodies (or later assemblages). These bodies are characterised by: a degree of 
power (or later affect); a very great number of extensive parts and a “characteristic relation”297 Human-
related bodies exist within the attributes of Extension and Thought. These attributes are shared by 
Nature and bodies. Nature, however, only exists in the production of bodies and their power. It moves 
from the unformed matter of substance (Nature) to the existence of modes and the power of modes. 
The infinite is expressed as the power of these bodies. Bodies are expressive.  
Deleuze wants to strengthens Spinoza’s principle of immanence and meticulously constructs Spinoza’s 
schema so that it, conceivably, function through modes only, through the interaction of modes as 
Nature. The production of Nature occurs through the production of the power of bodies. Expression 
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allows this to happen. This emphasis on modes allows his later work to embrace Nature298 itself, without 
the various transcendentally-leaning layers of substance, attributes and modes.  
Expressionism in Philosophy allows this happen at the same time as elaborating on the whole schema 
of substance-attribute-mode-power, which Deleuze uses to draw out key Spinozan conceptions of our 
relationship to the world and how understanding occurs.  
Open Systems and Individuals: Real distinction requires expression  
For Deleuze, “expression is inherent in substance, insofar as substance is absolutely infinite; in its 
attributes, insofar as they constitute an infinity: in essence, insofar as each essence in an attribute is 
infinite. Thus infinity has a nature. Spinozism was the ‘most perfect embodiment’ of ‘the idea of a 
positive infinity.’ Spinoza needed to introduce into infinity various distinctions corresponding to the three 
terms, substance, attributes and essence. So, ‘what is the character of distinction within infinity?”299  
Spinoza was particularly concerned with the problem of how there is distinction in the absolute, infinity. 
To engage with this he has to distinguish ‘real distinction’ from ‘numerical distinction’. In doing so he 
was being critical of common sense and Descartes. For Spinoza/Deleuze our attentions have been 
misplaced and the focus on numerical distinction defers us from the power of Nature, which is directly 
connected to real distinction. 
Numerical distinction involves, to move outside Expressionism in Philosophy, what Deleuze terms 
‘representational thought’, where distinctions come from abstract classifications, such as that provided 
by common sense, habitual recognition, language and received discourse. It is classification by merely 
extrinsic sign—by merely perceptible similarities and differences rather than internal causes.300 
Representational thought believes itself to include real difference. “With the categories of 
representational thought, the individual is classified within a general/particular framework of already 
formed matter. With representational thought the cause or principle of individuation is contained in the 
fully constituted individual, the particular ‘concrete appearance in reality”.301 Representational thought 
cannot tell us what constitutes the singularity of the individual. 
As Hardt says, “Spinoza’s challenge is to eliminate the relational, or negative, aspect of the real 
distinction. Rather than pose the real distinction as a ‘distinction between’ or a ‘difference from’, Spinoza 
wants to identify the real distinction in itself”.302  Deleuze takes up this question again in Difference and 
Repetition as well. This means embracing the singular. 
                                            
298 There may be Nature as a product (Natura naturata) but for Spinoza what is important, and Spinoza makes this 
distinction, is Nature as process (Natura naturans or Nature Naturing). The infinite is expressed through the 
concrete finite interactions of bodies as power. Nature as a process produces an infinity of specific modes each 
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Deleuze-Spinoza opposes Univocity to representational thought. With Univocity, “singularity is pre-
individual. The individual is no longer determined within a general framework of already formed 
matter.”303 Univocity involves only one infinite substance, differentiated ‘modally’. Allowing ourselves to 
see that it is an opening out to the infinity of Nature that produces the power of Nature, gets us to see 
such power and to see such power as singular power. 
There is a double movement suggested here—a double movement that solves the problem of the how 
to pass from infinite to finite. (This ‘how’ refers both to how there is a passing from the infinite to the 
finite and how to make this connection operationally.) This partly involves detaching from numerical 
distinction. By being “detached from all numerical distinction, real distinction is carried into the 
absolute”.304  
Numerical distinction is not about numbers but about numbers of entities. For instance, “by affirming the 
existence of two substances, Descartes”, who was Deleuze’s departure point, “presents the real 
distinction as a numerical distinction.” Spinoza challenges Descartes doubly by arguing that “a 
numerical distinction is never real” and “then that a real distinction is never numerical.” Also, “while 
traditional interpretations have generally identified Spinoza’s substance with the number one or with 
infinity, Deleuze insists that substance is completely removed from the realm of number”.305 
As opposed to the numerical distinction of the fully constituted individual of abstract classifications, “real 
distinction” is “purely qualitative, quidditive or formal” and excludes any division.306 So, on one hand, we 
have a movement that opens up to the absolute and on the other, and dependent on the former and 
vice versa, we open ourselves up to the singular, the quidditive, thisness, haeccity. It this double 
movement that connects to the power of Nature. Singularity, or singular-absolute is the only power of 
Nature. It is at this moment that we can “see” that “everything is necessary”.307 This necessity is not so 
much a cosmic determinism as some believe308 but a challenge for perception, a getting to see the 
world working as it does, as singular powers; by itself, as itself. Opening up to see what singular things 
happen, opening out wide enough to see what is involved and simultaneously affirming the precision, 
power and richness of what something does in all of its singular unique nature. That “modes are in their 
essence expressive” means that the infinity of the absolute is expressed as power, a singular power, in 
the nature of modes. This power in being absolute-singular, is expressive. The absolute is expressed in 
the singularity of the power. 
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Hardt is useful for clarifying the nature of singularity. He clarifies the way that Deleuze works to avoid an 
‘idealistic’ interpretation of singularity. “As a first approximation, we could say that singularity is the 
union of monism with the absolute positivity of pantheism: The unique substance directly infuses and 
animates the entire world.” The problem with this definition is that it leaves open an idealistic 
interpretation of substance, and allows for a confusion between the infinite and the indefinite. In other 
words, from an idealist perspective, absolute substance might be read as an indetermination, and 
pantheism might be read as acosmism.309 Deleuze’s reading, however, closes off this possibility. For 
Deleuze, Being is “singular not only in that it is unique and absolutely infinite, but, more important, in 
that it is remarkable.”310 
Singular being is not ‘distinct from’ or ‘different from’ anything outside itself, yet being is not ‘indifferent’. 
“Spinoza’s ontology311 is dominated by notions of cause of itself, in itself and through itself”.312 For Hardt, 
this involves an ‘internal causal dynamic’ and it is what ‘animates the real distinction of being’. This 
suggests an extension of the popular notion of ‘self-organisatIon’, where self-organisation is more than 
just self-causation. ‘Through itself’ is as important as ‘cause of itself’. Spinoza’s definition of substance: 
“By substance I understand what is in itself and is conceived through itself, i.e., that whose concept 
does not require the concept of another thing, from which it must be formed.” The distinction of being 
arises from within. “Causa sui means that being is both infinite and definite: Being is singular not only in 
being unique and absolutely infinite, but, more important, in that it is remarkable.…being is absolutely 
infinite and indivisible at the same time that it is distinct and determinate…the singular is remarkable 
because it is different in itself.”313 So, Hardt says we have to be careful not to mistake the infinite for the 
indefinite. “The infinite substance is not indeterminate.”314 The implications of the singular as remarkable 
are significant.  
It seems that the end-purpose of Deleuze’s re-reading of Spinoza is beyond proposing a description of 
the workings of Nature. Spinoza/Deleuze are concerned with technique, about how to connect to the 
power of Nature, difference. This involves a shift in preoccupations and emphasis – on being open to 
singular powers as real and simultaneously being open to the way that infinity is involved in this 
singularity to make it singular. It involves being able to perceive the singularity of these singular powers 
and it involves being able to understand how the infinity of Nature is involved in, is expressed in, this 
singular power, in its power and in the singularity of its power. This involves something new and foreign, 
embracing the challenge of moving beyond received or abstract numerical distinctions to be able to 
achieve real distinction. Not only is real distinction proposed as what we should be preoccupied with, 
but that it must be achieved, rather than effectively presumed. 
This text is continued in the Appendix. 
                                            
309 Hegel accuses Spinoza of acosmism: “all determinate content is swallowed up as radically null and void.” Since 
the Absolute is the only reality ‘that means that everything that is not-Absolute cannot be real. Thus, according to 
this viewpoint, the phenomenal dualistic world is ultimately an illusion’. 
310 Hardt, Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy. 62. 
311 Traditionally understood as the philosophical study of the nature of being, existence or reality. 
312 This phrase from Expressionism in Philosophy. 162, quoted in Hardt, Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in 
Philosophy. 62. 
313 Hardt, Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy. 63. 
314 Ibid. 60 
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2.2  CASE STUDY 1: FEDERATION SQUARE 
The case studies in this research, with the chapter on Deleuze’s Aesthetics of Affect, constitute the first 
full account of landscape affect and how to engage with it. 
Refer to separate file titled ‘Case Study 1: Federation Square’ 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR USE  
The file was produced in Microsoft Powerpoint 2008 for Mac. The Powerpoint instructions here are for 
this software. Equivalent instructions may be found in other versions of powerpoint (Mac and PC).  
1. Open file in Powerpoint 
2. On drop-down menu press on ‘Slide show’ 
3. Select ‘View Slide Show’  
4. The slideshow with audio should play by itself. 
If the Powerpoint file does not play then the text that is spoken on the powerpoint can be viewed in 
‘Presenter Tools’ under ‘View’ dropdown menu in Microsoft Powerpoint 2008 for Mac and later Mac 
versions. On a PC the equivalent this should be ‘Presenter View’. This mode of viewing is manual. 
 
2.3  CASE STUDY 2: ROYAL PARK  
A study of Royal Park in Melbourne to attempt to understand and communicate something it ‘does’ 
(landscape affect) and the processes involved in the production of this doing (landscape assemblage).  
Refer to separate files titled:  
‘Case Study 2: Royal Park: part 1’  
‘Case Study 2: Royal Park: part 2’  
‘Case Study 2: Royal Park: part 3’  
‘Case Study 2: Royal Park: part 4’ 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR USE  
This Case Study comes in 4 pdf file parts. Each pdf was produced in Microsoft Powerpoint 2011 for 
Mac. The Powerpoint instructions here are for this software. Equivalent instructions may be found in 
other versions of powerpoint (Mac and PC)  
1. Use high resolution large screen computer or display. 
2. Open first file (‘Case Study 2: Royal Park: part 1’) in Adobe Professional (or other pdf viewing 
software). 
3. (In Adobe Professional) On drop-down menu press ‘View’ then ‘Full Screen Mode’. 
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4. Proceed through presentation.  
5. This presentation was originally designed to be an A1 hardcopy. Many of the larger (A1 size) 
images include text on the image that coordinates with the images. With such images where the 
text is not clear, I would suggest exiting ‘Full Screen Mode’ and enlarging these images till the 
text is clearly readable.  
6. When finished the first file, start with the second (‘Case Study 2: Royal Park: part 2’), and so 
on… 
 
2.4  CASE STUDY 3: MELTON SUBURBAN CREEKLINE 
ASSEMBLAGE 
This was my first published account of a landscape assemblage (2002). I have included here as it very 
quickly, in two pages, communicates a found landscape assemblage in a very ordinary suburban 
situation – and probably suggests what a landscape assemblage might be. It is less successful than 
other case studies in its ability to express the affectuality of this assemblage but I think it describes 
something of the dispersed functioning of landscape assemblages. It employs one simple illustration. 
Refer to separate file located in the Appendix titled: ‘Case Study 3: Melton Suburban Creekline 
Assemblage  
INSTRUCTIONS FOR USE  
This Case Study employs a pdf file, produced in Microsoft Powerpoint 2011 for Mac. The Powerpoint 
instructions here are for this software. Equivalent instructions may be found in other versions of 
powerpoint (Mac and PC)  
1. Open file in Adobe Professional (or other pdf viewing software) and view. 
 
2.5  CASE STUDY 4: SCHULYKILL RIVER 
ADVENTUROUS ECOLOGY ASSEMBLAGE 
This was an early case study (2002) that describes a pre-existing landscape assemblage. It is a little 
larger than Case Study 3 but smaller than the other two case studies. I have found that others who look 
at this case study find it to be expressive of the functioning of the landscape and the dispersed nature of 
the assemblage. It seems to express the autonomous nature of affect and describes how the 
heterogeneous nature of the landscape produces and is expressed in this affect. It is employs 
representations constructed by one student as part of a design studio I led at the University of 
Pennsylvania. 
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Refer to separate file located in the Appendix titled: ‘Case Study 4: Schulykill River Adventurous 
Ecology Assemblage 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR USE  
This Case Study employs a pdf file, produced in Microsoft Powerpoint 2011 for Mac. The Powerpoint 
instructions here are for this software. Equivalent instructions may be found in other versions of 
powerpoint (Mac and PC)  
1. Open file in Adobe Professional (or other pdf viewing software) and view. 
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ASSEMBLAGE 3: ATTEMPTS TO CONCEPTUALISE AN 
AFFIRMATIVE OPEN-SYSTEMS LANDSCAPE DESIGN 
ASSEMBLAGE OF THE 2000’S (LANDSCAPE URBANISM) 
This is an attempt to characterise the most influential of the landscape urbanist design assemblages 
and what they seem constructed to do—and then suggest how these assemblages would need to be 
altered in the light of the findings from this research about how landscapes function. It also discusses 
some key concepts to such assemblages, such as program and diagram, for instance, and examines 
them in the light of the field studies of how landscapes ‘work’. This analysis of conceptions of 
assemblages and key relevant notions is then also designed to identify and account for problematic 
tendencies in landscape urbanism practice, tendencies that go beyond individual conceptions and do 
not receive adequate discussion. 
The commonly felt great potential of landscape urbanism has predominantly been experienced through 
written conceptions and associated unbuilt design investigations – and these have received little critical 
attention. Initial work has confirmed that the most influential of these, and important for their influence, 
are carefully constructed assemblages,315 the construction of which is focused through and evaluated by 
one or more leading, self-identifying and championed open system (usually Deleuze-Guattari inspired) 
notions (ie. ‘mapping’, ‘machinic landscape’ etc.).  
This assemblage will interrogate the influential landscape urbanist assemblages through a strategic 
focus on selected leading notions they champion to, initially, characterise how these assemblages are 
constructed and what they seem preoccupied with and constructed to do—and then from there attempt 
to evaluate their ability to engage with what we have found that landscapes do—or more precisely, their 
ability to engage with what a heterogeneous affectual continuum does and (central to this) their ability to 
draw upon the potential of, and design with, a pre-existing heterogeneous affectual continuum. This will 
result in something of an account of how such assemblages would need to be re-oriented to more fully 
engage with such a continuum? 
A series of questions have been found to be useful and will be asked of each assemblage, as they are 
presented, focused through an interrogation of the leading notions (ie. ‘mapping’, ‘machinic landscape’, 
etc.). Presently these are:  
what is it claimed to be able to do?  
how is it constructed and what does it actually seem to be able to do? 
is there are difference between what is claimed and what seems to be the case? 
what are the conceptual and operative preoccupations? 
                                            
315 The notion of assemblage was most influentially developed by Deleuze and Guattari (1988). In an analysis of 
these assemblages not only implied operativities and design capabilities but concepts, preoccupations, 
publication style, imagery, attitude, positioning and ambitions find themselves as part of this assemblage. 
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comparing the use of relevant theoretical notions to how we have understood how such terms 
function with respect to how we have found them to adequate with respect to real landscapes? and 
does this difference matter? how are the particular understandings of such terms productive? 
are the conceptions and operativity able to engage with the affectual heterogeneous continuum of 
landscape?  ie. with how such continuums function as we have found and with how to engage with 
such pre-existing continuums? 
is there a mode of critical evaluation?  
what is the rationale for how it is constructed? including what is at stake for these writers and how 
do they position their work? what is the relationship between the positioning and the assemblage?  
is there enough information provided to be able to make an evaluation of this assemblage (i.e. is 
there more than evocative conception and imagery)?  
taken as a whole (argument, presentation, layout, images, captions etc.) what is the model of an 
assemblage being presented/championed here? 
if the assemblage employs organisations (architectural, functional, ecological, infrastructural, formal 
etc.….) with their own internalised organisation how are they conceived, and seem to be able, to 
interact with or be part of the heterogeneous affectual continuum of landscape? 
how do the author/s build the sense of the terms (and assemblage)? 
what is the power of this assemblage? 
how is ambition constructed into this assemblage? What aspects of this ambition need to be 
reconstructed to suit the way that we find that landscape functions? What is the new image of 
ambition resulting from this reconstruction? 
As this section will argue, through discussion of key concepts introduced by the authors examined, that 
the default assemblage of landscape urbanism seems to be driven by something like the meshing 
together of a number of relatively simple ‘cogs’ - what has been called ‘abstract space’ (Lefebvre); the 
workings of the big plan; what I have termed ‘partitioning’, the practices of ‘organisation’, program, a 
whole aesthetic-representational mechanism of assemblage and a certain ethics or attitude to the world. 
I think of these as ‘simple’ as the individual, and especially the combined, effects of these seem ‘too 
obvious’. This section begins with a highly influential architectural essay. 
Alex Wall’s ‘Programming the Urban Surface’ 
Wall’s notion of “programming the urban surface”, in the essay of the same name,316 is commendable 
for producing, as other landscape urbanist writers also do, a conceptualisation of landscape with 
considerable evocative force.317 This notion shifts the nature and potential scope of landscape design 
far beyond objects, sites, compositions and what could be considered the normative notion of what a 
landscape might be. This notion also liberates a new power of operation within a wider landscape. The 
complexity of the urban landscape is presented as distinctly within the designer’s grasp. Wall 
                                            
316 Wall, Alex, "Programming the Urban Surface," in Recovering Landscape: Essays in Contemporary Landscape 
Theory, ed. Corner, James (New York, New York: Princeton, 1999). 232-249. 
317 A selection of such essays may be found cited in Waldheim. See essays by Corner, Waldheim and Allen for 
instance. Also Allen, Stan, Points + Lines : Diagrams and Projects for the City  (New York: Princeton Architectural 
Press, 1999). 
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contributes to an effect of empowerment that is part of what might be termed the ‘landscape urbanism 
effect’, being both real and rhetorical. What type of landscape does Wall invoke?318 
The landscape that Wall invokes: an active surface 
For Wall “the landscape no longer refers to prospects of pastoral innocence but rather invokes the 
functioning matrix of connective tissue that organises not only objects and spaces but also the dynamic 
processes and events that move through them”. For Wall, in contrast to such ‘innocence’, “this is 
landscape as active surface, structuring the conditions for new relationships and interactions among the 
things it supports”. This active surface relates directly to a now common awareness, especially post-
Koolhaas, of the powerful independence of the forces of urbanisation.319 For Wall, there is a shift in 
emphasis from “forms of urban space to processes of urbanisation, processes that network across vast 
regional – if not global – surfaces”. Wall, like other writers, invokes a corresponding openness to the 
world through “extension” and “continuity”.320 Yet, maybe more than others, Wall invokes a widely open 
self-organisational continuum—landscape as a self-organisational continuum. This conceptual 
extension is achieved through an abstract idea of globally-connected urbanisation and operationally 
through the big and bigger plan. In this he makes a connection between privileging the functional 
dimension of the landscape, the self-organisational processes of the landscape and a conception of the 
urban realm as a surface. For Wall, such a practice involves a “renewed concern with infrastructure, 
services, mobility, and with the provision of flexible, multifunctional surfaces…”.321 Wall, like many or 
most landscape urbanists, is privileging or strategising program and surface as a way of dealing with 
self-organisational processes—surface ‘organisation’ (architectural program, networks of infrastructures 
…) in the name of or in response to self-organisation. 
The Relation Between the Organisational and the Self-Organisational (Affectual) 
Though his emphasis is on the organisational, Wall also offers an implicit conception of the self-
organisational.322 The evocation of ‘events’, sometimes confused with what are normatively considered 
events (football games and so on), is a reference to self-organisational activity.323 His notion of event, 
                                            
318 Wall is, perhaps unconsciously, working within a tradition here. Ian McHarg, the landscape architect, in 1969, 
shocked landscape architecture out of its garden design small-mindedness into projects and realms beyond, in 
scale and scope, those suggested by Wall. McHarg had an extraordinary impact because his vision empowered 
the designer to conceptualise the landscape in a much wider way whilst making them feel that they could engage 
in this newly enlarged world through his invention of ambitious techniques and compelling communicative 
devices. It might even be said that it was his graphic nature of his techniques, as much as his explicit 
conceptualising, that really changed the landscape. Casey, Edward S, The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History  
(California: University of California Press, 1998). 
319 Sometimes self-organisation is wrongly seen as an historically new thing, as if the forces of globalism have 
suddenly opened up relations, however such open relations are always already the condition of the world, being 
an open system. We just have not struggled to embrace this condition till now. 
320 See Corner, Allen and Waldheim for instance. 
321 Landscape as a ‘services surface’, as Weller and Musiatowicz sardonically suggest. Nuttall, Jon, An Introduction 
to Philosophy  (Oxford: Polity Press, 2002).. 
322 In practice, as Deleuze clarifies, the material that is to be constructed is a single material. I have here 
considered them a twinned material largely because there is strong tendency, especially in landscape 
architecture, to defer from the self-organisational – and hence the material tends to be treated scenographically. 
323 As Deleuze says ‘an event does not just mean that a man has been run over’. Following Whitehead he says that 
‘events are produced in a chaos…(but) chaos does not exist; it is an abstraction because it is inseparable from a 
screen that makes something – something rather than nothing – emerge from it’ Deleuze, Gilles, The Fold: 
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associated with his ‘active’ surface’ here seems, however, to have a strange relation to self-
organisation, and it is here that his conception of the relationship between the organisational and the 
self-organisational starts to be clarified a little. To continue with his idea of surface: 
I refer to the extensive and inclusive ground-plane of the city, to the “field” that accommodates 
buildings, roads, utilities, open spaces, neighbourhoods, and natural habitats. This is the ground 
structure that organises and supports a broad range of fixed and changing activities in the city. As 
such, the urban surface is dynamic and responsive; like a catalytic emulsion, the surface literally 
unfolds events in time (my emphasis).324  
Though highly suggestive about the affectivity of this surface such activity and dynamism seems 
through the practice he implies only narrowly event-like. His interest in unfolding events in time is 
framed in terms of “uncertain futures” and invokes a common landscape urbanist theme of 
“indeterminacy”.325 For Wall, this seems limited to working with or promoting the changeability of 
functional services. “This is the ground structure that organises and supports a broad range of fixed and 
changing activities in the city”.326 ‘Events’ for Wall refer to the strategies catering for and facilitating the 
appearance and disappearance of functional activities and services.  
Such statements are typical of landscape urbanist writings where what is invoked has a self-
organisational wholeness, richness and dynamism that can seem very different to how the authors 
actually or at least operationally assume such self-organisational dynamism to function. Nevertheless, 
the emphasis on the programmatic may be wisely pragmatic and that Wall is strategically and 
polemically emphasising the programmatic. Architects, following Koolhaas, tend to view self-
organisation, strategically, as a “deep programmatic pressure” which invites a response through 
program, in other words, self-organisation as viewed through program. Architectural program is seen, as 
Wall reiterates, from Koolhaas, as being the “engine of the project”. For Wall, a number of recent urban 
projects in Europe indicate a “renewed interest in the instrumentality of design – its enabling function – 
as opposed to representation and stylisation”.327 This enabling function refers to the process of design, 
the propensities of surface and to program as the engine of a project. Wall considers that the primary 
response to the self-organisational nature of the world is through the organisation of program, 
infrastructure and other urban ‘equipment’ across a surface conceptually waiting for such organisation. 
For landscape architects, it should be the nature of the surface assumed that signals what might be 
most problematic about Wall’s conception of “programming the urban surface”. This “surface-for-
programming” seems particularly alien to landscape architecture, a fully affirmed landscape urbanism 
and possibly life itself. It would seem that we have, on one hand, the evocation of an open affective self-
organisational continuum and, on the other, the working assumption of a surface-for-programming – a 
surface that, as I will argue fails to honour what it evokes. Such a surface needs further examination. 
                                                                                                                                          
Leibniz and the Baroque, trans. Conley, Tom (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1993 (original French edition 
1988)). 76. For further reading on events see, for instance, 221-223 and, especially 52-57. Also, Kwinter, Sanford, 
Architectures of Time: Toward a Theory of ‘the Event’ in Modernist Culture, MIT: Boston, 2001.  
324 Wall, "Programming the Urban Surface." 233. 
325 ‘Indeterminacy’, in this discourse, is often interpreted as about how to structure or strategise organisation where 
certainty about particular functional mixes and needs is unavailable.  
326 Wall, "Programming the Urban Surface." 233. 
327 Ibid. 233. 
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The Urban Surface as an Abstract Space 
The Wall-ian evocation of the real or emerging city is telling—and the image at the start of his essay, 
appearing in James Corner’s book, Recovering Landscape: Essays in Contemporary Landscape 
Architecture,328 gives us some hints. It is a night-time photograph across the streetlights of a flat 
suburban-ish landscape taken from a couple of hundred metres in the air framed to accentuate the 
continuum of the city. This is accompanied by a caption that reads “the contemporary metropolis – an 
endless cityscape”329 . Such an image, and such a description, seems constructed to privilege the 
abstract endlessness of the surface over any particular differences ‘on’ or of the surface. Something like 
the regular punctuation of lights and sinuous freeways of this image could easily be generated on a 
computer screen. I would suggest that it is one thing to assume that there has been a radical 
transmogrification of the urban world since Geddes, but it is another to assume it has become an 
abstract homogeneous and continuous space. It is one thing to assume an open continuum, but it is 
another to assume that this openness is an abstract space. It has to be registered that there is 
something distinctly enabling about the continuity evoked in Wall, yet this is undercut by the 
abstractness of this continuity—and if there was any doubt about the abstractness of the surface 
invoked, it should be observed that such an abstractness is actively sought out. It is not just an 
unintentional slip. Wall goes on to connect his conception with the abstract space - the “pure planar 
landscape” - of the architectural practice Superstudio, where such an abstract surface is “both metaphor 
and instrument”. Likewise, Rem Koolhaas and OMA polemically reassert conceiving of the urban 
landscape as tabula rasa in their essay, ‘Tabula Rasa Revisited’.330 
The philosopher and social critic, Henri Lefebvre, drew out the powerful centrality of abstract space to 
modernity.331 Abstract space facilitates space being perceived and conceived as ‘purely visual’. This is 
‘a space of reference’ and the instrumental; a space in thrall to knowledge, power and capital; it is a 
space that promotes homogeneity and is continually co-produced by forms of representation and 
conception, particularly from the nineteenth century onwards. Lefebvre sees abstract space as being 
‘duplicitous’, as involving “the dissolution of old relations on the one hand and the generation of new 
relations on the other”.332 
                                            
328 Ibid. 232. 
329 Ibid. 232. 
330 Koolhaas, Rem, And Mau Bruce, "Tabula Rasa Revisited," in Mall, Medium, Large, Extra-Large : Office for 
Metropolitan Architecture, Rem 
Koolhaas and Bruce Mau, ed. Sigler, Jennfer (New York: Monacelli Press)., 1090-1136 
331 Lefebvre, The Production of Space. For Lefebvre, abstract space, being both conceptual and operative, is 
facilitated by modern forms of representation—forms which more than previously provided views from outside of, 
or above, life—which in turn facilitate new modes of perception, conception and operation that in turn presumes 
such a space. Historically, according to Lefebvre, abstract space connects new concrete forms of representation 
to new abstract notions of space and appears to replace a pre-modern ‘absolute space’. 
332 As Lefebvre says, the workings of abstract space are not simple, being both ‘obvious and hidden’. Lefebvre 
most insightfully highlights the workings of the abstract space of representation in the modern world, yet is 
ambiguous on what escapes such a space. In this he moves around, variously championing nature, 
representational space, the sensory / sensual realm, art, social practice, singularities and affectivity. David Smith 
says of Lefebvre’s work that it is the single most important source for the development of a critical understanding 
of both the production of space and its transformation. How much clearer Lefebvre’s work becomes, thirty years 
later, when self-organisational affectivity—that which time does to space—is affirmed as that which connects to 
and ‘drives’ all that tends to escape - including all that Lefebvre includes - the abstract space of representation.  
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Such an affirmation, chooses to ignore the past critique about the negative tendencies of abstract 
space, pioneered most forcefully by Lefebvre and most commonly and associated with modernism and 
the tabula rasa. The instrumentality and freedom associated with the tabula rasa came under attack and 
this critique tended to stress the negative at the expense of the positive. This was an assault on the idea 
that space is an homogenous unaffectual medium that objects are distributed upon or in, and that it is 
the emptiness of the tabula rasa that provides such a freedom. This critique has been re-oriented and 
clarified by the discourse of self-organisation, to be a positive critique only.333 From this perspective 
abstract space tends to produce space that is the result of a machinic process that tends to dis-engage 
from the affectivity and difference of the real landscape,334 not only denying any affectivity and 
difference which is not understood purely visually, but also the full productivity of abstract space, as the 
Waldheimian conception of productivity is understood from within abstract space alone. The old 
freedom of abstract space can be found in Wall’s ambiguous new notion of the urban surface. The very 
abstractness of this surface seems to liberate architects into the landscape.  
In addition to this it seems that it is what goes onto (or into) this surface that is active, and active in the 
narrow manner I have already discussed, an activity that meshes well with what can seen in the purely 
visual and referential world of abstract space. It should be said that there is a certain romanticism that 
landscape urbanists would not want to acknowledge in the conceptual imagery of the evoked surface. 
Relatedly, by its tendency to not notice what it might otherwise engage with, such an abstract space 
tends to domesticate the landscape with a comforting picturesque335 ease that recalls Andrea Kahn’s 
critique of the way architectural (and not just architectural) site analysis has the propensity to ‘overlook’ 
what constitutes the landscape336 – and, more negatively, Raymond Williams’ analysis of how the new 
picturesque landscape effectively hid great social changes in England.337 
The conception of the surface as an abstract space is a central part of the landscape urbanist 
assemblage. In the spirit of self-organisation it is the affects produced by this abstract space that are 
most important. The particular landscape urbanist use of abstract space machinically meshes with the 
other parts of this assemblage, which in turn facilitate other aspects of this assemblage and these will 
be discussed below. So, it is one important thing to affirm, as Waldheim does, the productivity of 
                                            
333 This section on Wall was written some time ago. On reflection the positive nature of this abstract space appears 
to involve a combination of powers. It firstly involves the power of the system of partitioning (as will be discussed 
further in the section of ‘Program’). This is a power to engage with, what I will discuss as the architectural 
affectuality produced in this abstract space and the non-affectual/metric/technical and these together. It is second, 
the power of this abstract surface, the power to distribute and organise and the ability to connect to the wider 
political economy of the system. There is certainly something positive about the conceptual power of this abstract 
space. 
334 Such a space does not actually produce abstract space in the world, as such a space cannot exist in the world 
of connection, but it tends to deny possible connectivities in favour of a limited range and quality of connectivities 
– tending to produce a relative homogeneity and even more so it tends to deny the productive abilities of the pre-
existing urban space ecology. 
335 As cultural frames the picturesque and the modern are historically coeval, and as Victor Burgin affirms, we still 
have not left the picturesque. See Burgin, Victor, The End of Art Theory: Criticism and Postmodernity  (New 
Jersey: Humanities Press Internationsl, 1986). Almost no attention, in design discourse, has been given to the 
historical relation between abstract space and the picturesque, probably because such terms become associated 
with particular design movements such as modernism and ‘the picturesque’ rather than be seen as wider cultural 
tendencies. 
336 Bauer et al., "From a Discussion with Andrea Kahn." 
337 Refer to Williams, Raymond, The Country and the City  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973).  
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abstract space—it is another to assume that this productivity is in terms of, or connects to, the affects 
and differences of the landscape. 
Where do such tendencies come from? To begin with, this account will focus on aspects of architectural 
production that have received very little attention. This inattention is not surprising, as the aspects that I 
refer to are so much part of architecture that their affects go unnoticed. Nothing goes more unnoticed 
about architecture, especially to architects, than what I refer to as ‘partitioning’.338 It is worth elaborating 
on this central dimension of architecture firstly, as recent landscape architectural practice strongly tends 
to misunderstand the function of key aspects of architecture that spin-off this partitioning and such a 
misunderstanding contributes to common appropriations of architecture that are not very productive for 
landscape architecture.339 
Partitioning  
Architecture is a radically different medium to landscape architecture.340 Central to such a difference is 
the function that representation plays in the production of both. The radical difference between practices 
is less defined by than driven by this difference in function. Central to architecture is an effective 
representational ‘partitioning’ off of the architectural object from the rest of the world. What this means is 
that architecture can effectively be produced in the (abstract) space of representation. Of course, such 
production (usually) occurs in relation to a site, context, situation, landscape, world… The partitioned is 
partitioned off from what is not the partitioned. So, what is transformed in the abstract space of 
representation can wholly be, and strongly tends to be, a transformation of what is simultaneously 
‘constructed’ in the space of representation.  
From the perspective of the architectural, the landscape architectural, conversely, tends not to involve 
partitioning. Abstract space is also central to landscape architectural design yet functions differently in 
landscape architectural design. In landscape architecture what is transformed in the abstract space of 
representation tends to be a transformation of what has been appropriated from something prior to or 
outside of this abstract space. It involves an abstraction from what is prior to representation—the pre-
existing landscape, site, situation and world. In contrast to the partitioning set up by architectural 
representation, landscape architectural uses of representation tend to construct a continuum of 
abstraction. Partitioning versus abstraction. The partitioned versus the open.  
                                            
338 This notion was first presented in, ‘The Particularity of Landscape Architecture’, Council of Educators of 
Landscape Architecture Annual Conference, San Luis Obispo, California, 2001. It has also been discussed in 
some detail in an unpublished paper of the same name and another titled ’What is a Critical landscape 
Architecture?  
339 I am often asked why I use architecture as a way of understanding landscape architecture. I repeat here what 
was recognised in the nineteenth century discussion of the nature of the different arts, and that self-organization 
clarifies - that there is no God-like outside perspective that allows an understanding of the particular problems of a 
discipline. Any such understanding seems to come relatively, being ‘in the middle’ as Deleuze would say, through 
comparison between the arts. Definitions and criteria are useless essentialising devices that die in use. It is also 
appropriate to use architecture as such a device as architecture is the practice that landscape architecture is most 
constantly appropriating from and negotiating its self-understanding, consciously or not, productively or not. There 
is an art to how comparison reduces or enrichen; disconnects or connects. 
340 The particularity of landscape architectural technique is the common thread that runs through all of my research. 
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Such an opposition is employed as a useful fiction. Both architectural and landscape architectural 
design are, in fact, an inseparable mix of both conditions, inseparably involving the arts of the 
partitioned and the open. However, their primary tendencies, which tend toward each end of what could 
be considered a creative continuum, tend to dominate over any mixings, hybrids, blurrings and 
exceptions. Partitioning is one of the defining aspects of architectural designing and opens up its own 
powerful interactions with the landscape. Partitioning is also centrally part of landscape architectural 
design, yet—relatively—tends to play a minor role in the landscape architectural production process.341 
What is more relevant to us here is that there are two sides to any partition—the rest of the world 
(ground, surface, site, context, situation…)—is effectively or strongly tends to be, partitioned off from the 
architectural construction. This in turn has its own affects and is in a sense very obvious, perhaps even 
too obvious.  
Partitioning is both constitutive of architecture and highly determined. The partitioned architectural 
object has been the focus of a whole practice, representational technique, theory, history, tradition, 
discipline, discourse, technology, jurisdiction, visuality and imagination. Architects strongly tend to see 
the world from a partitioned perspective, obsessing through it, highly privileging it, and all this is as it 
should be. The affects of partitioning tend to be very palpably ‘felt’ from outside architecture, in 
landscape architecture, but not clearly understood. The partitioned gets architects to practice in an 
architectural way and so far to get landscape urbanists to practice in related ways. 
Partitioning Traditionally Comes with Its Own Forms of Self-Organisation (Affect) 
Partitioning effectively comes with its own ready-packaged and readily-available forms of self-
organisation (affect).342 These are architectural typology and program—though they seem not to be 
recognised or discussed as such. Despite having been resurrected only recently, typology now seems 
an old idea and attention has of late, (especially with that associated with landscape urbanism) been 
given to flows, movement, ‘the temporal’ and events yet, operationally, typology remains the self-
organisational (affectual) departure point for contemporary architectural production and landscape 
urbanism. Though typology and program are only two ‘dimensions’ of (or entry-points to) self-
organisation (affect)—they are ones that come with an established discipline of practice—a discipline 
that is central to the modern practice of architecture. 
Typologies and programs differentiate themselves from each other by their self-organisational affects,343 
which architects ‘bodily’-‘remember’. The world anonymously differentiates these affects into types and 
these types are identified by architects—also being part of the open system of architecture—through 
(involuntarily) ‘knowing’ the differentiation amongst types and programs. This occurs even if the 
classifications of architects subjectively or intersubjectively chop up or redirect such differentiation in a 
                                            
341 Such partitioning may certainly be constructed in singular relation to, or to construct a singular relation to, the 
rest of the world. Such a relation may be richly focused and / or singularly powerful. The notions of the ‘armature’ 
and ‘intervention’ and even ‘siting’ suggest such an art. Conversely, just as partitioning may afford a productive 
relation to the world, such a relation may also be weak, restricted or irrelevant. 
342 Architectural typology (or program) are not normally considered as forms of self-organisation or seen in terms of 
affect. 
343 They are often seen as formally diagrammatic and even referring to some past historical origin or designer’s 
innovation. 
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manner that suits their conscious or unconscious purposes. The gross affects of a type or program that 
identifies its difference from other types or programs quickly gives way – in use or practice - to specific 
and singular affectual trajectories provoked by specific design acts. Design acts actualise the singular 
through typology and program. Typology and program are not about repeating anything; instead, it lets 
you ‘know what you are doing’. It is ‘about experimentation’, as is often said. 
Despite a confident matter-of-factness about the use of events and self-organisation in architecture and 
landscape urbanism, venturing outside of typology and program, self-organisationally (affectually), has 
been highly tentative,344 and tends to be restricted to what can be partitioned or modelled on the 
partitioned. Such venturing quickly falls into undisciplined, sensuous, scenographic and haphazard 
practices.345 For instance, designing with flows tends to be understood as being worthy just because 
flows (as bodily movement) are being employed or that some sort of self-organisation (affects) follows 
from flows or the conjunction of enough flows. Talk of flows is often associated with a faith in just getting 
things to flow.346 It also tends to ignore that flows are ever-present anyway (and not restricted to bodily 
movement) and it is instead the affects of flows, the event-dimension of flows or associated with 
flows,347 often confused with flows, which is important. It seems that faith may replace discipline when 
architects venture far from the typological and (architectural) program. So, on one hand, typology and 
program have their limits beyond the partitioned and, on the other, anything else tends to be far less 
disciplined.348 Despite this, typology, program and, especially, partitioning are so central to architecture 
and landscape urbanism that they go unnoticed or do not need to be talked about – and that a type of 
false confidence drives forays outside typology and program.  
Is the Architectural Notion of Program Suited to the Design of Landscape? 
More recently, program has eclipsed typology as the key regulative device or tool in the architectural 
design assemblage. The architectural re-discovery of program will be discussed as part of the following 
section devoted to program. I have come to realise how important program is to the contemporary open-
systems-oriented landscape design assemblage, even if not being mentioned. Program has become 
naturalised only relatively recently in landscape architecture. As I understand it program started to be 
discussed and used regularly in landscape architectural design education from the 80’s onwards, 
possibly related to the impact of the architectural and program centred Parc de la Villette competition 
                                            
344 Early popularising of the notion of event by Tschumi for instance fell back to conceiving events as football 
games. 
345 I use the term ‘haphazard’ to refer to design actions that veer away from affectual referentiality, self-
organizational affectuality that makes sense of any act. Disconnection from such affectuality results in deferral to 
the scenographic dimension of architecture, landscape and design and can be considered ‘undisciplined’.  
346 Refer to the various Downsview Competition schemes for examples of this. 
347 Refer to the discussion of movement in the ‘James Corner’s Mapping’ section of this paper. 
348 Architect and Landscape Urbanist, Rosalea Monacella (pers. com.), suggested that (following Deleuze) 
‘resonance’ (which I understand as expression) is the guide, and this is certainly the case, however, I would 
contend…more by extension than contradiction… that from experience, that in the big plan what is resonating 
about the landscape that the representation connects to or actualises is readily confused with various other 
resonances (graphic, the various power-suggestions of the synoptic, the fashionable dimensions of imagery…). 
As Andrew Benjamin (pers. com.) suggests, the image is unstable—and this instability is pregnant with 
possibility—and I would add, fraught with potential confusion and the tendency to botch such possibility, 
especially if such resonance is only understood from the synoptic view. The enigma of the synoptic, of the big 
plan is magnified, being as fraught as it is fascinating.  
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entries. suited to landscape design and gets spoken about and employed as if in the same way in 
landscape architecture. It is concerning that it has become part of the furniture of landscape 
architectural design, that it is assumed to be suited to the design of landscape – and that I would argue 
from experience, and I am not alone (though discussion seems to not have entered publications), that it 
is associated with a range of negative tendencies in the design of landscape. I will argue that the use of 
program is not the same in landscape as it is in architecture, and this section attempts a relatively 
complex investigation into why. This investigation revealed to me that is not so much program that is the 
issue but what I term the aesthetic-representational mechanism or assemblage associated with 
architectural program. This mechanism or assemblage is directly connected to or driven by partitioning 
and all that follows from partitioning. One person who has an opinion about the relationship between 
program and landscape design is Sebastien Marot. His ideas were somewhat novel when first published 
in 2003. 
Suburbanism 
Marot is an architect who writes about architecture, landscape architecture and urbanism, has given 
some attention to the relationships between architecture and landscape architecture. In his book Sub-
Urbanism And The Art of Memory, he argues for a landscape architectural urbanism. One that is 
focused on site, and through site onto the suburbs, as opposed to the commonly understood 
architectural version of urbanism focused on program (presumably focused on the the non-suburban 
and ‘more urban’?).349 Marot was writing this as he perceived that the architectural version has 
dominated attention and that a landscape architectural urbanism, one of site and suburbia, where most 
people lived, deserved to be given expression. His book affirms that there may be two distinct 
urbanisms relating to these two distinct disciplines, one driven by program, and presumably the city, on 
one hand and site and suburbia on the other. His attention with regards site is framed in terms of 
memory. It seems that memory for Marot might be his way of expressing that the potential (or particular 
difference) of landscape architecture (and/or the suburbs) is to be most fully investigated through seeing 
and acting in terms of that which preceded the designer, the site, and not through program (and 
projection). Other landscape architects, as was discussed in Assemblage 1, also framed their 
relationship to the pre-existing in terms of history. So, it could be seen that it is site as that which 
preceded the landscape architect and the suburb where site is more prevalent and important. His 
contrasting models might be more fully understood as two different assemblages, with program or site 
(or memory or suburbia) being singular and determining parts of each of these assemblages rather than 
‘defining’ them. He elaborates little on this ‘Suburbanism’, apart from some attention to one project by 
Alexandre Chemetoff, which involves careful intervention in a complex suburban situation. Whilst some 
landscape architects might feel that Marot’s idea is certainly touching on something important, they 
might also feel that: it underplays or strongly limits what landscape has to offer urbanism (and that 
Chemetoff’s project is probably a very narrow exemplification of Marot’s idea). They would also likely 
feel that landscape architecture has much more to offer urbanism than program.  
                                            
349 Vidler, Anthony, "Towards a Theory of the Architectural Program," October Fall 2003, no. 106 (2003)..  
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Why is it that program is the focus of Marot’s attention? Why is program some sort of representative or 
symbol of how architects do things? What is the assemblage associated with program? What does this 
mean for the design of landscape?  
This section attempts to points beyond program for landscape architecture and attempts to do this by, 
firstly, understanding what program is from an architectural perspective and what this says about how 
architecture approaches designing – the design assemblages it employs – so as to suggest something 
of what this might mean for landscape architectural designing.  
Landscape Architects 
Closer to the coalface, landscape architects and landscape architecture are often criticised, from within 
and without, for a reluctance to make design moves. This is partly blamed on the reliance or emphasis 
on analysis and a design approach predicated and hindered by this. It may be the case that individuals 
and maybe even all landscape architects might be ‘guilty’ of such a reluctance. Landscape architects 
can be astonished by the way that ‘projection’ functions in architecture. In comparison, landscape 
architectural designing might seem ‘conservative’ or timid and that this comparison can be internalised 
in a way that some landscape architects feel disempowered in comparison to architects.350 It may also 
be that there are two distinctly different planes of operation and that comparing one to the other is not 
particularly useful and disempowering of one or even both of them. 
If a landscape architect was asked what program was (and I often do ask students) they would feel 
nervous at not knowing exactly what ‘it’ was and yet might very well, or maybe confidently, say that it 
was ‘function’ or ‘use’: car-parking, picnic, park, wetlands, bio-swale, sports field, walking etc. Design 
discourse can be very serious and few would want to admit to not knowing, or not being sure, what a 
particular term of authority really means or that they are unsure. This does not stop a term like program 
being freely employed as if we all know, as if the discourse or architecture, or some architects or 
someone knows. Program might seem straightforward. Such function or use, such ‘programs’, still seem 
perplexing in relation to the landscape, as if such a characterisation is missing something about 
landscape?   
It is commonplace for the design of landscape (and architecture) to restrict designing to the essential / 
core / basic functional-technical dimensions and not engage with or consciously eschew anything 
‘subjective’. How is it that the assumption of primary-functionality comes with perplexity? If ‘it’ was so 
                                            
350 The ‘Projective’ might be a central emphasis of contemporary architecture over the last decade. To get a feel for 
how it is generally understood, and what it is used to position against here is a selection from Wikitechture: ‘A 
heavily debated yet still vaguely defined "theory" developed over the past few years, Projective Theory is likely 
an attempt more to move beyond recent (and increasingly unfashionable) theoretical stagnation within 
contemporary academia. Aligned with recent Anti-Theorist notions, Projective Theory is the updated term for what 
was at once called the Post-Critical, in stark reaction mainly to the work of the Five Architects throughout the 
1960's and 70's, with the strongest influence among this group coming from Peter Eisenman. Thus, this line of 
thought purports to abandon Eisenman's legacy in favor of an architecture that is "easy," "cool," "legible," and 
fast. Advocates promote ideas of "shape" as opposed to those of "form," "ambience" as opposed to meaning for 
example. However, as of now, the debate is still hardly able to define the true initiatives of what we can come to 
call the Projective. http://architecture.wikia.com/wiki/Projective_theory, Accessed 3 November, 2012. For Jane 
Rendell, characterizing Robert Somol and Sarah Whiting views, “‘Projective architecture’…would be 
‘diagrammatic’, based upon ‘atmospheric interaction’, aimed at ‘cool performance’, and concerned about ‘multiple 
engagements’, recognizing a diversity of economies, ecologies, and social groups.”Gargiani, Robert, Rem 
Koolhaas / Oma: The Construction of Merveiles  (Oxford: Rouledge : Taylor & Francis Group, 2011)., 51.  
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simple, how is it that program still remains problematic? Program seems to come with an array of 
unformed questions?  
The emphasis on program can be disturbing for landscape architects. ‘Using program’ can seem to 
deny the site and existing conditions. ‘All this talk about program. What about space?’ Sometimes it 
seems that designing ‘with program’ or in terms of program produces designs that seem to be just an 
arrangement of systems, functions/programs on or embedded in a neutral space, seemingly ignoring 
determining existing conditions. How is it that architects can just project program without considering 
what was there before? How is it that the projection of program seems to come with a deferral from 
what was there before? Architecture has an astonishing power to just posit program and to ‘project’ and 
produce designs at a speed and with an immediacy which is very appealing to landscape architects, 
who collectively tend to see analysis as holding landscape architecture back. Architects, with program, 
seem to design differently. They can be less precious and this can be very powerful, refreshing or 
‘insensitive’ or even all simultaneously.  
The reliance on analysis (and synthesis) is presented as old fashioned, conservative, associated with 
not knowing how to make propositions, speculation and experimentation. Not knowing how to project. 
Too much constrained by the pre-existing. Such ideas are not helped by weak abilities to think the 
function of the ‘pre-existing’ in the production of the new, and no doubt from weak conceptions of the 
new. How can you design something new if you are constrained by the pre-existing? The very language 
is problematic. 
The notions that ‘architecture constructs the site’ / the ‘intervention constructs the site’ / ‘infrastructure 
constructs the site’ seems to offer one way to think beyond the pernicious and conceptually limiting 
opposition between the pre-existing and the new (or the site and the idea, or the site and the proposition 
etc…) Such a notion, correctly, posits that there is no simple single pre-existing landscape and that the 
architecture/intervention/infrastructure: draws out / crystallises / constructs / actualises / brings to 
existence / gives expression to something about the landscape which was effectively invisible until the 
posited was posited or invents what was there from nothing. It is a design wisdom that if you do an 
analysis and assume that the design flows just from this, then the designing will likely be very passive. 
Analysis can’t be just done without first knowing what you are designing. The analysis should be in 
terms of a design ambition. The design should be posited first. Without the intervention the landscape 
seems to remain a mystery, passive.  
Program seems real and to have an authority. An authority that seems distinctly recognised by or 
bestowed upon it by architectural discourse, and it seems that this authority is reflected in an authority 
that ‘it’ has in landscape architecture. Such discursive authority comes from some value that program 
has for architecture, some way that it functions in designing. What might this value and function be? Is it 
simple and already understood? Is it simply translatable to landscape architecture? If we had a clearer 
idea of what it is for architects then what would this say about program in landscape architecture? Of 
course, some landscape architects might feel that program is equally landscape architectural as 
architectural or that it should. The authority of program or the authority associated with program seems 
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to come with a confidence. This confidence almost seems to get landscape architecture to overlook the 
landscape architectural perplexity about program.  
Discourse 
The question of program seems also to say something about how architectural, landscape architectural 
and design discourse functions. Maybe not program itself, but something that program seems to say 
about architectural approaches to design, about how landscape architects have understood or 
misunderstood this and about how the designing of landscape – by architects and landscape architects 
- has been constructed in response. 
Architectural Notions of Program: Implications for Open Systems Designing of Landscape 
The issue here is, once again, one of "program," a word all-but jettisoned in the high days of 
postmodernism and deemed irrelevant to architectural "meaning" since the discrediting of the 
seemingly narrow functionalism of the modern movement.351  
The architectural notion of program is important to recent open systems oriented approaches to the 
design of landscape. Partly due to the way that architects bring program to the landscape and partly for 
the way that landscape architects have come to employ this notion, often or usually disconnected from 
the history of how it has come to be employed in architecture and the functions it tends to serve there. 
Program comes with an authority that might be questionable to landscape architects but has not been 
critically examined by them. The remainder of this section examines selected architectural thinking 
about program. It aims to understand how program is conceived and employed in architecture and what 
this might mean for an open systems oriented landscape design assemblage.  
Architectural Theories of Program 
The essays by Bernard Tschumi352 and Anthony Vidler353 have been chosen due to their importance in 
the architectural discipline. Each tries to produce an affirmative conception of program for architecture. 
They are important in their influence and act as historical reference points in the discussion on program, 
an importance which comes from: their attempts at historical overview; their accounts of the greater 
situation which would make sense of program as a problematic, their accounts of how program tends to 
be understood and employed, and how they suggest it could be. The development of conceptions of 
program has been closely associated with approaches to architectural experimentation and projection. 
Methodologically, the following is a series of understandings of how Tschumi and Vidler understand 
what program is (not always the same) and could be and how it is used and could be.  
Open Systems and Program 
Program has a very close, if somewhat unexplored, relationship to open systems and affect. Most 
obviously, the Koolhaasian notions of a (worldly) “deep programmatic pressure” and “programmatic 
                                            
351 Vidler, "Towards a Theory of the Architectural Program." 59. 
352 Tschumi, Bernard, Architecture and Disjunction  (Cambridge: MIT, 1996). 
353 Vidler, "Towards a Theory of the Architectural Program." 
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indeterminacy” are two well-known open systems-oriented conceptions of program.354 Program and 
related terms (i.e. ‘performance’) bear a relationship to affect (as an autonomous involuntary movement 
of the world, of space, involving organisms). A program is a doing. Affect is a doing. 
Program has an important role to play in the architectural partitioning assemblage. This section attempts 
to tease apart what program tends to be, its relation to the open systems functioning of landscape and 
affect, how it functions in architectural design assemblages, and can it simply – or even not simply - be 
translated to the design of landscape. 
This discussion will need to build up a conception of how program functions in architecture to be able to 
speculate on the implications beyond architecture. 
The Term ‘Program’ is a Shifter 
The word ‘program’ is a ‘shifter’. It contains a number of senses. This is part of the appeal of program, 
part of its pragmatics and power and part of why there might be issues with it. Important discursive 
terms of whatever disciplines tend to be shifty and move around over time and in use. I would suggest 
that, based only on experience with a number of different discourses, that important architectural terms 
seem particularly shifty.  
Program and Landscape Architecture 
Program has a mystique for landscape architects. It will tend to be taken to mean something primary 
and somehow real relative to other common figures such as form or meaning or context. The way that it 
tends to be discussed tends to assume or posit that landscape architecture has not, till now, given much 
or enough attention to this primary or more real dimension. It will tend to be taken to mean something 
‘functional’ or technical that can be solely conceived and worked with in the abstract space of 
representation. It tends not to be understood in terms of repetition, as per architectural typology. It tends 
not to be seen in aesthetic terms. When program first became important in landscape architecture it 
seemed important as it emphasised the functional and moved away from the sensual and the 
meaningful. 
Architecture and Program 
Tschumi’s essay affirms the common and seemingly simple conception of program as being about 
function. [Program] “forms one of Vitruvius’ trilogy: utilitas, “appropriate spatial accommodation”.355 This 
will be returned to in this writing. Program suggests something solid, primary, functional and technical 
yet can refer to anything that occurs, any type of experience. It refers to the actions and to the spatial 
requirements of actions.  
                                            
354 The former posits or suggests that a program is determined to come into existence through an economic system 
which produces program, that it functions through its relation to other program, and that it plays a part in 
determining program beyond itself. This is open systems understood through the lens of, or as, program: program 
as determined by the ‘greater’ economic system, or the system as a system of program. The latter being the idea 
that open systems produce ‘indeterminacy’ or even that ‘indeterminacy’, which is not determined as one thing, is 
what systems are. The world as architectural program. 
355 Tschumi, Architecture and Disjunction. 112. 
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Tschumi also attends to a more temporal emphasis of program. He cites a dictionary definition: 
[program is] “a descriptive notice, issued beforehand….(in a concert) in the order of performance….the 
performance as a whole…”356 This quotation suggests both the (programmed) order of proceedings and 
the ‘whole performance’. It suggests both something that happens in time and it suggests a thing – a 
program.  
The word program, unless constrained (which it does not tend to be), involves the verb ‘to program’, 
where there is an emphasis on intention as determining the function or the nature of space and/or the 
act of doing so, a sort of programmatic determinism. That what is intended is what happens. It suggests 
a power of the one who is programming. Program strongly tends to operate by being posited or 
proposed ‘beforehand’…’to program’. Programming as this proposing of program tends to be seen as 
the act or action of determining the function or use of a design. It is very normal for an architect to begin 
a project by choosing or being given a program. A key-determining question is ‘what is the program?’ 
Such a dynamic helps afford architecture certain powers including, relative to landscape architectural 
modes of designing, the ‘attack’ afforded by the partitioned. 
Programmatic Indeterminacy 
To program the program or program a program suggests the determination or determinacy of what has 
been programmed. Determinacy is a shifty term also. The notion of ‘programmatic indeterminacy’ 
suggests, in contrast to such determinacy, the changeability of program. Though it is also the case that 
the determinacy that it opposed by such programmatic determinacy is ‘form’, where form is posited as 
‘static’ compared to the changeability (or indeterminacy) of program. There is a (static) form and there is 
(non-static or indeterminate) change. The notion of ‘programmatic indeterminacy’ is often employed in 
opposition to the ‘static’ nature of traditional landscapes and traditional design approaches to 
landscape. The ambiguity of ‘programmatic indeterminacy’ relies on the (suggested) determinacy of 
program. Such a construction sees the world in terms of program and that the landscape tends to be 
‘static’ and that programmed ‘programmatic indeterminacy’ therefore introduces what is not static into 
the landscape. The notion of program allows the notion of programmatic indeterminacy to exist and 
provides sense to it. This extraordinarily accepted notion has an obvious and immediate appeal. At the 
same time, it is recognised that landscape is inherently changing and indeterminate, compared with, 
say, architecture. There is something particularly perplexing about the way that the conceptual 
construction around program/ determinacy/indeterminacy has come to be as accepted as it is. 
Real landscapes, being multiplicitous and assemblage-forming, are never ‘static’ in the sense that any 
change in conditions, in time and space, changes the functioning or more precisely, the affectuality of 
them, an affectuality and an indeterminacy-of-this-affectuality that is always already present with the 
presence of organisms. Programmatic indeterminacy has, by getting designers to focus on program and 
the indeterminacy of program, the affect of deferring attention away from what might be considered the 
real indeterminacy of landscapes, from the indeterminacy of affects, from landscape affects and from 
attention to landscapes and what they do. Program, in being something that is brought to the landscape 
                                            
356 Ibid. 
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tends to get designers to defer attention from the power of landscape and to the powers and 
determining nature of the pre-existing landscape, as if it is program, or even the changing of program, 
that is the substantial part of the landscape. 
The Projection of Presumed Utilities 
Tschumi assumes architectural program, just as it seems to be more generally understood, as a set of 
pre-understood / presumed ‘utilities’….and that programming often involves the relations between such 
presumed utilities. “An architectural program is a list of required utilities; it indicates their relations, but 
suggests neither their combination nor their proportion…”357. A more traditional modernist version of 
programming, Tschumi refers to as ‘problem-solving’, whilst more contemporary notions include ‘cross- 
and trans-programming’: the emphasis of the former being on modernist rational planning and the latter 
on the effect (affect) of the combination of program. The latter promoting the freedom of these utilities to 
be combined and recombined in novel ways.  
So, combining the sense of presumption with the ‘projection of mental representations’, architectural 
program often seems to be assumed to be and/or practised as the projection (combined or not) of 
presumed programs. This attention to the mental and actual projection or positing of presumed program 
allows for attention to be directed to formal experimentation and investigation. Such a preoccupation on 
presumed programs and formal manipulation defers attention from embracing what might be beyond the 
partitioned apart from in ways that tend to be determined by the partitioned objects and organisations. 
It could be said that the texts by Tschumi and Vidler attempt to expand how architects can view 
program. However, they do tend to share (with a little departure from Vidler) the common idea of 
program as being types of human activities or functions or functions important for human activity. They 
tend to be assumed to be internal functions or utilities or human uses. With such an emphasis on 
program what is beyond partitioned forms and organisations, such as landscape, usually requires 
architects some effort to try to embrace as substantive. It also results in ways of looking at drawings 
which become apparent in design critiques that landscape architects share with architects where 
architects seem much more willing to accept what they see ‘on the wall’ as what there is, i.e. an 
adequate representation of all that is required to understand the particular landscape. This willingness 
seems to suggest that what architects normally or readily see when looking at architectural plans is 
adequate enough for them to evaluate. This different way of looking can be surprising to landscape 
architects. If they give attention to landscape, architects seem to, for lack of anything else, often 
consider landscape in terms of program. It is not uncommon for contemporary landscape architects to 
also refer to landscape in terms of program. 
Imaginary Modes Of Program 
Not all programs involve presumed utilities. For one, Tschumi wants to extend beyond ‘conventional’ 
programs…with their ‘easy solutions’.358 He notes the rise of an “imaginary programmatic mode”.359 
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Tschumi both identifies that there is an historical and contemporary tendency to use or be restricted to 
‘conventional’ programs. His ‘imaginary programmatic mode’ might open up new programmatic realms 
but it still seems to mean ‘imaginary’ programs that are mentally conceived / posited: still “a projection of 
a mental representation”. Both conventional and imaginary modes would seem to not be very attentive 
and to defer away from anything beyond that which is posited and partitioned.  
Michel Foucault spent a great deal of time examining the functioning of discourses. For Foucault, a 
discourse was a practice (this is sometimes obscured in general understanding of Foucault, possibly 
because of the name) as much as the movement of ideas and delimited or constructed what was 
considered an object of the discourse, what was considered proper, of interest etc. It does seem that 
what is considered imaginative, experimental and new is very much constructed in the image of the 
partitioned. The emphasis on the mentally conceived projective products of partitioning and the qualities 
of such an assemblage, often being capable of making an impact in reality and in images and image-
circulation, tend to direct what seems interesting and new and to defer attention to what does not seem 
to fit into such expectations. In the recent discourse, negotiating with pre-existing conditions tends to be 
considered un-interesting or less interesting than the projection of systems etc. (though ‘mapping’ has 
attracted significant attention, which will be discussed later). 
The Body 
“The ‘sole judge’ of utilitas is the body.” 360 Tschumi 
 
“Why is this so difficult? The question is directly one of perceptual semiotics. It's not easy to see 
things in the middle, rather than looking down on them from above or up at them from below, or 
from left to right or right to left: try it, you'll see that everything changes.”361  
Deleuze and Guattari 
 “A becoming is always in the middle; one can only get it by the middle.”362 Deleuze and Guattari 
Much more important than imaginary modes, Tschumi also gives a particular emphasis to the body in 
this essay. His emphasis on the body is an argument for how the body has been ignored with respects 
to program, and architecture. This is a proposition about the centrality of the body to program. For 
Tschumi, “from the space of the body to the body-in-space—the passage is intricate.”363 Or it might be 
said that it is hard to think about or to move between the space of the body and the body in abstract 
space. In this essay, Tschumi identifies that:  
1. the space-of-the-body has been weakly conceptualised and embraced in architecture;  
2. perception and design representations tend to defer from the space-of-the-body to the body-in-
space; and,  
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3. that operating between them requires uncommon, unaffirmed and challenging knowledges and 
practices. 
Program involves all of the senses of the body, “not simply the three dimensional projection of a mental 
representation”.364 For Tschumi, to embrace the body as the ”sole judge” means: embracing whatever is 
important about the bodily relation; that the senses tend not to be embraced, and that this embrace 
would be very different from the normal conception and practice of program as a “projection of a mental 
representation”. For Tschumi, program is a production of the behaviour of the body (and its senses) 
generating its own space through movement. Bodies “generate spaces produced by and through their 
movement”. “At their limit, these events become scenarios or programs…’365 The repetitive behaviour of 
space is generated by the body and its movements. There might be something, even intensely so, of an 
embrace of the body in the architectural design, yet despite Tschumi’s championing, there is very little 
obvious embrace of the body in the recent open-systems-oriented landscape design conceptions 
examined in this thesis. 
So, Tschumi suggests that a program is a ‘utility’ produced by the repetitive behaviour of the body 
where the body produces its own space and the space produced is part of the utility. If this is the case 
then such a utility - program, function, use, experience - would seem to be little different from Deleuze 
and Guattari’s notion of an autonomous affect and the assemblage that produces it. This thesis argues 
that the desires of Tschumi and Vidler for program would be more precisely served by the notion of 
assemblage.366 Program understood as assemblage and affect. This would mean cutting the 
technical/metric off from the intensive and affectual. Such a way of looking at program means that 
program is a power or force, an affect or affectuality, an involuntary action, a doing. Program is not to be 
presumed and is a multiplicity, and also not something just recombined from presumed entities. Such a 
power or force involves an aesthetics of affects – a Spinozan expressionist aesthetics - an aesthetics 
that is a form of evaluation which is inseparable from the sense or significance (or expression) of this 
power (affect) and whatever emergent problem associated with the affect (program) that would be its 
ultimate evaluative perspective. Such an aesthetics provides the means to pass between power/force, 
sense, problem and the various space-time relationships involved in this assemblage, in this program. 
Such an aesthetics is more implicit in Tschumi and more explicit in Vidler. This thesis also argues that 
Vidler’s conception of aesthetics would be best served by being an expressive aesthetics of affect. Such 
an expressionist aesthetics already exists in the architectural reading of architectural program yet is 
confusedly (and mystically?) conflated with it. The body gets some attention in Tschumi and in 
architecture more broadly. However, there is very little affirmation of the body and such a bodily notion 
of program outside of architectural partitions, out in the landscape (openness) in the open systems 
oriented landscape design assemblages (predominantly associated with ‘landscape urbanism’) 
examined in this thesis, despite program being a central figure in recent urbanisms.  
The aesthetic practices of the partitioning-assemblage have an adequacy (an ability to ‘connect’ to 
difference and affect) in dealing with architectural program, within architectural partitions (architectural 
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interiors). This thesis will later argue that such practices will tend to be of limited use in the landscape 
(openness). There is a silence about this limitedness in the discourse. A silence based on the lack of 
realisation about the limits of this program-seeing? It seems that it is assumed that program, as it is 
practiced, can be simply be taken out into the landscape. That what is in the landscape can be 
considered in the same way as what is inside architectural partitions. It seems, and this might be the 
main negative tendency, that when there is an evaluation in openness (landscape) of program that it 
strongly tends to be carried out ‘from outside the middle’ via what might be described as an overview-
viewing evaluation.  
Apart from program possibly being different outdoors than in them, there seems little consciousness in 
the discourse also that, firstly, ‘it is difficult to see things in the middle’, and that secondly, seeing things 
in the middle in the landscape (openness) is not the same thing, or cannot be approached in the same 
way, as seeing things in the middle in the space of the partitioned (where there are practices and 
traditions - i.e. via architectural typology (even if architectural typology has not been in the past seen 
this way). Why this might be will be discussed further in this section. 
Program As A Pretext For Form  
Just as Tschumi points to how “most beaux arts programs” were “pretexts for repetitive compositional 
recipes”,367 Robert Gargiani refers to how each of OMA’s programs, “from the residential complex to the 
headquarters of the state television station, becomes a pretext for the creation of’ forms that are “always 
capable of making a mark on their host landscapes”.368 This may or may not be the case, but it does 
seems that the choice of program often functions in an assemblage that, on one hand, might involve 
working back and forward between program and form and, on the other, program becomes a pretext for 
investigation and projection of form, as yet again the main game.369 Program might be simply ‘backed-
in’, ‘assumed’ or ‘bracketed’ to facilitate an examination of form - or it might be given relatively more 
attention. Where there is an intensity of movement, or machinic interplay, between program and form 
and the projection of form, then this intensity of movement tends to strongly defer attention away from 
what is beyond such dynamics. The very ‘physically’ preoccupying nature of this is entirely 
understandable. To attempt to embrace what is beyond such powerful assemblages and trajectories, to 
consider landscape for instance, seems to ‘go against’ the powerful and seductive projective trajectories 
of such assemblages. Projective theory, rightly intent on maximising such powers would consciously 
focus on the internal dynamics of what is being projected, and find engaging beyond the internal 
dynamics as weakening projection..  
Focus On Form At The Expense Of The Body 
Tschumi suggests that, historically, for modernists and post-modernists…. “form follows form”…and that 
architecture in this way is “architecture as object of contemplation”. This in itself is not news. For 
Tschumi, this is an issue, and in comparison, “the interaction of space and events, are ‘usually 
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unremarked upon”.370 However, he did not see this as restricted to history. Tschumi commented on the 
general state of affairs where… “the body and its experience” is usually excluded “from all discourse on 
the logic of form”.371  So, for Tschumi, from within the partitioning assemblage of architecture the focus 
on form strongly tends to be at the expense of an attentiveness to the ‘body and its experience’. It is 
obvious from the way that architects approach plan representations of landscape, in much the same 
way that they approach plan architectural plan representations, that architectural designing generally, 
involving the assemblage of partitioning, does have a powerful inbuilt bodily relate-ability – through the 
practice of positing architectural program in relation to representations constructed in the abstract space 
of architectural representations. Such bodily relate-ability quickly becomes much less effective ‘out’ in 
the landscape.372  
Conflating The Metric With The Affectual 
Having given attention to affect makes this author aware that Tschumi’s and Vidler’s essays both tend 
to reflect that when the notion of program is being used that there is a common and again undiscussed, 
as far as this landscape architect can make out, and certainly from the open systems oriented 
landscape design literature, conflation of what might be considered the technical / metric with the 
affectual - two dimensions of program. This is certainly shared between architects and landscape 
architects. 
From the perspective of fieldwork by this researcher – and the concepts of Deleuze / Deleuze and 
Guattari (vis-à-vis smooth and striated space, rigid and supple segmentarity, the plane of organisation 
and the plane of consistency etc.) - these two dimensions involve two very different forms of knowledge 
and operativity. One, the technical / metric, is entirely capable of being engaged with and investigated 
solely within the abstract space of representation, whilst the other requires an aesthetics of affects and 
being ‘in the middle’. Representations that engage with the affectual must connect to the relations of the 
middle relevant to the relevant affect. This is unaffirmedly different from the use of metric/technical 
representation in abstract space. It is striking how much this difference is not only glossed over but also 
ignored in recent discourse, certainly in recent open systems landscape design discourse. How can 
such a glossing-over be accounted for? The technical, quantitative, scientific or scientistic aspect of the 
metric seems, at this point in history, to provide something of a glamour, legitimacy and coolness to 
program. There seems to be some sort of joy of the enigma of such conflation, some sort of perverse 
attraction with its ambiguity? An ambiguity that slips between cool hard facts and fast pragmatic 
aesthetics? 
Specific Sites As Programs Themselves 
Vidler gives attention to landscape questions in this discussion of program. For Vidler, ‘a contemporary 
sense of program would imply the radical interrogation of the ethical and environmental conditions of 
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specific sites, which are considered as programs in themselves’.373 It is important to note that this 
reference to ‘specific sites’ is given a key introductory place in his essay and his theorising of a ‘new 
environmentalism’ (of program). In this essay he proposes that ‘specific sites’ should be considered 
‘programs in themselves’. These few words would, for different reasons, tend to be challenging to 
architects and landscape architects. These few words highlight or at least strongly suggest that Vidler 
considers: 
1. that specific sites are not normally considered in terms of program. That specific sites are not 
normally considered or embraced by architects in terms of function / utility, at least as these are 
understood by architects or architecture. 
2. that such a notion is somewhat foreign to architecture. 
3. that such a statement suggests that substantiveness is associated with program and that 
architecture therefore tends not to consider that there is something substantive about ‘specific 
sites’. 
4. that Vidler challenges, for architects (and also architecture) to embrace program requires an 
embrace of the program of specific sites. It is somewhat unclear what Vidler means by his stress 
on the importance of embracing the programmatic nature of ‘specific sites’. It partly means that to 
consider that program is limited to the architecturally internal is to limit the notion of program and 
architecture itself. It may also mean that to embrace program – functionality in some sense - really 
requires opening up to the various dimensions of functionality / utility / use of an architectural 
project and not just the form and what is inside it, i.e. the site, city etc…, in short a ‘new 
environmentalism’ which ‘might not privilege architecture in the conventional sense’. Something 
like this seems likely and seems an important reflection or even proposition about the state of 
architecture and the whole problematic of partitioning and program. I would suggest that this ‘new 
environmentalism’ involves an embrace of open systems which should be open to whatever 
functionality that is relevant in an architectural project not just, as tends to be assumed, that which 
is either enclosed in or ‘folded’ out from architectural partitions.  
5. that to make specific sites relevant (significant, visible, understandable?) to architects they must be 
seen in terms of program (which certainly seems to be an architectural notion, being part of an 
architectural assemblage). By specific sites being understood through or as program they become 
architectural. 
6. that this suggests a conception of specific sites and the program of specific sites as being singular 
(which seems to contrast with the general conception of architectural program as something 
presumed, repeatable and, in the design process, posit-able), which also suggests a de-
emphasising of the ‘projection of a mental representation’, because of the singular nature of 
existing sites. From the ‘outside’ it seems that ‘projection’ is currently central to ‘progressive’ 
architecture and such a de-emphasising of projection would therefore go against such a central 
preoccupation of architecture. It would, relatedly, go against certain preoccupations in recent open 
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systems oriented approaches to the design of landscape, especially promoted by architects, such 
as found in the Mostafavi book.374 It might be that the simple great tension of models of open 
systems oriented landscape design based on partitioning is the tension between the projective and 
the pre-existing.  
7. that such conditions are ‘environmental’ (in Vidler’s broad sense) and ‘ethical’. 
8. that such singularity results from conditions that require a ‘radical’ interrogation - and that the use 
of the term ‘radical’ here suggests the importance of environmental and ethical conditions and that 
their importance is not recognised and affirmed - and that such an interrogation would be radically 
different from what happens now. 
9. that Vidler’s idea of ethics is opposed to the influential (supposed) Koolhaasian neutrality and 
coolness currently associated with architecture (and program) that Vidler obviously wants to 
challenge. 
It is more than noteworthy that for Vidler, despite the foregrounding of this notion about specific sites 
and such radical interrogation, that they receive no more discussion in the essay, which suggests that, 
on one hand, such things are important for Vidler and architecture and yet remain unconceptualised and 
somewhat beyond Vidler and architecture. 
Responding To The Existing Conditions 
For Vidler, also (in 2003),  
such a new environmentalism would not imply a subservience to "green" building mired in the static 
response of existing economies and primitive technology, nor would it follow the static contextualism 
of the new urbanism mired in the nostalgic response to a false sense of the "good" historical past, 
nor finally would it accept the premises of global late modernism mired in the false confidence of 
technological universalism.  Instead it would be flexible and adaptive, inventive and mobile in its 
response to environmental conditions and technological possibilities.375 
Vidler’s environmentalism here could be taken as promoting two different (and not opposed) types of 
responses: the first one happens to be very dominant in recent open systems oriented design 
discourse, one that produces the flexible, the adaptive and the mobile. This flexibility and changeability 
is normally positioned against ‘static’ past conceptions, as mentioned. The second, less promoted, 
emphasis can be understood as an ability to respond to existing conditions (and be open to 
technological possibilities). It is suggested that such a statement would, at this point in time, tend to be 
read in terms of the former emphases, just as preoccupations with the landscape in recent open 
systems approaches almost automatically tend to fall back on the former. 
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Landscape Architects And Program 
Landscape architects have shown serious frustration with landscape being understood in terms of 
program. For many the term itself seems architectural or central to architects and only indirectly relevant 
to landscape and landscape architects. To consider landscape as program seems perplexing and 
reductive. It seems to reduce what has a number of dimensions to one dimension, and one dimension 
that seems ‘brought to the landscape’ and not ‘coming from landscape’. This is not to take away the 
value of the introduction of the notion to landscape architecture. The notion of program has been, from 
the nineties, invigorating for landscape architecture, re-emphasising functionality and highlighting the 
limitations of what were the dominant modes of designing, which had been inattentive to functionality for 
some time. 
The frustration of such landscape architects (and landscape architecture), however, is a frustration 
resulting from this term of dominant currency not being very adequate to the landscape and being 
associated with approaches to the design of landscape that defer attention to centrally important 
aspects of the landscape. There is a recognition by landscape architects of the authority and currency of 
the term ‘program’ in the wider, very architecturally influenced, design discourse, and that an alternative 
more landscape-oriented term with authority and currency does not seem to exist.376 So, whilst Vidler’s 
radical yet very architectural pronouncement, that ‘specific sites’ should be considered ‘programs in 
themselves’ might be difficult for landscape architects – landscape architects also participate in what 
they find difficult. 
Elizabeth Meyer, for instance, in wanting to affirm the centrality and determining aspect of site in 
landscape architecture against dominant tendencies, in the opening paragraph of her essay ‘Site 
Citations’, says:377  
Site works, site specific, site-inflected, site-readings, site-seeing, site response, site conditioned, site 
interpretation. Contemporary landscape architecture is replete with such phrases. For many, a site’s 
characteristics are not simply circumstances to be accommodated or mitigated. Instead, a site’s 
physical and sensual properties are sources for design expression. Site concerns permeate the 
design process, leaving their compartmentalised role in preconceptual design analysis. These 
repositioned site concerns challenge the modern divide between rational site analysis and intuitive, 
creative conceptual design: design as site interpretation, and site as program, not surface for 
program. 
Presented in a manner that attempts to see things from a site and landscape architectural perspective, 
Meyer succumbs, even if polemically or argumentatively, to the discursive referential pull and authority 
of program by referring to ‘site as program’. Less critically, reflectively, frustratingly, defensively, 
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unaffirmedly (but wanting to affirm) and enviously it is not uncommon for landscape architects, in 
discussion, to say things like, ‘site is program too!’ 
Independence Of Partitioning And Everything Else 
Architecture…’no longer needs to adhere to linguistic, material, or functional norms but can distort 
them at will’.378  
It is sometimes not realised, or commonly not realised very clearly, by landscape architects that 
architecture can be and is understood as a series of spatially independent realms. The material of 
architectural design tends to be understood as a set of relatively indeterminately related spatially 
separate ‘dimensions’ identified by separate and relatively independent terms, such as (exterior) form, 
(interior) function/program, site (which the building sits on or in) and context (beyond). Partitioning 
makes program separation, in comparison to landscape architecture, absolute. The normalisation of 
such terms hides that the sort of separation of these is radically different from what occurs with the 
landscape. Tschumi notes that form and function are ‘increasingly viewed as independent’,379 and that 
this independence is understood as a virtue for architects. Vidler, as will be shown seeks, in contrast, a 
new unity. Partitioning produces this effectively radical separation.  
Language And Partitioning 
In architectural discourse such terms as form, function, program, and context tend to be assumed to be 
separable and have some essential basis. Such terms are associated with practices and cannot simply 
be abandoned. Semi-recent critiques of language and discourse, in particular those of Derrida and 
Foucault, have highlighted the constructed and dependent nature of such terms and the binarist and 
essentialist assumptions we tend to employ in using them. Deleuze and Guattari stress how anything, 
concepts included, may be part of an assemblage, performing some function (even if stupid or wrong). It 
is very likely that such terms are related to the whole problematic of partitioning of architectural 
designing: for instance that form tends to be regarded as separable from internalised function or 
program etc. It would seem that there is an essentialising process of language and concepts that 
accompanies the spatial partitioning of different dimensions of architecture and that, relatedly, since the 
nineteenth century, it seems that architecture has been struggling between the breakdown of the old 
‘unity’ of architecture (which Sylvia Lavin describes very well)380 and the increasing independence of the 
terms and realms. Tschumi seems to invite such independence – based on the body - more than Vidler 
who wants to conceptualise some new unity – based on the body. This seems an ongoing architectural 
problematic. Program is not a thing, it is part of a shifting problematic. 
Tschumi considers that independence of the terms (form from function etc.) is a sign of freedom and 
power to the architect and architecture. There are certainly freedoms associated with such 
independence. As a relatively untutored ‘outsider’ such freedoms seem to have been fairly intensively 
examined in recent years. No doubt such new freedoms might come with new limitations. One freedom 
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opens up and comes with its own limitations and another freedom shuts down? Also, the freedom of this 
independence would probably tend to come with a rigidifying of each of the relevant concepts, form, 
program etc. It might also be that the freedoms experienced from an architectural perspective might not 
have the same relevance once beyond the normal realm of partitioning, in the openness of landscape. 
Meyer and Marot might agree. 
I would argue that it is understandable that landscape architects tend to either fall into accepting the 
architectural terms of reference and / or find them foreign and possibly reject them, with probably 
neither of these options being particularly productive. By not conceptualising and affirming the medium 
of landscape the designing of landscape architecture will tend to negotiate its own understanding 
through those available from elsewhere, notably architecture (and this is not separate from how 
architects bring this understanding to the design of landscape).  
It would help landscape architecture by recognising the architectural question about program as a 
problematic (as a series of interrelated questions), and an architectural problematic, and may or may 
not be relevant to the design of landscape rather than seeing program as essentially something (even if 
we are not sure what) and that landscape architects should be employing it and in the way it has been 
employed in architecture. One of the problems for the discourse of open systems landscape design is 
how such conceptions have simply been accepted (without being examined or even understood). 
The Social 
For Tschumi, program is not restricted to a narrow sense of functionality. For one thing in his theorising 
of program, the ‘spaces of movement’ …’corridors… thresholds’ etc… begin ‘the articulation between 
the spaces of the body and the spaces of society…  For Tschumi, program, understood as bodily, is 
what makes space social – or - the social nature of space is produced by the relationship of the body 
and space. 
In one of James Corner’s essays outlining his views or propositions for landscape urbanism he outlines 
a series of ideas that he considers important to landscape urbanism.381 Toward the end of this essay he 
says, “that there is simply no point whatsoever in addressing any of the above themes… for their own 
sake. The collective imagination, informed and stimulated by the experiences of the material world, 
must continue to be the primary motivation of any creative endeavour”. He continues, ‘public space in 
the city must surely be more than mere token compensation or vessels for this generic activity called 
“recreation”.’ Whilst, in this essay, he seems critical of the failings of the twentieth century, his 
championing of the collective imagination and public space seem equally pitched at landscape urbanism 
as at the twentieth century. Public / collective space or the public / collective dimension of urban space 
seem to be much more than some presumed and generic activity or program. I take Corner’s 
championing of an embrace of the ‘collective imagination’ as a response to a perceived lack of embrace 
of the social in recent landscape urbanism. The collective and the public seem out of bounds or beyond 
the dominant preoccupations of systems and program. This tendency is in the literature and in schools 
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of design. Whilst Tschumi’s conception of the social in program may or may not find purchase in 
architectural space, it seems to fade away in the landscape. The inbuilt bodily-relatability of architectural 
plan representations might allow a connection to ‘the articulation between the space of the body and the 
space of society’ yet the rapid shift away from this relatability that occurs once viewing shifts away from 
architectural-plan-space is not accompanied by something of the sort of architecturally critical faculty 
that comes with the architectural plan reading. The social or collective (and not just in the human sense) 
is a test of the intensive. The intensive connects in time and space. Without a strong sense of the 
intensive-affectual through bodily-relatability the individual body in a more or less abstract space 
dominates. This disconnection from the social is just one of the disconnections that follow from 
disconnecting from the middle. The social receives very little attention in recent open systems oriented 
approaches as has been examined here. This follows from the deferral from affect and intensity to 
‘systems’ understood in abstract space. The social-spatial does not figure in systems understanding 
without it being radically reduced. That it receives very little attention itself receives very little attention. 
This does not mean that the social is not engaged with but it tends to be a secondary preoccupation, 
sort of added onto the main preoccupation and evaluated in a distant and very ‘traditional’ overview-
viewing manner. It is not discussed very much and it could be suspected that ‘it’ gets associated with 
what is not metrically-technically understood, and with what tends to be understood as more 
‘subjective’. Corner, it seems, picks up on the lack of affirmation of the social. 
Recent Developments Relevant To Programmatic Invention 
Vidler stresses that the ‘critical development of the idea of program’ is driven by a number interventions 
in the idea and practice of design: 
 the potential of digital analysis and synthesis; 
 the increasing interest in the formal and spatial potential of new materials and structures; 
 the migration of the exploration of social and cultural forms from the domain of art installation to 
public architecture; 
 the implications of critical theory, new media, and the inventive reconstruction of space and time; 
 the formal potentials of digital media; 
 ‘the possibilities of animation and rendering programs to combine and represent information’;  
 ‘interdisciplinary team approaches of scientific research’;  
 ‘fabrication is no longer so distinct from conception since the development of sophisticated output 
technology’.382 
Vidler’s interventions parallel the common claims about the abilities of new digital, fabricational, material 
and technical capabilities etc. to offer new possibilities for program (human use or function) and 
programmatic organisation. 
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At this point it should be affirmed that ‘critical’ in a Deleuze-Guattarian sense would not just be ‘a 
critique of’ but also be attentive to new productivities and to be suspicious of, and bypass, forms of 
criticism that are not attentive to emergent productivities. 
With respect to the design of landscape I would argue that most of the above developments, listed in 
the name of program, have tended to be associated with the development, manipulation and viewing of 
form in abstract space and projection. They have also resulted in significant exploration and 
development of organisations, systems and forms of analysis. Such techniques of forms, organisation 
and analysis have been important for the non-intensive and non-affectual dimensions of the landscape 
but have given little attention to the intensive and affectual. It seems that whilst the theorising of the 
affectual and intensive has been intense of late, especially outside of architecture and landscape 
architecture, techniques associated with it in architecture and landscape architecture have been much 
more obscurely developed than those of form, organisation and non-affectual analysis.  
The new media has effectively deferred from the affectual and intensive even whilst championing open 
and complex systems: effectively, or in net terms it seems, heading in the opposite direction to what 
open-complex systems might have to offer vis-à-vis affect and intensity. In this regard, ‘Mapping’ as a 
form of analysis will be discussed later. Whilst such things as art practices and critical theory have much 
to offer they have not tended to offer alternatives to the projective trajectories of the partitioning 
assemblage. However, as is obvious this thesis draws upon the theoretical notions of Deleuze and 
Guattari to attempt to provide just such an alternative, one that affirms the affectual and intensive, and 
that could affirm an affectual and intensive conception of program. 
The Shiftiness and Authority of Diagrams 
Another critical development in the emerging investigation into program, according to Vidler, comes 
through the exploration and use of diagrams. The term ‘diagram’ in architecture, as Vidler draws out, 
comes with an authority. He says that ‘diagrams have become almost representative of a scientific 
approach to program’.383 Diagrams and talk of diagrams is a preoccupation in the design of landscape, 
very much influenced by architecture, and carrying an authority related to the architectural authority.  
Vidler wants to recognise the power and potential of diagrams and something of a ‘scientific’ approach 
to program and in this he certainly recognises the collective architectural regard for diagrams and their 
status as sorts-of-representatives. However, he does not just want to assume that these things are 
unproblematic, yet is not (as it turns out) interested in exploring what might be problematic. He is overall 
willing to just let this received-accepted state of affairs exist with a sort of mythical (in the Barthesian 
sense) aura. The call to diagrams seems to be accompanied with a call to ‘performance’ or productivity 
over ‘criticism’. Does Vidler feel that it would be improper to tease out more than the positive potentials 
of diagrams? 
                                            
383 Ibid. 60. 
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Things That Get Conflated Together Under the Term ‘Diagram’.  
Of course, one cannot question something if it is a wildly moving target or is actually many things.384 The 
term ‘diagram’ has a range of senses and functions in contemporary architecture. Isolating out key 
senses or functions might allow us to move beyond enigmatic acceptance for what currently happens. 
There is room for critique. Not everything that comes under the name ‘diagram’ is the same or equally 
productive or valuable. So, here is a list of various senses that the term ‘diagram’ seems to come with or 
might.385 It is suggested that by identifying each of these, and ways that they seem employed in the 
literature and practice, and thinking about them separately might facilitate some clarity about this 
important term, to enable an exploration of the implications for open-systems-oriented designing of 
landscape. 
 A graphic diagram. For architects, the term diagram firstly and possibly popularly refers to the 
graphic diagram. With such an understanding, to engage with or employ diagrams is to employ the 
graphic diagram. Such a notion is not uncommon, certainly in landscape architecture. This might 
be considered the ‘shallow’ sense of diagram. 
 The general recognition of affect. To use the term ‘diagram’ is to, as has recently been the case, 
recognises the central or important role of affect in general, in architecture or landscape – even if 
the term ‘affect’ is largely a foreign and uninvestigated term in architectural discourse, possibly 
(and wrongly) associated with conscious or subjective feelings (what Deleuze would term effects). 
It is very notable that architecture, which has always been an early user of emerging theoretical 
notions has ignored affect till very recently, possibly because of the connotations of ‘subjectivity’.386 
Whilst the diagram might be associated with a ‘diagrammatic turn’ in architectural discourse and 
practice the force of such a turn is probably better understood as an ‘affectual turn’.387 Affect as an 
autonomous, preconscious involuntary force produced by heterogeneous assemblages. Diagram, 
for all intents and purposes, is affect.  
 The affect of the graphic diagram. Whilst, in architecture, the term ‘affect’ tends not to be 
understood as an autonomous non-representational entity (the ‘involuntary part’ as Massumi would 
say), for many the term ‘diagram’ refers to the affect that is always related to the graphic diagram. 
Graphic diagrams have an associated graphic affect, even if this is not understood explicitly as 
                                            
384 The function of designing is to be productive. One architectural teacher at RMIT University, Peter Corrigan, 
realised that students tend to come with an attachment to the expressive artist, meaning that they tended to 
believe the particular theory espoused or feeling felt when designing or presenting were somehow ‘in’ the 
architecture. Rather than suggest that this might be problematic he seemed to work to employ the investment that 
students had in such an idea for the productivity of his design investigations. Whatever works. Similarly, I would 
suggest that many of the concepts and terms used in architecture and landscape architecture are ‘shifters’ that 
change to suit particular uses, have a glamour resulting from the strange mix of the various senses of the terms, 
the mixedness is associated with operativities and their tendencies and resist critical attention. The terms diagram 
and program are prime examples. Whilst this might generally be a useful strategy in architecture importing or 
exporting something of this mixedness or blancmange into other disciplines such as landscape architecture or to 
the architectural design of landscape, might be significantly problematic. 
385 Not discussed here is Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of the diagrammatic, equivalent to their an abstract 
‘machine’.  
386 Massumi’s notion of ‘biogram’ has become popular with some architects. A biogram is really an affect, dressed 
up in non-subjective garb. 
387 The work of Koolhaas, Robin Evans and Jane Jacobs amongst others have been part of this affectual turn. S, M, 
L, XL is an affective book. 
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affect. To see the affect is to see or experience the diagram or affect of the graphic diagram. The 
graphic diagram is a mark. The affect is the power of the mark or the mark as power. 
 The graphic diagram that produces a worldly architectural affect. An architect draws a line (in the 
abstract space of representation) and this graphic line structures and generates affects in the 
world, through built architectural design. The process of designing involves the manipulation of 
graphic lines and hence-simultaneously manipulating the architectural affects that flow from such 
lines in architectural forms. For the architect, the indeterminacy of lines themselves flows through 
to the indeterminacy of the production of affect, inciting further manipulation of lines.  This is a 
description of designing. 
Vidler quotes Toyo Ito’s celebrated views about Kazuo Sejima’s architectural work. The strength of this 
work, Ito noted, according to Vidler, “derived from her extreme reduction of the building to a special kind 
of diagram, constructing it as far as possible as she represented it”.388 The building is, according to Ito, 
the ‘equivalent of the kind of spatial diagram used to describe the daily activities for which the building is 
intended in abstract form’, or that ‘it seems as if’ this was the ‘objective’. ‘The wall, which technologically 
takes on the weight of this translation, thus carries the freight of the line, or vice versa.’ Ito is describing 
a sort of closeness of the architectural diagram to the built form and functioning of the spaces.  
In a stimulating lecture on datascaping, Patrick Schumacher argues that there is, and has always been, 
an architectural aesthetics associated with performativity.389  
The aesthetic judgement of cities and buildings is rational in as much as it operates as an 
immediate intuitive appreciation of performativity, short-circuiting first hand comparative experience 
or extended analysis. Aesthetic judgement thus represents an economical substitute for 
experience…390 
It would seem that, with regards the relation between representation and aesthetics that Sejima’s 
process of designing is being presented as a more pure version of what architecture tends to do 
normally and very effectively. 
For instance: 
Over and above these technological principles the aesthetic rules concerning e.g. (Vitruvian) city-
layout or the (Palladian) rules for the suburban villa enshrine and make easily reproducible specific 
social organisations which in turn are easily read off by the trained eye identifying the right 
environment aesthetically.391 
                                            
388 Vidler, Anthony, "Diagrams of Diagrams: Architectural Abstraction and Modern Representation," 
Representations Fall 2000, no. 72 (2000). 3. 
389 Performance and performativity are very shifty terms also, sliding freely between the affectual and the 
technological whilst evoking some sort of objectivity and certainty. 
390 Schumacher, Patrick, "The Work of Beauty & the Beauty of Work," in 3d to 2d - the Designer's Republic 
Adventures in and out of Architecture with Sadar Vuga Arhitketi and Spela Mlakar (London: Laurence King, 
2000).  
391 Schumacher, Patrick, "The Dialetic of the Pragmatic and the Aesthetic - Remarks on the Aesthetic of Data-
Scapes," in Architectural Association - 150 years celebration (London1997). With respect to ‘city layout’ refer to 
the different architectural affect types outlined later in this section on program. 
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Schumacher draws out the ‘rational’ side of this practice. His aesthetic rationality is historically specific 
and relies on mediating ‘the economies of performance within the total material reproduction of society’. 
The driving force of such aesthetic development originates in the economic realm. (Schumacher 
stresses that this economic realm includes the process of designing as well.)  According to Schumacher 
there is a tendency for the aesthetic judgement of one period to lose the relationship it has to the 
economic, to lose its economic rationality, and become ‘irrational prejudice’. So, Schumacher posits a 
prevalent and pragmatic aesthetics of performativity that has been and is essential to architectural 
practice, in general. This ‘economic substitute for experience’ facilitates architectural designing that 
pragmatically discovers what it is doing as it goes. It is entirely suited to projection, an aesthetics of 
projection. He also posits another aesthetics, a degraded version of the first, which has become 
detached from the economic. 
This allows him to reconcile the aesthetic392 whilst championing datascapes and avoid the pitfalls of 
aesthetics by positing a strong form of aesthetics, strong because it is economically rational. 
Datascapes and the various dimensions and measures of performance work to keep a connection with 
this economic rationality (and allows its own new exploration of the economic realm of architecture). 
Koolhaas’ seeking out of intensities of relationships between the economic and the architectural 
therefore can be seen as providing a potentially critical relation to an aesthetics of projection or an 
aesthetics of affect.393  
What is being described here is an elegant, productive and prevalent architectural designing machine. 
When an architect looks down at a drawing of an architectural interior (or across at a screen or at 
drawings on a wall in a critique) their ‘well-trained eyes’ are, if they are well-trained eyes, afforded an 
‘immediate intuitive appreciation of performativity’, being an ‘economical substitute for experience’. The 
relevant ‘social organisations’, ‘spatial functioning’ and ‘experience’ can be (at least relatively) easily 
read-off the plan. This reading off is a reading off of the relationships between the posited experiencing 
or use (program) associated with the particular relationship between walls, the space between walls and 
the greater partition. The positing sets in train a machinic relationship between an emerging 
singularising of affectuality and an emerging form. It can easily be read-off the plan if architecture or the 
architect maintain a critical aesthetic relation to the economic and not fall into style, fashion, image, 
etc.394 Such a machine seems so prevalent that architects barely notice that they employ it. There is an 
                                            
392 That Schumacher makes the relationship between data/scapes and aesthetics is the first account that this 
author has noticed (no doubt there are others) which discusses this important relationship between the aesthetic 
and the quantitative in architecture. In the literature (including design magazines) and in design schools it has 
seemed commonly assumed over the last decade or so that data / the metric was all that was needed for 
landscape design investigations, and that anything ‘subjective’, or requiring ‘interpretation’ was to be avoided. 
Certainly this is common in landscape architectural schools. 
393 James Williams elsewhere in this thesis identifies the quantitative as potentially providing just such a critical 
relation to an aesthetics of difference. 
394 Schumacher’s account of an economic rationality of the aesthetic brings together a number of senses of viability 
and life. His discussion identifies this economic rationality with handed-down architectural rule systems (Vitruvian, 
Palladian, Modernist etc.) – involving a ‘productive dialectic of material performance and aesthetic codification’. 
Such a useful notion tends to follow a general will to architectural autonomy. It may be better to see the dialectic 
as a machine that functions between ‘material performance’ and the economics of architectural production, 
aesthetic practices and the everyday life and experience of the particular time. It might be seen that this and other 
architectural machines function for their way of working with the experience of the world by architects: the 
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obvious day-to-day-pragmatics or art-of-designing here that creatively moves between realms that 
communicate with, feed-off and propel each other machinically.  
Metric Diagrams 
‘I believe that works of landscape architecture are more than designed ecosystems, more than 
strategies for open-ended processes.’395 
Datascapes and the various metrics of performance work to keep a connection with Schumacher’s 
economic rationality (and allows its own new exploration of the economic realm of architecture). All 
manner of metric measure, notations, statistics, the spatialising of statistics, are often also included 
under the title ‘diagram’. In themselves, these strongly tend to be restricted to the metrically 
measurable, non-affectual, linear logical, quantitative and able to be engaged with in a purely abstract 
space through the internal logic of the particular measure or system.  
A corollary of Schumacher’s notion of the rational aesthetics, being a communication between the 
aesthetic, metric and economic, where the aesthetic is made sense of through the metric and onto the 
economic is that the aesthetics is also required to make sense of the metric. In the Scumachian sense 
of performativity, where the aesthetic is made sense of with the metric (and economic) and therefore 
goes beyond the metric, they require the aesthetics of affect to get them to make sense, to be rational.  
There is a very strong tendency, in recent open-systems-oriented approaches to the design of 
landscape, however - largely due to what seems a lack of appreciation of affectuality in such 
approaches - to defer away from the affectual dimension of the ‘immediate intuitive appreciation of 
performativity’, restricting practices to metric and quasi-metric measures, to the design of systems, as 
Meyer alludes to, often associated with a reaction against anything ‘subjective’. Where design is 
evaluated for what it does beyond the metric, and it has to if it wants to make sense of life on the 
ground, it strongly tends to do this through a predominant, generalised and haphazard overview-
viewing, which equally strongly tends to lose the relation to the difference of the doing of landscape that, 
for instance, the viewing of interior plan-form in this architectural assemblage can provide: loses the 
relationship to the middle of the landscape. Why is it that landscape, or the designing of landscape, 
seems to disconnect designers from the difference of the landscape? Why is it that there seem to be 
two types of viewing, two actions or processes of viewing? One that connects and one that disconnects. 
This disconnection has become vividly obvious after intense and long-term experience with field studies 
of real landscapes. What I term ‘connection’, which I hope my case studies might communicate a little (a 
challenge, with respect to landscape, in a document like this), and Meyer terms ‘friction’, is an 
affirmation of a relation established to difference, through affect. There seems no discussion of this. 
Many would possibly deny that this is an issue or that what I am calling ‘connection’ is substantive. This 
is a serious non-problem at the heart of the discipline and the design of landscape.   
                                                                                                                                          
Difference and Repetition and expression of architecture that can only be gained through connection with built 
space. Rule systems are only effective in how well they function in such a machine.  
395 Meyer, "Sustaining Beauty. The Performance of Appearance – a Manifesto in Three Parts." 10. 
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The metric does not suffer this fate of deferral. There is an ease of processing of the metric, which is 
self-sufficient and can be worked through in the abstract space of representation. This ease contributes 
to the disconnecting process of viewing that very quickly dominates over the aesthetic and connection. 
An affect itself. The metric is important but the authority of the metric might be the dominant trope of 
contemporary practice. 
Performativity (or Performance)396 
For Schumacher, ‘performativity’ is the focus and crosses over between a number of entwined realms 
and ways of understanding. Performance in a number of senses. Performativity is a term that is 
deliberately vague, more precisely it might be the mutually enabling productive and creative 
communication between realms that Schumacher identifies.397 These realms, include the functioning of: 
 ‘social organisations’, ‘spatial functioning’ and ‘experience’;  
 building and room proportions and ratios, tectonic and compositional principles; 
 aesthetic codification; 
 construction standards, lighting and air quality guidelines and technological principles; 
 the economics of building; 
 the economics of the built environment; 
 and, the economies of designing.398 
The economic is in the end determining. Koolhaas’ notion of ‘deep programmatic pressure’ seems to 
distinctly be an architect’s way of seeing the forces of capitalism directly through the whole machinery of 
the provision and ecology of program, directly, if able to, through engaging with program. To begin to 
see such pressure might encourage the empowerment by the economic.  
The Primacy Of The Machinic In Deleuze And Guattari 
At one point in A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari refer to the primacy of the machinic over the 
other realms of pragmatics.399 For them, information, data, economic flows etc., are important to 
understand in modern capitalism, but the machinic, the workings of assemblages must be given a 
                                            
396 An example of how architectural problematics suddenly find themselves uncritically naturalised in landscape / 
landscape architecture is where the opposition of the relatively spatially separated realms of exterior form vs. 
interior program opposition (with whole architectural problematic of independence and unity etc.) gets transmuted 
(imported/exported?) into landscape as the opposition between performance and appearance in Julia Czerniak’s 
essay, Appearance, Performance: Landscape At Downsview, in Czerniak, Julia, ed. Case--Downsview Park 
Toronto (Munich: Prestal-Verlag, 2001).. Elizabeth’s frustration with this opposition is expressed in her essay, : 
‘Designed landscapes are considered from two perspectives - how they look (appearance], and how they function 
ecologically (performance]. What is missing from this critical position is how appearance performs or, in other 
words, how the experience of a designed landscape's forms and spaces work through our senses and alter our 
consciousness. How does the look of landscape alter us, work through and on us?’ Czerniak’s use of ‘how they 
look’ and ‘appearance’ in contrast to ‘function ecologically’ and ‘performance’ already suggests the valuation.  
397 Though it is not always so shifty. For some, performance would not be associated with anything that requires 
human ‘subjectivity’.   
398 Schumacher, "The Dialetic of the Pragmatic and the Aesthetic - Remarks on the Aesthetic of Data-Scapes." 
399 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia.. Page number undetermined. 
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primacy and not presumed to be determined by or able to be reduced to the economic. It is the affectual 
that makes the machinic, machinic. The workings of capital are often central to the function of such 
machines but do not finally determine them. The ‘immediate intuitive appreciation of performativity’ is 
not in the end just an intuition of capitalism, despite how important it is to connect to the workings of 
capitalism. This requires a working aesthetics of affect.  
It may be that Koolhaas’ most important influence has been the emphasis he has placed, by writing and 
example, on how to get architecture to see and open up to the material forces of development. His 
studies are preoccupied with the productivity and inventiveness of capitalism. His writings and research 
seem, however, to only give attention to the obvious, predictable, metrically understandable powers of 
capitalism or that which can be referenced to it. This attention creates paradoxical feelings of 
empowerment - in being opened up a little to the reality of the movements of capital vis-a-vis 
architecture, and he is very efficient at being able to capture the power of capital - and yet, 
disempowerment, in that that is all there seems to be in the end. The feeling is that your power is the 
power of capital.  
His studies track the movements of capitalism in a manner very useful for locating significant flows of 
architecturally-relevant capitalist related quantities and what is involved in such flow production. For 
instance, his study on shopping400 is preoccupied with techniques for registering the ever-new ways that 
capital constructs machines of shopping, to the point where the editors, in Koolhaasian tone, say that 
‘shopping is arguably the last remaining form of public activity’. Yet, in an interview after the publication 
of this book he agrees with the interviewer that ‘it is not shopping spaces themselves, but the residual 
spaces – the spaces outside of or between shopping environments – that we should pay more attention 
to’. For Koolhaas these ‘spaces present incredible opportunities for freedom, freedom that didn’t 
previously exist.’ The study of the dominant movement of capital in the shopping book has another side 
that does not get discussed in the book itself. This other dimension is missing in his studies, even 
though it will, as in the shopping studies be there in the Koolhaas background. Charting these dominant 
flows does not embrace or affirm such freedom-related potentials themselves. Koolhaas says he is 
cautious about applying ‘an instrumentality to’ these ‘spaces’, registering that engaging with the related 
freedoms of capitalism is a much less sure, less predictable practice, endangered by the designer and 
the ability of capitalism to seemingly usurp almost whatever.  
Residua: Affects Need To Be Affirmed Themselves 
The ‘spaces’ (or potentials) that are outside or residual to shopping will also tend to be outside or 
residual to the products, or the main preoccupations, of partitioning. Koolhaas acknowledges that such 
spaces might require understandings beyond architecture. Working with a group of students on a 
research seminar focused on the question of: ‘can shopping centres produce public life?’ seemed to 
prove Koolhaas’ point. This research found that shopping centres produced a range of very situational 
forms of what we called ‘public life’ or forms or instances of public life (avoiding the term ‘public space’) 
through the specifics of how the shopping centres connected to the neighbouring and greater world. 
                                            
400 Koolhaas, Rem, ed. The Harvard Guide to Shopping (Cologne: Taschen GmbH, 2002). 
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Each shopping centre did. Each one very differently and singularly. Koolhaas’ studies are, 
understandably centrally preoccupied with the production, functioning and role of the products of 
partitioning in capitalism. The singular nature of the ‘residua’ that he points to, seemed to be beyond the 
scope of what was investigated in the Shopping Books (and how it was investigated). The Shopping 
Books were, however, useful for our purposes for connecting to the power that, in  conjunction with 
relevant local conditions (mostly pre-existing the development), drives such shopping residuum. 
Connection to such forms of life is a connection to their affectuality. Such residua are not spaces even if 
they are associated with concrete spaces. Such forms of public life are forms of public capability. The 
production of tendencies to specific forms of local social interaction associated with a particular carpark, 
for instance. The-sociality-of-this-carpark it might be said. Such social interactivities or capabilities can 
only be ‘seen’, identified and worked with directly as singular products themselves, as affect and the 
assemblage that produces it. The shopping assemblage might be part of the public life assemblage but 
their abilities; the promotion of shopping and the promotion of social interaction (for instance) are not the 
same thing. This points to a limitation of Koolhaas’ thinking,401 especially with regards landscapes and 
cities. By only focusing attention on the obvious-capitalist-programmatic that design problems and the 
world become reduced to this. Only an embrace of the relevant emergent affect as real itself opens up 
an engagement with what it is reliant on, inseparable from and yet not simply reducible to shopping. 
Connecting to a shopping assemblage is a key means to identify such shopping-related productions. It 
seems that Koolhaas is saying this as well (in the interview). It has to be acknowledged that reliably 
producing shopping affects – a very well travelled path - is probably ‘easier’ than residual social-
interactivity affects. 
Abstraction & Defamiliarisation 
Strongly associated with diagrams in mappings or analysis is a twinning of abstraction and what could 
be called ‘defamiliarisation’. As James Corner points out, and this is discussed later, mapping requires 
selectivity. Abstraction is an essential action of mapping. Maps only become powerful through not 
choosing everything, and through how they not choose everything. How they only choose certain things 
and the way that they do this.  
Just as abstraction is essential so to is defamiliarisation. Without selecting in a manner that presents the 
world anew we tend to fall into picturing, repeating, ‘tracing’ (Deleuze and Guattari). Without consciously 
abstracting and consciously or not defamiliarising then we are prone to cliché and naturalising the world 
we are examining. 
The rise of diagrams seems to be associated with a studied investigation of abstraction and 
defamiliarisation. This has had certain tendencies in the landscape. The Architectural Association’s 
landscape urbanism program website at one point summarised the working methods of the program 
and referred to an ‘extreme reduction’ employed in the mapping of phenomenon in cities. As I discuss 
later, the approach of the AA,402 as much as can be made out in their enigmatic publications, seems to 
                                            
401 His actual work does not appear to be as reductive. 
402 Mostafavi and Najli, Manual for a Machinic Landscape. 
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involve the identification of some urban self-organisational phenomenon403 and then identify what seem 
to be the associated and very restricted abstractable set of relations which can then be used to 
generate, usually, a large scaled organisation that is intended to maintain the unit functioning within or 
as larger structures or networks or use the units as a starting points for development of organisations 
that shift to a different plane of organisation of some sort. As I will argue the AA landscape urbanist 
design assemblage seems designed, consciously or not, to produce large scaled organisations that are 
then located back on or in what has been treated, effectively, as an abstract space. A system located on 
the landscape. That it does not seem to be noticed, or not regarded as important, that this space has 
been treated as an abstract space is very obvious to a landscape architect.  
There seems to be an assumption, which I have also discussed elsewhere, that self-organisational 
phenomenon are atomistic or produced by limited sets of definable relations. The advantage of this 
assumption is that it allows these systems to be portable and abstractable from a situation. This process 
of abstraction of just these relations comes with a defamiliarisation of the material of operation. The first 
part of this defamiliarisation comes with the abstraction and the second with a multiplication or 
proliferation of what has been done with these abstracted relations, which functions as further 
defamiliarisation.  
It would seem, based on the ambiguous evidence, and certainly the imagery, that this design 
assemblage (or these design assemblages) tends to defer away from certain aspects of the 
assemblages and potential assemblages relevant to what landscape does. These aspects of landscape 
include: 
1. Affects themselves. Though this research cannot comment further as there is little indication as to 
what these assemblages are working with or attempting to work with. They certainly do not affirm 
the challenge of engaging with what landscape does, in the sense of affect.404  
2. Landscape assemblages are extended in time and space and extreme reduction and atomistic 
assumptions (not-extending in time and space) will likely be inadequate for most landscape affects.  
3. Such landscape assemblages are wildly heterogeneous, and the AA assemblages do not seem to 
be open to what might be involved in them. They seem extremely reductive in terms of what is 
being engaged with. 
4. This model seems to defer strongly away from the sorts of spatial relations involved in what 
landscapes tend to do. Such spatial relations include all of the realms and interlocking of bodily-
                                            
403 Actually, this is not clear from the literature. It is giving the AA the benefit of the doubt. That so much is unclear 
is one problem with the way that the AA discusses the work of the school. This has of course been the target of 
web-humour: http://www.ruderal.com/bullshit/bullshit.htm, accessed 11 November, 2012. An even bigger problem 
is that what should be clear is not affirmed. If we are to take the suggestions provided by the publications then it 
would have to be assumed that the AA is engaging with self-organisational doings of the landscape. The 
disregard for providing any detail or clarity suggests that discovering, identifying and abstracting what is relevant 
in a manner suited to design and engaging with what the landscape does is very simple and unproblematic. This 
strongly suggests to this author either naivety and/or supreme over-confidence. The other possibility is that the 
AA is unwilling, for whatever reason, to show any detail and affirm what they are doing. 
404 Their work presents such imagery as if it is self-evident that it is dealing with something that the world does, 
without providing the means to engage with it.  
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environmental relationalities, from the immediate in time and space to the far extended, as the 
Royal Park case study might suggest.  
The published outcomes reflect the thinking and strongly seem to treat the existing landscape as a 
(usually flat) surface for the location (plonking) of large systems. They strongly suggest that the existing 
landscape, and maybe landscape itself does not tend to ‘do’ anything significant, and it is the system 
that is brought to the landscape that does things.  
It seems that all of these actions: the use of diagrams, abstraction, atomisation and defamiliarisation, 
seem to aim to distance this model from ‘traditional landscape design’, via a combination of: very 
simplistic and usually oppositional positioning in relation to ‘traditional landscape design’; a certain 
thinking and language; ways of working; forms of representation and types of outcomes. This model 
seems one that aims through these means to make landscape an object of a certain architectural and 
consciously non-landscape architectural practice. This model also seems designed to evince a certain 
authority, and non-subjective coolness, which aligns or resonates with much recent architectural 
thinking.405  
The AA model, as it was presented in the Manual for a Machinic Landscape 406book and as it mostly 
appears on their website, is an extreme example, but there is a more general push or pull toward 
abstraction and defamiliarisation that runs through recent design practices. Just as the AA model as 
presented, in images and text, seems more suggestive than anything, it might be suggested that a great 
deal may have been lost or not gained by such an obviously conscious removal from what it posits, for 
its purposes, as ‘traditional landscape design’. What has been described above is an elegant, 
productive and prevalent architectural designing assemblage. Can this designing machine work in 
landscape (in openness)? 
Can This Assemblage Work In The Same Way In The Landscape? 
One of the obvious aspects of working with architects and in watching the way architects approach 
design in education or the critique of design is how such a machine is part of the architectural discipline 
even it is not usually as well conceptualised as Schumacher does. In practice, such a machine, I would 
suggest, functions expressively, even if architects have never (not that I am aware of) used the word 
‘expression’. The architect, through positing the typology or program can ‘connect’ to the program (or 
affect to be more precise) and ‘know what they are doing’. Such intuition-in-action (Deleuze and 
Guattari), when it is working, functions through the resonance of connection. It is a connection to the 
architectural difference associated with program (or use, function experience). This, I would argue cuts 
through a whole history of program (and typology). 
Architects seem to take the assumption of this assemblage with them ‘into’ landscape. However, I would 
suggest that it does not work in the same expressive manner ‘out there’. The analysis in this section I 
argue approaches confirming this, even if this can only be confirmed in relation to the real landscape. 
                                            
405 Some times it seems that what is trying to be achieved above all is the expression of a certain tone or attitude, 
reflected also in the editorial approach to their publications and websites. 
406 Mostafavi and Najli, Manual for a Machinic Landscape. 
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Landscape architects seem to appropriate something of the practices involved with this architectural 
machine. On one hand, they might intuitively engage expressively in their relations with a landscape, 
and on the other, there is a collective lack of understanding of the connection / expression involved in 
program (and typology) that architectural discourse tends to understand and architects tend to practice. 
At the same time there is something perplexing and disturbing about the untroubled ease and 
confidence that accompanies the use of this architectural assemblage or appropriated versions of it in 
the landscape by architects and landscape architects. Meyer’s notion of ‘friction’ and my notion of 
‘connection’ (it would be interesting to note other such notions or related observations fro landscape 
architects) touch on landscape architectural practices of expression suited to the landscape. This has 
not been news and should be. 
In engaging with this sort of conceptualising I keep coming back to a notion of ‘openness’, which this 
thesis has been working towards, landscape as openness, trying to affirm something that does not 
seem to be affirmed in recent practice and thought. Might thinking about program and partitioning and 
their associated practices have something to offer this query? To examine this question will first require 
some conceptual moves. To begin with, I’d like to acknowledge that program seems particularly relevant 
to the design of landscape, being the ‘doing’ of the medium, and to acknowledge that the ‘doing’ of 
landscape, in contrast to what is produced through architectural partitioning, is inseparable from any 
other components. As described already there is an effective, conceptual and spatial separation 
between key realms in architecture. There is no (relatively) absolute separation between exterior form 
and internal function, for instance, as there is in architecture.  
Second, to attempt to draw architecture and landscape into something of a common frame that honours 
both, as opposed to the predominantly architectural frames which seems to defer from affirming the 
landscape and the design of landscape, I will identify, based on the way architects discuss and practice 
architecture, what seem to be, the various spatial ‘realms’ of architectural designing generated by 
partitioning that come with their own traditions of practice. Partitioning produces a series of more or less 
spatially differentiated realms.  
These seem to be: 
 The interior / internal spatial realm; 
 The object or form; 
 The immediate area that ‘folds out from architecture’; 
 The relationship to site or what architecture does to site (siting); 
 The relationships between architectural objects / buildings; and, 
 Spaces produced by enclosing architectures including the spaces within ensembles 
I will then also consider these realms in one way, in terms of affect. Each of these realms seems to 
involve different types of affects. My field studies affirm to me that affect is the most adequate way to 
consider landscape. I will suggest or maybe champion (and I am not alone in this) that practice tends to 
function through affects.  
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Third, I would like to reiterate what I already identified about the notions of program and performativity. 
That is, these notions have two entwined dimensions, the affectual and the non-affectual, as has been 
introduced earlier, which are continually confused, especially recently. The non-affectual includes all 
those realms that can be engaged with visually and metrically in abstract space. The affectual, instead, 
requires an aesthetics of affect and requires being in the architectural ‘middle’ and a use of 
representation to match.  Architecture has practices of the architectural middle, which Schumacher 
touches upon. At the core of Schumacher’s ‘immediate intuitive appreciation of performativity’, I would 
suggest, is affect, though this is obscured in the super-shifty term, ‘performativity’.  
Of course, the non-affectual and non-affectual processes of the world are central to affectual processes. 
However, affectual processes are not reducible to the non-affectual, no matter how important they are to 
the affectual. The affectual is the product of the human(organism)-environment relation or connection. 
Affect is the empowerment produced by this relation. Affect is the power produced. Affect is the relation 
as power. This involves the inseparability of (human)organism-and-world as power, doing. Affect. Affect 
and the significance of the affect. The non-affectual plays a part in Schumacher’s intuitive appreciation 
of performativity. Affect, however, makes sense of the part it plays. Affect gives it a part to play. There 
would be no intuitive appreciation without affect. The non-affectual is brought into life, through affect, 
through the experience of architectural space if we understand experience as affect, as assemblage-
produced, involuntary and presubjective.  
Architects, it is suggested, practice with affect. Intuition-in-action as Deleuze and Guattari say.407 
Architects feel their way. They ‘know’, usually, when something is significant. Affects tell architects when 
they are ‘onto something’. Affects are the expression of difference (they are difference) and architects, 
when design is being productive, feed back and forward into the affectuality emerging, even if they see 
it as ‘form’ or ‘context’ etc. Form, for instance, is not form but what form does, the-doing-of-form408 and 
what it does is affect (and the sense or significance of this affect). Some ‘formal’ affects seem ‘closer’ to 
form and some function ‘further’ away, as contextual relations. What architects are ‘seeing’ or seeing-
feeling when they are practicing with form is affect, or form-affect, to distinguish it from other realms of 
affect. So, on one hand we have the various affect realms of architectural practice, various because 
produced through partitioning, split and set in relation by partitioning - and on the other the effectively 
single affect realm of landscape, of openness. The relative ‘narrowness’ of the aesthetics of 
architectural program (extreme relative to the landscape architectural) comes according to Schumacher 
with an “intuitive appreciation of performativity”, an “economic substitute for experience’409. The most 
precise object of this appreciation is affect, I am and have been arguing.  
The well-trained eyes of (some?) landscape architects might not have the same narrow-sharp 
architectural aesthetic machinery available to them when engaging with landscape. However, it is very 
obvious, when a landscape such as (one of the case studies in this thesis) is examined (and with many 
others I have examined) that architecture and landscape architecture have related yet different 
                                            
407 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia., 409. 
408 It might be better to see form as really affect. 
409 Schumacher, "The Work of Beauty & the Beauty of Work." 1. 
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processes of ‘intuitive appreciation’. Landscape architecture has obscured and strong aesthetic 
practices and an unaffirmed and yet to be conceptualised aesthetic machinery. Affect seems the most 
affirmative way to consider such landscapes, and the conceptualising of the machinery to be able to 
engage with affect is a key aim of this thesis. I would also say even if the term ‘affect’ is not used and 
that it is haphazardly connected to, that the object that would most affirm what they circle around or 
move past or touch on would be affect, and certainly more in practice than in conscious thought. Such 
practices are certainly not affirmed in the recent open-systems oriented design practice, discourse or 
education.410  
So, now, what are the particular architectural affect realms?  
Architectural Affects Realms 
This list is sketchy and these types of affect realms obviously blur into each other, yet they tend to be 
different realms, a couple of them distinctly particular. Individual projects, of course, do not practice 
exclusively in one of these. Such a typology is, as Deleuze would say, only possible in thought. Each 
one of these affect realms, however, has traditions, and representational and aesthetic practices 
developed or evolved to suit them.  
These affect realms have not, as far as I am aware, been understood in architecture in terms of affect, 
of course. They tend to be practiced rather than theorised. In being practiced this thesis would argued 
that affect (and sense and problem) is what is being practiced or practiced with. If you like, ‘design 
intelligence’411, as had been championed by Michael Speaks, is the practice of affect. This is practice as 
it should be thought of. For Spinoza, ‘joy makes one intelligent’. There is a very good reason why both 
Spinoza and Speaks, each in their own anti-intellectualist way, talk about, and want to reclaim, 
‘intelligence’. Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘intuition-in-practice’. Each wants to affirm experience and life. The 
experience of designing in Speaks’ case.412  
Each one of these affect realms has an aesthetic reference, even if architects have not tended to think 
of them as being aesthetic: via architectural typology and program mostly.  These affect realms involve 
the types of affects related to or produced by the partitioning assemblage. I term them ‘affect realms’ as 
each comes with rich traditions of practice and each does seem to be distinct from the others. 
These types of affects include: 
1. Architectural affect realms associated with a building or buildings: 
a. The affects of architectural form -  
formal affects. These would normally be considered as architectural form or object. Such affects are 
visual-formal-object affects. 
                                            
410 I would even suggest that those who engage with the open system of landscape most are practitioners, partly as 
they cannot avoid it and relatedly due to the landscape architectural equivalent of Schumacher’s economically 
oriented performativity. Reality comes with its own affirmation. 
411 Deleuze, "Lecture on Spinoza 24/01/1978". Accessed November 17, 2012. 
412 It is likely, I would suggest, that Speaks will tend to fall into the same blurring of the affectual and the non-
affectual, vis-à-vis program/performativity/diagram/etc. that often come with contemporary environmental design 
discourse. This is partly evidenced through what type of designing that Speaks champions.  
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b. The affects produced within architectural/built ‘form’/architectural partitions - 
or, interior or internal affects. This would normally be termed program, use, function, experience, events 
or flows. i.e. shopping, kitchen, library, dancing program/function …. 
c. The affects produced by the architectural form on the space that more or less immediately ‘folds out’ 
from architectural/built objects.  
Though there seems no obvious existing name for such affects they are certainly practiced.413 ‘Fold-out 
affects’ for lack of a better term. The living or utility spaces that ‘fold out’ from a domestic house are 
commonly understood areas that architects (and others) feel they have an aesthetic relation to.  
d. The affects produced by the combination of the architectural object and the site (Normally discussed 
in terms of ‘siting’) -  
siting affects. 
The above types of affects are fairly separable and distinct and tend to be associated with individual 
buildings. Beyond individual buildings there might be other, possibly more various and hard-to-pin down 
affect realms, which might be grouped together thus: 
2. Architectural affect realms beyond individual buildings:  
These tend to be affects related to the relations between built / architectural objects. They include 
affects produced by the interaction of buildings or affects produced within architectural arrangements, 
organisations or ensembles. 
a. (Urban space) affects produced by spaces and gaps in the built or urban fabric.  
Urban squares may be the obvious example and have long been studied for what they do. Such urban 
spaces are effectively treated like objects or like interiors. The traditional European city was partly 
produced by and productive of certain ‘city-layout’ practices (to refer to Schumacher’s idea). I would 
argue, following many recent architects that such practices have proven to be of very limited use in the 
contemporary city, and have tended to be strongly focused on the architectural layout, the city from the 
perspective of architecture, and be very limited in their ability to engage with urban space affects in 
themselves.414 
Also, and not separate from the previous: 
b. Monumental affects.  
                                            
413 I have heard it said that the best place to start to learn about what landscape does is to start with the 
architecture. I certainly take this as being about the ability afforded by the viewing of architectural plans to allow 
the designer to ‘connect’ to what the landscape next to the building is doing. In reverse this shows a lack of 
confidence of mystery once we move beyond this architecturally related space. 
414 This is an important and large area to discuss, which this thesis was not able to do. Important things to consider 
would be how what gets termed ‘new urbanism’ fits into this schema. On this matter I will simply suggest that such 
a guidelines-oriented approach has distinct operational powers that have not been affirmed, especially in an era 
where open systems thinking is said to be focused on engaging in the processes of the world and not just being 
academic. However, it very strongly tends to defer from engaging in how the world works itself, so focused on the 
distinctly moral satisfaction of the norms and guidelines of this otherwise powerful assemblage. The Deleuzian 
term ‘tracing’ is apt for such a dominant urbanist assemblage (maybe the most dominant). Any approach to 
designing can be used for productive purposes, however, New Urbanism tends to have very great tendencies to 
defer from what urban space affects do and for how productive designing can be. 
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Monumental relations between fabrics / non-monumental buildings and monumental architectural 
objects and relations between monumental architectural objects. Monumental urban spaces and 
systems of spaces produced through the disposition of monumental buildings and spaces. Monumental 
urban relations as strategies of setting up architectural affects in extension.  
This artificial typology is meant to draw attention to something of what the partitioning assemblage does. 
It produces relatively separable affect realms. Different realms of what buildings and architecture does. 
Such realms have certain affects, certain ‘shapes’, certain practices and potentials. Certain aesthetic 
practices. Each involves certain forms and uses of representation: the figure-ground, the figure-ground 
where the interior public spaces of buildings are shown, the section showing the building mass, the 
section showing a section of a building as well as the section of the ground etc. There are various 
aesthetic-representational-design assemblages that have evolved through a history associated with 
these. This typology could easily be populated with real architectural examples and conceptual thinking 
from the history of architecture. 
These realms do not act alone. Partitioning produces many ways that various types of affect realms, 
aesthetic practices and forms and uses of representation interact together. There is something very 
distinct about this set and each of these realms. They are like a history of architectural powers, ways 
that architecture has discovered to have power in the world, powers of architecture.415  
Moving Beyond the Classical Architectural Affects Realms? (In Time and Space) 
What happens once history moves away from the medieval city, the European city of the sixteenth to 
eighteenth century, the various cities of order and the modern city? What happens in more fragmented 
cities, cities that do not have a traditional built fabric, dispersed cities, suburban areas, farmlet 
subdivisions, rural areas, ‘natural’ / wild / ecological areas? What happens when traditional urban 
enclosed space disappears and object nature of architecture seems to be a relatively irrelevant part of a 
landscape. The desert, forest, steppe, Antarctica, etc. What happens when architectural objects are 
only part of space, mixed with landscape, sites, vegetation, topography, land divisions, road systems, 
linear infrastructures? What happens when they are not part of such space? In many ways architecture 
has recently been exploring the non-traditional city, a city more like a landscape, as Koolhaas might 
say. It has even been exploring situations where architecture is only a minor or negligible part of the 
scene. What happens to the practices of partitioning in contemporary times and in spatial situations 
beyond where buildings are dominant?  
Sebastien Marot’s comment about a form of urbanism suited to landscape architecture and site, 
‘suburbanism’, 416 might be referred to suggest that architectural urbanism is an urbanism of cities, 
densities and landscape architectural urbanism is maybe more suited to dealing with possibly more 
‘landscape’ type situations, where the site plays a dominant role, where architecture plays a minor role 
etc. Marot’s proposal does also seem to hark back to what still seems a general assumption that non-
suburban/urban cities are the product of architecture or buildings, where architecture and buildings are 
                                            
415 Some of these powers have been used or usurped for purposes of power beyond architecture but that has been 
spoken about many times. 
416 In his book, Marot, Sub-Urbanism and the Art of Memory. 
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determining of such cities, of the affects of such cities. In such cities, buildings, being the obvious and 
dominant structuring element of the city are also seen to determine of the nature of the spaces, the non-
building part of the city, the landscape and streets of the city. Architectural affects and how they affect 
spaces between buildings and produce affects between buildings might be seen as the dominant affects 
of such cities.  
Newish Forces 
There has of course been a recent and energetic investigation into the various ‘forces’ at play in 
contemporary urbanisation, interrelated sets of forces that seem to undermine the determining role of 
architecture or buildings (and architects and designers in general). Automobiles, mobility and speed and 
the various infrastructures of mobility; suburbanisation; telephones, mobile phones and the internet; 
lighting, electronic signage; changing social habits, privatisation of space, surveillance regimes; 
planning regulations; even the rise of the design of streetscape, street trees and the greening of cities 
and landscape architecture etc. Such ‘forces’ might be seen as undermining or dominating the 
traditional determining role of buildings in cities and producing their own urban affects. Architecture and 
landscape architecture have attempted to embrace these new forces and have attempted to develop 
means to engage with them and explore what can be done with them. 
It has often been said, by architects, that architecture can no longer rely upon the same tools that they 
once did. What if the new tools are still not very adequate for what urban space or landscapes do? I 
would suggest that my analysis of important contemporary open-systems-oriented landscape design 
assemblages suggests that such assemblages are still not adequate for the contemporary urban 
landscape, still only tentative. This may be partly as the particular focus on open and complex systems, 
on what gets called indeterminacy and systems, may have been misdirected.417  
What has been interesting about the question of openness is that thinking about architecture seemed to 
provide a means to start to conceptualise and affirm what openness might be, and not by considering 
the city most removed from the dense traditional fabric city or the suburban city or the fragmented city or 
the non-city or wild nature—but by considering the power of architecture and buildings in a dense city, 
and by considering this in relation to the results of field studies of urban landscapes. These field studies 
suggest something different to what seem to be half-thought assumptions. Buildings certainly structure 
and in their way determine city space. They define the spaces between the buildings. They produce 
powerful formal and social affects. It is usually assumed, I would suggest, that this makes dense cities 
and their spaces more architecturally determined, and hence dense city urbanism would be the province 
of architecture. 
                                            
417 One thing that appears to have happened in design schools, and I am not the only person who has noticed this, 
but no-one seems to have noticed in writing, is that students now seem to have the presumption that designing is 
only about designing internalised systems or providing flexibility etc. How ‘space’ or landscape works is hardly 
considered. This points to the power of discourse and how it functions ‘on the ground’. What is also almost 
perverse about this is that my field studies suggest a greater attention is needed to embrace the power of 
landscape at a time when the whole discourse is promoting something else. 
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The Production of an Urban Ecology of Space 
What is less affirmed is that the production of urban space affects by surrounding architecture (and this 
is without starting to bring in other factors) also produces something greater than the these affects 
which functions because of these affects. It produces a whole ‘urban ecology of urban space’. The built 
fabric produces (or strongly contributes to) immediate urban space affects and in the process, and this 
is the important step, also produce variation in the urban space affects (and potential urban space 
affects) in the city as a whole – and variation in how all of the parts of the city relate to each other. This 
variation of urban space affect and potential affect ‘then’ (simultaneously) produces an ecology of urban 
space affect (and potential affect) – or to see it the other way round, the whole urban space ecology 
which has been produced (in this dense city) by architectural affects determines the functioning of the 
individual parts of the urban space ecology. The urban space ecology ‘then’ usurps the locally produced 
powers and transforms them into a function of the whole ecology, effectively determined by the whole 
ecology. 
So, that architecture produces local affects that produces an ecology that subsumes the local affect. 
Any particular space or location in the city is then effectively determined by the ecology and not the 
buildings. The relativity of the ecology subsumes the building affect. The buildings (and other factors) 
produce powerful affects on the immediate and relevant space and the difference of these affects (and 
other factors) produce different affectualities in the overall system of urban space affect. These different 
affectualities provide the variation in the affectuality in the city yet the ecology ‘then’ determines how 
such variation functions in the ecology. Consider Manhattan, central Melbourne, Bangkok. The buildings 
set up what the ecology usurps. Such ecologies function relatively. The functioning of one part of the 
ecology depends on the functioning of the other parts, all of it. The power of the architecture drives the 
ecology that usurps, transforms and transcends the power of the architecture. Spaces, locations and 
differentiations function in terms of the ecology not architecture.  
Recap 
The discussion by Schumacher about the architectural aesthetic mechanism, the “intuitive appreciation 
of performativity”, where “aesthetic judgement … represents an economical substitute for experience”, 
provides a means to understand that a powerful aesthetic-representational mechanism functions in 
architecture with respect to program (and similarly with other realms, it would be added), and not just in 
datascaping but as part of prevalent architectural practice. The identified affect-realms of architecture 
that I have identified are affect-realms that have developed aesthetic-representational-design 
assemblages. By only considering the urban space of the city as being determined by built form, as a 
dense city, this allows us to consider how such built form produces an urban ecology which employs yet 
transforms built form affect into urban ecology affect, urban space ecology affect. 
This discussion is something of a mental exercise to start to conceptualise and affirm urban space 
ecology (or openness). It has consciously assumed that cities are the products of architectural or built 
form. In reality, built form is obviously important yet is only one of a range of dimensions of what plays a 
role in an urban space ecology. 
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The case studies, of Federation Square and Royal Park, in this thesis attempt to draw together key 
relevant factors involved in urban space ecologies. What follows here is an unsystematic list of 
dimensions or suggested dimensions that might function in the production of urban space ecologies, in 
the production of openness. 
Non-Systematic List of Dimensions and Examples to Suggest Something of the Heterogeneous 
Dimensions of Urban Space Ecologies 
Physical geographic relations, e.g. Manhattan is an Island and the islandness, the shape of the 
island and the various connections beyond the island helps set-up all sort of social geographical 
relations and differentiations along the length of the island. 
Political-economic relations, e.g. real estate relations - property value differentials set-up styles of 
life and movement across the ecology.  
Surveillance regimes i.e. you can do certain things in certain places and not in others, certain 
freedoms and restrictions of action.  
Geomorphological relations i.e. river deltas tend to produce certain housing situations. The wealthy 
in Auckland, New Zealand, tend to live on north or east facing slopes facing the ocean, their lives 
physically and psychically oriented that way.    
Geological relations i.e. if you are a tourist with a camera and you walk the 100+ metres down hill 
from Morningside Heights through Morningside Park from Columbia University to Harlem down a 
geological differentiation the whole world changes and the way you act changes and the way you 
relate to those around you changes (or this was the case a few years ago). This geological 
differentiation becomes a differentiation in many ways. Your sense of security is enfolded into the 
sharp socio-economic-demographic differentiation of this slope. The shift is felt in every step. 
Topographic relations, eg. Istiklal Caddesi (street), Istanbul is so lively and this is very much to do to 
with being on the ridge. The suburb where it is located is so cosmopolitan partly due to Istanbul 
being the international meeting place of many cultures and for the suburb being central yet 
historically separated from the more Islamic Fatih area, across the Golden Horn waterbody. 
Microclimatic relations, e.g. some parts of the city, some streets and some parts of streets are more 
sheltered than others. If it rains which way would you walk to work? Do you live close enough to 
walk to work? What is the public transport like in your city? Near your street? Near your work? 
Entertainment or diversion ecologies. Work ecologies. Recreation ecologies. 
Night and day ecologies i.e. the difference between night and day in Central Park. 
Ownership ecologies and physical boundaries. Accessibility and restriction ecologies. Places you 
can and cannot go and that get you to go around them or structure the use of the city. All cities have 
politically invisible sections that often secretly structure the rest of the city. 
Built objects and spacing. One building in a wide landscape might be very important, especially if it 
is the hut you are going to sleep in after a week long walk. 
Vectors, rhythms and dynamisms of movement. How something fits into your day and use the city. 
The collective rhythms of urban life. The shift from one area to another. 
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Movement ecologies. Pedestrian, automobile (truck, car etc.) and bicycle movements and 
ecologies. Different types of vehicles, volumes of traffic, sizes of flows. Commuting movements, 
diversion movements, neighbourhood movements, recreational cycling movements, tourist 
movements. Meeting places. Different mixtures of local use and more distant use 
Infrastructural structuring of the city and urban space, eg. linear infrastructures might change your 
relation to a distant place yet also cut off movement from one side to the other, and produce social 
differences across the divide. 
Vegetative ecologies, eg. ‘this is a nice area’. Another example, eg. social life in Kuala Lumpur 
urban space is strongly focused around the shade of trees as it is so hot.  
Ecologies of reasons to come to a place or not come to a place. Ecologies of sources of people and 
vehicles. Ecologies of movements between sources or catchments and destinations or reasons. 
Relations between local differentiations and more distant differentiations. Where I live and where I 
want to go. Us and them. 
Ecologies of land-use relations. Ecologies of speed of access and barriers to access. Relative 
functionalities. Economic competitiveness’ i.e. location, location, location. The relative pleasantness 
of spaces. The relative convenience of things. 
The image something has versus the reality experienced. 
How something fits into lives. How the city fits into lives. How lives fit into the city and parts of the 
city. How many lives does a space fit into? Your relation to how something fits into the lives of 
others.  
What parts of the city get continually ignored? Where do you always go? Where would you never 
go? What areas escape your thought totally? 
The way that urban space is at the human scale structured transforms the affects of surrounding 
buildings, intensifying them, shifting, restricting and nullifying them. The design or disposition of 
particular spaces and streets always manipulates and employs the affects of buildings. 
Built forms are not simple objects or masses and are themselves complex ecologies of access and 
life and differentiation. The surface of urban space variously and to varying degrees continues, if 
transforming in the process, into and through buildings and buildings likewise have many ways to 
interact with the ecology. Urban space can be seen as a contiguous varying realm with different 
things plugged into it throughout. 
Inclinations, gradients, tendencies, orientations and asymmetries. 
This list hopefully suggests or reminds a designer of some of the realms of factors that are or could be 
involved in an urban space ecology (landscape assemblages) beyond the built form. The point that I am 
trying to make by listing these is that the practices and assumptions traditionally associated with 
architectural affect realms – architectural design assemblages -, which are no less contemporary just 
because they are traditional, tend not to be open to or embrace the relevant heterogeneous relations 
and factors involved in production of urban open space ecologies. Such realms of factors do not act 
alone. They are coordinated through the singular integration of (human) occupation. The architectural 
assemblages listed above tend not to be open to how these are coordinated—they tend to not be open 
to or capable of engaging with the affects of urban space ecologies. This is not an issue, except to the 
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degree that is assumed that these assemblages are adequate for engaging with urban space ecologies 
(landscape affects). In contemporary use, however, it is an issue, as there is a strong tendency for 
contemporary open-systems-oriented landscape design assemblages, architectural and landscape 
architectural, to rely upon or not depart from such assemblages in situations involving urban space 
ecologies (landscape assemblages). Architectural practices have a strong tendency to not see such 
affects and their production – and to the degree that they do they tend to be limited by the perspective 
of the thinking and practices associated with architectural affect realms – which in general do not take 
the leap out into openness. Urban space ecologies produce their own affects, involve their own 
problems and issues and require their own techniques and design assemblages. My case studies 
concretely attempt to communicate such affects and in some detail the various heterogeneous realms of 
factors involved in them and how they are involved in them, and some examples of the techniques 
involved to engage with them. 
The architectural urbanism Andrea Kahn seems one of the few architectural urbanists who start to take 
this leap. 
Defining Urban Sites: Kahn 
Architect Andrea Kahn writes a very important open-systems oriented urbanist essay titled Defining 
Urban Sites.418 In this essay she attempts to conceptualise urban sites in ways that allow designers the 
ability to think, in design terms, the nature of the myriad relationships involved in an urban site. For her, 
‘urban design sites’ are ‘relational constructs’ requiring ‘relational site thinking’. Her ecological aim is 
clear in that ‘what matters is gaining understanding of the city in the site’. Kahn asks how do designers 
‘think through a site’s ‘complexity and multivalence’. Importantly, she draws out that ideas of site come 
through making. The creative process of representation makes the site as it proceeds. For instance: 
urban sites are constructed by a complex overlay of distinct but interrelated uses, boundaries, 
forms, and temporal sequences. In any given locale, variously scaled interactions establish a unique 
set of linkages to other places.419 
This essay certainly warrants closer attention than is given here, and possibly represents the most 
urban ecological conceptualisation of urban sites (or cities) by an architect. It does not go far enough, 
however. The whole essay, in many very suggestive ways, describes the complexity and shiftiness of 
urban relations and introduces a range of tools to help us think about and work with such complexity 
and shiftiness. Importantly, Kahn shows that the action of designers makes the site. Such actions 
discover the relevant complexity and shiftiness through the way representations are use. Kahn 
acknowledges that this complexity is not just a collection of factors. There are interactions, linkages, 
influences, co-presences, crossings, convergences and differential relations of such factors.  
However, in this uncommonly sophisticated essay about urban space, Kahn seems to fall into the 
common limitation of seeing complexity more passively than it should be. It is one thing to allude to the 
                                            
418 Schumacher, "The Work of Beauty & the Beauty of Work." 
419 Burns, Carol J., &  Andrea Kahn, ed. Site Matters: Design Concepts, Histories, and Strategies (New York and 
London: Routledge, 2005). 291. 
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various factors that could be involved in an urban site, and that these interact or connect with each 
other. However, what gets them to interact? What does interaction do? What is the process of 
interaction? What is interaction? Why be interested in interaction? Which interactions might be more 
relevant? How to select which factors and interactions? Whilst there are many types of interactions, 
which types of interactions are relevant to designers?  
Some realms of factors can be isolated and, for the moment, treated as autonomous from other factors. 
Chief amongst these are the non-affectual realms of organisation, technologies, systems and all else 
that can be dealt with within the abstract space of representation. However, even this totally central 
realm, usually providing the very means to engage with urban space ecologies, finds its way back into 
reality, where it must ‘then’ be understood in terms of the affectuality of urban space ecologies 
(landscape assemblages). Such realms need to be worked on internally and ‘then’ as part of a human-
involved-open system (urban space ecology). 
In this discussion Kahn certainly affirms the diversity of factors involved in urban sites. She, however, 
gives little affirmation to the way that complexity functions in an urban site. Complexity, in a sense 
relevant to life and design, is not numerical (even if infinite) so much as a process of interaction 
involving (human) organisms and heterogeneous combinations of worldly relations that do something or 
potentially do something. Such assemblages are integrative machines that produce interactions, being 
‘integrations’ of the world by organisms or organism-environment affiliations. Such interactions interact 
in the production of affect and potential affect. Certain spaces have certain abilities shared by the 
(human) organisms and the space. If Kahn is interested in what urban space ecologies ‘do’ then she 
should be interested in how such interactions function in urban space ecologies, or more precisely, 
urban space or landscape assemblages. It is not enough to academically champion relations or 
interactions. Read-off-the-page-program would be weak substitute for how such interactions function. 
Without tendering such a conceptions what can be assumed apart from this? Kahn, of course, is not 
alone in this. Kahn’s essay, championing relational constructs and relational thinking, is a great 
contribution to an affirmative open systems landscape design assemblage, however relations are only 
half of it. Elizabeth Meyer also succumbs to this, as we will see. That they do simply reflects the 
common lack of conception or affirmation of how complexity functions—that it is not just a diversity of 
complexity – it actually functions itself. How it functions needs to be affirmed. 
Kahn’s discussion is critical in the sense of opening architects (and others) up to the interrelatedness of 
sites but is uncritical in not showing the why and how of interrelatedness. It also, possibly 
unintentionally, perpetuates a myth of complexity as being, effectively, numerical (even if infinite) and 
passive, and leaving interactions hanging indefinitely: or does not dispel such a myth. Such a myth 
promotes such tendencies as the ‘display of complexity’ in a design presentation, as being seen as 
good in itself, that ‘representing’ the diversity of factors involved, or maybe present, in a site is worthy 
itself. Kahn does not conceptualise what a designer might be interested in such diversity for?  
The ‘saving grace’, it could be suggested, is that the designer’s representations are the means for 
bringing the site into existence. In the process the designer is likely to, to varying degrees, evaluate the 
significance of each of the factors and their significance in terms of something significant, and in terms 
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of something like affect (program?). However, this is only surmised from Kahn’s essay. The functioning 
of complexity remains unaffirmed and simply contributes to various myths of complexity in the 
discourse. Whilst it might seem pedantic to highlight Kahn failing to go beyond interactions to what they 
are really for or how they really function – as affect and problem - it is important to highlight that her 
otherwise fabulous essay, in this sense, is no different from the vast majority of open systems-oriented 
writings and thinking in not affirming how complexity functions. As Deleuze is at pains to point out: 
‘Difference is not Diversity’, as is discussed in the appendix.420 
Conditions 
There are many ways of considering this functioning, for instance, through the ideas of integration and 
selection. The world / Nature / Earth / city / openness / urban space ecology / the landscape only 
selects certain things in the production of landscape affect. The world / Nature… does not even select 
things so much as certain dimensions of such ‘things’, such dimensions are always a relationship of 
some relation of a thing to a relation of some other thing, and that in relation to some other relation and 
so on, and all in the service of affect. Kahn mentioned ‘differential relations of such factors’, and that is 
exactly how such integration functions, as discussed in detail in the Appendix, starting with the section 
titled ‘Ideas as Multiplicities’ (where the word ‘Idea’ has nothing to do with mental ideas). Differetial 
relations are where the changing relationship between two quantities i.e. dy/dx is related to the 
changing relations between two other relations, i.e. da/db, and so on, altogether producting, via an 
system of such relations involving communication (intensity) between such relations and the production 
of affect. Y and x are not things but changes in quantities (change of slope, temperature, closeness, 
etc.). 
It is only an ecology (of urban space) through the way that human bodies connect to and integrate these 
dimensions, or the relations of these dimensions. These dimensions are only ‘conditions’ (a very abused 
term) of an urban space ecology when they are conditions in the production of affect. It is important to 
understand this difference—just by producing arrays of mappings of various factors does not mean that 
a designer is engaging with how an open system functions. It can be said, if we wanted to add a critical 
dimension into such language, that such mappings are not mappings of conditions unless they are 
starting to connect at least the intensive dimension of landscape. They might be a condition for some 
physical system that is part of a project, but this is only relevant to the urban space ecology of the 
project if it is relevant to the production of urban space affect. Engaging with the system might be 
important to the project but it is not yet also engaging with the ‘higher purpose’ of the human-involved-
open-system (a higher purpose that landscape architects like James Corner and Elizabeth Meyer 
acknowledge when they criticise landscape architecture if it is only dealing with functional systems), the 
urban space ecology. However, through experience with what gets called ‘mapping’ in the design of 
landscape and open systems oriented designing, it is probably the case that most things ‘mapped’ only 
indefinitely relate to each other and to the relevant urban ecology and to any relevant or potential urban 
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space affect. ‘Mapping’, as I will argue later, is only mapping in the strict and powerful sense through 
connecting to conditions when they are conditions of affect or potential affect.  
The Aesthetic-Representational Assemblage Of Partitioning 
To reason for drawing attention to Schumacher’s ideas about datascapes, aesthetics and program was 
to touch on the practices of architecture that are relevant to designing beyond the sorts of realms that I 
have identified as architectural affect realms. If we were too summarise the assemblage or part-
assemblage that Schumacher, Vidler and Tschumi effectively describe - the naturalised complexity of it 
might be surprising.  It could look something like this: 
1. It relies on the action of partitioning that simultaneously produces and spatially separates the 
architectural designing and affect realms, each of which has its own practices and disciplines. 
2. It is associated with a language and a thought suited to propelling these practices: ‘projection’, 
‘projective theory’, ‘program’ vs. ‘form’, ‘diagram’, ‘performance’ etc. 
3. It is focused on program (though it has strong connections to practices in the other architectural affect 
realms). It is focused on (or departs from) what internal functions ‘do’ – use, experience (and I would 
argue that these are best understood in terms of affect, where the expression of affect involves a 
resonance that tells the architect if what they are doing is significant, as I have shown in my discussion 
of the aesthetic dimension of Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition). 
4. Such a focus on affect becomes creatively mixed up with non-affectual or metric considerations – and 
though it conflates the affectual with the non-affectual, practice luckily tends to function through the 
affectual, even if the workings of the affectual has not been strongly conceptualised (or not via that 
name). The designing of technical components can be understood technically at the same time as the 
use or affect of the changes to the technical and non-affectual can be evaluated aesthetically. The 
relation of differential relations being the way to conceptualise how the affectual and non-affectual are 
directly connected. The focus on affect is kept critical and driven by the rational connection to the 
economic. 
5. It involves a particular use of representation, which includes: 
 that all of the relevant relationships can be presented in the abstract space of representation; 
 a focus on plan projections of buildings and their interiors; 
 the production of drawings which are readily presented at a scale and at an extent that allows the 
external and internal walls and spaces and the relations between them to be clearly visible to the 
eye, and which fits neatly onto a single drawing on a board or single screen of a computer – in a 
manner where the program/use/function/experience/ affect can be read-off the 
drawing/screen/sketch/diagram; 
 design practices where the drawing of line-work is all that is needed (mostly); 
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 where the use of drawings and the system of drawings allows cross-referencing to elevations, 
details, sections, colours, textures etc; 
 the architect being able to neatly connect, via the a trained architectural eye, to the repetitive 
dimension of space/program ( via their use of a particular typology or program) and know what 
they are doing; 
 the ‘projection of presumed utilities’: an architect can simply choose or posit a program or use and 
then whatever the architect then does can be evaluated in relation to this presumed program (or 
affect realm). This allows the architect to ‘project’ and intuitively understand what they are doing as 
they are doing it; 
 being connected to a body with the ability to quickly transform line-work in relation to the presumed 
program. The trained eye being connecte to the transforming ability of the body allows architects to 
experiment, where experimentation connects doing to knowing (or rather, feeling) what you are 
doing; 
 the ability to interrelate this affect realm with other architectural affect realms; and, 
 this system meshing neatly with the whole process of production of architecture and the 
construction of the resultant buildings. 
Most individual architects practice with this very precise and flexible assemblage as if it were the air 
they breathed. The discipline of architecture has whole arrays of practices, traditions and strategies of 
using, or abandoning yourself to, this assemblage that have evolved over a long time and through many 
hands. If we return to the recent question posed: can the same machinery operate in the landscape, in 
the design of landscape? Is this machinery relevant to the designing of urban space ecologies / 
landscape / openness?  
I have already ben investigating this question. One approach to take this furher, would be to 
simply respond, more or less one component at a time, to the partitioning assemblage as 
described above. Such a comparison suffers the problems of being in terms of architecture, 
and in that sense is negative and not strongly affirming of a design assemblage more suited to 
openness or landscape. However, I would suggest that such a comparison is useful for the 
construction of a more affirmative conception. 
Is The Aesthetic-Representational Assemblage Of Partitioning Relevant To Urban Space Ecologies 
(Openness)? 
So, what might be translatable or useful about the ‘aesthetic-representational assemblage of 
partitioning’ and what might be less relevant, with respects to the affects of urban space ecologies? 
How does an assemblage of openness compare with a partitioning assemblage? Affects of urban space 
ecologies are, unlike with the program-assemblage, produced by the whole continuum of urban space. 
Differently to the partitioning assemblage this assemblage, of what can be called ‘openness’, is a single 
affect realm with many heterogeneously related dimensions. These affects are the affects of this 
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continuum: the affects produced by this continuum. It does not have the powers of partitioning. It 
involves the powers of openness, which need to be affirmed. The language of partitioning does not sit 
well with openness. A language and thinking suited to openness partly exists, fairly obscured (especially 
aesthetically) in landscape architectural designing and in a minor way in some architectural practices. 
For Deleuze, difference is ‘understood’ through expressive aesthetic practices, aesthetic practices of 
affect, when they function well. Field studies associated with this research have found that Deleuze’s 
account of an aesthetics of affect is the most affirmative description of what is experienced in 
‘perceiving’ what landscapes do, and then this perception leading to an understanding of the processes 
involved in the affects produced by the processes. What landscapes ‘do’ seems most fully affirmed as 
affect (and sense). The process of expression described by Deleuze, after Spinoza, seemed affirmed in 
Elizabeth Meyer’s reference to the notion of ‘friction’ and in our use of the term ‘connection’. This 
connection is the resonance between your understanding and the world that occurs when ‘you are onto 
something’ (being simultaneously the power of understanding and the difference or power of the world). 
It is not a re-presentation. A resonance not re-presentation. Partitioning has developed an elegant 
aesthetic machinery of program, which allows architects with a ‘well-trained eye’ to evaluate what is 
emerging in relation to a posited program.  
Openness, as our field-work strongly suggests, does not allow the architectural partitioning assemblage 
to function, as it does so efficiently in architecture. Landscape architectural designers have developed a 
range of abilities to engage with what openness does but the nature of openness tends to get them to 
defer from ‘connecting’ to what the landscape does (and, like architecture, there has not been an 
understanding of this, in terms of affect). This is not to say that strong practices do not exist, as I have 
said elsewhere, but where they do exist such practices will tend to remain obscured and not able to be 
developed for the collective benefit of the discipline.   
Openness is not focused on architectural (interior) program and the notion of program does not, despite 
what seems commonly assumed, simply translate to urban space ecologies, as I have argued and will 
argue further here. This is confused by the slipperiness of the term ‘program’, but even when program is 
best understood as affect (the functioning and evaluative part of program), as it is argued here, from the 
field work that such interior architectural affects and the processes of understanding them are not the 
same as the affects of openness. They are identical in that both are products of Nature but the affect 
realms associated with interior program and the affect realms of the greater urban space ecologies 
(openness) are radically different in nature and the techniques required. 
The rational connection to the economic is an interesting question for urban space ecologies. Once 
away from the production of the partitioned the economics of design transform. The economics shift 
from the production of a partitioned economic object, to an economics of transforming the existing. The 
first, which tends to involve positing program, tend to come with a positing of the readily understood 
economics of that program which has been posited. Openness, which tends to involve a discovery and 
mustering from an heterogeneous openness also tends to require a mustering of the economics of the 
project. Added to this is that connection to affect opens up a precision of the understanding of how the 
various relations are involved in the production of affect, leading to a precision and economy of the 
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means required to achieve desired affects. The precision and economy of transformation of the existing 
is a major issue in practice. Open systems involve a continual negotiation with and between the various 
relations involved in the production of affect. 
With openness, being both an open continuum and involving the transformation of something that pre-
existed the designer, all of the relevant relationships involved in affect are not readily available in the 
abstract space of representation as they are in the partitioning assemblage. Openness tends to employ 
plan as the distinctly dominant mode of representation, much more than in, say, architecture. The plans 
used in landscape architecture are not self-enclosed but are of surfaces that are already affectual and 
already connected to the rest of the continuum that empowers them. 
In comparison to the partitioning assemblage, openness tends to involve great variation in extent and 
configuration. There is also no such well-understood readily available binaristic wall-space relations in 
openness and that the relevant relations, which strongly tend not to be readily available tend not to 
come at a scale and extent where the relationships between all of the relations involved in affect can be 
made out (assuming that affect is affirmed as the focus of attention, which it does not tend to be, and 
where it is engaged with in practice it has tended to remain obscured to the wider world).421  
In openness, there is a tendency not to be able see the relations relevant to the production of affect in 
the actual landscape. Also, despite a general confidence with being able to read plans and design, the 
relevant affect will tend to not be able to be read-off the plan/drawing/sketch/diagram. Such seeing, 
even with a strong grasp of affect and how it functions requires a development of understanding of 
affect and their relations in both the real and graphic landscapes. 
Rather than binaristic absolute wall-space-affect relations, openness involves non-absolute and non-
binaristic ‘differentiations’ and ‘structures’ specific to openness. ‘Differentiations’, such as a transition 
(being the most obvious) emerge from gradients. ‘Structure’ is the relationship between major 
differentiations in time and space. Being a differentiation in space is always being a differentiation in 
time as it involves (human) bodily integration. Bodily integration produces the differentiations and 
structure involved in the production of affect. Differentiation and structure function in spacetime, human 
spacetime functions through intensity, affect and sense. Spacetime for (human) organisms is the time of 
affect, sense, intensities, problems and events. Structure is the structure of the ecology. It affords and 
produces affect. Structure also exists ‘before’ human organisms potentially as distances, gradients, 
asymmetries - and human integration brings structure to life with respects human life through 
assemblages that involve the structure. Structures produce affect and indeterminacy of affect. 
Structures tend to be relatively permanent and sometimes much of a structure is even effectively 
permanent in lived time (though of course not geological time). The current predilection for (abstract) 
indeterminacy defers attention away from such structure.422 
                                            
421 My many field studies have certainly opened me up to what landscapes do. They have also highlighted that both 
academia and practice are very moral in what they see, meaning that there are only certain landscapes that get 
looked at and these only in a certain manner. Academic and practice both have their own ways of deferring away 
from what landscapes do. 
422 Christophe Girot recently referred to his Lidar documentation of the landscape as the ‘body’ of the landscape. 
He was suggesting that it is the substantively real part of the landscape. I would suggest that the substantively 
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Structures have an extensive dimension and an intensive dimension. They can be both drawn and 
(involuntarily) experienced. The drawings can be related to (involuntary) experience. Structures are 
really intensive and affectual and are structure of sense or significance (not meaning in any linguistic, 
logical or conscious sense) as much as affect.  
Structures communicate within themselves, just as differentiations communicate within themselves. The 
communication makes sense of all of the parts of the structure and differentiations and this 
communication functions as part of affect. It is called the process of territorialisation (and 
deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation) by Deleuze and Guattari. Differentiations and structure are 
entirely bodily and require investment and effort. ‘I don’t go down there, there is no reason.’ ‘That is too 
far’ or ‘too much effort to climb the hill’ or ‘too noisy’ or ‘too dangerous’, thus producing a differentiation 
between here and there, and a different functioning of here and there, entirely relative to each other 
(and the rest of openness). 
Structure is ‘massive’ (I cannot think of a better word though it not as good as it could be) and 
permanent and has been ignored in the enthusiasm for, what I term, ‘abstract indeterminacy’ and the 
idea that everything changes and is in flux. This enthusiasm seriously gets designers to defer from the 
power (and structure) of the world, of openness. This enthusiasm allows the design world to bypass the 
hyper-obviousness of urban space ecosystem structures (landscape structures, structures of 
openness). Structures produce change and flux and abstract indeterminacy yet are certainly not 
reducible to these. Openness, the ecology produces structures. 
As discussed later in this section Elizabeth Meyer identified 3 central dimensions of the landscape that 
strongly tend to escape normalised plan representations (‘unspoken languages’)423 and which to be able 
to engage with them require very active and custom uses of representation to start to visualise Without 
elaboration here these involve: the relationships and characteristics of the land / landform / topography / 
geomorphology etc.; more-or-less the spatiality of vegetation, and the movement of rigid and planar 
surfaces. Meyer was not discussing the relations relevant to affect, which are not simply that which is 
visible and extended in space and time in ways beyond Meyer’s formal, and not affectual, interest. In 
comparison, linework is immediately and readily adequate for the bulk of the relationships involved in 
the affectuality of architectural program. Whilst the programmatic assemblage is preoccupied with what 
might be termed rigid and absolute (relative to openness) differentiations the landscape is dominated by 
what might be termed supple differentiations. The relationships between the differentiations relevant to 
affect, unlike with architectural program, certainly tends not to be immediately apparent. Relevant 
differentiations function intensively and it is the system that makes them emerge and function. The 
body, as the integration process of the system, integrates the forces and relations of the world that it 
encounters and produces differentiations (they emerge) that become specified and significant by the 
                                                                                                                                          
real landscape has another dimension, ‘structure’. So that we now have the extensive (body) and the intensive 
and affectual (structure). The extensive allows engagement with the intensive/affectual and for a designer should 
always be in the service of the intensive/affectual. This then allows a substantive engagement with the landscape. 
Girot, Christophe, "Lecture on Lidar Mapping Techniques.," (Unitec Department of Landscape Architecture, 
2012).  
423 Meyer, "Landscape Architecture as Modern Other and Postmodern Ground." 
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system. This bodily-produced integration of the world leads to a body-produced investigative procedure, 
a very open one. Openness requires an aesthetic openness. 
In openness there are not readily available forms of repetition, such as architectural typology and 
program (program involves Difference and Repetition to the extent that it involves affect and sense). 
Typologies might be momentarily useful and the most relevant typologies in openness are very 
situational, set in relation to a concrete situation usually, and to be discovered to be relevant. Formal 
typologies also do not tend to be as relevant as visitation typologies and vectors (as discussed in the 
case studies) to openness. The repetitive dimension of openness is particularly situational and always 
singular, in the sense that forms of reference are situational, bodily-referenced, and only singular, as I 
have discussed in the section on the beautiful in the Royal Park case study. 
A designer in openness cannot simply presume and project a utility. They are not, like an architect, 
engaging with an abstract space. Designing in openness is always in relation to an existing and already-
affectual continuum, so any posited and/or presumed program quickly enters a process of 
transformation. Partly because of their open continuous nature landscapes do not tend to be just one 
‘program’ or function, and tend to be a singular mixture of, what might be better described as 
functionings, rather than functions. Something to be discovered rather than presumed. Positing might be 
part of the process of the discovery of the singular functioning. Architecture is also singular but possibly 
not so heterogeneously functional, not so open to variations in inputs: and this is not discussing change 
but indeterminacy of functioning or affect. 
The Formal Affects of Partitioning  
So, now returning to the dominant open systems oriented design assemblages of landscape, mostly 
focused on landscape urbanism, this section will begin by discussing some of the affects of partitioning 
more directly relevant to landscape architects. 
Partitioning tends to get architecture and landscape urbanism to do certain things. To begin with, they 
produce a range of, what could be termed ‘formal’ affects – affects that Elizabeth Meyer, in her 1992 
essay ‘Landscape Architecture as Modern Other and Post-Modern Ground’424 (whose ideas I have 
introduced already) has similarly discussed - that have a direct bearing on the landscape and landscape 
urbanism. Partitioning sets up two important divisions. Firstly, architectural productions construct a 
conceptual and spatial distinction between architectural products and the (architecturally constructed) 
‘surface’. Second, the same production constructs another distinction between architectural products 
and all else that is on such a ‘surface’. ‘Such a double binary relationship results in a clearly demarcated 
three-way construction of the partitioned versus ‘context’ versus surface.  
Landscape urbanism has its own particular intensification of this demarcation given that it tends to 
explore heightened horizontal intensities of the organisation of program (architectural program, 
                                            
424 Ibid. 20-25. 
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infrastructures etc.…) Landscape urbanism is often seen as being about this horizontal organisation.425 
Organisations, even more than the single architectural production, tend to set up a binary relationship 
between architectural organisations and distributions and the rest of the world, especially that which an 
organisation ‘sits upon’. Organisations and the act of organising tend to construct an organisation as 
‘sitting upon’ or within a ‘surface’. The horizontal relations, fascinations, complexities and imperatives of 
such organisations accentuate further the binarity of the relation between organisation and surface. 
The binarity associated with program, and especially organisation, tends to treat this surface as a 
surface and accentuate how it is treated as an abstract surface—as an homogenous and symmetrical 
space that tends (though not always) to have no thickness, materiality, propensities or resistances of its 
own, and tends to be flattened or to be flat. It tends to be a neutral foundation for program, organisation, 
infrastructure and things, and be unimportant apart from being a foundation, as Meyer says. The 
partitioned tends to see organisation in terms of the partitioned, and beyond the partitioned there does 
not seem to be much to organise. Partitioning promotes the ‘surface’ being seen in the logic of form, but 
not actually be form itself, or if it achieves form it is an abstract sheet-form, ready for manipulation.  
Worst of all, formally, this surface, that which is a not-partitioned product, tends to be presumed rather 
than to be discovered. Presumed as a surface rather than involving the actualising of the differences of 
the landscape. This neutral surface-conception promotes the idea that something is lacking and that 
providing forms and organisations or formally manipulating this surface brings something to this 
constitutive lack. Binarity tends to overlook the whole array of differentiations, structurings, spacings and 
distributions—as well as the infinity of analog tendencies, continuums, asymmetries and gradations (the 
landscape is all gradation and tendency) that make up the landscape426—in favour of the digital end-
identities of the partitioned and the not-partitioned (a return to presumed-identities when the escape 
from them is being mouthed?). Such a landscape lacks connections from within and from without – 
apart from the conceptual infinity of abstract space. Such binarity seriously downplays, or even denies, 
any prior or found difference that pre-exists the addition of the partitioned (or at least what was already 
or readily objectifiable in representation). So, such binarity overlooks difference in and of the landscape, 
that which—as I asserted early in this essay—was central to landscape architectural designing—in 
favour of the difference of the partitioned.427 
The partitioned constructs the ‘landscape’ side of the binary division as ‘not-architecture’ rather than as 
having differences itself, having difference itself. Binarity privileges one half of the division over the 
other, the architectural over the non-architectural. From the point of view of the partitioned, all else is 
seen as not-architectural - and perversely in a sense all else is therefore seen as therefore architectural. 
It is one thing to conceptualise the whole landscape in terms of architecture, as all disciplines 
                                            
425 Charles Waldheim foregrounds a quote of Stan Allen, with his idea of the history of landscape design, in his 
essay, ‘Landscape Urbanism: A Genealogy’, Praxis 4, 2002, 12. ‘Increasingly. Landscape is emerging as a 
model for urbanism. Landscape has traditionally been defined as the art of organising horizontal surfaces’. 
426 Or as Kahn listed above: ‘urban sites are constructed by a complex overlay of distinct but interrelated uses, 
boundaries, forms, and temporal sequences. In any given locale, variously scaled interactions establish a unique 
set of linkages to other places.426…this complexity is not just a collection of factors. There are interactions, 
linkages, influences, co-presences, crossings, convergences and differential relations of such factors.  
427 This is a reminder that difference, for Deleuze, is not ‘difference between’ but ‘difference of’ – difference as 
affect and sense and the indeterminacy of affect and sense. 
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necessarily employ their own universalising conceptions. It is another for such conceptualising to deny 
the difference of the landscape. 
The affects of partitioning can be felt in Wall’s conception of ‘programming the urban surface’, at the 
expense of the landscape. The work of landscape architectural theorist Elizabeth Meyer attempts to 
affirm the landscape through an analysis that explores what common forms of representation tend to do 
to central dimensions of the landscape architectural medium. 
Extending Meyer’s Critique of What Typical Plan Representations Do 
Though Meyer does not talk in terms of ‘partitioning’, it is from such a critique that Meyer affirms central 
and positive dimensions of the landscape that could not be affirmed by the world constructed from the 
perspective of the partitioned. Partitioning tends to promote the gross and prevalent conceptual and 
representational affect that Meyer refers to as ‘landscape-for-architecture’, where typical and received 
plan forms of representations tend to construct a binary condition of a ‘discrete, cubic object on a 
neutral, open ground plane’. This condition denies centrally important landscape architectural 
‘languages’ that she terms the ‘figured-ground’, ‘articulated space’ and the ‘minimal garden’.428 For 
Meyer, these are important formal dimensions of landscape architecture that because of the 
propensities of representations (including words) tend to exist only as ‘unspoken languages’. What 
Meyer approaches, but does not directly say, sharply clarifies and extends her analysis, and to put it 
simply - landscape-for-architecture is effectively born from the abstract space of representation. What is 
not already objectifiable or happens to be readily objectifiable in the plane of representation tends also 
to be unspoken for. As Meyer says, landscape always tends to be constricted to a single plane, the 
vertical plane of the scenic view or the horizontal frame of the cleared site.429 What is not partitioned 
tends to become unspoken for. Tends not to be seen as form. The more unpartitioned or unpartitionable 
it is, the more unspoken it becomes. The stuff of landscape therefore tends to be relegated to the 
unspoken. ‘Forms’ which ‘speak’ loudest and most clearly, whose qualities and form are readily visible 
in representation, are partitioned architectural and planar forms as such forms are born of the space of 
representation or happen to suit it. The world seen from the perspective of the partitioned is a world 
where what is not partitioned tends to become unspoken for and often is unspeakable from such a 
perspective. Landscape urbanism, in this regards, has a strong tendency to promote landscape-for-
architecture - and landscape-for-architecture, in turn, I will argue, facilitate landscape urbanism. It would 
also seem that partitioned forms appeal to progressive landscape architects and students because of 
how loudly they (easily and lazily) speak. 
                                            
428 It is noteworthy that Meyer refers to the repressed languages of landscape as part of a larger ‘unseen and 
unheard landscape of modernity’, suggesting to this author that current landscape urbanism, wanting to embrace 
our modernity, may be but a transitional state on a trajectory of exploration of the possibilities of the modern 
abstract space of representation. 
429 Meyer 16 
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The Notion of Organisation is Problematic in the Landscape 
This immediately brings into focus that the Wallian / landscape urbanist notion of ‘organisation’ itself is 
problematic from the perspective of the landscape. This notion (and maybe all notions, of organisation) 
meshes directly with landscape-for-architecture. The notion and practices of organisation constructs 
landscape as landscape-for-architecture—or rather what could be termed a ‘surface-for-organisation’. 
Organisation and surface each facilitate the other. Language itself promotes landscape-for-architecture 
as a fully affirmed landscape architectural notion of organisation. A language that affirms all that is 
organisable in the landscape, in terms that suit what there is to organise barely exists. Meyer’s notion of 
‘unspoken languages’ is not just an extended formalism, but highlights not only the limitations of 
traditional uses of representations (which Meyer regards as modelled on those of art and architecture) 
but also the very limits of spoken language and design discourse when it comes the landscape. Meyer’s 
essay seeks an affirmation of the form of the landscape and representations adequate to it. For Meyer, 
representations have to be made to work much harder. Meyer’s analysis provides one way to 
reconsider the notion of organisation. Rather than dismiss this lazy notion of organisation, Meyer’s 
notion of unspoken languages of the modern landscape implies a radically extended sense of 
organisation—one that should take it beyond how organisation tends to be conceived currently—into the 
unexplored and vast realm of the differences of the open landscape.  
The Affects of Partitioning on Landscape Self-Organisation (Affectuality) 
The limit of Meyer’s analysis, as all analyses have limits, is that it does not venture far from the formal. 
So, what does partitioning do to the self-organisation (affectuality) of the landscape—being affectual 
rather than formal? This is an entirely different problem, and a totally unaffirmed realm of landscape 
architecture. There is very good reason for this—self-organisational affects are invisible, or 
‘imperceptible’, as already discussed. The graphic does not itself capture the imperceptible. No doubt 
the non-graphic nature of affects contributes to its ‘unspoken’ status.430 However, just as it has been in 
architecture, also equally part of Nature, self-organisational affect has always been central to landscape 
architectural practice and design of the landscape, but always obscured and ‘haphazardly’. Haphazard 
practices involve a lack of ‘discipline’, where discipline involves the connection to affect, or emerging 
trajectories of affect. ‘Haphazard’ is not weak or poor but it tends to be weak and poor—and tends to not 
know that it is. The haphazard equally obscures strong and fine acts and judgements, defers from them. 
Any self-organisational affectual ‘genius’ (projects, designers, acts, moves, judgements, hunches, 
moments, details…)—and there is no shortage of it in landscape architecture, remains relatively 
obscured and relatively unaffirmed. Discipline is not a formula—it is a practice, struggled over, 
constructed, fleeting or not, easily lost. Landscape architecture has always had a fraught relationship 
with the self-organisational (affect). Ignored yet central. Ever-present yet ever-deferred from. Always 
                                            
430 Imperceptibility is foreign enough for architecture or with affects associated with the partitioned. In openness, 
this foreignness is intensified by at least two conditions: firstly, as James Corner says when we are in a landscape 
we strongly tend to be in a state of ‘disinterested immersion’ which makes it difficult to see the obvious / the 
affectual and, second, because of the different functioning of representation that this author outlined later in this 
essay. Such a condition is as the author refers to, also later in this essay, as being in the ‘middle of openness’. 
Disciplines and practices for such a middle are only just starting to be explored.  
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sensed yet with no discourse and practice it remains foreign. Landscape urbanism self-consciously 
embraces the concept of self-organisation, constantly evokes it, yet has not embraced what this means 
out in the landscape – despite having explored a number of blurred-together strategies in the name of 
self-organisation.431 While the partitioned comes with a discipline of the conditions (the interaction of the 
concrete relations) of the architectural object, vis-à-vis program and typology—once beyond this 
partition such discipline tends to evaporate, or not even be seen as needed. What is greater than the 
partitioned - of the landscape - needs another discipline – in terms of the world the same, yet in terms of 
the specific practices, radically different. 
Wall’s Continuum 
More pointedly, partitioning has very significant affects on landscape architectural self-organisation 
(affectuality) and some of these affects will be explored here, once again using the self-organisational 
continuum that Wall evokes as the departure point. One of the immediate effects of partitioning is that 
such a continuum can hardly exist. It tends to disappear. Partitioning divides, in a similar manner to 
what it does formally or visibly, the self-organisational continuum into three distinct spheres. These are 
the partitioned (architecture, infrastructural-objects and other ‘organisations’ possibly), what could be 
(and is) called ‘urbanisation’ and ‘the surface’. These three realms are each then considered in distinct 
self-organisational ways. The first is the partitioned and this is understood through typology and 
program. The partitioned is ‘understood’ in relation to a ‘greater’ self-organisational realm, being the 
second sphere, ‘urbanisation’. The third realm, this surface, is not affirmed as self-organisational at all, 
even if this is invoked by Wall. Koolhaas, hammering home this conception, refers to the non-partitioned 
/ non-urbanisation as a ‘nonevent’.432 
With Wall and others global self-organisation is central to landscape urbanism and is connected with or 
experienced via ‘urbanisation’, as an instance or expression of it.433 Partitioning promotes a binary 
                                            
431 A crude list of some strategies that are often presumed, ipso facto, to be engaging in ‘self-organisation’ - 
picturing bodily movement, representing the paths of invisible bodies, picturing things which cannot be seen, 
picturing things that seem to have some relation to an identified self-organisation, such things as football games 
seen as events, managing movement, ‘phasing’ a project over time, catering for or facilitating the evolution of a 
project over time, allowing for changes in the future, the design of management systems and frameworks, 
(instrumentality / performance as) the ability for presumed functions to operate (instrumental, ecological or 
whatever), presuming that getting things to move will produce self-organisation, the virtual (virtual reality) of the 
computer taken as the virtual (Deleuze) of the world, the dynamism of ‘time-based’ three dimensional digital form 
production, ecological dynamism or growth and engaging with ecological systems or working with systems of 
whatever type. What is commonly important in these is the registration of time and / or movement per se. 
However, such a ‘spatialising of time’ (Bergson and Massumi) or registration of ‘temporality’ is no more self-
organisational in-itself than representing space. Self-organisational affects integrate movement and spatial 
relations, are reliant upon and produced by them yet cannot be reduced to them, being relatively ‘independent’ 
bodies themselves. Self-organisational affects are ever-present and just employing these various 
‘indeterminacies’ or ‘temporalities’ really is therefore no advance, by itself, on what already happens. What 
appears to have happened is the production of whole series of intertwined and potentially important secondary 
problems – ‘indeterminacy’ possibly being a term that brings them all together - whilst the central problem of the 
particular affectivities (functionings) of landscape openness, and their worthy employment, seems to have been 
only lightly dealt with. Indeterminacy is really about such functionings and any of the above indeterminacies are 
only relevant in so much as they produce such functionings. The addition and value of the secondary problems, 
as misleading as they are valuable, does not equate to the primary problem, however. 
432 Koolhaas (actual page citation misplaced and to be found somewhere in the 1346 pages of S, M, L, XL.) 
433 Corner, for instance, suggests connections between the global and mapping. ‘These surfaces are massive 
collection, sorting and transfer sites, great fields…placed within an assortment of relational structures’… Corner, 
"The Agency of Mapping: Speculation, Critique and Invention." 214. For Wall, as quoted already in this essay, 
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relation to urbanisation, a division between the partitioned and urbanisation. Urbanisation brings 
program-organisation to life. This realm of self-organisation, partly because of partitioning, tends to be 
treated abstractly; and this abstractness comes with authority–-the authority of globalisation, such that 
globalisation and urbanisation are understood as self-organisational forces directing, and yet relatively 
independent of, any particular entities—and this authority is connected to the authority of statistical 
studies and pronouncements of academics from other fields such as demographics.434  
Of the three forms of self-organisation of landscape urbanism—the partitioned, abstract urbanisation 
and abstract surface—two of these could really be affirmed as self-organisational—and only one of 
them could be considered as being anything more (affectual) than abstract and general. This 
construction tends to privilege only the connection between the partitioned and urbanisation and play 
down all else. Also, this construction or assemblage, in general, privileges the ‘partitioned’ over 
‘urbanisation’ that is then significantly privileged over the ‘surface’. Together, this partitioning seriously 
plays down anything that cuts across such partitions and especially defers from the whole continuum—
most notably—specific interactions that make up the continuum, and specific integrations and 
expressions of the whole continuum. Such interactions, integrations, expressions and ecologies of these 
constitute what is reductively understood as the surface of landscape urbanism, or at least Wall’s 
version of it. 
The landscape, following Meyer, and accentuated in landscape urbanistic uses of representation, tends 
to be treated as formally or organisationally empty. In extension, and more importantly, it also tends to 
be treated as self-organisationally (affectually) dead. It is therefore doubly unspoken for. Whilst the 
narrowness of program can be useful as strategic, pragmatic and empowering of architecture (at least), 
it can also be argued as only being open to certain self-organisational (affectual) realms and to have 
‘botched’, to use Deleuze’s phrase, the continuum. Though landscape urbanism mouths self-
organisation it tends to only supply the partitioned variety.  
In doing so, just because of the manner that self-organisation actually functions, through 
connectedness—programmatic instrumentality is itself reduced. Thus the false sense of the 
instrumentality of Wall’s abstract space and the tabula rasa is intensified. The partitioned is 
accompanied by the ‘nonevent’ of the surface and this facilitates a false ease of organisation across it. 
Such a comforting ease is at the expense of a disconnection from the wider connectivity that enlivens 
the partitioned, and from the life of the continuum itself. The continuum starts looking narrow, graphic 
and conceptual only. 
The Attitude and Ethics of ‘Scape’ 
Just as landscape urbanism seems to have botched the continuum that it is conceptually reliant upon, it 
may also have too readily accepted an attitude and ethics that is not worthy of the world. The abstract 
ideas of the global and urbanisation are accompanied by a Koolhaasian inspired tone that permeates 
                                                                                                                                          
there is a shift in emphasis from ‘forms of urban space to processes of urbanisation, processes that network 
across vast regional – if not global – surfaces’. 
434 Refer, for example, to the interview with Peter Hall and Saskia Sassen in MVRDV’s recent ‘Regionmaker’, which 
seems partly to be placed to add authority to the study.  
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recent architectural and landscape urbanist discourse, and which was most fully presented in such 
essays as ‘Generic City’ and ‘Junk Space’.435 Such essays vividly communicate or allude to the self-
organisational affects of the world by presenting the seeming prevalence, inevitability and banality of the 
production-processes and products of the urban world and showing how little control designers have 
over such powers. These essays are accompanied in the discourse by other writings emphasising the 
unstoppable rapidity and extent of change, such as the study on the Pearl River Delta by the Harvard 
Project on the City. Typically such essays employ statistics and grainy digital imagery of cities (often 
taken from moving vehicles) to emphasise what Deleuze calls the ‘actual’ dimension of self-organisation 
(as opposed to the ‘virtual’), the visual by-products of self-organisational affects rather than the affectual 
production resulting from interactions of concrete relations that produce such by-products.436 Picturing 
such relics can certainly register something of the too-obviousness of the power of the world—yet alone 
such picturing stresses the inevitability of the products well above the concreteness of the underlying 
processes and their affectual production. Schumacher’s notions of the economic rationality of 
datascapes draws out the positive side of Koolhaas’ style. 
Koolhaas mastered a style of presentation that is polemically paradoxical: one that put the 
overwhelming power and inevitable homogeneity of the world in your lap and left you to wonder what to 
do with it. This Koolhaas thinking style seems to have become de rigeur in the world of architecture. The 
registration of urban processes and the fetishising of the actual, in the name of the virtual, has the now-
tired polemical effect of giving authority to the designer with the coolest attitude. More importantly, it 
inhibits exploration of the conditions behind or beyond such fascinating and fascinatingly-presented 
relics. The style of such presentation verges on being a kind of gothic romance of the scenographic, 
while presenting itself as anything-but romantic.  
Such coolness wants to present the instrumentality of the designer and take it away at the same time. 
For instance, Koolhaas uses text to show that the designer has no purchase in the world and, 
simultaneously, uses projects to graphically present ambitions most designers can only ever dream of. 
The positive side to this, of course, is a recognition of the power of the world and that a designer may 
sometimes be able to connect with this power. Architects have, usually second-hand, borrowed 
Deleuze’s notion of the ‘anonymous’ workings of the world as a way to communicate this power.437 
However architectural discourse tends to put a particular ‘spin’ on this notion. Architects have rightly 
ditched the moralism of previous eras and much of the historically-strategic Koolhaas-effect is aimed at 
this. The world cuts across and over-runs the ‘tracings’ of moral formulae. However, they tend to fail to 
affirm the ethical dimension of the world and that Deleuze himself counters such detached anonymity 
with what he refers to as the ‘splendid anonymity’ of the world. This is an anonymity where the designer 
is in contrast affirmed as part of the open system and the events of the world are events that the 
                                            
435 I would suggest inspired by his writings more than his work. 
436 Refer to Massumi for discussions on the virtual in relation to human-involved assemblages. Massumi, Parables 
for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation. 
437 Corner champions mapping that is more ‘neutral’ than it has been. Corner, "The Agency of Mapping: 
Speculation, Critique and Invention." 230.  
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designer is also ‘plugged into’.438 The morality of what is assumed and proper is replaced by an ethics 
that is situational, immanent and to be constructed-whilst-being-discovered. The implications of this are 
that designer agendas respond to the world just as they resonate with the world. This is part of a new 
aesthetics. In a sense, landscape urbanism, as Wall and others present it, is very often presented 
without any ‘why’ that the world might offer. Part of the authority that Weller and Musiatowicz feel is an 
authority which may also compel the designer to accept a way of doing things without any sense of the 
sense of what they are doing, which might be provided through interacting with the world. 
The ethical nature of self-organisation (affect) is that an ethics must be constructed through connection 
to the world, not superimposed on the world. The historically strategic coolness of architecture possibly 
reaches a peak in landscape urbanism and this suits the polemical imperative of architectural discourse, 
but may not be ‘worthy of the event’ (as Deleuze would say)—the event that is an urbanistic problem.439 
It may not be worthy of the way that splendid anonymity functions. This tendency to present the generic, 
the actual, and the homogenous must be connected to a newness that the world is also continually 
producing. The world has two sides, as Deleuze is always saying. It is relentlessly producing the 
homogenous and within the homogeneous is newness, the heterogeneous, inseparably and largely 
imperceptibly. The shifty yet sharp edge between the two is what the designer must discover, and this is 
a tenuous affair that is nothing like the cool received way of designing that landscape urbanists like Wall 
would seem to want us simply to accept. 
Such coolness is currently closely bound up with the championing of program and the organisation of 
systems. While architectural program may certainly serve strategic purposes; landscape urbanism falls 
back on one of the modern myths of function being somehow primary (and all else being secondary) by 
the total lack of affirmation of anything beyond (architectural) program, or even how function actually 
functions in the world. When plugged into the world, into the continuum, what is regarded as function 
functions in terms of what it is plugged into, or that such plugging-in produces ‘functionings’ that are 
independent of the presumed-thing-identity that is a function (which has been one of the great 
abstractions of the twentieth century). Function, being an abstract device, is always secondary to 
functionings. Deleuze wants to connect to things in a totally literal sense, seeing how they function 
beyond preconceptions of function, and it is tracing the myth of function into design to accept that simply 
programming the urban surface is design.440 
Landscape Architects and Program 
The contradictory enigmas of recent discourse are ever-present and no more so for landscape 
architects than in how the very notion of program is found in landscape architecture. The authority of 
program in architecture has not gone unnoticed in landscape architecture and the migration of the 
notion to landscape architecture has almost not been seen as a migration, so naturalised is the current 
use of the term in this discipline. Earlier, I sketched out, with reference to Schumacher, how, in 
                                            
438 Although Deleuze is the departure point here, Elizabeth Grosz discusses the relation between problems and 
self-organization in the inaugural edition of Log journal, which is discussed in a later footnote.. 
439 Problems are of the order of events, according to Deleuze. 
440 On one hand architecture tries to depart from the typical in type and yet seems to fall into the trap of regarding 
function / program as a pivot as much as it ever did with type. 
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architecture program has a strategic relation to self-organisation (affect)—how program connects to the 
world. Landscape architecture has collectively ignored this relation or, rather, never understood self-
organisation (affect) (by that name or any other) anyway. It is common, especially in landscape 
architectural design schools, where the mere use of the term ‘program’, or regarding landscape in terms 
of program or just ‘using’ program, may suggest that the designer is engaging with reality. What is 
called program is itself seen as the real or by itself is ambivalently and mystically real or resonates with 
realness. By such a focus on weak notions of program such as this, landscape architects thus 
disconnect themselves from the landscape architectural equivalent of the mutual provocation between 
organisation-configuration and self-organisational affect that drives architectural uses of program—and 
more tragically—landscape architects tend to forfeit what rich though haphazard relation they already 
had with landscape self-organisation (affect). Landscape architects have failed to learn the self-
organisational (affectual) question posed by program, instead weakly copying the architectural practice 
of it. Mistaking the product for the process. Design becomes the distribution of program; and it is totally 
unclear that there is anything beyond organisational and compositional logics and simple received 
landscape urbanist ideas about what you should do that drives such distribution.  
While landscape architecture traditionally disconnects from the self-organisational (affect) it would seem 
that architectural landscape urbanism tends to suffer a similar fate once beyond, across or above the 
partitioned, so unused to ‘seeing’ self-organisational affect (program being what architecture is used to) 
beyond the partitioned connection to the world. It is no wonder that there is, despite evocations of self-
organisation, a deferral in both to the purely organisational (systems) in landscape urbanism.  
Wall’s Notion of the Ground 
If the partitioning of architectural landscape urbanism promotes ‘landscape-for-architecture’ (Meyer), as 
a synoptic landscape-for-architects, and an effective partitioning of the Wallian continuum into discreet 
self-organisational realms that has the effect of radically downplaying landscape architectural self-
organisation, how do we understand the material that has been constructed as the not-partitioned that is 
worthy of Wall’s suggested continuum, the greater landscape? 
To begin with, it may be useful to consider Wall’s notion of the ‘ground’, roughly equivalent to his idea of 
surface, to escape the dominating affect of the partitioned on both landscape organisation and self-
organisation. Whilst Wall plays down the landscape he certainly champions the ‘ground’. So, what is his 
idea of the ground? For Wall, ‘everything comes together on the ground’, and he presents this in a 
manner that suggests that such a focus is a discovery or a renewed discovery of the ground. However, 
the idea that ‘it all comes together on the ground’ is, for Wall, less an argument for the ground than an 
argument for maps and plans—as the ‘landscape is a horizontal and continuous surface’…such a ‘field 
(also equivalent) is best apprehended in maps and plans’. It is an argument for the synoptic overview 
and, willingly or not, for the type of ground, or ‘field’, that this constructs. This is a synoptic ground – 
discovered or constructed by the synoptic overview. As such, we can then understand why Wall would 
be enthusiastic about the ground, and its role in landscape urbanism. For Wall, the synoptic overview, 
and especially the big synoptic overview, suddenly gives architects a view (conceptually constructed as 
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much as visually given) of the ground—being the primary instrument that connects with the ‘extension’, 
‘continuity’ and self-organisational forces of the ‘global surface’. Such an understanding of how ‘it all 
comes together on the ground’ suggests that it is on this (synoptic) ground that landscape urbanism, 
itself, ‘comes together’. A ground constructed to enable landscape urbanism. 
On first reading this ‘ground’ section of Wall’s ‘programming the urban surface’ essay I was struck that it 
was founded on a re-reading of an unacknowledged quote by Deleuze.441 However, it was not just an 
alteration of the original, it was a total mis-reading (and yes there is such a thing), resulting in an 
effective reversal of Deleuze’s meaning. For Deleuze, ‘coming together’ is not an argument for maps 
but, in a sense, an argument against maps or rather what maps tend to do by themselves. Or rather, it 
is saying that maps cannot discern self-organisational (affectual) activity just from above, as it only 
occurs where everything ‘comes together’, being wholly in ‘the middle’, that is, on the ground, in the 
middle of life. So, against the Wallian synoptic ground, inspired by Deleuze, we can oppose the 
Deleuzian self-organisational (affectual) ground. The ground is where the world does things. This is an 
affective ground and it is only here that the emergent appears and it is here that there is instrumentality. 
Wall evokes a life-enabling surface, and he no doubt recognises the self-organisational nature of life on 
the ground, yet his model and methods ‘botches’ such a recognition and evocation…and it would seem, 
the ground and life. 
It may be tempting, as a landscape architect, to consider that architects are not able to see such life on 
the ground, but architects already have a disciplined practice of life on the ground – their own particular 
on-the-ground - their own particular practice of how ‘it all comes together on the ground, and this is 
through architectural typology and program. The readily-available pre-packaged aspect of these allows 
architects to ‘remember’ the affects of an architectural act. Such a practice has powers even outside the 
partitioned and the architectural, but these tend to be powerfully narrow and/or spatially restricted and 
seem to dissipate rapidly away from the pure products of partitioning. Individual architects have a 
certain, and sometimes fabulous, precision about self-organisational affectuality outside of the 
architectural partition, as a sort of ‘extension’ or ‘folding out’ from architecture and some certainly 
beyond this. Despite this, I would suggest, architecture only tentatively ventures into the wider 
landscape continuum that Wall evokes, even if it does so confidently. 
Stan Allen’s Fields 
Stan Allen’s notions are as important to landscape urbanism as Alex Wall’s. However, much more 
explicitly than Wall, Allen foregrounds the role of infrastructure in his conceptions, through his notion of 
an ‘infrastructural practice’.442 Allen shares much with Wall. His central notion of ‘field’, for instance, has 
strong similarities to Wall’s notions of surface, ground and field.443 Allen attempts to fully embrace the 
                                            
441 Deleuze source unknown. 
442 Allen 46-57 
443 All three notions have relevant Deleuzian inspirations or corollaries. 
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idea of a ‘field’ as a self-organisational entity. A quote from Sanford Kwinter is used to set up his 
influential essay on fields, titled ‘Field Conditions’:444 
The field describes a space of propagation, of effects. It contains no matter or material points, rather 
functions, vectors and speeds. It describes local relations of difference within fields of celerity, 
transmission or of careering points, in a word, what Minkowski called the world (my emphasis) 
Allen identifies his notion of field with the urban continuum and geography, yet how he specifically 
conceives of this field seems more limited than his quotation suggests. Allen’s conception foregrounds 
what he refers to as ‘field conditions’. According to Allen, ‘these are ‘bottom-up phenomena, defined not 
by overarching geometrical schemas but by intricate local connections’. ‘Field conditions’…’disrupt the 
overall tendency of infrastructural systems to organise themselves in linear fashion’.445  
Such field conditions are envisaged as self-organisational phenomena within infrastructural fields. ‘More 
than a formal configuration, the field condition implies an architecture that admits change, accident and 
improvisation…an architecture that leaves space for the uncertainty of the real’. Like Wall, for Allen, 
‘infrastructure prepares the ground for future building and creates the conditions for future events’. So, 
for Allen, such field conditions occur when the architect ‘admits’ or ‘leaves space’ within their systems of 
infrastructure for such self-organisational activity, leaves space for the ‘real’ to occur. What initially 
appears as an embrace seems to only weakly affirm self-organisation (affect) - and also the real. This 
idea echoes weak yet common conceptions of self-organisation: that the architect creates a system that 
with good design or luck will have self-organisational moments within it, or it may come to be self-
organisational (as opposed to more traditional approaches to design which are said to be ‘only’ formal 
and ‘static’).446 
Whilst Minkowski’s models is given as a world of affects and not form, Allen’s is more like something-
like-affects as gaps in an otherwise non-affectual system. More concerning, for a landscape architect, 
should be the diminutive role that anything outside Allen’s seemingly self-enclosed form-systems plays 
in such conceptions. For such a heightened interest in the self-organisational workings of the world, 
there is very little of the open world involved in these systems. This oddity is explained if we consider 
the actual examples of ‘fields’ that he draws upon. These begin with 2-dimensional examples of graphic 
fields and progress through to 3-dimensional collectives of atomistic entities: flocks, swarms and 
crowds. His discussion of Cordoba Mosque, utilising Raphael Moneo’s fabulous analysis of the 
typological structure of this mosque, is presented as the most representative inspiration or model for his 
‘urbanism for the open-ended networks’ of the modern city, championed in his influential book, Points 
and Lines.447 This analysis identified a unit typological (or programmatic) structure in this mosque where 
each unit involves the interaction of local relations – and when repeated across a field (being the 
Mosque) maintain their functioning as units, without the need for a greater imposed order (parts without 
wholes), and together this constitutes the functioning integrity of the mosque, an integrity that 
                                            
444 Allen 90-103 
445 Allen 55 
446 Another weak conception of self-organisation is that organic nature, ecology, represents the true realm of self-
organisation.  
447 Allen, Points + Lines : Diagrams and Projects for the City. 
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‘continues’ (Moneo) even when the mosque has, according to other commentators been ‘destroyed’ 
through enlarging this field.  
So, whilst there is no doubting the value of Moneo’s analysis and Allen’s interpretation of it in terms of a 
field, Allen’s conception of field only very weakly relates to the urban-geographical open-ended network-
field. Whilst he evokes open-endedness it appears that his attention, through his use of examples and 
projects is almost wholly limited to single buildings or field-like or ‘matt’ buildings (as he refers to them) 
or urban sites transformed into extensive field-like buildings or site-building-distributions. Whilst the 
medium of infrastructure is, according to Allen, geography, he makes a very tentative entry into this 
geography—by being partitioned from it. He affirms nothing else. The self-organisation (affect) of a 
building is taken for the self-organisation (affect) of the city. Once this is realised the heterogeneous 
nature of cities and geographies as self-organisational (affectual?) fields suddenly distinguish 
themselves from the fields that Allen assumes. They may be both self-organisational (affectual) entities, 
but they are entirely different problems. Once we notice this slippage from building to city, it becomes 
clearer why the rest of the world is given little attention in his analysis of fields, it is effectively partitioned 
off from the projects. Such an emphasis could no doubt produce valuable urbanism but it fails to 
embrace the openness that he evokes. 
Infrastructure Constructs the Site 
Allen works hard to establish just how instrumental infrastructure is. In the concluding section of his 
manifesto-chapter on infrastructure, ‘Infrastructural Urbanism’, in the same book, he presents seven 
propositions, which may count as the first serious attempt to come to conceptualise the design potential 
of infrastructure. The first proposition begins - ‘infrastructure…constructs the site itself. Infrastructure 
prepares the ground for future building and creates the conditions for future events.’ It ends with 
‘infrastructure’s medium is geography’.448 Thus, in one paragraph reconceptualising both what 
infrastructure can do and the scope of operation of infrastructure and linking these together in a highly 
suggestive manner. However, such value and scope are undermined from within. 
Next to this proposition and given equal importance in the layout is an image of Carquinez Bridge 
Approach, Crockett, California, 1958’. It is a view of the approach section of this bridge taken from 
around 300m in the air accentuating the bridge and its sinuous form. Most importantly it seems chosen 
to accentuate some of the visual effects of the bridge – the cutting into a hill, the division of upper area 
from lower, the division of the geography, the altered connectability to surrounding settlement... The 
way the bridge is imaged seems to be chosen to affirm the first proposition by graphically showing the 
effects of infrastructure on the landscape. A quick reading of the page might easily process the image 
this way. However, the image can be used to affirm exactly the opposite: that the landscape is an active 
player in the image - and in the intervention that involves the siting of the bridge. The reason why the 
bridge is affectual as an image is because of the interplay of the bridge with the rest of the landscape. 
This is, I would argue, why the image was actually (unconsciously) chosen. A quick search on Google 
                                            
448 Ibid. 54. 
an affirmative open systems conception of how to design landscape  Connolly, Peter  
177 
 
brings up views of this (highly photographed) bridge which place even more emphasis on the rest of the 
landscape and its own differences, in the interaction.449  
The notion that ‘infrastructure constructs the site’ is a version of the common, attractive and important 
architectural notion that ‘architecture constructs the site’. The idea that ‘architecture constructs the site’ 
is a recognition of how the specifics of an architectural intervention (or any intervention) actualise 
specific and singular dimensions of the ‘site’.450 However, it also has a tendency to be taken to mean 
that architecture is what determines the site or that, more importantly for us, that the differences of the 
site are of little importance or the site (and land, geography, ecology…) is not an active player in such 
an intervention.451 This involves another illicit slippage. As Meyer says, ‘the landscape does not sit silent 
awaiting the arrival of the architectural subject. The site speaks prior to the act of design.’452 ‘As such’, 
she continues, ‘the intersection of geometry and geomorphology, of past site and present project, 
requires a dialogue between the site as a speaking figure and the design intervention relative to the 
site’. For Meyer this requires a systems aesthetic and not an object aesthetic. It looks at the 
relationships between things, not the things themselves’.453 A cursory look at the image, even from the 
great distance of the photograph, invites speculation about the various dimensions of relations and 
orders of difference to be found beyond that of the bridge itself – in the landscape and between the 
landscape and the bridge.454 Though Meyer’s notion of ‘speaking’ tends to be limited by an analysis that 
aims for the development of a specifically landscape architectural formality and spatiality, it highlights 
the limits of Allen’s notion that ‘infrastructure constructs the site’. The same could be said for the 
landscape, self-organisationally (affectually). It might be that the landscape architect, James Corner, 
also has troubles with the landscape. 
James Corner’s ‘Mapping’ 
‘The near-seers have a simple spyglass. In the abyss, they see the outline of gigantic cells, great 
binary divisions, dichotomies, well-defined segments of the type “classroom, barracks, low-income 
housing project, or even countryside seen from an airplane” They see branches, chains, rows, 
columns, dominoes, striae…Then they bring out the terrible Ray Telescope. It is used not to see 
with but to cut with, to cut out shapes…. The cutting telescope overcodes everything; it acts on flesh 
                                            
449 http://home.comcast.net/~c-bridge/topofbridge.htm Internet road maps show that the site for this bridge is 
effectively ‘chosen’ by the geography (limited opportunities for it to be elsewhere) and the 360 degree view on this 
web-site suggests that the siting of the bridge is very much a negotiation between the site conditions and the 
desired bridge location. That there have been four bridges on this site (one later than this one) emphasises the 
geographical assemblage that this particular bridge answers to, an assemblage that the particular site conditions 
are an inflexion within. 
450 Or sometimes as previously discussed provide little more than a foil to focus attention on the (architectural) 
intervention itself. This move has the same ‘structure’ as program being the pretext for form, as already 
discussed. 
451 There is no reason to identify infrastructure more with architecture than landscape architecture. 
452 Meyer, "Landscape Architecture as Modern Other and Postmodern Ground." 31. 
453 Ibid. 32. 
454 Of course, the image that the architect provides limits our ability to speculate on the sorts of interactions that 
might be involved. 
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and blood, but itself is nothing but pure geometry, as a State affair, and the near-seers’ physics in 
the service of that machine’.  Deleuze and Guattari455 
James Corner, arguably the most influential landscape architect in landscape urbanist discourse, also 
evokes self-organisation and gives explicit attention to the ‘ground’, ‘middle’ and, in other ways, the 
open continuum evoked by Wall. It might be expected that, being a landscape architect, he is able to 
more fully affirm the nature of openness - this self-organisational (affectual) continuum. The primary tool 
he employs in his 1999 essay, The Agency of Mapping: Speculation, Critique and Invention, is his 
notion of ‘mapping’, borrowing, with some difference, from Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of ‘mapping’.456 
In this essay, like Deleueze and Guattari, Corner constructs a distinction between two types of mapping: 
mapping as ‘what is’ (‘tracing’), and mapping as ‘equal to what is and what is not yet’ (‘mapping’). ‘The 
‘unfolding agency of mapping is most effective when its capacity for description also sets the conditions 
for new eidetic and physical worlds to emerge’.457 Tracings ‘propagate redundancies’ and ‘mappings 
discover new worlds’.458 In the ‘fantastic cultural project’ of mapping invoked by Corner ‘the capacity to 
reformulate what already exists is the most important step’.  
The notion of mapping he evokes, like Deleuze and Guattari, is distinctly self-organisational and the 
potential of his mapping relies upon how it engages with the self-organisational. With his model he 
claims to be able to explore ‘more than just the physical attributes of terrain (topography, rivers, roads, 
buildings)459—more than just the ‘tracings’ of normal mapping which record ‘only the surface expression 
of a complex and dynamic imbroglio of social and natural processes’ (my emphases).460 Mapping, in his 
sense of the word, aims to visualise ‘these interrelationships and interactions’ and as such ‘participate in 
any future unfoldings’ (my emphases). In such an unfolding he asserts that the self-organisational realm 
is beyond traditional approaches to the landscape and cities. Visualising these interrelationships is the 
royal road to avoiding the scenographic tendencies of traditional practices of landscape architecture, 
urban design and mapping.461 ‘Ideas about spatiality are moving away from physical objects and forms 
towards the variety of territorial, political and psychological and social processes that flow through 
space. The interrelationships amongst things in space, as well as the effects (my emphases) that are 
                                            
455 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. 200. 
456 ‘Make a map not a tracing’, quoted in Corner, "The Agency of Mapping: Speculation, Critique and Invention.", 
taken from Deleuze and Guattari, 13. For Corner mapping is about making maps, using one big map, thus taking 
the original authors literally. For Deleuze and Guattari, instead, mapping is a process, a technique where 
technique and aesthetic connection are co-joined on a ‘plane of consistency’. ‘Mapping’, for Deleuze and Guattari, 
is the exploration of the ‘plane of consistency’, which may be explored in a map or in any creative process. As I 
have tried to illustrate in this essay, the single map by itself tends not to connect to such ‘consistency’, being a 
‘plane’ of investigation of self-organisational affect as it tends to be detached from the Deleuzian ‘middle’. Please 
also refer to the discussion of Corner’s notion of the eidetic from Assemblage 1. 
457 Corner ibid. 214. 
458 Ibid. 214. 
459 This is an under-characterisation of traditional mapping. 
460 Corner, "The Agency of Mapping: Speculation, Critique and Invention." 241. 
461 In this essay Corner suggests that the map is the royal road to avoiding the scenographic tendencies of 
representations. If the big map tends away from the interactions of the middle, as I claim, then Corner is unable to 
maintain such a privilege for the map. For an account of the history, workings and affects of the scenographic 
refer to Jay, Martin, Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought  (Berkeley: 
University of California, 1994). 
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produced through such dynamic interactions, are becoming of greater significance for intervening in 
urban landscapes than the solely compositional arrangements of objects and surfaces’.462  
Central to his notion of mapping, and unlike, say, Wall, is his affirmation of the affectivity of 
representations. A good deal of his essay concentrates on what representations, and more specifically 
what large maps, can ‘do’. He roundly asserts their synoptically instrumental power, which flows not 
only from ‘their vantage point but also because they present all parts at once, with an immediacy 
unavailable to the grounded individual’.463 Unlike Wall, he is wary that this synoptic power is a double-
edged sword and that there is a strong tendency of maps to overlook life on the ground: where ‘sites are 
treated as blank areas (tabulae rasae) or as simple geometric figures to be manipulated from high 
above’. ‘The synoptic masterplan governs while mapping…’ In this he champions the ground in a very 
different manner than Wall. For Corner, the importance of ‘life’ on the ground is central to his ambitious 
project, and central to avoiding the results similar to that of the ‘countless examples of authoritarian, 
simplistic, erroneous and coercive acts of mapping, with reductive effects upon both individuals and 
environments’, which result from ‘agendas of imperialist technocracy and control’.464 More precisely for 
this investigation, connecting to life on the ground might allow Corner to employ the instrumentality of 
mapping and the landscape whilst avoiding the instrumentalism normally associated with maps and 
synoptic overviews.  
He presents a method that he claims can avoid such tendencies. Toward this his method targets the 
‘various hidden forces that underlie the workings of a given place’. Such hidden forces include: natural 
processes (wind and sun), historical events and local stories, economic and legislative conditions, 
political interests, regulatory mechanisms and programmatic structures. To engage with such hidden 
forces as they occur ‘on the ground’ his method involves the selection and isolation of what he refers to 
as ‘extracts’. More specifically these are ‘things that are observed within a given milieu and drawn onto 
the graphic field’ (my emphasis). With such extracts he claims to explore the hidden forces of a given 
place, by ‘visualising the complex and dynamic imbroglio’ that make up the place. 
On closer inspection, his method seems mostly limited to extracting things that can be made 
observable. In terms of his extracts, the ‘hiddenness’, he cites, comes in a number of forms, including: 
1. things that are effectively visually hidden, or just out of view of the normal map, and which can be 
made visible, through the use of, say, shadows to communicate things which would otherwise not be 
visible; 2. making graphic the path and/or the numerical intensity of the path of something bodily moving 
or the path of something ‘moving’ which is not an object, but information, capital etc.; 3. making graphic 
that which is spatialised yet tending to be excluded from normal maps, such as governances and 
political interests; 4. making graphic reference to, and identifying the location or spatial reference of 
stories and histories etc.; 5, geo-spatial data, etc. Hence, hiddenness seems to mean things that are 
just out of the visibility of a normal map and those that can be made visible or spatialisable in a map but 
not in ways available to or tending to be included in traditional mapping. Hiddenness as the-things-that-
so-far-have-not-been-made-visible-in-maps.  
                                            
462 Corner, "The Agency of Mapping: Speculation, Critique and Invention." 227.  
463 Ibid. 225. 
464 Ibid. 213. 
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Here there is a serious slippage from the self-organisational effects (affects?), the ‘hidden forces’ he 
invokes, to this form of hiddenness. Corner (1999) confuses the what-can-be-made-visible with the self-
organisationally-affectual. The immediate impression given is that Corner seems to assume that by 
visualising what has hitherto not been made visible that he is visualising such affects(?) themselves. 
Such an understanding can be dismissed immediately—as in contrast to the so-far-invisible which may 
be able to be made visible, the self-organisationally affectual can never be graphically represented, 
being ‘imperceptible’465 rather than hidden. What does this mean? 
To gain some way of seeing what imperceptibility is and that it is incommensurably different to 
‘hiddenness’, it is convenient to consider, for instance, movement. Corner (1999) and landscape 
urbanism in general place a great emphasis on movement and this is manifest in a variety of ways. 
Movement is commonly associated with self-organisation. An emphasis on movement is seen as being 
about ‘temporality’ not ‘spatiality’ and beyond mere ‘static’ objects and form. Corner’s hiddenness 
includes the notation of moving bodies of various sorts (physical bodies, data, capital…). However to 
‘really move’, as Constantin Boundas says (after Deleuze and Guattari), ‘is not to go through a trajectory 
which can be decomposed and recomposed in quantitative terms’. Movement, real movement, is central 
to Deleuze (and Guattari) but is betrayed if is reconstituted on the basis of instants’. It is not itself 
notatable. Notation requires a separation between the moving and what it is moving in or through, 
everything else. Instead ‘real movement’, to really move, ‘is to become other than itself, in a sense that 
makes movement a qualitative change’. ‘Movement affects both space and the bodies moving through 
it’, together. Real movement is more like a tendency, a propensity, an affect.466 Tendencies cannot in 
themselves be represented. They are imperceptible. Which means that they escape normal perception 
as they occur, not so much ‘out there’ or ‘in there’ as an effect, but instead ‘happen to the world’. So, 
Corner’s or any other visualising is not in itself able to graphically re-present affects.467 Another 
possibility is that such visualising is a visualising of the ‘interrelationships and interactions’ relevant to 
self-organisational affects. Despite his stated intentions, Corner does not affirm that this is what he 
means.  
Before returning to this let us first consider Corner’s most explicit discussion of the ways that mapping in 
his sense might avoid the propensity of maps to disconnect from life on the ground. In the last section of 
his mapping essay, he refers to a number of examples of mappings from designers and artists. The 
function of the four thematics that these are grouped under (‘drift’, ‘layering’, ‘game-board’ and 
‘rhizome’) is largely to explore ways to connect to ‘life’ on the ground. However, despite their suggestive 
contributions to the mapping project, Corner chooses to try to avoid this propensity largely from within 
the system of a (single) map. The two or three examples he refers to that seem to move beyond just the 
                                            
465 The imperceptible, a Deleuzian term, refers to the workings of intensity, but just as well can be used for the 
workings of affect. 
466 Boundas, Constantin V., "Deleuze-Bergson: An Ontology of the Virtual," in Delueze: A Critical Reader, ed. 
Patton, Paul (Canbridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell, 1996). 82-84 
467 This has radical and unaffirmed consequences for representation: a repertoire of graphic representations has 
limited ability to express affect, but it has a powerful ability to abstract out a set of relations relevant to affect. To 
really bring such representations to life also requires the expression of affect, which will come from graphic and 
text-based representations functioning together. To some this would break the current design wisdom that ‘you 
should be able to see it’. 
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single map remain in the end inattentive to how to connect to what happens on the ground.468 All of 
these ‘life-on-the-ground strategies’ tend to suffer what I have termed elsewhere the ‘referential fallacy’, 
registering merely some relation to the particular forces on the ground, only a registration of ‘life’ on the 
ground and not some relation to self-organisational (affectual) movement. Such strategies are important 
as an affirmation that a multiplicity of realms of life on the ground seem to escape traditional mapping. 
However, such strategies seem to remain at the level of ‘surface expression’, unable to affirm how much 
or little they are departing from it, unable to affirm how they connect with the affectual, instrumental and 
self-organisational dimensions evoked. His model, it seems, struggles to affirm a connection, largely 
because the radical privilege he gives to the big map comes with an inattention to the propensities of 
the big map, by itself, to not facilitate, or defer from, a connection to self-organisational affect.  
In the important project of affirming the affectivity of representations that Corner really opens up for 
landscape architecture and landscape urbanism, it is worth considering such propensities, aside from 
Corner, in a little detail. First, and most obviously, the big map gets you to see synoptically observable 
‘things’. Their initial availability to the mapper, that which they tend to construct their maps from tends to 
be pre-objectified in available synoptic readings of the land (available maps, aerial photographs etc.).469  
Second - and to take us straight to the crux of the problem - the synoptic big map tends to get you to 
seriously defer from ‘seeing’ from within ‘the middle’ – the Deleuzian/Guattarian middle. The synoptic 
middle gets you to defer from the real middle. It gets you to defer from perceiving self-organisational 
affects, as you cannot really perceive, or be open to, the tendencies of the middle, the affects of open 
systems, from way above the middle, from the map.470 Such affects are not only imperceptible, for being 
in the middle - they are also foreign to the expectations of the partitioned, for being in openness.  
Therefore they tend not to be what architecturally-inclined landscape urbanism expects – the middle of 
openness. Doubly foreign. Anything produced just from within the map will likely have an ambiguous 
self-organisational (affectual) status.471 
                                            
468 The examples of the ‘mapping’ Corner refers to are valuable in suggesting the possible realms that may be 
engaged in. In regards to self-organisational connection three of the examples are suggestive. The examples 
from Richard Long and the Situationists, however, only really make a registration of life on the ground, and in 
themselves are not yet, and they potentially could be, in a form suitable for such connection with the middle. The 
Bunschoten example is less clear-cut, as Corner refers to (proto-urban) ‘conditions’ – a term which suggests 
something more than just a registration. These mappings seem to be a drawing together on one surface over-
lapping versions of the complex situation for the purposes of negotiation or interactive political ‘gaming’. Yet 
despite suggestions that are made, the portrayal of this example is inattentive to the importance of the 
identification of specific conditions contributing, or relevant, to each of the various versions of the ‘situation’. 
469 Deleuze and Guattari do say that the ‘tracings’ must be put back onto the map, suggesting the potential to re-
enliven what has been disconnected. 
470 Such synoptic views of the middle involve ‘remembrance’ of such affects and such retrospective vision is 
particularly limited in its ability to connect to self-organisational affects, partly as remembrance tends to generality, 
especially in ‘openness’. ‘Seeing’ affects in the openness of the middle is foreign enough to traditional practices, 
without trying to see them from 30,000 feet. Corner also does not affirm the identification of the affectual ‘on the 
ground’. It might also be added that ‘remembrance’ of affects rapidly diminishes with increases in scale. Before 
the term ‘self-organisation’ became commonplace over a decade ago I had a ‘rule of thumb’ idea that speculating 
on life on the ground became a very precarious affair once the plan scale moved beyond about 1:200 (an idea of 
life which now appears very vague). 
471 Whilst this investigation has concentrated on one essay by James Corner for the sake of focus, and with 
whatever limitations accompanies such a selection, a reference to one question asked by an audience member of 
James Corner after a (very stimulating) lecture of his at the Edge.Co Conference hosted by UNITEC in Auckland 
in 1998, is also relevant here. The audience member asked, after a fascinating series of maps and aerial imagery 
relating to one project in Copenhagen, ‘How do we know you are dealing with the topography (whilst using a big 
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Third, the big map also therefore gets you to strongly defer from being able to speculate upon or identify 
the interaction of the relevant local relations, the ‘intricate local connectivity’ (Allen) of the ‘middle’ 
relevant to the production of the ‘bottom-up phenomena’ that are the self-organisational affects of 
openness. It gets you to defer from what understanding what produces such affects. It is the ‘intricate 
local connectivity’ that (to re-use Deleuze and Guattari) ‘integrates the world’. The various processes of 
life connect to life through this local connectivity, which is nothing like Allen’s local connectivity, being in 
openness. For Deleuze and Guattari the ‘machinic is precisely’ the ‘synthesis of heterogeneities as 
such.’472 Nature or self-organisation (affect) uses whatever it likes from cities, landscapes, geographies, 
natures, ecologies and life in a manner that is much more heterogenous than the partitioned has ever 
assumed and very different from what landscape architects assume. The identification of these relations 
and their interactions is a very limited affair from within the big plan.  
Fourth, and flowing directly from the previous point, the synoptic view therefore also gets you to strongly 
defer from the production of representations suited to such local connectivity.  
With such anonymous propensities it may be that Corner’s ambition is beyond his method. His 
visualisations of ‘hiddenness’, his extracts, cannot therefore be affirmed as self-organisational affects - 
or even as the ‘interrelations and interactions’ relevant to the production of affects without engaging in 
the middle-proper. However, his method involves more than extracts. For Corner, borrowing again from 
Deleuze and Guattari, what also separates mapping from tracing is a ‘selectivity’ in the drawing of the 
extracts into the ‘graphic field’.473 For the original authors, however, such a selectivity may be informed 
by synoptic speculation, but is made from within the middle, in relation to the middle, and (at least 
speculated to be) in relation to affects that can only be connected with in the middle.474 Such selectivity, 
in Corner’s case, probably therefore remains a synoptic selectivity without being driven by at least an 
entry connection made from within the middle.475  
Also, to rightly extend selectivity, as the synoptic selectivity of extracts is only one of an infinity of 
selectivities, would mean extending selectivity way beyond just the extracts taken up into the big plan. 
Selectivity would extend at least to the choice of the forms and construction-style of whatever forms of 
representation might be useful for connecting to affects in the middle. It is odd therefore that he appears 
to restrict himself to one big map – though there is no doubting that such a restriction has allowed him to 
‘push’ maps further than anyone previously. He therefore makes a great contribution to such a 
selectivity through his exploration of how to construct a map and moves toward, but fails to affirm, ways 
to connect to the middle - and therefore in turn fails to affirm what a map itself might do. 
It may be, despite these issues, that Corner has other suggestions of ways to affirm connection. 
Following the first step of his method, undiscussed here, of the ‘creation of a field’, where he is 
                                                                                                                                          
plan)?’ To this Corner, polemically, answered ‘how do you know I am not? Thus drawing attention to ‘synoptic 
ambiguity’ – an ambiguity that results from the synoptic not being in itself able to affirm how it connects to the 
ground. 
472 Corner, "The Agency of Mapping: Speculation, Critique and Invention." 330. 
473 Ibid. 4. 
474 Ibid. 23. 
475 Partly as Corner does not affirm where such selectivity comes from, many interpret selectivity per se as being 
worthy just by itself. 
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groundbreaking,476 and the second of the selection of ‘extracts’, he proposes ‘plotting’ as the final step. 
‘Plotting’ entails the ‘drawing out’ of new and latent relationships that can be seen amongst the various 
extracts within the field’ (my emphasis).477 As he says there are an ‘infinite number of relationships that 
can be drawn depending upon one’s criteria or agenda’. ‘Plotting’, is not about a selectivity of ‘things’. It 
involves a selectivity of relationships, for instance, selecting all south-facing aspects in sequential order 
from largest to smallest. Corner is highly suggestive about the ability to discover connections that could 
not be made on the ground and how to set up such connection-making. He champions a ‘strategic and 
imaginative drawing out of relational structures’ – and it might be assumed that such ‘latent 
relationships’ and ‘relational structures’ refer to those relationships relevant to self-organisational 
affects, however, Corner’s emphasis is less on a connection to relations relevant to self-organisational 
affects than on affirming the ability to identifying all manner of relationships not previously identified in 
maps. His interest is creatively elsewhere – and anyway such a selectivity is carried out entirely from 
within the synoptic overview. 
Hence, if Corner’s selection of extracts (things) and the procedure of plotting (relations) has also 
isolated them from what enlivens them or been inattentive to what enlivens them, then it is difficult to 
see how discoveries and connections made in the synoptic plane could be fully affirmed self-
organisational-affectual discoveries. The discoveries and connections of plotting would tend toward 
being purely synoptic connections or be limited to the connections that can be made (‘remembered’)478 
after disconnecting (‘latent’ relationships): synoptic connections taken as self-organisational (affectual) 
connections. The synoptic middle - and Corner follows the same misunderstanding as Wall479 here - 
taken as the Deleuze/Guattarian middle. Such connections would struggle to reconnect what has been 
disconnected. Like Wall, and despite the important recognition of self-organisation and the great 
promise of mapping, Corner fails to affirm a way of dealing with the ground.  
So, and in relation to landscape urbanism, the privilege given to the big map gets you to defer from the 
local connections that would be relevant to connecting ‘organisation’ and self-organisation (affect) - 
deferring from the relations that would bring organisation to life and produce organisation in terms of life. 
In doing so, what should be a strong affectual connection-making between the ground and the synoptic 
gets overrun by what the synoptic tends to do. To see this slightly differently, ‘organisation’ and ‘self-
organisation’ (affect) may be regarded as two inseparable and entwined components of space.480 The 
synoptic plan, however, treats each very differently. The big plan, especially by itself, has the propensity 
                                            
476 That is, Corner’s attention to the conventions of mapping is exemplary. 
477 Corner, "The Agency of Mapping: Speculation, Critique and Invention." 230. 
478 There is certainly a discipline to seeing self-organization synoptically but such powers are limited, haphazard 
and tend to generality and the presumed by themselves, especially with those who have never taken seriously a 
discipline of the real world that would allow them to ‘remember’ what happens on the ground. Landscape 
architectural education gives very little attention to what happens on the ground. Could an architect imagine the 
lack of discipline involved if they could not reference typologies or program? 
479 Corner, "The Agency of Mapping: Speculation, Critique and Invention." 244-245 Here Corner distinctly privileges 
the synoptic plane, using ‘one fully inclusive, non-hierarchical, non-differentiated surface’, as the place from which 
to connect to a middle, where middle seems to be simply equated with what is revealed in this plane – a synoptic 
middle. I am with Corner in his ambition to be working with the middle in the map, for the map to become-middle, 
but such a connection must be constructed, not presumed. Corner champions emergence in representation, yet 
the synoptic plane or the great privilege given to the synoptic plane would likely result in not embracing such an 
emergence. 
480 Refer to later footnote discussing Elizabeth Grosz’s idea of Deleuze and Guattari’s two components of space. 
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for powerful organisational developments and yet simultaneously radically defers from self-
organisational (affectual) developments, in a manner where there is a very great tendency to the 
organisational and away from the self-organisational (affectual). The imperatives and obsessiveness of 
organisation connect to the fascination and enthusiasm for the big plan in a manner that really should 
register that the synoptic is less a view than an affect itself—the ‘synoptic affect’. Rather than getting 
you to ‘remember’, it gets you to ‘forget’ - and this is not just an ‘overlooking’ as Andrea Kahn would 
have it, but is more like a vacuum, sucking you away from what happens on the ground as though it did 
not exist, despite the best of intentions.481 
Overall, the big plan has the propensity to not make a connection between the synoptic and the ground. 
Synoptically selected extracts tend to not make a connection and Corner’s life-on-the-ground-strategies, 
whilst suggesting great possibilities from within the middle remain inattentive to the middle by lack of 
affirmation of the connectivity, affectivity and life of the middle and how the connection between the 
ground and the sky might be made. It should be stressed that the ‘capacity for reformulation’ therefore 
strongly tends to be a one-dimensional organisational capacity. 
The above account does underplay Corner’s stress on selectivity. For Corner, selectivity is not just 
creative, it is motivated - and he suggests that it is based upon ‘interests’ and ‘agendas’. This twinning 
of interests/agendas and selectivity is central to the importance of Corner and highlights at least: his 
attentiveness to the processes of the world, the necessity that abstractions be driven by interests (such 
as liberating life) and, the level of ambition he injects into landscape architecture – all of which are 
important. However, if such selectivity only selects synoptically, or only weakly embraces anything else, 
then Corner would tend to fail to affirm such interests and agendas. His mapping, despite the ambitions, 
would then tend to be unworthy of these interests and agendas. This means that such selectivity would 
fail to clearly and seriously separate itself from the selectivity, the ‘tracing’, of traditional map-making, in 
the spirit of the way Corner would like it to.482 
Deleuze and Guattari are far stronger on affirming where such selectivity comes from. Self-
organisational material is not just affective and instrumental material, it is also, simultaneously, to use 
my term, ‘regulative’ (or aesthetic) material, which directs and steers the discovery, investigation and 
development of such affective material. What guides or regulates the selectivity, in a sense, therefore 
comes from the affectual itself, from the self-organisational affects of openness, the landscape and the 
situation itself. Whilst the situation may involve the big confrontations with urbanisation and the global, 
such confrontations remain abstract and general and not in a form connectable to design unless they 
are connected to the middle. Such confrontations may be sensed by the designer abstractly - yet, in 
openness it is only through the intricacy of local connections that selectivity connects in terms of such 
greater forces – as such forces cannot be explored in some non-existent abstract and separate global 
realm, but only within and through the intricacy of the middle.  
                                            
481 In design studio teaching valuable explorations of self-organisational affects in the field seem to become 
instantly irrelevant at the moment when the student moves to the big plan. Negotiating between the two, being not 
readily available to each other, requires its own discipline. 
482 Especially if we accept the Deleuzian version of this distinction. See the earlier footnote on this distinction. 
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Also, it is often interpreted, from Corner’s essay, that it is the designer who is the creative source of 
selectivity, and that this ‘participation’ is what separates mapping from the more institutionalised tracing. 
Such an interpretation is to be supported if participation is understood. The designer’s creativity only 
really comes from a selectivity that connects with the world.483 The world and the selectivity provoke and 
select and move toward each other, through their forward-moving connection. This is counter to more 
conventional notions where creativity flows just from the designer or just because they have exercised 
choices and judgements. The creativity of the designer, instead, comes from the difference of their 
connectivity with the world, and it is this difference that facilitates ‘transversal’ acts that seem to become 
‘light’ and depart from the world, from within the world, if the designer is able to open onto such genius. 
As Deleuze and Guattari say, ‘it is only in the middle that things pick up speed’, and such lightness may 
only begin to be constructed from within the middle as such lightness may only be perceived in the 
middle. This is what is termed ‘immanence’ – where newness only comes from within the middle, 
working within the middle. Immanence confounds old assumptions of the division between the existing 
and the new.484 Claramunt and Mosbach, as discussed in Assemblage 1, provide just such a model of 
landscape design immanence. Reformulation really aims for the lightness that may only be constructed 
from within the middle, and the propensities of the synoptic plane tend to obscure, by not connecting to, 
such lightness. 
Manuel De Landa’s Theory of Divergent Actualisation: His Influential Conception of Deleuze’s 
Open Systems Ideas and the Relation to Digital Design Processes 
At this point it is worth touching on what is in the open systems-oriented discourse of the design of 
landscape a very influential interpretation of Deleuze’s open systems ideas, as found in Difference and 
Repetition, and to a lesser degree, Deleuze and Guattari’s, A Thousand Plateaus. Specifically, I am 
referring to the ideas of Manuel De Landa.  
This discussion should really be compared to James Williams’ version of Difference and Repetition (and 
the ideas of other commentators such as Smith and Rolli), which I have discussed in the Appendix, and 
which will be discussed in the conclusion of this section. Williams provides a very different notion of 
Deleuze’s theory of open systems than the very much more influential version for the environmental 
design fields, championed by De Landa. De Landa’s ideas are not design ideas but present a theory of 
open systems that for many is very amenable to design and digital design in particular.485 It is certainly 
relevant to some key open systems oriented landscape design assemblages. 
                                            
483 ‘Participation’ really means being machinically connected to the world, to representations, to whatever might be 
useful – and the middle brings all of these to life, if you are able to connect to it - as though they were one 
material, one assemblage. It is from such participation that one has the privilege of being able to act in terms of 
such life and creatively ‘across’ such life. 
484 Deleuze and Guattari 266-267 For Deleuze and Guattari here the ‘plane of immanence’ is the ‘plane of 
Nature’…’the plane of proliferation’…’where there is only relations of movement’. 
485 The problems with the use of De Landa which I attempt to outline in this section point to a problem with the way 
that designer’s use theory. Current wisdom asserts that ‘using’ theory is problematic in design, usually being more 
about providing a spurious authority to the work and deferring from what design itself is actually doing. With this 
goes the idea that if theory is to be used it can be used in whatever ways designers find productive. I agree with 
these ideas but also assert, as my field studies have drawn out, that theory can be useful and can propel design 
in ways that just design cannot do. The notion of landscape affect and expression, for instance, whilst as central 
as they are obscured in design practice, would not see the light of day if the anti-all-theory view got its way. The 
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In his Deleuze and the Open Ended Becoming of the World,486 chosen for examination here for its 
directness and influence (and that it is representative of a number of De Landa’s essays that are 
influential in this discourse), De Landa says that his task is to ‘make a case for what we may call 
Deleuze’s “neo-realist” approach, an approach involving a theory of the genesis of form that does away 
with essences, as well as a theory of epistemology that does not rely on a view of truth as a faithful 
reflection of a static world of beings’.487 De Landa’s conception of Deleuze’s ideas are important for the 
emerging area of digital design. De Landa’s conception of Deleuze’s ideas are centrally important for 
digital design in architecture and in landscape architecture, firstly as these ideas directly influence how 
the landscape is being thought of and how it is designed digitally. I would strongly suggest that De 
Landa’s ideas are best seen as representative of the thinking of the digital designing of landscape or 
more accurately imply a design assemblage that more or less equates to the contemporary design 
assemblage and its positive and negative tendencies. 
Open systems-oriented Digital Design: what is at stake? 
Before directly discussing De Landa I will also touch on a discussion, or event, in architectural discourse 
that may not map directly onto landscape architecture but some of it is directly relevant to landscape 
architecture. The event touched on is from architectural discourse and is chosen as there is a quantity 
and richness of the discussion that is unavailable (or at the least much less readily available) in 
landscape architectural discourse. Also, the apparent lack of landscape architectural discourse in this 
area might also reflect that for many the architectural discourse on the matter is the major site of the 
discourse on digital design of the landscape.  
The event can be sensed in an essay by Helene Frichot, ‘On the Death of Architectural Theory and 
Other Spectres’, an essay preoccupied with the current ‘anti-theory’ phase in the discourse, most 
directly associated with what is discussed and championed as ‘post-critical’ practice and particularly 
oriented around ‘digital design’. Frichot is not alone in her criticism and feeling about the rise of this new 
‘pragmatism’ and associated deferral from ‘theory’ and I take her essay as signaling what is at stake for 
both ‘sides’, even if we only get Frichot’s version of the situation. Frichot says: 
Digital design presents us with algorithmic or rule-based procedures, parametric modelling, that lets 
the software run and produce innumerable solutions to design problems, the only issue being, which 
formal solution to pick from the rest.  
She discusses the formal iterations involved in Greg Lynn’s Embryological House, ‘which is less a 
house than a system articulating strategies that respond to issues of customisation, variation, flexible 
manufacture, assembly, and site specificity’, and quotes Lynn in saying that ‘there is no ideal or original 
Embryological House, as every instance is perfect in its mutations.” The Embryological House is not one 
                                                                                                                                          
uptake of De Landa’s notions also highlight to this author that the way that theory gets ‘used’ tends to relate to 
design-palatable theories, ones that a designer can immediately apply. Design-discourse and designers have 
their own machinery of use of theory which needs serious questioning, a machinery which attracts designers to 
certain theories and gets them to ‘use’ them in certain ways and defers attention away from other less-
operationaliseable theories and uses of theory. 
486 De Landa, Manuel, "Deleuze and the Open-Ended Becoming of the World,"  
http://www.cddc.vt.edu/host/delanda/. 
487 Ibid.  
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singular and fixed form, but an open system that allows for an unending series of formal permutations. 
Having tested six permutations of the ever-deforming house he says, “I love them all equally as if they 
were my children.488 
Such approaches are related to notions of self-organisation: 
‘The paradigm shift toward a ‘post-critical’ mode of engagement for architecture devolves the 
importance of the authorial intent of the designer-creator in favour of ‘bottom-up’ or self-organising 
systems…’489 
In the same essay, Frichot quotes Reinhold Martin, ‘another American architect and theorist’, who 
‘weighs in against the ‘post-critical’ players and asks by what criteria they hope their work will be judged, 
“beyond mere acceptance and accommodation of existing societal, economic, or cultural norms”, that is, 
beyond habit, opinion and cliché.’490 
So, the event involves reference to certain conceptions and associated practices of digital designing 
that are obviously very preoccupying and offer liberation and yet-to-be-explored-potential associated 
with the digital ability to produce an infinite array of permutations of architectural form. Such practices 
are associated with an emphasis on open systems and that this seems to be particularly associated with 
a conception of ‘open systems’ ‘in’ the computer. For authors such as Frichot and Martin the question of 
how to evaluate the products of such digital form generation points to key issues in this range of 
practices. This situation will be returned to after discussing De Landa’s conception of Deleuze’s ideas. 
De Landa’s Version Of Deleuze 
De Landa is critical of ‘social constructivist’ thinking, and it might be thought that he is targeting what, 
say, Brian Massumi might term ‘1990’s constructivism’.491 However, his target is wider, probably best 
summarised by his embrace of a ‘mind-independent’ world, which he says does not mean 
correspondence notions of truth or essentialism, but he certainly foregrounds or favours ‘objectivity’ in a 
scientific sense. Whilst acknowledging that social entities cannot be studied independent of minds he 
asserts the ‘conception-independence’ of social entities over conceptions of them. His conception of 
Deleuze is certainly scientifically-oriented. 
As part of this he quotes Deleuze oft-quoted lines: 
"Difference is not diversity. Diversity is given, but difference is that by which the given is 
given...Difference is not phenomenon but the nuomenon closest to the phenomenon...Every 
                                            
488 Frichot, H. (2009). "On the Death of Architectural Theory and Other Spectres." Design Principles & Practices: An 
International Journal 3(2): 115. 
489 Frichot, On the Death of Architectural Theory, 114. 
490 Frichot, On the Death of Architectural Theory, 118. 
491 ‘What is constructed are fundamentally perspectives or paradigms, and the corresponding subject positions. 
Within the 1990s constructivist model these were understood in terms of signifying structures or coding, typically 
applying models derived from linguistics and rhetoric. This telescoped becoming onto the human plane. At the 
same time, it reduced the constitution of the human plane to the question of the human subject (if not its effective 
construction, then the impossibility of it, or if not exactly that, its subversion). A vicious circle results. The only 
conceptual tools available are pre-humanized by virtue of the models they derive from.’ (2009) “Technical 
Mentality” Revisited: Brian Massumi On Gilbert Simondon (An Interview with Brian Massumi), With Arne De 
Boever, Alex Murray and Jon Roffe  Parrhesia: A Journal of Critical Philosophy 36-45.  
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phenomenon refers to an inequality by which it is conditioned...Everything which happens and 
everything which appears is correlated with orders of differences: differences of level, temperature, 
pressure, tension, potential, difference of intensity".  
De Landa says, ‘There are several things to notice in this quote. First of all, it is clear that for Deleuze 
‘nuomena’ are not (as they were for Kant) beyond human knowledge. On the other hand, that which is 
beyond what is given to us in experience is not a being but a becoming, a difference-driven process by 
which the given is given.’ De Landa points out that this difference-driven process is driven by intensity 
differences. He says that ‘one can build an entire theory of the genesis of form (of geological, biological 
or cultural forms) on the basis of processes of being driven by intensity differences. Unlike essentialism, 
where matter is viewed as an inert receptacle for forms that come from the outside (transcendental 
essences), here matter is seen as possessing its own immanent, intensive resources for the generation 
of form from within.’492 
However, in the page following the quote above, according to De Landa, Deleuze argues that, despite 
this important insight, nineteenth century thermodynamics cannot provide the foundation he needs for a 
philosophy of form. Why?  
Because that branch of physics became obsessed with the final equilibrium forms, at the expense of 
the difference-driven morphogenetic process which gives rise to those forms. In other words, 
intensive differences are subordinated to the extensive structures (structures extended in space-
time) they give rise to. But as Deleuze argues, most of the important philosophical insights can only 
be grasped during the process of morphogenesis, that is, before the final form is actualised, before 
the difference disappears.493 (my emphasis) 
De Landa then concentrates attention on how such shortcomings have been repaired through the 
development of a branch of physics labelled ‘far-from-equilibrium thermodynamics.’… ‘Although 
Deleuze does not explicitly refer to this new branch of science, it is clear that far-from-equilibrium 
thermodynamics meets all the objections which he raises against its nineteenth century counterpart.’  
In particular, the systems studied in this new discipline are continuously traversed by a strong flow 
of energy and matter, a flow that maintains these differences and keeps them from cancelling 
themselves, that is, a flow which does not allow the intensive process to become hidden underneath 
the extensive results. It is only in these far-from-equilibrium conditions, only in this singular zone of 
intensity, that difference-driven morphogenesis comes into its own, and that matter becomes an 
active material agent.494  
What is meant by this difference-driven morphogenesis that De Landa sees as key to an open future, 
one that will hopefully escape the vagaries of the human mind and embrace something more objective?   
He refers to ‘two lines of argument used by Deleuze’. The ‘first one is directly related to his theory of 
individuation or actualisation… that is, a theory of intensive processes of becoming involving 
spontaneous spatio-temporal dynamisms, or as I refer to them, processes of self-organisation’. He goes 
                                            
492 De Landa, "Deleuze and the Open-Ended Becoming of the World".4. 
493 Ibid. 4. 
494 Delanda, . ‘…one which does not need form to come and impose itself from the outside.’  
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on to describe two such process of self-organisation, the formation of soap-bubbles and salt-crystals, as 
examples showing how ‘one and the same topological form can guide the morphogenesis of a variety of 
geometrical forms’.  
He also discusses other physio-chemical processes. ‘Deleuze calls this ability of topological forms to 
give rise to many different physical instantiations, a process of "divergent actualisation", taking the idea 
from French philosopher Henri Bergson who, at the turn of the century, wrote a series of texts where he 
criticised the inability of the science of his time to think the new, the truly novel. He quotes Deleuze 
again: "actualisation breaks with resemblance as a process no less than it does with identity as a 
principle. In this sense, actualisation or differenciation is always a genuine creation." So, ‘before the 
differences in intensity are cancelled, the final form (or more exactly, its topological counterpart) is 
already there, guiding (or acting as an attractor for) the morphogenetic process’. He emphasises 
Deleuze’s ‘realist’ bent as ‘topological attractors have a perfectly real existence, as virtual entities, even 
before a given geometrical form becomes actual’.  
Deleuze’s second line of argument is for De Landa, even ‘less deterministic’, a ‘process which is even 
more intimately connected with the emergence of novelty keeping the world from closing: the 
spontaneous formation of "machinic assemblages" (which he calls ‘meshworks’) of diverse elements.’  
Consistency necessarily occurs between heterogeneities… because heterogeneities that were 
formerly content to coexist or succeed one another become bound up with one another through the 
‘consolidation’ of their coexistence or succession...  
He then again quotes Deleuze & Guattari, …”What we term machinic is precisely this synthesis of 
heterogeneities as such.”495 Heterogeneity of components is for De Landa important for ‘combinatorial 
richness’, but also ‘processes which allow heterogeneous elements to come together, that is, processes 
which allow the articulation of the diverse as such’ e.g. special intercalary elements.496 He shows an 
interest in ‘the ability of particular creatures to enter into complex combinations with heterogeneous 
elements in their environment’ and then, however, quickly shifts away from organisms and asserts: ‘but 
meshworks can be formed at all levels of reality, including inorganic materials’, and then spends time 
discussing how ‘metal and metallurgy’ have brought to light a ‘life proper to matter, a vital state of matter 
as such, a material vitalism’ where, historically, the ‘blacksmith treats metals as active materials, 
pregnant with morphogenetic capabilities, and his role is that of teasing a form out of them, of guiding, 
through a series of processes (heating, annealing, quenching, hammering), the emergence of a form, a 
form in which the materials themselves have a say’.  
His other examples also are designed to emphasise the combinatory abilities of processes with 
particular attention to ‘matter’ related processes. What is consistent in his preoccupation with these 
examples is evident from what he emphasises, which can be discerned in the following phrases: 
‘allowing the planet to "explore" a space of possible chemical combinations’ 
‘combinatorial richness’ 
‘the articulation of the diverse’ 
                                            
495 De Landa, "Deleuze and the Open-Ended Becoming of the World". 
496 Ibid. 
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‘variety and heterogeneity’ 
‘the number of organisms that may be built combinatorially out of these elements is, again, 
immense’ 
‘combinatorial productivity’ 
‘special combinatorial spaces that are more open than others’497 
He stays away from human-involved assemblages. Apart from discussing examples involving matter 
and materials in some detail, he discusses ecosystems and large-scaled urban historical meshworks,498 
presumably as all of these are removed or can be discussed at a level of remove from human life – yet 
he is happy to suggest the relevance of the work to philosophers and social scientists (and it is 
obviously very appealing to designers). 
So, it seems that – and he does not affirm anything else – that his interest is in the processes involved 
in the production of ‘the new and the novel’. The processes may be summarised under the banners of 
“Deleuze’s two lines of argument’: firstly, ‘divergent actualisation’ is presented as the ability for intensive 
processes (i.e. topological components) to produce a great variety of ‘final forms’. Similarly, his interest 
in ‘machinic assemblages’/‘meshworks’ is presented as an interest in the ability of heterogeneous 
components to combine to produce a great variety of combinations of elements.  
Issues with De Landa’s version of Deleuze 
There are some issues with De Landa’s version of Deleuze that are important to discuss here. To begin 
with, Deleuze is not explicitly interested in a ‘theory of form’ and does not make an argument about it on 
the page he refers to. Remember that this is the page after Deleuze attempts to affirm difference: 
‘Difference is not diversity. Diversity is given, but difference is that by which the given is given, that by 
which the given is given as diverse.’ The most relevant thing that Deleuze says on that page that ‘we 
know only forms of energy which are already localised in and distributed in extensity.’ ‘In experience, 
intensio (intension) is inseparable from an extensio (extension) which relates it to extensum (extensity). 
Intensity and extensity are hard to disentangle. On top of this, intensity has a tendency to ‘cancel itself 
out in extensity and underneath quality’. On the next page he does highlight the nineteenth century 
‘epistemological tendency to be suspicious of intensive quantity’…’because it seems to rush headlong 
into suicide’.  
It would be easy to understand that De Landa could read this as supporting the notion that difference 
functions in the processes involved before the production of the final form and that it is cancelled out in 
the final form. Certainly, Deleuze is provocative in the way he repeats how difference is cancelled out in 
extensity and under quality and assertive in underlining the challenge of embracing difference and 
extricating it from diversity.  
It might be that if De Landa understood that difference cancelled itself out ‘in the final form’ then this 
implies a ‘theory of the genesis of form’, one concentrating on the processes of difference involved in 
the production of form before the form is produced. If this was the case, and it might very well be then 
                                            
497 Ibid. 
498 Often drawing upon the extraordinary work of Fernand Braudel. 
an affirmative open systems conception of how to design landscape  Connolly, Peter  
191 
 
there would be a question as to the function or significance of the final form, if difference were cancelled 
out. Am I to be suspicious of my own reading of De Landa’s ideas? Is this really what he is saying? 
Maybe he really meant to say that difference is not cancelled out in the final form but the processes of 
production of form are a very fruitful area that needs to be examined? 
‘Divergent actualisation’ 
Directly related to this is another questionable use of Deleuze. De Landa calls upon Deleuze’s notion of 
‘divergent actualisation’, which is presented as the ability for intensive processes (i.e. topological 
components) to produce a great variety of ‘final forms’. His citing of this phrase piqued my interest, not 
just because I had just spent considerable time with Difference and Repetition and could not recall the 
term, but it also did not seem to ‘gel’ with Deleuze’s thinking. I digitally searched Deleuze’s book and 
there was no trace of this term. I then Googled it and found many references to it, mainly in architectural 
discourse, often citing De Landa and often referring to it being Deleuze’s term. However, when I was 
able to find the source of the term it always came back to De Landa, not Deleuze. Not a problem 
possibly? Maybe De Landa has encapsulated Deleuze’s ideas with his own term? It did make me go 
back and check my understanding of the Deleuze’s term, actualisation, and not just to be pedantic. 
Such a term has to be distinguished from other related terms: differenciation (and differentiation) 
explication and individuation itself. This takes the story back to what Deleuze terms ‘Ideas’.499  
Deleuze asks us to:  
reconsider the movement of Ideas, which is inseparable from a process of actualisation. For 
example, an Idea or multiplicity such as that of colour is constituted by the virtual coexistence of 
relations between genetic or differential elements of a particular order. These relations are 
actualised in qualitatively distinct colours, while their distinctive points are incarnated in distinct 
extensities which correspond to these qualities. The qualities are therefore differenciated, along with 
the extensities, in so far as these represent divergent lines along which the differential relations 
which coexist only in the Idea are actualised.500  
This certainly suggests that along with, and not just before, the ‘differenciation’ of qualities and 
extensities is the actualisation of the ‘relations between genetic or differential elements of a particular 
order’ in this extensity.  
Deleuze goes on to ask:  
‘how is the Idea determined to incarnate itself in differenciated qualities and differenciated 
extensities? What determines the relations coexisting within the Idea to differenciate themselves in 
qualities and extensities?’501  
In response to his own question, Deleuze says that, ‘the answer lies precisely in the intensive 
quantities.’ And as already quoted: ‘intensity is the determinant in the process of actualisation. It is 
intensity which dramatises. It is intensity which is immediately expressed in the basic spatio-temporal 
                                            
499 Which I discuss in detail in the Appendix. 
500 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. 245. 
501 Ibid., 245. 
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dynamisms and determines an 'indistinct' differential relation in the Idea to incarnate itself in a distinct 
quality and a distinguished extensity.502 Actualisation therefore, according to Deleuze, involves the 
incarnation of Ideas in extensity, the incarnation of the multiplicity, the incarnation of relations of the 
individuation. Intensity determines and it is intensity which is expressed in these quantities and 
extensities.503 As has already been mentioned in this section, Deleuze points out that in the ‘extended 
order’ (of good sense) in which they are explicated, ‘constitutive differences’ tend to be cancelled out – 
and that qualities are produced in this extended order which are signs of these differences.504 So, 
though obscured by extensity and qualities, qualities are signs of intensity, which is incarnated in distinct 
extensities that correspond to these qualities. 
The Individuality of the Diverse and Expression505 
So, what does this mean for ‘the quote’? ‘Difference is not diversity.’ Deleuze writes, ‘diversity is given, 
but difference is that by which the given is given, by which the given is given as diverse.’506 Daniel Smith 
clarifies one thing of importance. For him ‘the error of the dogmatic image of thought is not to deny 
diversity, but to tend to comprehend it only in terms of generalities or genera. One of Deleuze’s 
philosophical aims is to show that the singularity and individuality of the diverse can only be 
comprehended from the viewpoint of difference itself.’507 This is obviously what Deleuze is leading 
toward when he begins the chapter with the ‘quote’. Yet, what does this mean? Simon Duffy, possibly 
the most precise and academic of Deleuze’s commentators, especially when it comes to Expressionism 
in Philosophy, says that:  
according to Deleuze, the risk or tendency of a difference of intensity to be extinguished or 
cancelled renders it ‘imperceptible’ when considered from the point of view of the expression itself. 
However, when considered according to the (what Duffy terms the) logic of expression, ‘intensity is 
simultaneously the imperceptible and that which can only be sensed’.508 So, although imperceptible 
when considered from the point of view of the expression itself, according to the logic of expression, 
difference of intensity is restored as ‘that which can only be sensed’. 
                                            
502 Ibid., 245. 
503 And just to clarify the difference of terms: ‘In this way, after a fashion (but, as we shall see, only after a fashion), 
the movement and the categories of differenciation reproduce those of explication. We speak of differenciation in 
relation to the Idea which is actualised. We speak of explication in relation to the intensity which 'develops' and 
which, precisely, determines the movement of actualization.’ So, there is a two part process. 
504 As per Deleuze’s style, ‘tends to be cancelled out’ in the extended order of good sense does not mean that it is 
cancelled out tout court but that it is cancelled out from the perspective of good sense and the extended order 
that it produces or ‘sees’. As per his style the emphasis on cancelling out in this example is much more easily 
grasped than the alternative he is proposing.  
505 It is worth noting here that Delanda’s use of the notion of change can easily be understood as change in the 
actual – in time as bodily translation in space or alteration of form - whereas Deleuze (and Williams and Boundas) 
would want to see change as being change as becoming, change where the actual is inseparably connected to 
the virtual, to the intensive. Change beyond all measure. Significant change. This is a centrally important and 
critical distinction that, if it isn’t already apparent, undermines much open-systems-oriented landscape design 
discourse. 
506 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition., 222. 
507 Smith, Daniel W., "Deleuze's Theory of Sensation: Overcoming the Kantian Duality," in Deleuze: A Critical 
Reader, ed. Patton, Paul (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996). 38. 
508 Cited by Duffy from Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. 230. 
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So, if Duffy is correct about Deleuze, then not only is De Landa wrong about intensity being cancelled 
out ‘before’ the actual and that, instead, intensity exists imperceptibly in this actuality, but he is also 
wrong about the scientific objectivity of such intensity and how to access it. For Deleuze, intensity ‘can 
only be sensed’, and it can only be sensed, and can only be determined by expression. As Williams 
would say: intensity, the sensing he is referring to and expression are each beyond science, explanation 
and measure.  
What this means in terms of a design assemblage might be suggested already and will be discussed in 
the conclusion. So, this not only suggests that a preoccupation with ‘the articulation of the diverse’ and 
‘combinatoririal productivity’ is a very weak understanding of Deleuze’s ideas—having nothing to do with 
any theory of form: it also provides something of an answer to Reinhold Martin’s query about how the 
work of the ‘post-critical’ digital players, ‘by what criteria’ will the work ‘be judged’ (‘beyond mere 
acceptance and accommodation of existing societal, economic, or cultural norms”, that is, beyond habit, 
opinion and cliché’). Once it is accepted that intensive quantities (intensity and affect) are part of any 
final form then Deleuze’s conception of evaluation comes back into play: evaluation of intensity and 
affects involves an immanent form of evaluation and can only be sensed and understood through 
expression. This opens up any resultant form to move beyond senselessness and  being evaluated in 
the whole affectual and problematic ecology of life that will enliven it, way beyond ‘liking’ a particular 
form.  
Reorienting the Conceptual Machinery of the Architectural Association’s Landscape Urbanism 
Assemblage 
The attraction to the ‘machine’ is that it allows for the idea of an ‘evolution’ proceeding in terms that 
do not pre-judge what constitutes the character of open systems, which is customarily done by 
privileging in a priori fashion organismic conceptions of unity and totality’ (my emphasis)509 Ansell 
Pearson 
Possibly the most compelling model of creativity recently conceptualised, a creativity of open systems, 
of the world itself, was developed by the Gilles Deleuze ( with Felix Guattari ) and draws heavily from 
previous thinkers, often employing landscape examples.510 For Deleuze, there seemed to be an 
unnecessary opposition between the creativity of the evolution of organisms, à la Darwin, and an 
implied uncreativity of the rest of the world. Previous models of newness had too readily assumed the 
unity of an organism as the primary level of creativity. Deleuze-Guattari attempted instead to embrace 
‘machines’ and ‘assemblages’.511 Such an emphasis naturally throws the spotlight back onto 
landscapes, cities, geographies and ecologies. It is no secret that their notions of a ‘machinic 
assemblage’ and ‘machinic evolution’ are clearly inspirational and explicitly central to what might be 
considered the Architectural Association’s model of ‘landscape urbanism’, as articulated in Mostafavi’s 
                                            
509 Ansell Pearson, Keith, Germinal Life: The Difference and Repetition of Deleuze  (London: Routledge, 1999). 
142. 
510 The development and nature of this task is beautifully laid out in ibid. 
511 As Deleuze and Guattari say, “a machine is only its connections and productions”. In an open system these 
connections go way beyond any assumed body or organism. The opening onto open systems is a challenge and 
invitation to be open enough to see such productions and the connections that enliven them. 
an affirmative open systems conception of how to design landscape  Connolly, Peter  
194 
 
Manual for a Machinic Landscape. Mostafavi, as editor, curates an attempted shift from architectural 
unities to assemblages suited to the landscape. This essay evaluates their version and in the process 
some further aspects of assemblages may be distilled. 
Given the sensed potential, the shift in thinking required and the lack of built projects at that time, 
considerable energy is devoted to the careful construction of an operative conceptualisation which 
attempted to distil and communicate in image and text not only a whole way of thinking and doing, but 
an ethos, originality, sense of authority, potential power and relevance. This essay attempts to 
characterise this conceptual assemblage as an important ‘part’ of what might be termed the 
Architectural Association landscape urbanism assemblage ( AALUA ).512 Such a characterisation 
should, I would suggest, prove useful to more landscape architectural interests in the production of 
newness. This usefulness will require both an initial characterisation and an immediate shift in 
characterisation. This shift in characterisation is aided by a direct re-reading of relevant AALUA 
concepts through Deleuze and Guattari and indirectly drawing upon reference to field work associated 
with this thesis and an appeal to reader experience of Mostafavi’s book and its influence.  
the abstract and transcendental principal of indeterminacy 
Central to the carefully constructed operativity, way and mythos of the AALUA is a curiously common 
sense notion of ‘indeterminacy’513 – more or less an inability to predict what will exist, the changeability 
of something and/or the promotion of change itself. For such a way of thinking, open systems are about 
openness in a very one-dimensional abstract sense. The notion of the indeterminate, in this sense, 
seems to have been installed as an abstract and, to follow Deleuze, ‘transcendental’ principle.514 
Tellingly, at the very start of Ciro Najle’s essay515 in the collection, ‘Convolutedness’ which is presented 
as a sort of ideal image of the AALUA, he states that: ‘under the assumption that architectural 
determination and its false opposition ( my emphasis ) to indeterminacy must be reconsidered in the 
context where no future actuality can be definitively predicted…’ In saying this, he begins to evocatively 
                                            
512 What I have said here may not hold for particular projects, as I have concentrated on the conceptualisation of 
the AALUA, especially through the words of the ‘theorists of the AALUA’ in Mohsen Mostafavi (Editor), A Manual 
for a Machinic Landscape, London: AA Publications, 2003, notably the words of Mostafavi, Najle, Hight and Barth. 
Actual projects might move beyond the implied assemblage of the conceptualisation. This is likely to be, I would 
argue, despite the implied assemblage, not because of it. 
513 See Waldheim, Charles, "Landscape Urbanism: A Genealogy," PRAXIS Journal, no. 4 (On Landscape) 
(2002).for one history of this notion. To this it should be added that Koolhaas introduces indeterminacy through 
the notion of ‘programmatic indeterminacy’. That the ‘programmatic’ in programmatic indeterminacy, involving a 
‘bracketing’ or replacement of affect as ( architecturally understood ) program, simply aids the tendency toward 
the abstract and away from the particularity of the affectual – and the particular affectuality of  landscape. I would 
argue that the current great emphasis on abstract indeterminacy ( change ) is valuable but should not be at the 
expense of the real reason for being interested in open systems – making a difference, and hence: difference, 
affects, problems, ethics and life). 
514 Effectively a timeless or essentialist idea that exists outside of time, space and life and that can be used to judge 
or explain something which is within life – and hence, for Deleuze, takes away the power of that which only 
functions in life. A transcendental entity is effectively a rule to follow or find variance from. In contrast, Deleuze, in 
relation to problems ( which are themselves the products of open systems ) effectively says that ‘immanence’ ( 
the within and that produced from within ) or life continually co-evolves its own evaluative edges with the 
emergence of whatever emerges or evolves. Affects act against any transcendental rules (the ten 
commandments, New Urbanism, the abstract sense of indeterminacy…) by being both the very material of design 
and the means to evaluate design. Use of the term ‘abstract’ in this essay is not reference to something vague or 
theoretical but to transcendental ideas or guidelines which function to defer you from the affects of the world. 
515 Ciro Najli, ‘Convolutedness’, in Mostafavi and Najli, Manual for a Machinic Landscape.160. 
an affirmative open systems conception of how to design landscape  Connolly, Peter  
195 
 
open the door to an alternative model of indeterminacy, something beyond the common opposition 
between the ‘determinate’ and the indeterminate, yet just as quickly shuts it again – almost as if it would 
be inconvenient for him, or landscape urbanism, to do otherwise. Najle therefore contributes to the 
uncritical continuation of the abstract model of indeterminacy. 
Change Is Not Difference 
Deleuze-Guattari remain the leading thinkers of open systems operativity. For them practice is, instead 
of abstract openness, about ‘making a difference’. Deleuze, himself, goes to great lengths to guard 
against weak understandings of such key notions. In his 1968 text, discussed in detail in the appendices 
of this thesis, and in the previous section, for instance, Deleuze started chapter five by warning that: 
‘Difference is not diversity. Diversity is given, but difference is that by which the given is given, that 
by which the given is given as diverse’.516 
For Deleuze we have a tendency to see difference as being the difference between things and/or 
confusing difference with the variety of things. Diversity is many different things in space or time. 
Different things in space equals variety. Different things in time equals change, no matter how fast, 
slow, hard to grasp or ephemeral. Variety and change.  
Difference is instead a power of the world, only existing in and expressed through particular powers of 
the world: affectivities, capabilities, propensities or potentials that continually ‘return’ differently through 
particular times and situations to be ever newly affective, ever different in their powers, and ever 
differing in their difference of power. Diversity is not power or life but the more obvious by-product of the 
power of the world. This by-product strongly tends to obscure the power of the world. It is not variety or 
change which are important but the power of or associated with such variety or change. Deleuze says 
that such a distinction is a difficult one.517 The preoccupation with the abstractly indeterminate very 
strongly tends to defer any real obligation to engage in the power of the world. Change should not be 
confused with affect. Change is only relevant for its affect, if it has or is associated with any. There are 
no guarantees, as the abstract version suggests.518  
pre-history in this assemblage 
‘all landscapes, it might be argued, are profoundly picturesque’ Christopher Hight  
Abstract indeterminacy in the AALUA meshes, in this assemblage, with a typically reductive reductive 
architectural reading of landscape architectural history. Christopher Hight, in Mostafavi, quotes,519 and in 
the end accepts, Reynar Banham’s suggestion that landscape and landscape architecture are, unlike 
                                            
516 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. 222. 
517 This distinction is almost universally lost on practices that consciously concentrate on ‘the indeterminate’. 
518 What also gets obscured by focusing on abstract indeterminacy is that there is a variation of affect itself, a 
‘continuous variation of affect’, to follow Deleuze following the philosopher Spinoza, which, importantly can only 
be discovered once you connect to affect. It is achieved or available only through ‘firstly’ connecting to affect. 
519 Christopher Hight, ‘Portraying the Urban Landscape: Landscape in Architectural Criticism and Theory, 1960 – 
Present’, in Mostafavi and Najli, Manual for a Machinic Landscape., 25. 
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‘real architecture’, concerned instead with the pictorial and the simulacrum.520 He also suggests that 
painting is an origin myth of landscape. Such pre-histories then posit the abstractly indeterminate – and 
nothing else is affirmed in the AALUA – as the royal road to surpass the ‘static’ pictoriality of landscape 
and landscape design, glossing over that in an open system, in life, there is no such thing as a static 
landscape – and more importantly, that abstract indeterminacy is, and no-one seems to notice – instead 
wholly scenographic ( a fast or infinite scenographic? ). The obsession with it, instead of allowing an 
escape from the scenographic, perversely rigidifies it in its own attractive shiftiness – and sets up 
misleading perceptual expectations that defers designers away from the openness required for 
perceiving the affectual. The supposed newness of the change-narrative obscures that it is the same 
passively received story over and over.  
the twinning of the abstract principles of indeterminacy and the perpetual changing of the world  
Running parallel to this origin myth of the AALUA, of the static and the open ended, is another story, 
very evident in Najle’s opening statement about indeterminacy – that the world is ever and constantly 
changing and we can never predict future situations. The second story has become a standard trope in 
the landscape urbanist literature. Together, these two abstract principles seem to reign: the abstract 
principle of indeterminacy and the abstract principle of the perpetual change of the world. It seems that 
the first story requires the second. How else to cater for a continually changing world? The production of 
changing or changeable designs. Change requires change. This produces an operative dynamic that 
tends to: circularity, passivity, and a lack of curiosity about the real landscape and its affectuality.  
For Deleuze and Guattari, assemblages are enlivened by and connected to an ‘outside’, responding to 
real events, problems and situations in the world. By reducing the capabilities and affectivities of the 
world to abstract indeterminacy and reducing the outside or situation to the abstract principle of 
perpetual change, it all becomes a little too easy. Such circular operativities do not seem to make any 
sense in terms of the world. All of this, for me, underlines yet again how affects, and in particular the 
affects of the landscape, being central to the open system that is the landscape, are not embraced or 
are too passively or naively presumed.521 The AALUA gives no conceptual space to affects or the whole 
problematic of affects of the landscape.  
a reflex of displacement 
One dimension of the AALUA that receives little attention is the very particular movement or dynamism 
of this assemblage, being actually more like a reflex – an architecturally automatistic movement from 
the landscape. In a discussion on the importance of abstraction Lawrence Barth says that: 
                                            
520 Whilst Mostafavi considers such a distinction ‘colonial’ on architecture’s behalf, he nonetheless does not 
question it. 
521 I have outlined in an unpublished essay, The Fate of Affects in Landscape Urbanism that affects: are pivotal to 
why one would even be interested in open systems; are poorly understood and an emerging area of investigation 
(Manual De Landa); and have been given virtually no attention, theoretically and operatively, in landscape and the 
design of landscape.  
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( emphasis added ) abstraction522 permits the strategic consideration of generalised functions and 
relations. … On the one hand, it divorces diagnosis from the question of immediate interests, that 
game of advantage among polarised and immobile camps, and links it to the broader field of 
knowledge and professional competence…’ Secondly, … the question of the local decision is 
dispersed onto the wider field of urban reason…. The plan …mobilises this field of repetition523 and 
differentiation, … The repeatability of these functions and relations indicates the strategic or broader 
political dimension of the urban,524 for the question of what should be done in a particular location 
cannot justly be answered by narrowing the focus to the specifics of site and place. Instead, the 
question is addressed through a displacement onto a lateral field of generalisation, possibility and 
regularity.525 
For Barth, like others in the collection, there is an abstraction, a divorce from the pre-existing landscape 
and situation, and a later dispersal onto a ‘wider field’. He constructs an opposition between a wider and 
lateral field of abstraction and the ‘immediate interests’ and the ‘specifics of site and place’. Abstraction 
and displacement are connected to repeatability and portability as central to avoiding the ‘narrowness’ 
of focusing on ‘site and place’ and the immobility of ‘immediate interests’. 
convolution: the machinic functioning of the AALUA 
So, what happens in the dynamism of the AALUA once we have the displacement of repetitive ‘atoms’ 
abstracted from ( or even imported to ) the landscape? Najle evocatively suggests that we are now 
dealing in an intense and separate realm and that this is the main game. For instance, ‘this meta-
infrastructure of negotiation involves processes of propagation in two simultaneous directions…: in one 
direction it intensifies virtual potentials through their progressive specification; in the other, it integrates 
disparate informational realms into a single organisational system’…etc. ‘They revolve onto each other 
in convolution’.526 …They mesh them in networks of increasing complexity.’ Such networks 
‘progressively distribute and coordinate forces’.527  
 ‘Convolutedness’, for Najle, is identified with complexity, speed and fluidity. Convolutedness is both an 
organisational ambition; ‘how convoluted can architecture get’;528 and a fluid product. By ‘increasing its 
speed, a system multiplies its interactions and is compelled to open up and behave’, ( with direct 
                                            
522 Abstraction here also refers to representational defamiliarisation, which, as a device, can enhance the ability to 
connect to affects and to avoid habitual ways to employ such connection – but from experience with landscape 
design it also has very strong tendencies to, instead, further defer from connection to the landscape and shift 
attention to an obsession with the separate organisation (and in this negative move perversely contribute to the 
feeling that the AALUA is dealing in a new and different territory). Diagrams being one way that this happens. 
523 It might be assumed that Barth is referring to the isolation and abstraction of repetitive affectual phenomena – of 
affectual relations of relations – of typologies, ‘prototypes’ (a pivotal term in the AALUA) and program. Najle 
supports this by referring to an ‘intense typological redefinition’ (p. 162). However, this probably should not simply 
be assumed, as the AALUA give scant attention to affectuality (especially in comparison to ‘the indeterminate’), to 
fieldwork and that the repetitive behaviour of the landscape ( as I mention elsewhere in this essay ) is not 
predominantly atomistic or available in such readily presumable packages as is the case with, say, architectural 
typology. What sort of ‘atoms’ are therefore being extracted?  
524 A very odd conception. 
525 Lawrence Barth, ‘Diagram, Dispersal, Region’, in Mohsen Mostafavi, A Manual for the Machinic Landscape, 35. 
526 Najli, in Mostafavi and Najli, Manual for a Machinic Landscape.164. 
527 Ibid.165. The imagery of ‘networks’ is seriously inadequate to the way heterogeneity is structured. Too 
homogenous, one-dimensional and symmetrical. See my essay, previously cited, in the previous edition of Kerb. 
528 ibid, 172. 
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reference to Deleuze and Guattari ) ‘smoothly’.529 The preoccupation of the whole AALUA is really on 
this organisational ( and hopefully smooth ) convoluting. The machinic, for the AALUA, is to be found in 
this separate machine that produces smoothness, and the machinic is this smoothness. Such a 
smoothness, for the original authors, is profoundly affectual, yet, as argued already, there is little in the 
AALUA to affirm that the affectual is what they are really interested in, especially given the very great 
emphasis on the abstractly indeterminate.  
merging and ‘the existing’ 
To come back to Najle - after the convolution of this organisational system ‘they’ then, he almost 
casually says – ‘merge ( this system )…with the territory’. So, we have a return to the territory. This 
territory is presented as secondary, passive and abstract. It is also enigmatic – ‘the territory’. Almost as 
casually, Mostafavi says, at the very end of a discussion on the relation between landscape and 
urbanism… ‘and like a landscape architect, the landscape urbanist always begins with the given’.530 
What sort of relationship to the given is he implying? What sort of given is he treating so casually?  
A casual observer might have assumed that the AALUA had a fascination with the new realm of the 
open system of the landscape. There is, however, little explicit attention given to ‘the given’ 
conceptually. Hight does recognise that it is ‘occupied by forces’.531 Mostafavi gives some attention to 
the ‘given forces of the site’, but oddly restricts them to the ‘financial or regulative’!532 The main 
operative preoccupations with the existing seem to be: the atomistically abstracted ( to be convoluted ), 
the entwining-manipulation of infrastructures ( in relation to abstracted ‘atoms’ ) and abstract-‘territories’-
as-canvas. 
Of ‘the given’ - only objects, the very-readily-objectifiable and ready-available-objectifications seem to 
be perceivable by the AALUA533 and only those ‘things’ which will readily fit into the architectural 
operativity of the AALUA are employed. Very light attention is given to non-‘extensive’ ( non-
scenographic ) or potentially ‘intensive’534 mappings of the way that the pre-existing landscapes are 
structured ( in time and space ). The intensive structuring of the given - and in landscape this is wildly 
asymmetrical, smooth (as per Deleuze and Guattari) gradient-like and heterogeneous - cannot be 
                                            
529 ibid, 161. Smoothness (usually in reference to ‘smooth space’) is drawn directly from Deleuze-Guattari, and 
refers to an affectivity that becomes apparent when you connect to the ‘middle’, that cuts across or traverses the 
heterogeneity of the middle. Refer to Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia. 1987, Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press. Clarifying the smoothness imagined by the 
AALUA is an important task, and it seems that the AALUA are only evocative of a smoothness. 
530 Mohsen Mostafavi, ‘Landscapes of Urbanism’, in Mostafavi and Najli, Manual for a Machinic Landscape.8. 
531 Hight in, ibid. 27. 
532 Mohsen Mostafavi, ‘Landscapes of Urbanism’, 9. The opening and closing times of international markets and 
planning regulations. 
533 ibid, 9. He identifies the ‘infrastructures of the urban’…’highways, roads, rivers, bridges, embankments, paths, 
surfaces, lights, markings, signage”, as the focus of manipulation.  
534 Interactions of ‘intensive’ relations produce affects. The simplest example to communicate the intensive is given 
by Manual Delanda (in his Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy, London: Continuum, 2002), of ordinal 
numbers, such as first, second, third…and by comparison with cardinal numbers, such as 1,2,3… Ordinal 
numbers rely upon and communicate with each other asymmetrically. Cardinal numbers are locatable in an 
abstract regular symmetrical space. In a more openly open system such as a landscape such communication is 
wildly heterogenous, potentialising and productive of affects. The extensive dimension of ordinal numbers are the 
words themselves, the intensive is their functioning. In this regard cardinal numbers do not function. In open 
systems, in heterogeneity, it is only asymmetries that potentialise. See the following endnote which discusses 
further the notion that ‘difference is not diversity’. 
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presumed or read-off a big plan, and is more important than the ‘extensive’535 for the way the landscape 
functions as an open system.  
It seems that the interest in open systems here is largely restricted to the organisational system that 
departed from the given, and this displays and promotes a passive acceptance of what the landscape is 
made up of. For this conception of landscape urbanism, the abstract notion of the territory, as a 
conceptual and operative new realm, seems to allow the AALUA the luxury of bring able to concentrate 
attention on ‘convolution’ relatively unsullied by complications that the actual landscape might bring with 
it. The enigma or glamour of this new abstract realm, very different from the messy one that the system 
departed from, probably parallels something of the importance given to territory by Deleuze and 
Guattari. For them territory is, however, not at all abstract – such a difference makes the ‘existing’ 
radically different also, and has direct implications for the separate organisational machine as well. 
the Deleuze-Guattarian concrete and affectual notion of territory 
To get at the way that the machinic is conceived of as functioning, according to Deleuze and Guattari, 
territory is actually the best place to start. They draw attention, to the Australian bird, the Brown 
Stagemaker, amongst other examples.536 This male bird picks a number of leaves off a tree and drops 
them to the ground and then upturns some of them so that all of them reveal the same pale underside. 
This then allows it to go about constructing a territoriality through its song. Such an action is much more 
than about claiming, defending or appropriating property. Such an act, is a product and producer of 
heterogeneity, and involves a spontaneous and precise ‘selection’ from, and mustering of, 
heterogeneous space-time. The only way to account for territoriality they argue is to see territoriality as 
involving a ‘territorial assemblage’. They speak of a ‘veritable machinic opera that unites heterogeneous 
orders, species and qualities’.537 The bird’s song being indissociably linked to his position on his singing 
stick, his situation in relation to his particular display ground, the leaves he manipulates, his exposure of 
yellow feathers below his beak, the weaving in and out of his song with the song and responses of other 
birds, to the presence of prospective mates, pre-existing and adjacent territories etc.538 His song can be 
heard at a great distance and is ‘only one part of an intricate circuit of actions and objects’.539 His song 
can be mistaken as the ‘refrain’ or affectual ‘trajectory’ that selectively musters available heterogenous 
forces and characteristics of the world. Any particular dimension of heterogeneity is brought into being 
by such an integration, and is part of this trajectory.540  
Such an act is an affectual production where the world is simultaneously brought into being as affect 
and sense (or expression) and where sense inseparably functions as part of affect or affectuality. The 
stone surface at Federation Square are not stone but a socially interactive surface or part of a singular 
social interactivity, capability or affect. Affect and sense (or expression depending on which of Deleuze / 
                                            
535 In opposition to and co-dependent with the intensive and more or less equivalent to the visual. See the previous 
endnote. 
536 Scenopoeetes dentirostris 
537 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. 1987, Minneapolis: The 
University of Minnesota Press. 330. 
538 Well discussed in Ronald Bogue, Deleuze on Music, Painting and the Arts, London: Routledge, 2003, 71. 
539 Ronald Bogue, Deleuze on Music, Painting and the Arts, 72. 
540 Not to be confused with the birdsong itself. 
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Deleuze/Guattari’s books are being discussed). Sense is nothing like meaning as is discussed in the 
appendix. A present or anticipated affect gains its sense and difference in relation to all past relevant 
affects. Force on force not linguistic meaning. Sense is significance in relation to the ‘vector’, motivation 
or use. Such relation to force or affect in this affect is experienced as a sensation or refrain that passes 
through and produces the relevant parts of the environment. The surface of Federation Square is 
involuntarily sensed as socially interactive (in a much more singular manner than described here). The 
Royal Park case study devotes considerable time to drawing out not only the affectual doing of Royal 
Park but the sense of this doing, the significance of the doing. All affects have a territory, or more 
precisely all affectuality has a territoriality or sense. For them territory is primary and can never be a 
neutral backdrop. Not only does heterogeneity produce affects but affects are indiscernibly 
heterogeneous. Heterogeneity is central to their forces, their newness. 
heterogeneity: 541 a different notion of a machinic landscape  
As suggested already, the heterogeneous points to a very different sense of the machinic and a very 
different assemblage, than Najle evokes. For Deleuze-Guattari, ‘what we term the machinic is precisely’ 
the ‘synthesis of heterogeneities as such’.542 …’Quiet heterogenous’, they stress. Nothing like the 
relatively or seemingly homogenous examples, employing the behaviour of collections of the same 
entity, i.e. ants and boids, that are didactically useful for quickly communicating the notion of self-
organisation in books such as Stephen Johnson’s Emergence,543 cited in Mohsen (Ed.). Heterogeneity, 
like Johnson says about the examples in his book, also functions from ‘local connections’, only from ‘the 
bottom up’…but in the openness of the world local and material connections go way beyond the 
homogeneous-atomistic. They are in no way just extrapolations from the atomistic. The atomistic, 
however, suits the common brand of digital and chaos theory-inspired ideas of proliferation and an 
operativity of displacement.544  
The reflex of displacement effectively avoids the landscape-heterogenous.545 The Baroque to-be-
discoveredness of heterogeneity makes the AALUA organisation, in comparison, seem predictable, 
                                            
541 Deleuze follows directly on from his ‘difference is not diversity’ warning to say that ‘every phenomenon refers to 
an inequality by which it is conditioned’…’everything which happens, and everything which appears is correlated 
with orders of differences: differences of level, temperature, pressure, tension, potential, difference of intensity’. 
Each ‘phenomenon is composed of heterogeneous terms’. Strangely, the asymmetry-gradient-relativity aspect of 
heterogeneity has received no obvious attention in landscape urbanism ( or elsewhere ), yet all urban 
phenomenon are of the asymmetry-gradient type. For Deleuze-Guattari, the middle is profoundly relativity-driven. 
To misquote them, ‘relativity is when things pick up speed’. It is in relation to x and y that z becomes… To choose 
to not embrace the middle of the heterogeneous ( the heterogeneous is only heterogeneous as middle ) is to be 
restricted to the extensive world that open systems offers us an escape from. See Gilles Deleuze, Difference and 
Repetition, 222. See the appendix for a detailed account of this. 
542 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 330. 
543 Johnson, Steven, Emergence: The Connected Lives of Ants, Brains, Cities and Software  (New York, New York: 
Scribner, 2001). 
544 The AALUA passively goes along with is the idea that open systems imply digital systems. Please refer to Brian 
Massumi’s essay, ‘On the Superiority of the Analog’, in his Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation, 
Durham: Duke University, 2002. The atomism discussed here is discussed further in the next section on Manuel 
De landa. 
545 Such separated organisations, such architectures, have their own heterogeneity, but if you are interested in the 
design of the open landscape then your concern should be for how the heterogeneous affectivity of such an 
organisation alters or affects the affectuality of the openly heterogeneous. You cannot just be preoccupied with 
what is added to the openly heterogeneous. To the degree that you defer from the functioning of the openly 
heterogeneous you are seriously mistaking the material you are working with – and probably ambiguously 
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homogenous, one-dimensional and symmetrical. It may be that deferral from the openly heterogenous 
in the AALUA occurs because such pre-existing heterogeneity would pose intractable problems for an 
assemblage of portability and displacement. Anything beyond the atomistic would not suit displacement 
and proliferation. However, serious attention to accounting for the difference or the way that real 
landscapes function – as my field studies attest - would quickly have to push past the atomistic to 
account for affects and difference.546 Najle’s promise of the machinic landscape also, very significantly, 
ignores that the landscape is always already machinic – and it will likely be that in the openly 
heterogeneous the machinic requires the infinite openness of such heterogeneity to potentialise it to the 
point of functioning machinically. Affects, as they function in all of their singularity and power, are 
produced by all of Nature, the Earth, not just a handful of relations. 
machinic creativity and non-organic life 
The Stagemaker and other examples of landscapes, including those of the author,547 highlight that the 
way that Najle et. al. talk about the machinic de-emphasises much of what Deleuze and Guattari place 
great emphasis on, and how landscapes ( and the heterogeneous ) function. Such examples illustrate 
key characteristics of machinic creativity: most notably, how territoriality and affectuality function 
‘transversally’ through integrating the heterogeneous. Such heterogeneous relations and materials 
spontaneously develop an expressiveness ( or worlding or sense or territoriality )548 which involves 
something of all of the heterogeneous, as has just been discussed. This expressiveness (sense) 
involves a transformation of existing or organic functions ( i.e. of the organism, including human 
organism ) These transversals involve indiscernible mergings of the behaviours of organisms and 
spatial and temporal relations into transversal affectualities – such that, seemingly paradoxically, 
autonomous new forms of life, new transversal capabilities, emerge from the world but within the world. 
Such machinic forms of life, are integrated involuntarily by organisms (such as humans and collections 
of humans) and function through their heterogeneous components. And they do this ‘under the radar’, 
imperceptively to our preconceptions.549 The AALUA either avoids or seems naïve of such functioning, 
such newness, and in comparison seems to be content with evoking a more generalised or abstract 
fluidity. The avoidance of the particularity of machinic affectivity is an avoidance of newness, and 
                                                                                                                                          
confusing what the design of landscape is. In this regard I would argue that the AALUA tends not to be a form of 
landscape design – concentrating on what is beyond openness - despite its desires. 
546 Such an accounting can be found in the previous cited examples I have published. The examples that Deleuze 
and Guattari draw upon communicate key principles. For landscape architectural purposes their work does not, 
understandably, go far enough in engaging with affects that are more relevant to landscape architecture and in 
drawing out, in relation to the body and often urbanistically and geographically, all that potentialises landscape 
affects and how this production occurs in a manner suited to designers. My studies attempt to directly embrace 
this task. 
547 Please refer to my essay, Connolly, Peter, "The Heterogenous: An Example," Kerb: Journal of Landscape 
Architecture, no. 15, Landscape Urbanism Issue (2007). This essay was cited in the body text and an earlier 
footnote, illustrating an heterogenously produced transversal, a particular ‘ecological adventurousness’, particular 
to a landscape in Philadelphia, Pa. Territory is much more than identifying the boundaries of territories and who 
possesses them, it is a way to identify what is produced in open systems of relevance to human life, ‘beyond the 
human’, and to enter the production process of such products.  
548 Expressiveness and sense are not conceptualized exactly the same. It seems to me that the conceptualization 
of ‘expression’ is designed to embrace the heterogeneous mixing of the world more so that ‘sense’, but I tend to 
employ sense as it suggests something closer to how expression/sense seems to function. 
549 Not beyond perceivability, interpretation and what gets called ‘subjectivity’, as some sort of quasi-objectivity 
(data etc.), as is often promoted. 
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therefore also a deferral from the opportunity to interact with the particular concrete relations in time and 
space, the particular forces and relations that are involved in the machinic production of newness. 
Through territoriality Deleuze and Guattari articulate their notion of non-organic life – their ‘discovery’ of 
the second great realm of the creativity of Nature, of the world – a machinic evolution that is produced 
by heterogenous machinic assemblages. This non-organic life is not to be construed in opposition to 
organismic life ( and its evolution ) ‘but as always accompanying it and informing the openness of living 
systems to the world’.550 For Ansell Pearson, discussing Deleuze and Guattari, ‘all life involves 
individuating closure and this can be established in a number of ways: membrane, skin, a territory, all of 
which serve to bring into communication an interior and an exterior’.551 Without individuating closure, the 
chaos of the world would be simply a disjointed diversity of separable sub-movements. Such a 
membrane co-ordinates and connects available forces to deterritorialise and evolve the particular form 
of life further. It is the very concrete interactions of relations of the heterogenous that produce machinic 
evolution. Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of territory allow them to embrace such evolution.  
It might be assumed that territory is about a territory, but it is more like a worlding involving the 
emergence of the world from ‘chaos’, an emergence where differentiations and structure emerges in 
relation to the affectuality associated with such differentiation and structure. It is more like a territorial or 
affectual ecology, experienced transitions, as expressed in the case studies, being the most obvious 
differentiations. Shifts in sensation register shifts in the structure, differentiation, structure and 
sense/expression of a landscape. What are the main implications of all of this for the AALUA and 
landscape architecture? 
Reorienting the AALUA 
To begin with, it is clear from the way that it positions itself historically, that the AALUA desires 
designing in the medium of the openness of landscape. Landscape and assemblages naturally go 
together. The move to assemblages, following Deleuze, it would be imagined, is a move to seek out 
newness in the medium of the open landscape. What can be said about such a desire? 
In this section on the AALUA I have tried to identify what I believe to be some serious issues with the 
way that the AALUA conceives of machinics and newness and also what flows from the way that the 
AALUA has been set up to produce a machinic landscape. In this regard the AALUA seems a fairly 
straight extension of an existing architectural operativity - the reflex of abstraction-defamiliarisation-
displacement, intense separate development, merging and an assumption of the read-off-ability of 
results. On top of this: in the name of open systems, the AALUA utilises a series of abstract principles ( 
of territory, indeterminacy, perpetual change and ambiguously-smooth-machinics ) in place of concrete 
evaluation and problematics; it moves to the very big plan finally understood, it seems, through an 
overview-viewing ( as if this is no different than looking at a building ) and, further, employs digitally 
intensified organisational development.552 It is constructed to maximise ‘convolution’ and central to this 
                                            
550 Ansell Pearson, Germinal Life: The Difference and Repetition of Deleuze. 210. 
551 Ibid., 210 
552 To repeat as I have said before open systems are already complex. Complexity makes no sense (is not 
significant) in itself. It is the affectual production of such systems that should be the primary preoccupation, not 
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is a strong avoidance of, on one hand, the complicating, messy, narrow compromising of the existing 
landscape. This avoidance is operationalised, on the other hand by, also, making such a ‘territory’ 
abstract, enigmatic and passive and usually black. 
What I have also hoped to show, by comparison, is that which the AALUA sees as messy, passive and, 
at the same time abstract, can be seen more ‘openly’ as, instead, active and heterogeneously-open and 
full of potential. The AALUA seems unable to see the particular structure of relations ( in time and space 
) and functioning of the openly heterogenous. The differentiations and structures of openness tend to 
escape common sense and ways of seeing focused on more binaristic architectural understandings, as 
Schumacher has described (walls-space-program). The AALUA does not seem to appreciate: that the 
existing landscape is already strong, affective and machinic; that anything apart from the atomistic is 
affective; that the concrete realities of situations-affects-machinics-newness of the heterogenous and 
how they are produced require their own operativities and forms of evaluations that cannot be reduced 
to abstract principles and overview viewing reading-off of plans – and that the landscape, openness, 
Nature, the Earth, will do what it wants with any applied or merged system.  
Central to the AALUA embracing the heterogeneous is a much greater focus on how ‘merging’ 
functions. For a start, merging will not be successful if what the AALUA is merging with is seen as 
passive, as it is now. If the AALUA has real ambitions for openly and maximally affecting the openly 
heterogeneous, merging distributively or strategically, will not be affective without strongly affirming the 
openly heterogeneous. To be affective, or more importantly, to achieve newness in the openly 
heterogeneous requires a very significant re-orientation of the AALUA – one that is probably beyond 
what architects would be interested in (or even capable of doing?), due to the very significant demands 
of having to take on both of these two great and different realms of operativity – two distinct and 
continually emerging forms of life themselves – as well as their merging.  
Assemblages offer the opportunity to go ‘beyond the human’, as Najle following Deleuze has said. 
However, for Deleuze such a beyond is not outside of life, but outside of our limited conceptions of life. 
Assemblages offer the opportunity to more openly see how life functions and in doing so develop a 
wider and yet more precise way to engage with it. The whole set-up of the AALUA, reflected in the 
attitudes of its key writers, seems instead, to promote a deferral from and avoidance of evaluation-
discovery of, such life and such new life, especially of and in the openly heterogenous. New urban life 
is, instead, to be found in transversal vectors that occur in heterogeneity, in life – and for the AALUA 
desires for the open landscape this heterogeneity is the heterogeneity of the open landscape. 
Landscape architects are already largely set-up for such vectors of the openly-heterogenous. New 
urban life is less a problem of getting the right idea or image of a city, than of a determined tuning of the 
assemblage – a shift in technique and conceptualising. The AALUA, as conceptualised, seems to need 
more than just tuning. 
                                                                                                                                          
the production, display or evocation of complexity (or the ambiguity of the abstractly indeterminate). The way that 
the AALUA presents itself through A Manual for the Machinic Landscape, works hard on such display and 
evocation. 
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CONCLUSION: TOWARDS AN AFFIRMATIVE CONCEPTION 
OF OPEN SYSTEMS LANDSCAPE DESIGN: 
The contributions that this research makes553 
This thesis attempts to go beyond the advertorials and generalities that tend to populate the open-
systems-oriented design discourse. Assemblage 3 examined explicit attempts at constructing an 
affirmative open systems landscape design assemblage from the early 2000’s. Assemblage 1 analysed 
conceptions from the 1990’s that were mostly not explicitly open-systems-oriented, which I have found 
relevant to the construction of an affirmative open systems landscape design assemblage. 
Understanding these traditions of conceptions as devoted to the production of design assemblages has 
allowed me to more precisely determine the makeup of these approaches to design and their 
productivities and tendencies. It allows me to go back behind the talk to determine the conceptual and 
physical machinery involved. It has allowed me to uncover what is more obscure – mostly by it being 
‘too obvious’. It allows me to get to how they are or would be practiced in a way that much of the 
existing writing has not been able to. I have found that I uncovered this in two ways: through 
understanding design assemblages promoted and practiced in the early 2000’s and their not well-
discussed yet prevalent negative tendencies – and the equally obscured and positive contributions of 
the landscape design empiricists. These landscape architectural writings from late 1990’s (especially 
Claramunt and Mosbach), with limited theoretical tools yet precise empiricist efforts and devotion to the 
task, fashioned the first immanent conception of a landscape design assemblages – one that started to 
mesh with and express the machinic functioning of a landscape design assemblage when, it is 
functioning well. What is astonishing about this work is that to get to be able to produce such a 
conception pushed them toward conceiving of most of the key components necessary to the task. Their 
conception of embodiment allowed them to construct conceptions of landscape assemblages, 
landscape design assemblages and even research assemblages. Their empiricism led them to 
construct strong notions of the involuntary connection of humans and their world, affects, expression, 
sense, virtuality, an aesthetics of affects, experimentation and problem and a theory of expression in 
representation. Their conception of the aesthetics of the relationship to a site in a design project is the 
clearest critical conception of landscape design so far written. Their conception of ‘projecting’ is a 
beautiful counter-notion to architectural ‘projection’, whether they meant it to be or not, one that 
expresses the very different assemblage associated with the pre-existing, whilst containing the critical 
relation to site/pre-existing. What this illustrates to me is that the very wholeness of practice, if taken 
wholly seriously, cannot help but get the designer-thinker to engage with the machinic functioning of the 
immanence of open systems. Claramunt and Mosbach are exemplary in this regard.  
 
 
                                            
553 As I have already mentioned I have not explicitly discussed my contribution to this problem in the text. My 
writings start before the subject matter discussed here and continue beyond it. Each of my writings engages with 
or is very relevant to the question of an affirmative open systems oriented landscape design assemblage.  
an affirmative open systems conception of how to design landscape  Connolly, Peter  
205 
 
This investigation has revealed that the sorts of problematic tendencies of these assemblages can 
mostly be understood as a result of the basic machinery of the pre-existing architectural and landscape 
architectural design assemblages. Whilst there may have been considerable investigation and 
development of these assemblages that is important to contemporary open systems oriented landscape 
design assemblages, there has been much that has stayed more or less the same. If anything, the 
recent discourse has ‘hardened’ and does not reflect on technique as it first did. One hope is that the 
real world demands of contemporary practice will develop their own honest and explicit empirical edge. 
There seems little public sign of this yet. 
In general, the problematic tendencies of the more explicit conceptions have 3 sources or locations: 
1. The nature and workings of pre-existing architectural assemblages (partitioning, etc.) or more 
recent expressions of this assemblage (the emphasis on projection, surface organisation, digital 
design generation techniques etc.) when these are transferred over to or shifted into open-
systems-oriented design of landscape. 
2. The influence of architectural assemblages and aspects of them on landscape architects 
associated with the shift into open-systems-oriented design of landscape.  
3. The nature and workings of pre-existing landscape architectural approaches with the shift into 
open-systems-oriented design of landscape. 
Assemblage 3 tends to focus on the first and second of these. To me, the predominance of architectural 
componentry in this assemblage and the serious negative tendencies associated with the way they 
mesh is simply a case of what happens when a discipline moves into an area, the design of landscape, 
that they have not previously been intensely preoccupied with. There are certainly aspects of the 
landscape architectural components of this assemblage that need addressing, but these are lesser in 
number or less complex to untangle, given that the landscape design assemblage has co-evolved with 
its medium. It should be said that architectural and landscape architectural ‘components’ or cogs are not 
are employed by both architects and landscape architects. 
As I said at the start of Assemblage 3, that it seemed that there was something like a ‘default’ open 
systems-oriented landscape design assemblage. It is default in that the conceptions examined here 
tend toward a similar machinery and tendencies. Anything else will tend to be more obscured (and will 
also tend not to be regarded as proper). It seems that this assemblage - or possibly a series or family of 
closely related assemblages - tends to be constructed of some common components. As I mentioned in 
Assemblage 3, I considered these components like cogs that machinically meshed together and fed off 
each other. Based on my analysis I can elaborate further on the various interrelated components of this 
assemblage. These components include: 
More general components 
The general cultural tendency to scenographic visuality (landscape urbanism writers often claims 
that what they champion is able to transcend the scenographic tendencies of ‘traditional’ landscape 
design, seemingly not noticing the very great scenographic tendencies of landscape urbanism, one 
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only has to consider the spatialising of time of most open-systems-oriented attempts to ‘design with 
time’ and ‘indeterminacy’; 
A general tendency of representation to set up and restrict attention to what happens inside 
representation (the very obvious physicality of this); 
Primary Components 
Architecture being the pure product of the abstract space of representation; 
What I have termed ‘partitioning’;  
That partitioning effectively produces a series of interrelated separable spatial (and affectual) and 
operative architectural realms – a production with serious implications for landscape; 
That this production produces (architectural) program and typology; 
That these devices (and conceptions) function as the material and the (aesthetic) means of 
evaluation of this material; 
That this assemblage involves what I term a singular aesthetic-representational machinery (or 
mechanism or assemblage itself) that is assumed to function in the landscape (this is a complex 
machinery and is discussed in detail in the section titled: ‘The Aesthetic-Representational 
Assemblage of Partitioning’ and includes such components as posited and presumed program, 
overview viewing of form as evaluation, read-off-ability of experience, the ability to see all the 
relevant relations in one readily available view etc.);  
That this has evolved into and been pushed along by the notion of projection / projective thinking / 
projective practices; 
The reliance on abstract notions (over immanent forms of evaluation); 
The propensities of ‘abstract space’ (Lefebvre);  
The positive and negative powers of the big plan (synoptic power, sucking you away from the 
middle etc.);  
A whole range of questionable theoretical conceptions about open systems; 
A certain Koolhaasian(?) ethics or attitude to the world;  
A strong tendency to produce simplistic histories of the design of landscape that provide rationales 
for the particular preoccupations being explored; 
A desire to be ambitious; 
The practices of ‘organisation’;  
An opposition to anything ‘subjective’ and a predilection for quantities, data, objective measures 
(whilst often denying the aesthetic functioning of typology and program); 
These meshing components function together to have certain productivities and negative tendencies. 
These tendencies themselves ‘then’ become part of the assemblage also: 
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The generation of a whole series of preoccupations explicitly or implicitly open-systems-oriented 
(refer to the Appendix for ‘a list of preoccupations of recent open systems oriented landscape 
design assemblages that only ‘indirectly’ engage with landscape affect.’)554 
A single great tendency to defer away from the middle of the landscape (this is the single great 
tendency of the meshing of these components – from which all else can be said to ‘follow’; 
A assumed relevance to the landscape; 
An assumption that the whole assemblage of partitioning, program and projection can be taken out 
into the landscape;  
A conflation of the affectual and the non-affectual and metric; 
A conflation of the affectual and the non-affectual in programme;  
A denial of the shiftiness of key notions such as program; 
Abstraction, often accompanied by defamiliarisation; 
A strong sense of what is considered the sorts of representations that are associated with open-
systems-oriented landscape designing (ad that others are considered improper) (this is much 
stronger than it might be assumed); 
The tendency for abstraction to be employed in relation to what exists in a manner that defers away 
from what it is abstracting from; 
A lack of critical faculty for appreciating when this occurs;  
A very common assumption that opens systems function, what I term, ‘atomistically’. This might suit 
digital proliferation processes, but it does not suit the openly heterogeneous nature of landscape; 
A strong tendency to confuse the organisational with the self-organisational (partly as the dominant 
conceptions of the self-organisational does not affirm affects); 
A tendency to confuse human-involved assemblages with other processes; 
A very strong tendency not to embrace human-involved assemblages; 
A very strong tendency to pull away from the middle of openness (landscape / urban space 
ecologies); 
A lack of conception of how determining the pre-existing landscape is in the process of design 
landscape; 
A great tendency for the imperatives of the various preoccupations that are produced in open-
systems-oriented design assemblages to draw attention away from the tendency to defer from the 
middle as if it is not a problem; 
A confusing of such things as relatively homogenous networks and fields with the openly 
heterogeneous and heterogeneously open nature of urban space ecologies / landscape; 
A lack of realisation that maps suck you away from what is happening on the ground; 
                                            
554 As I said in the Introduction: after sufficient engagement with this thesis, this list should make it obvious how 
important that open-systems thinking is to the recent discourse and practices, how open systems tends to be 
understood, how the open systems nature of the landscape tends to be understood, how such an interest is 
operationalised, that these preoccupations strongly tend not to engage with landscape affect (they are ‘indirect’ in 
this sense) and, for anyone familiar with recent open systems oriented landscape design assemblages (i.e. 
landscape urbanism) that such ‘indirect’ preoccupations make up the bulk of the preoccupations of recent 
practices. 
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A lack of critical faculty to discern when a designer who is using large scaled plans or maps  is 
departing from the middle; 
That this is related to the lack of conception that open systems not only do things themselves but 
they also ‘know themselves’ (immanence); 
That recent discourse has not embraced the immanence of open systems – and tends to rely upon 
abstract forms of judgment – even if they are not recognised as such i.e. what I term  ‘abstract 
indeterminacy’; 
A tendency not to realise that Nature only functions through singular expressions involving the 
whole of Nature;  
That the preoccupation large-scaled organisations on a surface from well-above them, strongly 
tends to defer attention away form the nature and abilities of the surface itself;  
Questionable conceptions of what landscape open systems do; 
A tendency to not to appreciate that landscapes ‘do things’ and that what it does are affects; 
A tendency to comprehend what landscape does in terms of program, metric systems etc. 
That the lack of a critical relationship to the middle of openness creates a sort of false freedom, 
power and ambition; 
A lack of conception that there is a problem. 
Etc… 
This research has ambitious aims. It wants to affirm past landscape architectural design practices and 
thinking. It also wants to identify the limitations of past practices and provide some sort of route to move 
beyond them. This thesis also wants to affirm the power of recent open systems-oriented landscape 
design assemblages, even if it seems that I wish to be mostly critical. By identifying the limitations of 
such practices and thinking this work then hopes to provide or point to options for moving beyond these 
limitations. For one thing, the reader might now be more able to precisely discern and express powers 
that have been developed in recent open-systems-oriented landscape design assemblages (i.e. what I 
would term the whole ‘aesthetic-representational assemblage’ associated with partitioning and program, 
as an example). It also argues that there are some powerful and worthy ambitions produced in recent 
conceptions – the very ambition itself – but such ambitions might be better served if the approaches to 
design were re-oriented. 
Disempowerment 
This researcher has a strong disciplinary interest and wants to empower people where they are. Design 
discourse has very strong tendencies to produce a feeling in individual designers that authority exists 
somewhere else, by someone famous, by another discipline or through engaging in ‘landscape 
urbanism’, for instance. I experience such feelings of disempowerment in students everyday as a design 
educator. This thesis attempts to provide the tools to bypass such deferral away from the here-and-now. 
To see your brain, your body and yourself as part of the world, as Spinoza teaches, is to dismiss the 
need to look elsewhere.  
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Landscape Affect555 
I would suggest that the single most important contribution that this research makes to the problem at 
hand – how to produce an affirmative open systems landscape design assemblage – and hence to the 
discipline of landscape architecture is in introducing, in a degree of detail, a significantly different 
conception of the nature of the material of landscape designing, which I have identified as being 
‘landscape affect’. This has resulted from the most sustained and intense study of how landscapes 
function in the discipline. From affect everything else flows. 
Affect & Expression 
This would not have been made possible without the help of the theorising of affect by Deleuze / 
Deleuze and Guattari. The engagement with this body of theory has been essential to this inquiry. The 
intensity of engagement with real landscapes and design investigations in this research has been 
equalled by an intensity of engagement with what has been found to be the most adequate way to 
engage with them, via the Deleuzian/Guattarian notion of affect. Affect is foreign enough and for the 
discipline to seriously embrace it requires motivated and devoted energy expended to draw out in a 
non-superficial manner how affect and affectuality function and how, what I have called ‘landscape 
affect’, functions. This has really been a decade long close reading moving back and forward between 
field studies, design investigations, using the expressiveness of the findings and the expressiveness of 
particular concepts to the findings to guide the reading and further development of thinking and 
techniques. Without such academic devotion the chances are that the findings would not have 
separated themselves from received understandings. Now that this work is done, others may engage 
with it, dispute it, and move beyond it. I have endeavoured to lay out Deleuze’s (and Guattari’s) and my 
own ideas about affect and landscape affect in enough detail and argument to be able to be evaluated 
and related to.  
The Foreignness of Affect & the Case Studies 
One of the key challenges, of course, is that affect is notoriously challenging to communicate in a 
document (the affects of documents themselves are a different matter i.e. literature). This was always 
the most challenging aspect of this work, especially knowing that the case studies might very well be 
being read/engaged with by someone who had not experienced the particular landscapes. Another is a 
concern that the foreignness of the way that the case studies have been presented might lead readers / 
examiners to simply reject or not engage with them. The particular case studies used here do require a 
certain type of work, and a different type of work than that which designers (and others) are used to. 
There has been some resistance from others to engaging in the various formats of the case studies. 
The notion of giving expression in the case studies is too much for some. No doubt, partly because they 
are different from has been experienced and that they tend to be at least a little demanding. The original 
aim was to engage with a range of different types of landscape or conditions, so as to demonstrate a 
                                            
555 For further detail about the findings of this research concerning Landscape Affect refer to the last part of Case 
Study 2: Royal Park. 
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rich sample of the sorts of things landscapes do and a variety of approaches to engaging with them. 
However, in the end the number of case studies was reduced to the minimum so as to concentrate on 
depth and detail and other parts. The two examples hopefully suggest the relevance of key concepts 
and techniques employed in them to other landscapes. A designer of infrastructure might wonder why 
they are examining a very non-urban park in a thesis about open systems designing. I would like to 
suggest that Nature does not discriminate between types of landscape. The Vietnam Veteran’s 
Memorial is part of an open system as much as any motorway system or ecology. The processes of 
Nature are what is the target here, and field studies suggest and affirm that the same sorts of affect-
production processes are involved in the most dense and the most sparse or romantic of landscapes. 
The Nature of Landscape Affect 
Landscape affects are like the affects of a painting, architecture and political practice in being products 
of Nature. However, just as painting and architecture produce different affects so does landscape. 
Landscape affects have their own characteristics. This certainly has not been openly appreciated. A 
selection, a territorialisation, of the whole environment is involved in affect. Affect involves the whole 
environment. This work, through example mostly, draws out a range of characteristics of landscape 
affects that have not been given expression before. 
Heterogeneity and Aesthetic Openness 
Anything, in time and space, immediate and distant might be involved in a landscape, what it does and 
how it does it. This heterogeneity requires an aesthetic openness to whatever might be involved and to 
however a designer might be able to engage with it. Recent opens systems design assemblages 
supremely restricted and presumptive as to what they might be preoccupied with. 
Affect and Sense 
There seems little affirmation of what happens once contemporary discourse has gotten rid of 
‘meaning’. It seems that there are systems, metrics, cool performance and little else affirmed. Affect 
actually comes with its own significance, sense (or ‘expression’ in A Thousand Plateaus). Such a 
reduction to the non-affectual aligns well with the Koolhaasian inspired approach to the design of 
landscape in giving great weight to systems and the non-affectual. Designing is about ‘making a 
difference’, affect is about making a difference. Affect makes the difference. So, whilst there may be no 
meaning, affect makes or rather produces sense (but not good or common sense). Just as with affect, 
sense is effectively ignored, even though designing is replete with affect and sense (and problem). 
Without embracing how these work there is a strong sense of not affirming practice, and not affirming 
the significance or difference-making abilities of practice and designing. A little theory allows an 
understanding of sense, and the relationship to affect and problem. The past empowerments 
perpetually coming toi meet present and anticipated empowerments allows the concreteness of power 
that has not till Deleuze received serious affirmation to be inseparable from and machinically connected 
to the most abstract nature of sense, and all before we have even thought. Consciousness feeds off 
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such affect-sense. Deleuze’s books Cinema 1 and 2 are a revelation in this regard. The case studies 
are continually touching upon affect and sense and how they function. 
A New Perception 
As Deleuze says Philosophy can change our perception. I would extend this to say that real landscapes 
themselves, in concert with Deleuzian philosophy have certainly, in our case, resulted in changes of 
perception and changes in ways of perceiving – have themselves led to new perceptual techniques. It is 
hoped that elaboration on the theoretical notions of expression and affect and the solid engagement 
with the case studies might do this somewhat for readers. I have found a strong recognition in 
audiences and designers with the Federation Square example, drawing out what they ‘already knew’ but 
did not have the words and ways of saying to say it. They continually add to the expressive ability of this 
case study with their expressions. From the very beginning of the field study exploration in the mid-
nineties we talked about an ‘interpretation-machine’, referring to what is set in train, what happens 
machinically when numbers of landscapes are engaged with in the right (expressive) sorts of ways. 
Landscapes themselves generate knowledge. More than the theory. Claramunt and Mosbach are 
saying this as well. A little theory (the notion of expression for instance) can set machines working. 
Assemblages as Involving a Change of Approach 
Assemblages have a double advantage over both ‘traditional’ and ‘contemporary’ approaches, even if 
these use the term ‘assemblages’. Assemblages involve the open heterogeneity of Nature in the 
production of singular affects and affectuality (and sense). To start to connect to (give expression) to an 
affect involuntary allows you to start to see how some of the relevant aspects of the heterogeneity 
function in the production of that affect, which then aids further affirmation and expression of the affect 
which aids further opening up of the heterogeneous dimensions of the relevant assemblage. This is an 
aesthetic and aesthetics-analytical task and is not affirmed in the recent approaches to design and is 
essential in the heterogeneously open and openly heterogeneous nature of Openness. An assemblage 
gets you to be open to whatever might be involved in whatever is being produced and to whatever might 
be involved in its production. This is certainly at odds with the positing of presumed program that seems 
to be part of much of the architecturally influenced landscape design assemblages. There seems little of 
the sort of mode of inquiry implied by the notion of assemblage employed in the discourse. This points 
to the whole ‘problematic of landscape affect’ for designers. Having engaged with many landscapes and 
case studies examining and working with landscape affects, it is very obvious that this is a vast and 
ongoing change requiring the continual development of an array of concepts and techniques. An 
apprenticeship: a disciplined apprenticeship. Such a problematic is not embraced in the discipline. It 
seems that the lack of affirmation of what should be the target of inquiry results in a deferral to more 
immediate and accessible figures to engage with, notably all that is non-affectual. The work required to 
go beyond generality is demanding. 
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2 Realms of Assemblages  
The notion of assemblage is key to re-thinking open systems landscape designing. There are two 
realms of assemblages that are particularly relevant to the design of the landscape: ‘landscape 
assemblages’ or the assemblages of the landscape and the landscape affects they produce and ‘design 
assemblages’ and the designing affects they produce. It seems that landscape assemblages have only 
weakly been embraced till now.  
This research makes a contribution also in the employment of the notion of assemblage as a research 
device. Assemblage allows for a more precise, rich, robust and critical sense of the abilities of designing 
that can only be evaluated really in terms of such abilities and for the abilities of the landscape that they 
produce.  
Assemblages are Dynamisms 
A design assemblage is a dynamism of affectuality, an affectual dynamism. The open systems oriented 
design assemblage implied in this thesis has a singular dynamism. It is a singular dynamism involving 
singular ‘parts’ each of which sets in train and machinically meshes with other parts. The whole 
assemblage producing a singular movement or trajectory, a singular arc of development and a singular 
regulative arc (hunch, discovery, emerging problem, criticality etc.). This is a dynamism that is 
constructed to engage with the very different things that openness does and the very different types of 
problems of openness, this different material. It is a dynamism evolved to come to terms with openness 
– and is continually having to newly come to terms with openness. It is also constructed to deal with 
having openness pre-existing the designer. A design transformation designers will strongly tend to 
involve an appropropriation from this pre-existing opennenss. This sets up the assemblage of openness 
to have distinctly different dynamism that that which architectural assemblages have. My discussion of 
the partitioning-program/projection assemblage was designed to draw out these two different 
dynamisms, these two different assemblages. This notion of the dynamism of heterogenous parts 
allows a strong sense of the singular dfferences of the two assemblages more than any defining 
essential element. It is the affectual dynamism of each discipline (architecture, landscape architecture) 
that each discipline ‘feels’ when they observe or experience the design assemblage of the other 
discipline. 
The Affects of Openness 
The case studies I have been involved in point toward a sort of affect that the other affects of landscape 
tend to become subsumed under or into. These might be considered ‘movements of the world that we 
are part of’. Dance and interior design also explore related affects, but openness, being 
heterogeneously open and openly heterogeneous, functions differently and involves different arts and 
practices than these arts. It is the dual challenge of how openness functions and how to engage with it 
that makes openness a challenge. Engaging with openness is always to engage with an existing 
openness, even if a site you might be working on seems ‘blank’. It is always enlivened by an existing 
urban or geographical space ecology.  
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The Material that Designers are Working is Beyond Our Expectations 
One of the great challenges with affect is that designers come with expectations of what they are 
working with. Affect and landscape affect in particular do not tend to fit into these expectations. 
Designers seem from experience to expect what they are looking at laid out in the space of 
representation in front of them. Affect is more abstract than expected, and this is registered in the 
surprise that the Pierre and Paul example elicits. It is more concrete than expected in that affects only 
function within the concrete relations of the world. I should note that recent design assemblages seem 
to have created a certain expectation for what gets called ‘indeterminacy’ or the ‘informal’ etc. Such 
expectations push expectation even further away from affect. It is hoped that the case studies, and I 
think all I can do is hope, based on how others have engaged with them, give expression to something 
of the concrete and abstract workings of affect and landscape affect. How concrete interactions produce 
abstract affects. 
Landscape Affect as Both the Material of Design and Mode of Evaluation 
Sanford Kwinter said in his ‘Architectures of Time’ that there was a ‘profound aimlessness’ in 
architecture. The same might be said for the design of landscape. On one hand, there are driving 
preoccupations of the discipline. On the other hand, without an immanent ability to evaluate the material 
being worked with then the designer and the discipline falls back onto outside guides, technical metrics, 
what seems interesting, what others value etc. Landscape affect is double in that it is both the material 
that designers work with and the mode of evaluation, the only one mode of evaluation, according to 
Antonio Negri. Affect is power, force, ability, propensity, affordance. It is also the sense, significance of 
that power. It is also problematic. Guattari says that a perception is a combination of sensory and 
problematic affects that communicate with other. Problematic affect makes connections beyond 
immediate sensory affect.556  This is a way of more practically restating Spinoza’s and Deleuze’s 
immanent forms of evaluation, discussed in this thesis most obviously in Deleuze’s discussion of how 
problems function. Problems are a product of Nature just as our way of understanding them is also.  
Indirectness 
In the Appendix I include a lecture where I lightly outline a range of what I term myths of open systems 
oriented landscape design. The basic point of the list contained within is to enumerate many of the key 
preoccupations of open systems-oriented landscape design in one place. The aim being to suggest 
what might be in common between them. What is most obviously common to them is their indirect 
relationship to the power of landscape, to affect. Many of these preoccupations have been discussed in 
Assemblage 3. I would suggest that putting these together and relating them to affect draws out what 
                                            
556 We begin from the perception in which any work of art first appears. Guattari claims it is the combination of a 
“sensory affect,“ the simple empirical perception … and a “problematic affect,“ the network of associations and 
feelings evoked by this particular sensory event …. In the problematic affect connections are made beyond my 
immediate sensual experience, introducing all sorts of temporal und emotional flows. These deterritorialising 
affects, Guattari suggests, make experience the nexus of series of affectual connections, “a multi-headed 
enunciative lay-out [agencement],“ as he puts it, of which “I“ am merely the “fluctuating intersection“, quoted in 
Zepke, Art as Abstract Machine: Aesthetics and Ontology in Deleuze and Guattari., 152. 
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might be in common with them. Each of them is not problematic in themselves. There is a tendency to 
assume that by engaging with these preoccupations, however, that designers are engaging with the 
productivity of open systems. For instance, designing with flows or movement, using notations in 
analysis, engaging with ecological change etc. None of these nor the other preoccupations involve the 
power of Nature, the power of (human) organism-environment connections. They are in Deleuze’s 
parlance, preoccupied with ‘diversity’ and not ‘difference’. It is only in relation to affect that these 
preoccupations come to life. This relationship is partly appreciated in Schumacher’s discussion of the 
architectural relationship between aesthetics and datascapes, where there is an aesthetic relationship 
between metric (data) measures and program (experience, use), etc. Although Schumacher falls into 
conflating or not distinguishing the affectual and the non-affectual, there is a recognition of affect in his 
conceptions. However, as my analysis demonstrates, as already discussed in this conclusion, the 
efficient aesthetic-representational mechanism of partitioning that he outlines falls apart when it starts to 
move into openness, for the reasons I outline. The various preoccupations in the ‘list’ can be 
considered, from the perspective of affect, to be indirectly related to what open systems of the 
landscape ‘do’. Schumacher, slightly ambiguously, affirms this for architectural interior functionality. No-
one, till now, affirms this once beyond the architectural partition. 
Openness 
I approach what I call ‘openness’ in a number of ways, and found that by discussing the very extreme 
version of architecture’s contribution to the city and the urban, via urban density, that openness could 
for the first time be partly ‘seen’ and partly affirmed, from within what is normally presumed an 
architectural realm. What was suggested was an ecology of urban space with its own affects. It might in 
a sense be produced by architecture, but once produced it gets taken up and taken away by the larger 
urban space ecology, to be appropriated by this ecology for what it (Nature) wants to do. In this sense 
architectural affects are contributors to, and become subsumed by, a greater ecology of affects, the 
landscape. I argue from experience with many examples of field studies of urban space ecologies that 
to really affirm the doings of Nature in the space of the city is to embrace the workings of the whole 
urban spatial ecology, produced by architecture (etc.) but effectively independent of it. Openness is not 
restricted to density at all (and architecture is but one part of openness), but by discussing density in the 
right manner openness emerges. I am proposing that openness, not suburbia or site, as Marot 
suggests, may be a better way to consider an urbanism of landscape architecture (which is inseparable 
from landscape architecture as others would concur). 
An exercise I carried out with an Earth-wide random geographical location generator might be relevant. 
After multiple iterations I was surprised how few urban locations were generated. After significant 
experience with landscapes of all sorts, from the most urban to the least, and even from the 
eperspective of a large aerial photograph, it seemed obvious that all of these locations were all equally 
in openness. All equally heterogeneous. Each certainly involved ‘systems’ ( in the way that 
contemporary landscape design discusses but Openness involves (human)organism-environment 
combinations, assemblages as well.  In this regard each of these locations was as equally intense, 
equally affective as the densest cities. Would contemporary open-systems-oriented approaches to the 
an affirmative open systems conception of how to design landscape  Connolly, Peter  
215 
 
design of landscapes be able to engage with the particular powers of openness in these locations? To 
some degree no doubt, but it is suggested that this will likely be to the degree that they fall back onto 
more traditional ways of understanding landscape and general intuitive practices. As such this would 
both (weakly) affirm the role of intuition (not ‘get to’ a strong sense of expressive intuition) and also 
display that their preoccupations were with the non-affectual, not with (human) organism-environment 
assemblages directly. The possibly clumsy point being made here is that talk of open systems blurs 
together the affectual and the non-affectual. There always seems the suggestion, for instance, in recent 
designer statements and imagery about what their projects engage with, that human life beyond the 
systems is being engaged with, yet there is very little indication or affirmation that recent designers and 
design discourse take such powers seriously – or that such powers even exist.  
The (Human) Organism Involvement in Open Systems. 
All of this points to a collective ‘missing of the point’ of assemblages by recent open systems oriented 
landscape design approaches - that the most relevant systems for human life are human(organism)-
environment assemblages. It is through this connection or assemblage that the power of Nature 
relevant to humans is produced. There is a serious slippage between (human organism connected) 
open systems and the (relatively) closed systems that preoccupy designers – simply because the 
former is not conceptualised and affirmed. The few examples of approaches that attempt to take this 
seriously seem fairly marginal to the dominant preoccupations and discourse. So, humans are part of 
the ‘becoming’ or the power of Nature. 
Being part of an open system – or rather being part of the production process (assemblage) and the 
product (affect) - of the system that is relevant to you has the advantage, as Deleuze and Spinoza 
affirm, of a direct connection to what the world is doing. When expression functions well there is no 
interpretation or subjectivity. Such a claim would of course likely be dismissed by the recent discourse. 
This lack of affirmation of the human organism involvement in open systems has a whole cascading 
series of implications for open-systems-oriented design disciplines that seem readily apparent, and it is 
only ‘good old intuition’ (or that part of intuition that connects to affects and sense) that seems to save 
(relatively) closed ‘systems’ from obscuring all else. It is only in embracing the human (organism) nature 
of systems that systems really come to life, function in life, have a significance, contribute to projects 
and the city. So, the human part in open systems produces the two powers of Nature that Spinoza 
champions: being or the power or the affects of the world, and knowing or the power of understanding. 
Both are part of open systems and both suffer in the discourse, and in practice, by the lack of affirmation 
of the human involvement with open systems. It is no wonder that recent open systems-oriented 
designing pays scant and general-only attention to human life in designing, simply because their ways 
of knowing are incapable of engaging with it. I would argue that this thesis probably affirms human life 
as part of open systems more fully than previous assemblages, and certainly, with the other writings of 
the author, is really the first to affirm human life in more than general ways, in affectual ways, in ways 
that are about the power of human-environment combinations or assemblages. The first to provide a 
means not to see a difference between humans-and-their-environment. 
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The Affectual and the Non-Affectual 
Architectural designers of landscape and influential architectural writings and practice employ notions 
such as program, performativity, typology, diagram etc. These terms do not, as I have attempted to 
communicate, travel very well into the design of landscape. They suffer from confusing the affectual 
(which has not been affirmed) with the non-affectual (which is seriously championed). I call it the ‘non-
affectual’ as it refers to a range of entities or characteristics, from the technical, the metric, the visually 
sensual, qualities etc. All have in common that they can be engaged with in an internalised abstract 
space free from the necessity of having to give expression to their power. The distinction of affectual / 
non-affectual is intended to shift the emphasis as it both positively identifies what the focus should be 
and that it can only be affirmed by expression. This distinction recognises that the affectual and the non-
affectual are two entirely different realms and that it is really the affectual that makes sense itself as the 
prime focus of enquiry and that the other side, the non-affectual, is centrally important in that it usually 
provides the means to engage in or with the affectual. However, the non-affectual requires the affectual 
to bring it to life, to make sense of it, to make it significant. Without an affirmation of the affectual the 
non-affectual will tend to dominate mostly because it is ‘physically’ ‘easier’, immediate and suits 
consciousness. The non-affectual is usually able to be engaged with in the abstract space of 
representation in a self-enclosed and self-referential manner and judged according to outside criteria 
and metrics. The non-affectual (the complexity of infrastructural or technical problems, the designing of 
wetlands systems, visual composition etc.) might certainly be challenging but is much less foreign than 
what might be required for the affectual. It is no wonder that the affectual and the non-affectual have 
been confused. 
Immanence 
There is an extraordinary directness about the world that Spinoza/Deleuze discover that is not obvious 
in their writings on a casual examination, where it could be easily assumed that their ideas are 
intellectualist. This directness is about power and its evaluation. The significance of an affect only 
comes from significance in relation to some motivation or situation in the world. A discovery resonates 
with an initial sensed potential and something that endangers that, for instance. Affect is as much about 
this communicating as a doing. The doing is only a doing by its ability to make a difference, to be 
significant. An affect comes with a significance and resonates with eventful situations and emerging 
problems. Recent open systems designing might have touched on self-organisation in identifying that 
some things function themselves. It seems to have not embraced that problems and significance are 
also part of Nature. Deleuze certainly takes this seriously and his conception of problems has not 
seriously been engaged with in the design disciplines. It is not enough to simply work with this ‘self-
organisation’. Why?... would be the question to ask. The aim is more to work with how the world can 
make a difference to itself. No outside metric or criteria can tell a designer if something is making a 
difference. This directness is not just the directness, the too-obviousness of affectual evaluation it is 
also that the world, Nature, provides its own means of knowing, expression. Expression is inseparable 
from immanence. Immanence is an ambition that Deleuze and Spinoza strive for. To engage with how 
the open system of landscapes really functions means embracing and affirming the immanence (from 
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within) of Nature, problems and design operativity. The notion of ‘abstract indeterminacy’, as I refer to it, 
seems a collective expectation that something is not solid is indeterminate and that is then satisfied by 
something moving or not being solid. This is an abstract slot to fit something into. It is not an evaluation 
of the power or significance of something or even the indeterminacy (in the Deleuzian sense) of affect, 
the shiftiness of power for some potential or situation. Championing immanence is not this researcher’s 
contribution to the world but teasing apart how it is betrayed in the discipline of designing landscape and 
to a little degree what might have to be embraced to embrace the aim of immanence might be. The 
serious profundity of immanence, of the power of Nature really does need to be embraced. In general it 
is not embraced. There are some indicators of an embrace in James Corner’s thinking. This thesis 
provides the basis, for the first time, of a strong form of evaluation, an immanent form of evaluation. 
A Landscape Ethics 
This is obviously all about ethics. An ecological ethics. The heterogeneous open continuum 
spontaneously produces continually new abilities obscured amongst what common sense and 
consciousness might tend to see as ‘more of the same’. Designers are part of this Nature and able to 
sense or potentially sense those bits that are relevant to us. That we can ‘never know what a body is 
capable of’ is an invitation to experiment, and for Spinoza/Deleuze this is an aesthetic challenge as 
much as a transformative one. To experiment is to ‘follow’. It is to connect yourself to the middle and to 
sense what might be relevant and how to possibly deal with it and then follow how effective something 
seems to be and what the potential of it might possibly be or what significance it might have in the 
world. To get to be able to be ethical, to move beyond expectations and our moral preoccupations, 
requires ‘experimenting’ or moving in ‘the middle’. Federation Square offers social potentials seemingly 
through the rolling paving stone surface (expressed ‘through’ the surface or the movement which is 
involved in the surface).  
There seem certain tendencies in the environmental design discourse to nullify the potential of 
openness by reducing it to the product of the economy/capitalism and not embracing that open systems 
are always, amongst the productions of capital, producing other potentials, as Koolhaas himself in a 
quiet moment and our studies of Shopping Centres attest to. Place a shopping mall into the world and 
potentials spin off. We certainly found that such potentials emerged through the way it combined with 
what was around it. The way it was part of the production of openness. Such potentials can only be 
evaluated in themselves, as real themselves, which Koolhaas was reluctant to openly do. As 
productions of Nature, of cities, of openness such potentials, such affects, tend to escape the 
techniques of partitioning (partitioning has its own potentials). Such an ethics certainly involves the non-
affectual / technical (systems, for instance) but the non-affectual / technical only makes sense, becomes 
ethical, does something, through affect. The concrete relations of openness involved in the production 
of ethical forms of life tend to escape being noticed by contemporary design assemblages. This claim 
may be questioned, but what is not able to be questioned is that such assemblages do not affirm such 
affects, such forms of life and the relations involved in them. By not affirming they tend to defer from 
what they in the background desire or might even be providing. This thesis attempts to affirm an ethics 
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of opens systems landscape designing in a situation that has tended to be only weakly ethical or even 
moral, and this includes landscape urbanism.  
The Challenge of the Middle 
The Deleuze-Guattarian middle is a critical concept. It identifies and affirms the environmental side of 
the shifting realm of human-environment relations involved in the production of affect. The architectural 
assemblage of partitioning focused on program has an inbuilt middle-connection mechanism (to the 
middle of the partitioned) through the way that viewing relates the doing of a plan to the relations 
involved in the doing (or program). The dominant design assemblages, as I have argued, almost 
immediately tend to move away from any ‘connection’ to the middle of openness. If there were to be a 
dominant negative tendency in the design of landscape it might be a pulling away or deferring away 
from ‘the middle’ of openness. To the degree that a design assemblage even engages with the middle 
of openness it then tends to suffer the tendency to pull or defer away from the middle, and has little t 
suggest that this might be happening. This occurs in the field and certainly happens working in 
representations. To embrace landscape affect for the first time provides a means to stay connected to 
the workings of Nature relevant to (human) organisms. Expression of affect is the means to stay 
connected to the middle, to the realm relevant to the production of affect. This requires all sorts of 
practices. It is an aesthetic challenge.  
A New Landscape Aesthetics 
Obviously, this thesis wants to affirm an aesthetics of (landscape) affects. On one hand, it aims to 
conceptualise what such an aesthetics might be like and it also, probably more in the case studies, 
touches on a series of aesthetic techniques developed for openness (landscape). This comes at a time 
when anything ‘subjective’ very strongly (and morally) tends to be considered improper. This thesis 
hopefully goes someway to being able to distinguish expressive non-subjective practices from what 
might really be subjective, haphazard and general with respects to landscape. Spinoza certainly 
distinguishes weak and strong ways of ‘understanding’. Even expressive aesthetic landscape design 
practice moves in and out of being expressive. It is a challenge to stay connected. There are no 
guarantees. ‘Connecting’ requires a whole range of disciplines and practices which are given 
expression, confidence and helped along helped along by Deleuzian theory but a whole emerging realm 
of technique needs to be developed, which might feed-off such theory but which is its own thing and is 
not reducible to Deleuzian theory. Expressive practice knows when it is ‘connecting’. These can halt the 
tendency of deferring away from giving expression to what the landscape and designing does. This is a 
continual very concrete challenge. This thesis introduces a range of more general principles and a 
range of specific techniques. Some of these have been discussed. Much of this might not be that 
obvious, such as how language can be made more or less expressive, how it functions expressively 
with drawings etc. How drawings can be brought to life? How are drawings expressive differently from 
words? Photographs can ‘kill’ but how to use them expressively?  
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A New Function for Representation 
Expressiveness and affect adds a new, and most important function for representation. Representation 
is not about re-presenting anything, as virtually all the theorising of representation in landscape falls into 
assuming, and the new multi-author book titled ‘Representing Landscape’557 also assumes. How to 
think beyond this? Put simply, relations in time and space involving the connection of environment and 
(human) organisms produce affects. Affects cannot be graphically represented. They can, however, be 
given expression through giving expression to the action of the world eg. the social shiftiness of 
Federation Square. What can be graphically engaged with is the relations involved in the production of 
affect and the relationship between the changing of relations to the change of affect. So, the 
relationships involved in drawings can be brought to life through relationship to landscape affects, if 
connected to the expression given to intensity and affect. Representations can therefore be brought to 
life, made to function in relation to some affect, in relation to some problem. This is very different 
conception of representation than is championed in the discourse, which does not mean that there are 
not already expressive representational practices but to the extent that they are they tend not to be 
affirmed and remain obscured and only weakly expressive. So, the function of a design representation 
might be seen as extensively engaging in the relations relevant to affect and in doing so transforming 
such extensive relations into intensive and affectual and problematic design machines or parts of 
problematic design machines – so that a change of a representational relation results in changes of 
affects and life, changes that make a difference, and that tell you that they are making a difference. No 
one has said this with respect to the design of landscape before. 
Affirming What Openness ‘Does’ 
The case studies’ intention is to communicate that openness does things itself and that these are 
significant and very concrete, even if this concreteness seems to function a little differently to what 
designers, landscape architects included, expect. The Royal Park case study attempts to make 
extensive (spatial) drawn and more designerly relations to intensity and affect in a way that the 
Federation Square case study does not attempt to. The Royal Park case study examines the detail of 
the process of the production of affect to a degree where it might encourage designers to question what 
they can connect to and engage with just by focusing on masterplan scale drawings, which tends to be 
the case. The longitudinal sections, for instance, attempt to get at the effort, time and investment 
involved in the assemblage. Effort, time and investment devoted are not the sorts of things that tend to 
be registered or related to in most landscape and urban representations. Extreme examples are the way 
that the Architectural Association representations present the landscape beyond the organisations that 
they are preoccupied with. These landscapes or surfaces seem totally symmetrical, frictionless abstract 
spaces, or, more tellingly, nothing beyond this is affirmed. There is a really obvious though undiscussed 
series of affects that happens when plan representations come together with landscapes. They seem 
and do empower ways to engage with them and equally do the opposite, drawing the designer away 
from the middle, into the internal system or form (or ‘process’) relations produced by the drawing. The 
                                            
557 Amoroso, Nadia, ed. Representing Landscape: A Visual Collection of Landscape Architectural Drawings 
(London: Routledge, 2012). 
an affirmative open systems conception of how to design landscape  Connolly, Peter  
220 
 
dominant preoccupations of landscape, in the name of open systems, or certainly involving 
preoccupations which have are open systems-oriented, such as (abstract) indeterminacy, designing 
with time, the design of systems etc. predominantly defer from the power, affect of landscape. Elizabeth 
Meyer, in her discussion of site referred to in this thesis, and many others have become dismayed that 
landscape seems to be about systems design, or the array of organisation of systems on what has been 
treated as little more than a neutral surface (flat, ‘topological’ or faceted). ‘Systems’ are one of the non-
affectual realms of the design of landscape. Such systems are always, beyond their internalised 
purposes, also involved in the production of affect. An ecology, for instance, is always doing other 
things, social, neighbourly, urban things. An example of any real wetland, for instance, will tell you this. 
However, the predominant preoccupation of the discourse is with internalised functioning of systems 
and not on the externalised connection that the system has with the rest of the world and human life, 
which brings to life the system, makes it an ‘open’ system of relevance to the (human) organism and the 
life of the city.  
Affirming the Everyday 
One of the tendencies of open systems-oriented designing is to defer from the everyday world and the 
potentials of the everyday. A symptom is the lack of regard for real examples of landscape – and of the 
real landscape.  The preoccupations of recent design assemblages seem to promote this. Projection, 
convolution, digital design techniques, systems design all tend to, in the way that they tend to be 
employed, tend to defer from the middle. This does not get discussed in the discourse. 
Affirming Practice 
A lot has been made of ‘design intelligence’ and pragmatics in recent times, owing a great deal to 
Koolhaas and Deleuze and Guattari. The theorist of this post-theory time, besides Koolhaas, might be 
considered to be Michael Speaks. Recent open-systems-oriented landscape design assemblages 
strongly tend to align themselves with this pragmatism. Speaks makes good use of Spinoza’s notion of 
the body and how it is affected and affects the environment. In his essay, ‘Design Intelligence Part 1: 
Introduction’ of 2002, he utilises Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza’s notion of the body, which I give some 
attention to, to communicate what ‘design intelligence’ might be. Like Spinoza, he says Deleuze defines 
the body as any corporeal arrangement composed of an infinite number of parts or particles held 
together when they move in unison as the same speed. He says ‘a body has the capacity to affect and 
be affected by other bodies’. ‘If an architecture is such a body, then it becomes more powerful to the 
degree that it transforms the chatter of little truths into design intelligence.’ He goes onto provide 
examples of design intelligence, citing James Corner and Stan Allen’s (at that time) Field Operations’ 
deployment of ‘interactive layers and fields rather than single design elements’. ‘These “field operations” 
trigger the emergence of new forms of natural and urban life that evolve over time into self-organised 
artificial ecologies teaming with life.’558 Field Operations’ Downsview Park scheme entry of that time, on 
one hand, pays significant attention to scientifically understood ecological systems. In terms of human 
                                            
558 Site Matters: Design Concepts, Histories, and Strategies., 212-213. 
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life this seems to be focused on the layout of paths in ways that humans might interact with one another 
in a variety of ways. He also focuses on processes of decision-making and community involvement. His 
mapping work, which I also analyse in this thesis, evokes self-organisational life yet on closer 
inspection, I argue, does not embrace landscape affects. Downsview Park shows no sign that he 
engages or affirms anything more. Corner writes an essay which champions Speaks’ notion of Design 
Intelligence.559 Design intelligence seems, at least with landscape, to focus on the ability of the designer 
to affect and be affected: to employ its connectivity to the environment and situations in the production 
of design intelligence. This is a highly valuable notion, if understood affectually. Practice is an affectual 
realm. It is notable that there is significant attention given to the scientific-ecological and at the same 
time a general and very traditional normal approach to the human dimension of landscape, through 
‘reading-off’ human life off the plans at the master plan scale. Nothing else is suggested here (or 
anywhere else). Neither Speaks nor Corner/Allen seems aware of the lack of affirmation of the 
difference of the human-environment open systems functioning. Spinoza’s notion of the body would be 
very useful here, and would clarify that the body, as a human-environment relation produces affects 
shared between the organism and the environment. It seems that design intelligence is intelligent about 
the Spinozan-designer side of landscape design but not very capable of engaging with the Spinozan-
landscape side. An assemblage is a body and neither seems to affirm the assemblage of bodily 
dimension, apart from with general evocation and mixing it up with organic life. A real ‘design 
intelligence’ might employ the bodily powers of the designers to draw out the bodily powers of human-
environment assemblages: the powers of designing becoming the powers of making a difference to and 
with landscape. There is a design intelligence for the landscape that has not been explored yet? 
Non-problem 
There are serious issues with the discourse regarding the nature of the medium of landscape and how 
designers engage with it, yet there is not a great deal of discussion around this topic. There is a sense 
of disempowerment and scepticism in landscape architecture, symptoms of concerns about recent 
designing which is associated with open and complex systems, yet there has been little clarification of 
the nature of this problem. This thesis attempts to make this non-problem a problem. 
Many Techniques and Concepts 
This thesis introduces and reconstructs many concepts and techniques relevant to the problem of how 
to conceptualise an affirmative open systems oriented landscape design assemblage. The landscape 
architectural elaboration on the notion of assemblage is a key contribution to this investigation. There 
are also a range of concepts and techniques directly relevant to the practice of design. 
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A Range of Criticisms of Various Practices 
This thesis also provides a series of critiques of dominant open systems oriented landscape design 
practices that have so far not been made. It identifies the various approaches or assemblages that tend 
to share certain commonalities, most notably a lack of engagement with what (human)-organism-
environment assemblages actually do, but also many things which seem to come from architecture with 
probably not enough critical transformation in the process. I will strongly suggest that recent open-
systems oriented landscape design assemblages are just that, open systems-oriented. My overall 
contention is that they together amount to a tentative engagement with open systems for the reasons 
outlined in this thesis. 
An Affirmative Open Systems Landscape Design Assemblage? 
I argue that my fieldwork provides the means to understand and tsrat t engage with how open ystems 
actually function. In this I would argue that we can make the shift to assemblages that have been 
inspired by the ideas of open systems – open-systems-oriented landscape design assemblages – to 
assemblages that engage directly with the open systems nature of landscape – open systems 
landscape design assemblages. The embrace of landscape affects and expression in this thesis allows 
me to embrace that forgotten aspect of open systems, that not only are open systems self-doing but that 
they are self-knowing. This means that we can produce an affirmative conception rather than just a 
conception.   
The original ambition of this work was that the various analyses would be brought together to produce 
such an affirmative open systems landscape design assemblage. What has resulted has not been 
distilled down and expressed fully in the form of an assemblage - this is a job for future writing. This 
thesis has, however, opened up ways to understand the problem, what to strategically focus on and 
how. I believe that it offers a rich resource of useful components for the serious task of producing an 
affirmative open systems landscape design assemblage to the discipline – and something of how they 
go together. 
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Part 1 (the first 18 pages) of this section is located in the body of the thesis and the remaining part 
follows over the page. 
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DELEUZE’S AESTHETICS OF AFFECT  PART 2 
The first part (the first 18 pages) of Deleuze’s Aesthetics of Affect can be found in the body of the 
thesis. 
The role of the Attributes 
“The univocity of being is expressive because of the role played by the attributes. God as Substance 
consists of an infinity of attributes, each one expressing an eternal and infinite essence of God (Ethics, 
1, D6). Modes express Substance in an actual and determinate way, each mode being a modification 
of Substance, expressed according to the essence of each attribute. So in a schematic sense, 
Substance expresses itself, attributes express its essence, while modes arc expressions within the 
attributes, and hence expressions of the essence of Substance. Modes in relation to the attributes arc, 
as Deleuze comments, ‘an expression, as it were, of expression itself’ (EPS, 14/10). That is, the 
expressed (Substance) has no existence outside of its expression (modes), because modes express 
the essence (attributes) of what expresses itself”.1 
Zepke summarises the whole schema succinctly: 
Or following Spinoza, even more succinctly: Substance…, which expresses itself; attributes …, 
which are its expressions; essence…, which is expressed (in modes). 
Deleuze cites the oft-repeated definition of attribute: “By attribute I understand what the intellect 
perceives of a Substance, as constituting its essence“ 2 . For Deleuze, in common with some 
commentators, sees this definition (this not being the only translation) as being, with the emphasis on 
constituting, ‘genetic’ and to do with the production of essences. 
Attributes exist in Act 
Substance, or God/Nature, does not pre-exist its attributes, just as it does not pre-exist its actual 
expressions, the attributes. “The attributes are the immanent formal elements that constitute God‘s 
absolute nature, but in being the formal constituents of God‘s essence they are also the mechanisms 
of God‘s expression in differentiated things.” 3  However, attributes exist ‘formally’, and, Deleuze 
stresses, among the many senses of the word ‘formal’ we must bear in mind the one in which it is 
opposed to ‘eminent’ or ‘analogical’. Substance should never be thought of as comprehending its 
attributes eminently, nor should attributes, in their turn, be thought of as containing the essences of 
modes.  
Analogies, Properties & Expression 
Spinoza needed to bypass the traditional conception of attributes. Using May to summarise the more 
traditional conception of attributes once more: “Attributes are the characteristics or essences of 
                                            
1 Zepke, Stephen, Art as Abstract Machine: Aesthetics and Ontology in Deleuze and Guattari  (London and New 
York: Routledge, 2005). 43. 
2 Spinoza, Ethics, 1, D4 
3 Zepke, Art as Abstract Machine: Aesthetics and Ontology in Deleuze and Guattari. 44. 
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substance, modes their concrete appearance in reality. An attribute of mental substance is that it 
thinks; a mode is a specific thought. An attribute of physical substance is that it is extended. My body 
is one of its modes. God’s attributes are omniscience, omnipotence, etc.”4 
He needed this to escape the transcendence of a substance outside of reality. As Deleuze says, 
“Spinoza's philosophy remains in part unintelligible if one does not see in it a constant struggle against 
the three notions of equivocation, eminence and analogy.”5 In reverse, Spinoza is seeking a univocity, 
and not an equivocity, which requires eminence and analogy to understand the relationship between 
‘creatures’ and God. 
So, Spinoza’s conception of attributes as described above moves away from more traditional notions 
of attributes, which were used to discuss God. Whilst Spinoza identifies an infinity of attributes, 
humans can only know two, thought and extension. More traditional conceptions of attributes 
attributed propria (properties) to God. Such properties involved borrowing analogies from ‘creatures’. 6 
God was infinite, perfect, immutable, eternal, omniscient, omnipresent etc. Without going into the 
details of Spinoza’s argument, Deleuze shows how expression is different from analogy through a 
discussion of propria (properties). For Spinoza,  “propria are just adjectives (i.e. wobbly 
box)”7…”proprium is what belongs to a thing but can never explain what it is…they express nothing… 
they are not expressive”.8 
Hardt, following Deleuze as has been sketched above, says “properties are notions impressed on us 
that cannot make us understand anything about nature, because they do not present us with a 
common form.”9 What is common form? 
Common Form as the means for God/Nature to exist in the world 
Attributes as explained are the mechanism that Substance / God / Nature exists in its essences. 
Attributes are therefore ‘common’ to Substance and modes, according to what Deleuze calls the ‘rule 
of convertibility’ whereby “the essence is not only that without which a thing can neither be nor be 
conceived, but is conversely that which cannot be nor be conceived outside the thing“ (EPS, 47/38). 
The attributes simultaneously constitute God’s essence and God’s existence. Whilst Spinoza says that 
the essence of attributes is ‘an unlimited, infinite quality of Substance’ it is only the modes ‘within’ the 
attributes that this essence and God exists, or becomes a quantity of this quality. The common form of 
attributes is the means for God/Nature to exist in the world. It is the means for God/Nature to be 
immanent in the world, in the acts of the production of essences. 
                                            
4 May, Todd, Gilles Deleuze: An Introduction  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
5 Deleuze, Gilles, Expressionism in Philosophy, trans. Joughin, Martin (New York: Zone Books, 1990, original 
French edition: 1968). 48-49. 
6 ‘Whenever we proceed by analogy we borrow from creatures certain characteristics in order to attribute them to 
God either equivocally or eminently. Thus God has Will. Understanding, Goodness, Wisdom and so on. but has 
them equivocally or eminently Analogy cannot do without equivocation or eminence. and hence contains a 
subtle anthropomorphism. just as dangerous as the naive variety. It is obvious that a triangle, could it speak, 
would say that God was eminently triangular.’ ibid. 45. 
7 An adjective is a 'describing' word; the main syntactic role of which is to qualify a noun or noun phrase, giving 
more information about the object signified. 
8 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy. 49-50. 
9 Hardt, Michael, Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy  (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2002). 
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Distinction of Attributes 
The attributes are not only characterized by an internal common form, in terms of humans the two 
attributes are ‘formally distinct’ as well. According to Hardt, formal distinction complements formal 
commonality and this complement is required for the absolute immanence of God / Nature in the 
world.10 With thought and extension we have “two orders, that of formal reason and that of being”. 11 
Together common form, or the expressive attributes, and the distinction of attributes  constitutes a 
conception of the univocity of being. Previously I discussed univocity as requiring that “nothing, not 
even God, exists in a reality that would lie beyond the reality of the world, as a separate 
transcendent”,12 and determining realm. Univocity also means that the attributes are both expressions 
of God and that neither should be determining of the other. “Univocity means more precisely that 
being is expressed always and everywhere in the same voice; in other words, the attributes each 
express being in a different form but the same sense”.13 The singularity of being, or real distinction, 
requires both common form and the formal distinction among the attributes to achieve univocity. 
The attributes are not only characterised by ‘an internal common form’ but also ‘an external plurality’. 
‘The formal commonality embodied in each infinite attribute has to be complemented by the formal 
distinction among the different attributes’ for being to be expressed in “a different form in the same 
sense.”14 For Spinoza there is only one substance, and real distinction is rather between the attributes, 
in relation to this one substance. An “attribute cannot exists and cannot be conceived without the aid 
of the another, insofar as they are really distinct.’ 15  Formal distinction becomes, in effect, real 
distinction. That is, from the ‘viewpoint of quantity’ there is only one substance for all attributes. 
According to Deleuze, “Attributes are formally affirmed of substance; they are formally predicated of 
the substance whose essence they constitute, and of the modes whose essences they contain. 
Spinoza constantly reminds us of the affirmative character of the attributes that define substance…”  
Natural Knowledge & Expression 
Properties are, as Spinoza says, indefinite and inexpressive. For Spinoza, however, “the whole order 
of Nature is expressive.” God does not express himself in signs or propria. In contrast ‘Natural 
knowledge’ implies the essence of God…because it is “knowledge of the attributes that actually 
express this essence.” “The only names expressive of God, the only divine expressions, are then the 
attributes: common forms predicable of substances and modes. If we know only two of these, it is 
because we are constituted by a mode of Extension and a mode of Thought.”16 
Spinoza claims that attributes are affirmed of substance. Attributes are formally affirmed of substance; 
they are formally predicated of the substance whose essence they constitute, and of the modes whose 
                                            
10 Ibid. 65 
11 Ibid. 65 
12 Ibid. 65 
13 Ibid. 66 
14 Ibid. 65-66 
15 Duffy, Simon, The Logic of Expression: Quality, Quantity and Intensity in Spinoza, Hegel and Deleuze  
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006). 98-99. 
16 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy. 59. 
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essences they contain.17 This follows from how attributes exist in nature, formally, in act, and not 
eminently. They are “formally affirmed of substance; they are formally predicated of the substance 
whose essence they constitute, and of the modes whose essences they contain.”18 
It follows directly from Spinoza’s real distinction, which “elevates univocity to the level of affirmation”. 
In the Spinozian attribute, “the expression of being is the affirmation of being”.19  “Attributes are 
affirmations; but affirmation, in its essence is always formal, actual, univocal: therein lies its 
expressivity”.20 Spinoza’s philosophy is a “philosophy of pure affirmation. Affirmation is the speculative 
principle on which hangs the whole of The Ethics”. In the Spinozian context, Deleuze gives affirmation 
an original and precise definition: It is a speculative principle based on the absolute singularity and 
univocity of being, or, in other words, on the full expressivity of being. 21 
The few authors who discuss the notion of the ‘affirmative character of the attributes’ tend to stick 
closely to the text, so it remains somewhat unclear how it is being interpreted. In terms of a fully 
immanent conception of affirmation, Francois Dosse draws out Spinoza’s emphasis on expression 
rather than Cartesian consciousness, where “expressing covers an ontological dimension whose 
impact is to oppose the potentialities of a philosophy of nature to Cartesian thinking.”22 Deleuze, in 
Practical Philosophy, says that “Knowledge is not the operation of a subject but the affirmation of the 
idea in the mid: “It is never we who affirm or deny something of a thing; it is the thing itself that affirms 
or denies something of itself in us” (short Treatise, II, 16, 5) where “the kinds of knowledge are modes 
of existence, because knowing embraces the types of consciousness and the types of affects that 
correspond to it, so that the whole capacity for being is filled.”23 It may even be that Curley, the most 
respected translator of Spinoza, who tends not to support Deleuze’s translations, says it simplest: “the 
mind’s affirmation involves the idea which is affirmed; and less obviously, the idea involves the 
affirmation.”24 Though it will not be discussed just yet, Deleuze relies upon Nietzsche’s notion of 
eternal return, in concert with an embrace of modes, effectively without attributes and substance, to 
fully provide “the effective realization of …univocity”25 and the affirmation of being, but this is beyond 
the scope of the present discussion. 
Expression & Signs: Expressions are productive and critical 
The way that properties and signs function is in distinct contrast to the way that expression functions. 
Just as expression gets you to do things so properties and signs do also, and that the latter deserves 
attention like the former. Deleuze connects the way that properties function to the way that ‘signs’ 
                                            
17 Ibid. 60. 
18 Ibid. 60. 
19 Hardt, Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy. 66. 
20 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy. 60. 
21 Ibid. 60. 
22 Dosse, Francois Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari: Intersecting Lives trans. Glassman, Deborah (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2010). 
23 Deleuze, Gilles, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, trans. Hurley, Robert (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1988 
(original French edition: 1970)). 81-82. 
24 Spinoza: Issues and Directions : The Proceedings of the Chicago Spinoza Conference ed. Curley, Edwin and 
Patricia Fetzer Moreau (Leiden, The Netherlands: E.J. Brill, 1990). 119. 
25 Deleuze, Gilles, Difference and Repetition, trans. Patton, Paul (London: Athlone, 1994 (original French edition 
1968)). 51. 
 an affirmative open systems conception of how to design landscape  Connolly, Peter  
vi 
function. They “are not expressive…rather they are like impressed notions”.26 Propria are not only 
inexpressive they are also associated with ‘signs’. Signs, impressive imperative words, ‘always attach’ 
themselves ‘to proprium’, and signify a ‘commandment’. “Whenever one takes a sign for an 
expression, one sees mysteries everywhere”. Spinoza proposes an explanation for signs “which is a 
sort of genesis of an illusion”.27 
“Propria are neither negative or positive but indefinite”. 28  Spinoza is here making a connection 
between how inexpressive propria (usually characterized by adjectives) that these are associated with 
‘signs’ (and mysteries) and that these signify a ‘commandment’. Not only are propria inexpressive and 
hence defer you from a power that might have been available to you but they also function as 
‘commandments’ that you come under the power of.  
For Deleuze, “the end of Scripture is to subject us to models of life, to make us obey, and ground our 
obedience.” 29  A “sign (impressive, imperative word) always attaches to a proprium, signifies a 
commandment.”30 Deleuze’s target is not scripture, so much as the functioning of signs in general. An 
‘expression (expressive word), in contrast, always relates to an attribute, it expresses an essence, 
nature in the infinitive, it makes it known to us.’  
Even technical rules take on a moral aspect when we make no sense of them and only cling to a sign. 
So, not only does Spinoza provide a device, the notion of expression, to connect to the positive but in 
doing so provides a critical device to identify the negative. Critical here can be considered positive and 
negative, in terms of the positive. Expression has this double power of connecting to power and 
connection to a criticality provided by this connection. The inexpressive becomes obvious. The 
functioning of signs, commandments and mysteries – social, discursive and in practice – becomes 
obvious. 
Spinoza was as interested in the power of Nature and the function of expression in identifying and 
capturing this power as he was in the mechanisms that defer you from such identification and capture. 
The way that deferral from the power available to you is a double movement touched on here will be 
important to the larger argument of this thesis.  
Understanding as the only capacity to perceive what is expressed 
At the same time as Spinoza reminding us “the affirmative character of the attributes that define 
substance”, he seamlessly reminds us of “need for any good definition to be itself affirmative”. So, on 
one hand, being and understanding are both affirmative and less distinguishable than we might 
assume. On the other, expression opens up a new conception of knowledge. Just because ‘attributes 
explicate substance’ means that they are “correlative with an understanding in which all explication is 
reproduced or ‘explicates’ itself objectively.”31 
                                            
26 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy. 50. 
27 Ibid. 57. 
28 Ibid. 55. 
29 Ibid. 56. 
30 Ibid. 57. 
31 Ibid. 62. 
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Deleuze identifies in Spinoza an ancient interest in sense, which he soon after gives serious attention 
to in the Logic of Sense and extends in each of his studies revising it as he goes, and includes the 
notions of expression (and content), territory and refrain in A Thousand Plateaus. “One distinguishes 
in an expression (say, a proposition) what it expresses and what it designates. What is expressed is, 
so to speak, a sense that has no existence outside the expression”. Just as Spinoza opens up thought 
to sense he opens up a new capacity of thought. “It is because attributes are expressions that they are 
necessarily referred to the understanding as the only capacity for perceiving what is expressed.” Not 
only new capacity but the only capacity for perceiving what is expressed. Sense “must thus be 
referred to an understanding that grasps it objectively, that is, ideally.” However, even though it 
focuses on the expression “it is predicated of the thing, and not of the expression itself.” 
“Understanding relates it to the object itself; understanding relates it to the object designated, as the 
essence of that object. One can then conceive how names may be distinguished by their senses.”32 
What is expressed is sense and this relates to the essence of that object. Understanding provides 
access to the essence of Nature. 
It is at this point, with the use of formal distinction, which has become a real distinction, where ‘the 
concept of univocal Being is perfectly determinate, as what is predicated in one and the same sense 
of substance in itself, and of modes that are in something else,’ that ‘immanent cause takes over, in 
Spinoza, from univocity’. God (Nature) ‘is said to be cause of all things in the very sense that he is 
said to be cause of himself’. 
The Absolute & Expression 
According to Deleuze the real distinction between attributes provides access to the absolute, to God, 
to Nature. ‘God’s nature (natura naturans) is expressive…Expression is not simply manifestation, but 
is also the constitution of God (nature) himself’ (bracket added). “Life, that is expressivity, is carried 
into the absolute”.33 At the moment he raises the stakes and broadens the perspective he begins to 
describe how expression seems to function as the widening out of the perspective seems to clarify the 
functioning of expression and the significance of it simultaneously. By moving beyond Cartesian 
“infinite perfection … to absolute infinity’ he also discovers that ‘no nature lacks anything; all forms of 
being are affirmed”.34 It would be easy to gloss over that such observations are not just speculative but 
practical principles. 
Expression is found to work in ways that need affirmation themselves, just as the practical principles 
warrant, for Spinoza, affirmation. Expressive forms are the ‘fount of things’.35 Attributes are mirrors 
and seeds: mirrors, in that ‘essence is reflected and multiplied in attributes…each expresses in its kind 
the essence of substance: they relate necessarily to an understanding, as mirrors to an eye which 
sees in them an image’. Seeds, in the sense that ‘what is expressed is at the same time involved in its 
expression, as a tree in its seed: the essence of substance is not so much reflected in the attributes as 
constituted by the attributes that express it; attributes are not so much mirrors as dynamic or genetic 
                                            
32 Ibid. 59-62. 
33 Ibid. 80-81. 
34 Ibid. 81. 
35 Ibid. 78. 
 an affirmative open systems conception of how to design landscape  Connolly, Peter  
viii 
elements’. Without continually pointing it out my elaboration of Deleuze’s study of Spinoza, as per the 
other is intended to not only draw attention to the mechanisms of Nature but practical principles and 
devices where they warrant attention. 
Modes are Expressions of God/Nature 
So, attributes exist in act, in the modes. Modes are modifications of Substance, in the form of 
particular things. “Particular things’ are ‘affections of God’s attributes…or modes by which God‘s 
attributes are expressed in a certain and determinate way’ (Ethics, 1, P25c see also Ethics, 111, P6d). 
The modes are the expression of God, as Spinoza says quite specifically: “Whatever exists expresses 
the nature, or essence of God in a certain and determinate way, that is, whatever exists expresses in 
a certain and determinate way the power of God, which is the cause of all things” (Ethics, 1, P36d).  
Extrinsic parts (modes) form a whole, but through their constantly variable relations this is a dynamic 
whole undergoing continual transformation, and forming an infinitely changeable universe. As a result 
God, as Nature, and as expressed in the modes, is this permanent becoming, and has an infinite 
power of expression. Nature is the production of essences in modes.  
Modes are distinguished by their abilities to be affected and by the degrees of power resulting from 
their abilities to be affected. By characterizing modes by how they are affected, modes are opened up 
to each other, to each other’s affects and to how each other’s affects are affected by other affects and 
to the whole of infinite substance as an infinite and infinitely connected substance. 
The Shift to Power 
The shift from the idea of God to power 
“how can one possibly embark on a project starting from the idea of God, from the absolute?” 36 
So far the exposition of Spinoza’s thinking has focused on his speculative philosophy of Nature. This 
speculation ‘traces the contours of being’s productive dynamic’, the processes of Nature. To make the 
shift to a practical philosophy requires following his embrace of power as being the essence of being. 
Hardt says “The seeds of the Spinozian principle of power can be found in the … proofs of the 
existence of God”. that, “like Descartes, Spinoza begins from the ‘idea of God’ and asserts that the 
cause of this idea must exist and contain formally all that the idea contains objectively (Short Treatise 
I:3)”.37 The argument for the existence of God is not relevant here but the discussion of the idea of 
God is useful for understanding Spinoza’s conception of the expressive workings of Nature, the 
concreteness of expression itself and to begin to suggest all that follow from it. Expressionism in 
Philosophy does not communicate the concreteness of the ‘idea of God’ and hence why knowing 
about it might be relevant. To get at this, we will return to the particular Deleuze lecture on Spinoza 
that we started with at the beginning of this chapter as it provides useful examples and clarifications. 
The particular section of the lecture draws out the concrete relationship between the idea of God and 
power. It also serves to reconnect the text back to affect and its concreteness, which is obscured in 
                                            
36 Hardt, Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy. 59. 
37 Ibid. 71. 
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the pre-power-pragmatics / speculative part of Expressionism in Philosophy that the discussion has so 
far been concentrated on. 
In this section we will follow Deleuze outlining the difference between idea and affect38 and between 
the ‘objective’ and ‘formal’ realities of an idea, for us to get to, for the moment what the ‘idea of God’ 
is. These two terms will become very important in the discussion of Spinoza’s method which follows 
the section on power. (Highlights have been added to aid understanding) 
Firstly, Deleuze wants to communicate what affect is by distinguishing it from an idea. So, ‘what is an 
idea?’ “What is called an idea, in the sense in which everyone has always taken it in the history of 
philosophy, is a mode of thought which represents something. A representational mode of thought. 
For example, the idea of a triangle is the mode of thought which represents the triangle”.39 This 
“aspect of the idea has been termed its ‘objective reality’”. “The idea, insofar as it represents 
something, is said to have an objective reality. It is the relation of the idea to the object that it 
represents”.  
Thus we start from a quite simple thing: the idea is a mode of thought defined by its representational 
character. This already gives us a first point of departure for distinguishing idea and affect (affectus) 
because we call affect any mode of thought which doesn't represent anything. So what does that 
mean? Here I will repeat an example already discussed: 
“Take at random what anybody would call affect or feeling, a hope for example, a pain, a love, 
this is not representational. There is an idea of the loved thing, to be sure, there is an idea of 
something hoped for, but hope as such or love as such represents nothing, strictly nothing”.   
Then, Deleuze discusses a second way of presenting the idea-affect relation.  
Yet an idea not only has an objective reality but it also has a formal reality. “What is the formal reality 
of the idea? Once we say that the objective reality is the reality of the idea insofar as it represents 
something, the formal reality of the idea… is… the reality of the idea insofar as it is itself something”.  
The objective reality of the idea of the triangle is the idea of the triangle insofar as it represents the 
triangle as thing, but the idea of the triangle is itself something’… the idea has a formal reality since it 
is itself something insofar as it is an idea’.40   
‘What does this mean, the formal reality of the idea?’ ‘This formal reality of the idea will be what 
Spinoza very often terms a certain degree of reality or of perfection that the idea has as such. As 
such, every idea has a certain degree of reality or perfection. Undoubtedly this degree of reality or 
                                            
38 To remind the reader, the mode of affect discussed in this example is affectus, a mode which Spinoza terms a 
passion. It is the mode of affect where we do not yet have possession of our own power of existing. By 
‘connecting’ to affectus, however, the example provides potential access to the higher forms of affect and to the 
realm of affect in general. 
39 Deleuze, Gilles, "Lecture on Spinoza 24/01/1978," (Seminars given between 1971 and 1987 at the Universite 
de Paris VIII Vincennes and Vincennes St-Denis).(1978), 
http://www.webdeleuze.com/php/texte.php?cle=14&groupe=Spinoza&langue=2. 1. 
40 The full remaining part of the quote is ‘…moreover, insofar as it is something, I can form an idea of this thing, I 
can always form an idea of the idea. I would say therefore that not only is every idea something—to say that 
every idea is the idea of something is to say that every idea has an objective reality, it represents something—
but I would also say that the idea has a formal reality since it is itself something insofar as it is an idea’.  
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perfection is connected to the object that it represents, but it is not to be confused with the object: that 
is, the formal reality of the idea, the thing the idea is or the degree of reality or perfection it 
possesses in itself, is its intrinsic character. The objective reality of the idea, that is the relation of 
the idea to the object it represents, is its extrinsic character; the extrinsic character and the intrinsic 
character may be fundamentally connected, but they are not the same thing.  
More directly and concretely Deleuze offers an example: “The idea of God and the idea of a frog have 
different objective realities, that is they do not represent the same thing, but at the same time they do 
not have the same intrinsic reality, they do not have the same formal reality, that is one of them—you 
sense this quite well—has a degree of reality infinitely greater than the other's (my emphasis). The 
idea of God has a formal reality, a degree of reality or intrinsic perfection infinitely greater than 
the idea of a frog, which is the idea of a finite thing.  
The idea of God assumes great importance in Spinoza’s system. Whilst it here is associated with the 
formal reality of a thought of God it will be transposed through the realisation that formal reality of any 
thought is the formal reality of God.  
There is thus a formal reality of the idea, which is to say the idea is something in itself—something 
you can sense quite well—this formal reality is its intrinsic character and is the degree of reality or 
perfection that it envelopes in itself.  
“Just now, when I defined the idea by its objective reality or its representational character, I opposed 
the idea immediately to the affect by saying that affect is precisely a mode of thought which has no 
representational character. Now I come to define the idea by the following: every idea is something, 
not only is it the idea of something but it is something, that is to say it has a degree of reality which is 
proper to it. Thus at this second level I must discover a fundamental difference between idea and 
affect.  
The language of ‘idea’ can seem intellectualist and hence be misleading and Deleuze offers an 
example that suggests a much wider sense of idea, one closer to Deleuze’s main interests. He says 
that “our ideas succeed each other constantly: one idea chases another, one idea replaces another 
idea for example, in an instant. A perception is a certain type of idea... Just now I had my head turned 
there, I saw that corner of the room, I turn...it's another idea” (my emphasis).41 
At this point Spinoza begins his discussion of the example of meeting Pierre and Paul in the street, 
which I have already employed at from the start of this chapter. I walk down a street where I know 
people, I say “Hello Pierre” and then I turn and say “Hello Paul…etc.” For Spinoza, as has been 
discussed, apart from the succession of ideas experienced in his walk, there is, if it is ‘pointed out’, the 
experience of a continuous variation—“of the force of existing or of the power of acting.” This kind of 
melodic line of continuous variation will define affect (affectus) in its correlation with ideas and at the 
same time in its difference in nature from ideas.” 
                                            
41 Deleuze, "Lecture on Spinoza 24/01/1978". 
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The example is useful as it allows us to consider it from the perspective of both the degree of reality 
or perfection that an idea has and of power, my power of existing, as both are employed in his 
example. 
First, in terms of quantities of perfection or reality, “when I see Pierre who displeases me, an idea, the 
idea of Pierre, is given to me; when I see Paul who pleases me, the idea of Paul is given to me. Each 
one of these ideas in relation to me has a certain degree of reality or perfection. I would say that the 
idea of Paul, in relation to me, has more intrinsic perfection than the idea of Pierre since the idea of 
Paul contents me and the idea of Pierre upsets me”.42  
Second, in terms of power, “when the idea of Paul succeeds the idea of Pierre, it is agreeable to say 
that my force of existing or my power of acting is increased or improved; when, on the contrary, the 
situation is reversed, when after having seen someone who made me joyful I then see someone who 
makes me sad, I say that my power of acting is inhibited or obstructed”. 43 
To begin with, these examples serve to draw out the very everydayness, prevalence and obviousness 
of what Spinoza / Deleuze are talking about: of the situations involved; of the sensing of the degree or 
perfection or reality or the sensing of the variation of power of existing.  
Following Descartes, Spinoza’s ‘proof is based on the quantities of perfection or reality’. However, 
Spinoza found this axiom about the quantities of perfection or reality to not be sufficient to support 
this proof (though the example may or may not tell you this). In its place, Spinoza substitutes an axiom 
of power that links the power to think with the power to exist or act: “The intellect has no more power 
to know than its objects have to exist and act; the power to think and know cannot be greater than a 
necessarily correlative power of existing.”44 
The seemingly subtle shift from ‘degrees of reality or perfection that an idea possesses’ to the ‘power 
of acting or the force of existing’ has major implications for Spinoza and Deleuze. 
So, with reference to quote from the beginning of this section, ‘starting from the idea of God’ is much 
more concrete than might be supposed, and is from this concrete site45 already providing access to 
the absolute.46 
Power 
His argument develops in turn and the implications for later work start to emerge: from the Short 
Treatise "there is no thing of which there is not an idea in the thinking thing, and no idea can exist 
unless the thing exists." (Short Treatise)  For Deleuze, “this principle is basic to all of Spinozism. Once 
proved it leads to the equality of two powers”.47 
In terms of proving God’s existence: “We have an idea of God; we must then assert an infinite power 
of thinking as corresponding to this idea; but the power of thinking is no greater than the power of 
                                            
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Hardt, Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy. 71. 
45 A Leibnizian term. 
46 For future reference, the idea of God has these two dimensions, of formal and objective reality. 
47 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy. 86. 
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existing and acting; we must then assert an infinite power of existing as corresponding to the nature of 
God”. The existence of God is not inferred directly from the idea of God: “we pass through the detour 
of powers to find, in the power of thinking, the ground of the objective reality contained in the idea of 
God, and in the power of existing the ground of the formal reality of God himself.”48 According to 
Deleuze, the equality of powers outlined comes to play a decisive factor in the demonstration of 
parallelism (once God's existence is already proved)49. 
Hence, in the place of the ‘proof is based on the quantities of perfection or reality’, Spinoza 
substitutes an axiom of power that links the power to think with the power to exist or act: “The intellect 
has no more power to know than its objects have to exist and act; the power to think and know cannot 
be greater than a necessarily correlative power of existing.”50 
By the time of The Ethics his argument for God bypasses the idea of God or the corresponding the 
power of thinking to “proceeds directly within existence, via the power of existing”.51 Here, Deleuze 
starts to elaborate on what an embrace of power entails.  
It may be worth mentioning that what shines through Spinoza’s speculative work, for all of its 
intellectualist appearance, and despite being traditionally or popularly being classified as a Rationalist, 
is a commitment to his experience of experience: the idea of God being one such example. I 
emphasized this aspect of Deleuze’s Spinoza more than I have found in the work of other 
commentator’s. I get the very strong sense that to produce a philosophy of Nature in an era obsessed 
with infinity and questions of God, his commitment to experience has moved him to embrace the 
implications of experience and infinity together.52 I say this at this point as everything seems to change 
a gear and the real energetics of the open system of Nature when Spinoza embraces power. He 
identifies that power involves a power to preserve itself, and that whatever has this power ‘exists 
necessarily’.  
As an almost random example of Spinoza’s attention to experience a term such as necessarily can be 
understood in a deductive-analytical logical sense, playing its part in the construction of an overall self-
consistent system of logic, based on certain truths or postulates. Such a self-consistent system is what 
Spinoza (and Deleuze) seek but the terms involved are descriptive of the process of reality as 
experienced, where experience goes beyond normal conscious experience to the experience of what 
tends to escape consciousness, the realm of affect (and sense, problems etc.). The self-consistency 
refers to the description of the ecology of terms and where Spiniza privileges the intellectual it is to this 
realm that tends to be beyond the conscious, the realm of affect, that he is seeking and championing. 
Deleuze goes to lengths to emphasize this Spinozan aesthetics, which aids in the Deleuzian 
construction of an aesthetics of affect, an aesthetics of Nature or open systems. The focus on power 
affirms this aesthetic dimension.  
                                            
48 Ibid. 87. 
49 Ibid. 88. 
50 Hardt, Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy.71. 
51 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy. 88. 
52 Casey, Edward S, The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History  (California: University of California Press, 1998). 
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Spinoza also shifts our perspective, shifts what we should be focusing on in his emphasis on power. 
For him, ‘existence, whether possible or necessary, is itself power; power is identical to essence 
itself…’ and that ‘the capacity to exist…is a power’.53  
The implications of power 
Deleuze charts the implications of Spinoza’s developing understanding of power: 
 Power as the principle of being  
“Power is the essence of being that presents essence in existence.”54 
 The power to exist comes from being part of a whole  
“A power of existing is attributed to a finite being as identical to its essence. Of course a finite being 
exists not by its own essence or power, but by virtue of some external cause.”55 “On what condition do 
we attribute to a finite being, which does not exist through itself, a power of existing and acting 
identical to its essence?” Deleuze extrapolates that “we affirm this power of a finite being to the extent 
that we consider this being as part of a whole, as a mode of an attribute, a modification of a 
substance”.56  
 The power of thinking comes from being part of a whole  
And the same reasoning applies to the power of thinking: “we attribute to a distinct idea a power of 
knowing, but this to the extent that we consider this idea as part of a whole, as a mode of the attribute 
Thought, a modification of a thinking substance that itself has an infinite power of thinking”.57 In fact, 
“reducing things to the modes of a single substance (God/Nature) is … the only way to make them 
‘natural’ beings, endowed with force and power”.58 
 The dynamic role of the attributes 
On one hand, the attributes, not being powers themselves, are the conditions for the attribution 
to: “absolute substance of an infinite power of existing and acting, identical with its formal 
essence and; finite beings of a power identical with their formal being”. On the other, the attribute 
of Thought is… “the condition for: assigning to absolute substance an absolutely infinite power of 
thinking, identical with its objective essence, and for the attribution to ideas of a power of 
knowing, identical with the objective essence that respectively defines them”.59 
 Man’s power is part of God / Nature 
                                            
53 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy. 89. 
54 Hardt, Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy. 72. 
55 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy. 89-90. 
56 Ibid. 90. 
57 Ibid 90. 
58 ibid. 
59 ibid 90. 
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Man’s power does not come from God, it is an irreducible ‘part’ ‘of the infinite power of 
God…distinct from all others’. We are part of the power of God ‘insofar as this power is 
“explicated” by our essence itself”60 
 Power properly belongs to modes 
Reducing creatures to the status of modes, “far from taking away their power, shows rather how 
a part of their power properly belongs to them, along with their essence. The identity of power 
and essence is to be asserted equally’ (under the same conditions, the attributes) ‘of modes and 
of substance”.61 
 Power is always an act 
“The identity of power and essence means: a power is always an act or, at least, in action”.62 
 There is no longer potential power 
For the traditional distinction of power and act, potentiality and actuality, “was substituted the 
correlation of a power of acting and a power of being acted on,” both actual.63 
 The capacity to be affected 
All power “bears with it a corresponding and inseparable capacity to be affected”.64 
 Potentia and potestas 
“To potentia” (essence) 65  “there corresponds an aptitudo or potesas” (a capacity for being 
affected); “but there is no aptitude or capacity that remains ineffective, and so no power that is 
not actual”.66 
 The capacity of a mode to be affected is always exercised 
To a mode's essence is a power that corresponds with ‘a certain capacity of the mode to be affected. 
But because the mode is a part of Nature, this capacity is always exercised, either in affections 
produced by external things (those affections called passive), or in affections explained by its own 
essence (called active). 67  Thus “the distinction between power and act, on the level of modes, 
disappears in favor of two equally actual powers, that of acting, and that of suffering action”.68 
 The capacity to be affected remains fixed 
Spinoza “can sometimes present the power of modes as an invariant identical to their essence, since 
the capacity to be affected remains fixed...”69  
                                            
60 ibid 92. 
61 Ibid 92. 
62 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy. 93. 
63 Ibid. 93. 
64 Ibid. 93. 
65 The distinction between potestas and potentia is discussed in a number of places. Here it is cited from ibid. 98. 
66 Ibid. 93. 
67 The distinction between active and passive will be discussed later. 
68 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy. 93. 
69 Ibid. 93. 
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 The variation in the power of the modes is due to the proportion of contributing active affections 
“...and sometimes as subject to variation, since the power of acting (or force of existing) 
‘increases’ and ‘diminishes’ according to the proportion of active affections contributing to the 
exercise of this power at any moment.” 70 
 Nature’s / God’s power is active 
We ‘should’ … “distinguish between essence as power, that of which it is the essence, and the 
corresponding capacity to be affected. That of which an essence is the essence is always a quantity of 
reality or perfection. But a thing has the greater reality or perfection. The greater the number of ways 
in which it can be affected: the quantity of reality is always grounded in a power identical to an 
essences”.71 
 Actions, passions and the feeling of power 
It is here, according to Hardt, that Deleuze identifies a link between Spinoza and Nietzsche. “A will to 
power is always accompanied by a feeling of power”. An affection (feeling) may be an action or a 
passion, depending on whether the affection results from an internal or an external cause. Hardt uses 
the term ‘sensibility’ to describe this capacity to produce feel, affirm and come to ‘possess’ our own 
power (active) or not (passive). 
 Power as a practical project 
Hardt also says that “the power to be affected, which corresponds to the power to exist, is completely 
filled with active and passive affections.” He considers that this means that there is an “internal 
structure of power”.72 
 
Figure 1: Internal structure of a mode's power. 
For Hardt this structure suggests a practical project. If we consider power by itself it appears as ‘pure 
spontaneity’. However, “once Spinoza has proposed the equivalence between the power to exist and 
the power to be affected, we can shift our investigation to the other side of the equation”.73 Active 
affections appear as the road to power, and this leads us to ask how do we become active? 
                                            
70 Ibid. 93. 
71 Ibid. 94. 
72 Diagram from Hardt, Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy. 73. 
73 Ibid. 73. 
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Parrallelism & Immanence 
Parrallelism and expression go together. The attributes are the means, via expression, to allow 
production and understanding to occur. For Spinoza, understanding is “opposed to conceiving 
something as possible”. Instead God (Nature) “understands the necessity of his own nature”. “Infinite 
understanding…is the form of the idea that God necessarily has of himself or of his own essence”. 
“Understanding is thus the deduction of properties from what one apprehends as necessary”.74 The 
absolute nature of this notion of understanding shifts understanding from a conscious act to a part of 
Nature, in its necessity, part of the process of Nature. 
An understanding capable of perceiving (God’s essence) 
“That God understands himself should follow from the necessity of the divine nature”. Spinoza’s notion 
of expression plays here a ‘decisive role’. God understands himself insofar as he expresses himself. 
The concreteness of the idea of God reappears in The Ethics. “In expressing himself formally in his 
attributes he understands himself objectively in an idea. God's essence, expressed in the attributes as 
formal essence, is expressed in ideas as objective essence. Thus Spinoza, from the definition of 
attribute on, invokes an understanding capable of perceiving. Not that the attribute is ‘attributed’ by 
understanding: the word ‘perceiving’ sufficiently indicates that understanding grasps nothing that is not 
in Nature. But as expressing the essence of substance. attributes are necessarily referred to an 
understanding that understands them objectively, that is, perceives what they express.” 75 The Idea of 
God, which is sensed, is seen to be grounded in the divine Nature itself. 
Understanding and production are parts of God’s process. “God necessarily and actively produces an 
infinity of things which affect him in an infinity of ways”, in an infinity of modes. As if to highlight the 
machinic workings of God / Nature, Deleuze stresses how Spinoza pursues a constant polemic: “he 
never tires of showing the absurdity of a God producing things through moral attributes such as 
goodness, justice or charity, or indeed through human attributes such as understanding and will”.76 
“God does not produce things because he wills, but because he is”. He “acts by the laws of his nature 
alone”.77 
To communicate something of the process of expression, Spinoza employs the linguistic notion of 
sense and the “traditional distinction between the sense expressed and the object designated (and 
expressing itself in this sense)”, having its own movement, where “he sense of an initial proposition 
becomes the designatum of a second, which will itself have a new sense, and so on”. 
Following Deleuze’s account of expression in some detail, due to the detail required to understand it, 
beginning with the whole process of production:  
“Thus the substance they designate is expressed in the attributes, attributes express an essence. 
Then the attributes are in their turn expressed: they express themselves in modes which designate 
them, the modes expressing a modification”. … “Thus expression, through its own movement, 
                                            
74 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy. 100. 
75 Ibid. 101. 
76 Ibid. 103. 
77 Ibid. 104. 
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generates a second level of expression. Expression has within it the sufficient reason of a re-
expression. This second level defines production itself: God (Nature) is said to produce things, as his 
attributes find expression. So that in the last instance it is always God (Nature) who (that)…is 
designated by all things”.78 (my additions in brackets) 
The lack of real causality between attributes 
“If there is an order of production, it is the same for all attributes”. God produces things concurrently “in 
all attributes that constitute his nature”… “down to the level of the finite modes, which must have the 
same order in different attributes. This identity of order defines a correspondence of modes: to any 
mode of one attribute there necessarily corresponds a mode of each of the other attributes. This 
identity of order excludes any relation of real causality. Attributes are mutually irreducible and really 
distinct; none is cause of another, or of anything whatever in another. Modes therefore involve the 
concept or their own attribute alone, and not that of any other”.79 
He then explains the lack of real causality between the attributes: 
Thought and extension “act one on another when they are taken together”, or that two modes of 
different attributes (soul and body) act one on another to the extent that they form ‘parts of a whole’. 
Nothing in this really goes beyond the assertion of correspondence: if two things are parts of a whole, 
nothing can change in one without there being some corresponding change in the other, and neither 
thing can change without the whole itself changing”.80 
The three orders of parallelism 
“there is an identity of order or correspondence between modes or different attributes. One may 
indeed call ‘parallel’ two things or two series of things which bear to each other a constant 
relation, such that there is nothing in one to which there corresponds nothing in the other, while 
all real causality between them is excluded”.81 
For Deleuze, the above amounts to “Spinoza’s first formulation of parallelism”82: 
Spinoza gives “two further formulations that extend the first”: 
1. identity of connection or equality of principle 
This refers to “one and the same order, that is, one and the same connection of causes, i.e., that the 
same things follow one another”. “Identity of connection means not only the autonomy of 
corresponding series, but an isonomy, that is, an equality of principle (cause) between autonomous or 
independent series (my addition). When Spinoza asserts that modes of different attributes have not 
                                            
78 Ibid. 105. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid. 
82 As Deleuze says of the term: ‘but one should be wary of the word "parallelism," which is not Spinoza's. It seems 
to be a creation of Leibniz's, who employs it on his own account to designate such a correspondence between 
autonomous or independent series…. If the word "parallelism" does adequately characterize Spinoza's 
philosophy, it does so by itself implying something beside a mere identity of order, something beside a 
correspondence. And it does so also because Spinoza is not satisfied with this correspondence or this identity 
as definition of the link that unites modes of different attributes’. Ibid. 107. 
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only the same order, but also the same connection or concatenation, he means that the principles on 
which they depend are themselves equal”.83 Deleuze adds, that “if two attributes or two modes of 
different attributes are ‘taken together’, this is because they form equal parts or halves of a whole. By 
his strict parallelism84 Spinoza refuses any analogy, any eminence, any kind of superiority of one 
series over another, and any ideal action that presupposes a preeminence: there is no more any 
superiority of soul over body, than of the attribute of Thought over that of Extension”.85 
2. Identity of being or ontological unity 
This formulation “goes even further in the same direction: the modes of different attributes have not 
only the same order and the same connection, but the same being; they are the same things, 
distinguished only by the attribute whose concept they involve. Modes of different attributes are one 
and the same modification, differing only in attribute”. 86  “Spinoza’s doctrine is rightly named 
parallelism” as it ’exclude any analogy’, eminence or transcendence. It “is to be understood” … “from 
the viewpoint of an immanent God and immanent causality”.87 It “implies the equality of two things that 
express the same third thing, and the identity of this third thing as expressed in the other two”.88  
Parallelism characterizes modes and modifications only 
“Parallelism characterizes modes, and modes alone. But it is grounded in substance and the attributes 
of substance. God (Nature) produces things in all attributes at once: he produces them in the same 
order in each, and so there is a correspondence between modes of different attributes”.89 
In summary: “Substance expressed itself in attributes, each attribute was an expression, the essence 
of substance was expressed. Now each attribute expresses itself, the dependent modes are 
expressions, and a modification is expressed”. A mode is an affection of an attribute, understood 
formally; a modification an affection of substance, understood ontologically. “One and the same thing 
(modification) is ‘expressed’ in all attributes; as this thing has no existence outside the modes that 
express it in each attribute, modes differing in attribute have the same order, the same connection, 
and the same being in themselves”.90 
Three Types of Parallelism: Ontological, Epistemological & Psychophysical 
What is described above Deleuze terms ontological parallelism, which is between all modes differing 
in attribute.  
                                            
83 Ibid.108. 
84 Deleuze says: “Leibniz, then, coins the word ‘parallelism’, but invokes it for his own purposes in a very general 
and hardly satisfactory manner: Leibniz's system does indeed imply a correspondence between autonomous 
series, substances and phenomena, solids and projections; but the principles of these series are singularly 
unequal… Spinoza, on the other hand, does not use the word ‘parallelism’, yet the word suits his system, as he 
does suppose the equality of the principles from which independent and corresponding series follow. Here 
again one sees well enough the nature of his polemical intent”. 
85 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy. 108. 
86 Ibid. 109. 
87 Ibid. 109. 
88 Ibid. 110. 
89 Ibid. 110. 
90 Ibid. 111. 
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However, Deleuze finds that Spinoza, in his Enuncia, cited in Expressionism in Philosophy, asserts an 
“identity of order, connection and even being” 91  but not between modes expressing the same 
modification in each attribute. “The triple identity is asserted only of ideas, which are modes of 
Thought, and the thing they represent, which is a mode of some attribute. Such parallelism is 
epistemological: it is established between an idea and its ‘object’”.92 
It is not focused on the unity of a modification expressed by all modes in different attributes but rather 
“to the unity of an ‘individual’ formed by the mode of a certain attribute and the idea that represents 
solely this mode”. 93  “One and the same individual is expressed by a given mode and by the 
corresponding idea.” 
From this Deleuze infers that ‘psychophysical parallelism’ “is a particular case of epistemological 
parallelism: the soul is the idea of the body, that is to say, the idea of a certain mode of Extension, and 
of this mode only.” 
Spiritual Automaton 
However, Spinoza invokes the Aristotelian principle that “know is to know by cause” in his axiom that 
“The knowledge of an effect depends on, and involves, the knowledge of its cause”.94 However, 
Spinoza’s understanding varies from Aristotle’s. For Spinoza “we have shown that a true idea…shows 
how and why something is, or has been done, and that its objective effects proceeds in the soul 
according to the formal nature of its object”. So true knowledge proceeds from the formal nature of a 
true idea’s object to the objective effects that proceed in the soul (according to the formal nature…). 
Spinoza identifies his originality and that the ancients “never conceived the soul (as we do here) as 
acting according to certain laws, like a spiritual automaton”.95 “‘Spiritual automaton’ means first of all 
that an idea, being a mode of thought, has its (efficient96 and formal) cause nowhere but in the 
attribute of Thought”.97  
Nature’s Two Powers: Being & Knowing 
From the discovery of the soul’s actions, Spinoza identifies two powers (Being & Knowing) and teases 
out three ‘equalities’: 
1. Equality of order 
                                            
91 Ibid. 113. 
92 Ibid. 113. 
93 Earlier Deleuze stressed that the singularity (of an individual) is pre-individual. Here added to this is 
understanding as part of individuality. Individuality exists outside knowledge but to get to the individuality of an 
individual requires knowledge as the only capacity to perceive what is expressed. 
94 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy. 115. 
95 Smith, Daniel, Essays on Deleuze  (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012). 389. 
96 “Nowadays, when we talk about a cause we mean what Aristotle referred to as efficient cause, an event or 
state of affairs that produces another event or state of affairs”. Nuttall, Jon, An Introduction to Philosophy  
(Oxford: Polity Press, 2002). 95.  
97 “Let us consider the ideas we have corresponding to the effect of an object on our body. On the one hand. they 
depend on our power of knowing, that is, on our soul or mind, as their formal cause”. Deleuze, Expressionism in 
Philosophy. 146. This will be discussed in detail later. 
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Equally, “any object whatever has its efficient and formal cause only, in the attribute of which it is a 
mode, and whose concept it involves”. So that what sets Spinoza apart from tradition is that all 
efficient and formal causality between ideas and things is excluded. “Spinoza can thus assert the 
independence of the two series, the series of things and the series of ideas. That to each idea there 
corresponds some thing is, in this context, an initial element of parallelism”.98 
2. Equality of principle (connection) 
However, for “ideas to have the same connection as things, there must also be an idea corresponding 
to each thing”. For Deleuze, “to the extent that God produces as he understands himself, all that he 
produces necessarily “falls’ within his infinite understanding”… “Ideas that God forms are ideas of his 
own essence, but are also ideas of all that he formally produces in his attributes. There are thus as 
many ideas as there are things, each thing being the object of an idea”. Deleuze, importantly for the 
consistency of the system, clarifies that a ‘thing’ is a mode (from the attribute through which they are 
explicated).99 “But as God understands all he produces, to each mode that follows from an attribute 
there corresponds an idea in God’s understanding”.100 “Thus ideas themselves flow from the idea of 
God, just as modes follow or flow from their respective attribute; the idea of God is thus the cause of 
all ideas, just as God is himself the cause of all things”. “To every idea there corresponds some thing, 
and to every thing an idea”. This theme allows Spinoza to assert an equality of principle, and that 
“there are in God two equal powers”. This allows Spinoza to also assert that “God’s power of thinking 
is equal to his power of acting.” The argument from powers now “plays a decisive role in determining 
epistemological parallelism”. 
3. Equality of being 
The argument allows Spinoza to also assert an identity of being between objects and ideas. “What 
follows formally…from God’s infinite nature, is the same as what follows objectively from the idea of 
God”. “A mode of an attribute and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing expressed in two 
ways, under two powers”. Hence again, there are the three moments of parallelism, identity of: order; 
principle and being. However, they “here apply only to the relations of an object and idea”. So “we 
must attribute to God a power of existing and acting identical to his formal essence, or corresponding 
to his idea. But we must equally, on the other hand. attribute to him a power of thinking identical to his 
objective essence, or corresponding to his nature”.101  
How does Epistemological Parallelism follow from the Equality of Powers? 
So, we have two powers, and the notion of epistemological parallelism, which is established between 
an idea and its ‘object’. Epistemological parallelism needs more concrete elaboration and, as Deleuze 
says, the “principle of the equality (of powers) merits close attention”. 102  He also stresses the 
                                            
98 Ibid. 115-116. 
99 “One calls a "thing," indeed, anything that follows formally from the divine substance; things are explicated 
through that attribute of which they are a mode.” Ibid. 116. 
100 Ibid. 116-117. 
101 Ibid. 117. 
102 Ibid. 117. 
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difference between the distinction of powers (involving modes) and attributes, and the importance of 
this difference for Spinozism, as “epistemological parallelism follows from the equality of powers”.103 
An initial difference between powers and attributes: “God (Nature), that is the absolutely infinite, 
possesses two equal powers: the power of existing and acting, and the power of thinking and 
knowing”. Deleuze suggests a Bergsonian formulation, that “the absolute has “two sides, two halves”. 
“If the absolute thus possesses two powers, it does so in and through itself, involving them in its 
radical unity. Such is not the case with attributes”.104  
And again, through identifying that there are two aspects of the attribute of Thought worth 
distinguishing: “the power of thinking is absolutely infinite” … ”God thinks himself absolutely, and 
thinks an infinity of things in an infinity of modes. Whence the expressions absoluta cogitatio to 
designate the power of thinking, and intellectus absolute infinitus to designate infinite understanding; 
and the thesis according to which an infinity of things in an infinity of modes follows (objectively) from 
the idea of God. The two powers are thus in no way relative: they are the halves of the absolute”.105  
These two powers function differently. “On the one hand, all attributes are equal: but this should be 
understood in relation to the power of existing and acting. On the other hand, this power of existing is 
only one half of the absolute, the other half being a power of thinking equal to it: it is in relation to this 
second power that the attribute of Thought enjoys certain privileges.” 106 
Deleuze notes that “nothing… can be known except by thought”,107 and to be able to do this it has 
three privileges.  
Three privileges of the attribute of Thought 
The first privilege of the attribute of Thought is that “it formally contains modes that, taken 
objectively, represent the attributes themselves”. 
A second privilege, not to be confused with it, ‘flows from it’: a “mode that depends on a particular 
attribute is represented by an idea in the attribute of Thought: but a mode that differs from the first in 
attribute must be represented by another idea. For whatever participates, within this or that attribute, 
in the power of existing and acting, also participates in the power of thinking, but always in the 
attribute of Thought”.108  
Third, “everything that exists formally has an idea that corresponds to it objectively. But the attribute 
of Thought is itself a form of existence, and every idea has a formal being in this attribute. Therefore 
every idea is, in its turn, the object of an idea that represents it; this other idea is the object of a third, 
                                            
103 Ibid. 126. 
104 Ibid. 118. 
105 Ibid. 118. The significance of the idea of God should become clear later in this section. 
106 Ibid. 121. 
107 Ibid. 121. More fully: “nothing…can be known except by thought: the power of thinking and knowing is indeed 
fulfilled by the attribute of Thought”. Again, it is worth saying that ‘thought is not restricted here to conscious 
intellectual thought, as is commonly known. 
108 Ibid. 124. As Deleuze notes: “As Schuller says, ‘the attribute of Thought has a much wider extension than the 
other attributes.’”  
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and so on ad infinitum.”109 In other words (and it is worth recalling the distinction between the ’power 
of thinking’ and the ’infinite intellect’ just mentioned):  
if it be true that every idea that participates in the power of thinking belongs formally to the 
attribute of Thought, then conversely, every idea that belongs to the attribute of Thought is the 
object of an idea that participates in the power of thinking. Whence this final apparent privilege of 
the attribute of Thought, which is the ground of a capacity of ideas to reflect themselves ad 
infinitum. Spinoza sometimes says that the idea of an idea has to the idea the same relation as 
the idea to its object.110  
Deleuze highlights how Spinoza, in The Correction of the Understanding, shifts viewpoint (to move the 
emphasis onto the modal level of the power of thought): here he “presents the idea of an idea as 
another idea, distinct from the first. But every idea is, on the other hand, referred to the power of 
thinking: even its formal being is only the condition of its participation in that power. From this 
viewpoint we see the unity of an idea and the idea of that idea, insofar as they are given in God with 
the same necessity, by the same power of thinking”. So that now that they are both in terms of the 
power of thinking, “there is… only a distinction of reason between the two ideas: the idea of an idea is 
the form of that idea, referred as such to the power of thinking”.111 
According to Deleuze, in order to understand what appear as inconsistencies in Spinoza’s thought that 
we need to consider “the complex status of the idea of God. From the viewpoint of its objective 
necessity, the idea of God is an absolute principle, with no less unity than absolutely infinite 
substance. From the viewpoint of its formal possibility, it is only a mode whose principle is to be found 
in the attribute of Thought. Hence the idea of God is able to communicate something of substantial 
unity to modes. Indeed, ideas that flow from the idea of God itself - that is to say, modes of thinking 
that belong to infinite understanding - will have a specifically modal unity”.112 
Turning this ‘around’ shifts the emphasis from considering that the ideas of the power of thinking flow 
from substance/the attribute of Thought to focus on the workings of the power of thinking, in its 
necessity, and the relation of the emergence of formal essence in relation to it. Again, it is worth 
remembering the concreteness of the idea of God, only that this time that it has two dimensions.113 
                                            
109 Ibid. 125. 
110 Ibid.125. Again: “but object and idea are not referred only to two attributes, but referred also to two powers, the 
power or existing and acting, and the power of thinking and knowing. It is the same with an idea and the idea of 
that idea: they are certainly referred to the same attribute, but are referred also to two powers, since the 
attribute of Thought is on the one hand a form of existence, and on the other, the condition of the power of 
thinking”. Ibid. 125-126. 
111 Ibid. 126. 
112 Ibid. 127. 
113 Ibid.128. “The idea of God provides just such a principle, through its dual aspect. In it one passes from the 
unity of substance, constituted by all the attributes that express its essence, to the unity of a modification 
comprehended in infinite understanding, but constituted by the modes that express it in each attribute”. 
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Spinoza’s Theory of Being: Modal Essences 
Spinoza’s ontology, his theory of being, is dominated by the notions of a cause of itself, in itself and 
through itself. It is partly a reaction to Descartes’ reliance on equivocation, eminence and analogy.114 
Spinoza is searching for a “reason through which self-causality can be arrived at in itself, and directly 
grounded in the concept or nature of God”. For Spinoza, “the attributes are the immanent formal 
elements that constitute God's absolute nature. And these attributes, in constituting God's essence 
also constitute his existence; in expressing his essence they also express the existence that 
necessarily flows from it; his existence is therefore the same as his essence. The attributes thus 
constitute the formal reason that makes substance in itself a cause of itself, directly”.115 
“Self-causality is…no longer asserted in another sense than efficient causality; rather is efficient 
causality asserted in the same sense as self-causality. Thus God produces as he exists: on the one 
hand, he produces necessarily; on the other he necessarily produces within the same attributes that 
constitute his essence. So we come again upon the two aspects of Spinozist univocity, univocity of 
cause and univocity of attributes”.116 Spinoza’s immanence means that efficient causation is self-
causation and that attributes constitute the essence of substance and modes. Univocity shifts into 
immanence. 
Genevieve Lloyd elaborates further. She refers to Spinoza’s novel treatment of the “old philosophical 
ideal of substance—the idea of self-contained, independent being”.117 She identifies three key features 
of his ontology. 
What exists from the necessity of its own nature, is “determined to act by itself alone” and hence ‘free’ 
(and eternity, rather than evoking transcendence, becomes the very existence of substance – reality 
itself, construed under attributes). Lloyd here highlights the ‘self-organisational’ or ‘open systems 
thinking’ dimension of Spinoza, and also makes the connection between how things work and ethics – 
in the sense of ‘freedom’ being directly related to how Nature works - that Deleuze draws out in later 
parts of his book.118 
“The necessary correspondence between thought and reality. What is true of reality is true also of 
thought: what is in itself must be conceived through itself”. “From the necessary correspondence 
between thought and reality: the relations of dependence between what causes and what is caused 
are reflected in corresponding relations between the knowledge of effects and the knowledge of 
causes – the one is “understood through” the other”. The preceding discussion has drawn out this 
dimension and that thought is only partly intellectual and conscious. 
“In addition to the ‘being in’ relation, which binds things together, and the “thinking through” relation, 
which binds their concepts together” his ontology “introduces us to another crucial relation – that 
between ideas and things. This is not a causal relation but a relation of agreement: truth is a matter of 
                                            
114 Ibid. 163-164. 
115 Ibid. 164. 
116 Ibid. 165. 
117 Lloyd, Genevieve, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Spinoza and the Ethics, ed. Wolff, Tim Crane and 
Jonathan (London: Routledge, 1996). 
118 Ibid. 29. 
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agreement between idea and object”. For Lloyd, “these three sets of relations – between things, 
between ideas, and between ideas and things – underpin the structure of The Ethics”. 119  The 
discussion of ideas in Expressionism in Philosophy might obscure this relation. 
“For Spinoza thought and extension are created by God; they are attributes of God”. “God, the world 
and the human mind here enter new and unorthodox relations”. She refers to Deleuze’s use of the 
ideas of the mirror and the seed: “what is ‘expressed’ is also enveloped in the expression, like the tree 
in the seed”. But stresses that “this is no passive reflection, but an active, dynamic articulation”. 120 
With “immanence all is affirmation”.121 
The correlation of Immanence & Expression 
For Spinoza, an “effect is ‘immanate’ in the cause”. The effect remains in its cause no less than the 
cause remains in itself. This implies an “equality between cause and effect”.122 Immanence implies a 
“theory of being in which unity is the only property of substance and of what is” and requires “the 
equality of being, or the positing of equal Being: not only is being equal in itself, but it is seen to be 
equally present in all things…and the cause is equally close: there is no remote causation”. Pure 
immanence requires a “Being that is univocal and constitutes a Nature, and that consists of positive 
forms, common to producer and product, to cause and effect”. Immanence does not do away with the 
distinction of essences: “but there must be common forms that constitute the essence of substance as 
cause, while they contain the essences of modes as effects”.123 
For Spinoza, “all things are present to God, who complicates them. God is present to all things, which 
explicate and implicate him”. In terms of Nature this might be stated: All things are present to Nature 
that complicates them. Nature is present to all things, which explicate and implicate it. Immanence, for 
Deleuze, “corresponds to the unity of complication and explication, of inherence and implication”. 
Which might be said something like: Nature involves the relating of all things. Nature is present in all 
things. All things produce Nature and involve Nature. 
“Expression comprehends all of these things: complication, explication, inherence, implication. 
And these aspects are also the categories of immanence. Immanence is revealed as expression, 
and expression as immanent….in a system…in which the two notions are correlative”.124  
The infinite system of modes 
Univocity “gives expression a positive content” in comparison to signs. This positive content is 
‘quantitative’, but not in a numerical sense. A “mode is always a certain degree, a certain quantity, of a 
quality…precisely…within the attribute containing it, a part so to speak of God’s power”. “Attributes are 
the conditions of substance having an omnipotence identical with its essence, and also of modes 
possessing a part of this power identical with their essence. God’s power expresses itself …modally”. 
                                            
119 Ibid. 30. 
120 Ibid. 29- 31. 
121 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy. 174. 
122 Ibid. 171. 
123 Ibid. 173. 
124 Ibid. 176. 
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“Man thus loses in Spinozism all the privileges owed to a quality supposed proper to him” from the 
viewpoint that sees Man participating in God’s power ‘imitatively’. 
Modes (of the same attribute) in the sense of real distinction, are … “quantitatively distinguished by 
the quantity or capacity of their respective essences which always participate directly in divine 
substance (Nature).” 125 The “system of finite modes…(is) an actual infinite collection, a system of 
mutual implications, in which each essence conforms with all of the others, and in which all essences 
are involved in all others”.126 
What is the nature of modal matter?   
“All modes are expressive.” 
“Each attribute is indivisible qua quality.” Each “attribute-quality has an infinite quantity that” has an 
infinite quantity that is “divisible in certain conditions” and “constitutes a matter, but a purely modal 
matter”. It has modally, and not really or substantially, distinct parts. The word ‘part’ must be 
understood in two ways:  
“parts of power…intrinsic or intensive parts, degrees of power or intensity”. “Modal essences are 
thus defined as degrees of power”;  
“extrinsic or extensive parts, external to one another, and acting on one another from outside”.  
“The simplest bodies are” thus “the ultimate extensive modal division of Extension.”127 The modes of 
extension are defined by degrees of power and an attribute of thought has extensive modal parts, 
ideas that correspond to the simplest bodies. A modal essence is…”a physical reality, pure physical 
reality. Essence, qua essence, has an existence.” “A modal essence has an existence distinct from 
that of the corresponding mode.”128 
How is a modal essence a singular essence?  
There is a direct relationship between God (Nature) and modal essence. “God is the efficient cause of 
essences…all essences agree…as they all have God as their cause”. “To think of them concretely”, in 
relation “to the cause on which they depend we posit them all together, coexisting and agreeing”. “One 
essence can only be separated abstractly, by considering it independently of the principle of 
production which comprehends all…thus essences form a total system, an actually infinite 
whole...infinite through its cause”.129 How are they singular? 
The function of intensity in the infinite system: quantitative modal individuation 
It is “through duration”, and in the case of modes of Extension, “through figure and place” that existing 
modes have extrinsic individuation. Deleuze asks if there is “another type of modal distinction, 
presenting an intrinsic principle of individuation”. He refers to Duns Scotus’ discussion of whiteness:  
                                            
125 Ibid. 183. 
126 Ibid. 184. 
127 Ibid. 191. 
128 Ibid. 192. 
129 Ibid. 194. 
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“whiteness”, he says, “has various intensities; these are not added to whiteness as one thing to 
another, like a shape added to a wall on which it is drawn; its degrees of intensity are intrinsic 
determinations, intrinsic modes, of a whiteness that remains univocally the same under whichever 
modality it is considered.”130  
Similarly for Spinoza: “modal essences are intrinsic modes or intensive quantities” distinguished from 
their attribute as “intensities of its quality, and from one another as different degrees of intensity”. For 
Deleuze, Spinoza is looking for a “distinction of singularity belonging to modal essences as such”. The 
difference of being of modal essences “is at once intrinsic and purely quantitative; for the quantity here 
in question is an intensive one”. This quantitative distinction is “no mere appearance, but an internal 
difference, a difference of intensity. So that each finite thing must be said to express the absolute, 
according to the intensive quantity that constitutes its essence, according, that is to the degree of its 
power”. In Spinoza, “individuation… is…. quantitative and intrinsic, intensive”.131  
“Intensive quantity is infinite” and the “system of essences an actually infinite series”. To refer back to 
the axiom of Spinoza’s theory of being, it is an “infinity “through a cause”. So, it “is now easy to see” 
that this “infinity is in a sense indivisible: one cannot divide it into extensive or extrinsic parts, except 
through abstraction”.132 But by abstraction we separate essences from their causes and from the 
attributes that contain them…and take from them ‘all physical reality’. “Modal essences are 
thus…inseparable…characterised by total agreement…but…singular and particular and distinguished 
from one another intrinsically”. “All essences are involved in the production of each…since the series 
is actually infinite”. Yet in this ‘concrete system’ “each essence is produced as an irreducible degree, 
necessarily apprehended as a singular unity”. For Deleuze modal essences are parts of this system 
because they are intensive. “They are not all contained in each, but all are comprised in the production 
of each.” As such, a modal essence “has an expressive power”. This contributes significantly to the 
Spinozist problem of how to move from the infinite to the finite.133 “Here again” the: “reduction of 
creatures to the status of modes appears as the condition of their essence being a power, that is, of 
being an irreducible part of God’s power. Thus modes are in their essence expressive: they express 
God’s essence, each according to the degree of power that constitutes its essence.”134 
What does modal existence consist of? 
Deleuze stresses the external relations of modal existence when he says that “an existing mode 
‘needs’ a great number of other existing modes” as “this already suggests that it is itself composed of 
a great number of parts”.135 So a mode's existence requires “a very great number…of parts. These 
component parts are external to the mode's essence, and external one to another: they are extensive 
parts. And the soul, insofar as it is the idea of an existing body, is itself composed of a great number of 
                                            
130 Ibid. 196. 
131 Ibid. 197. 
132 Ibid. 197. 
133 Ibid. 197-198. 
134 Ibid. 198. 
135 Ibid. 201. 
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ideas which correspond to the body's component parts, and which are extrinsically distinct from one 
another.”136 
So, a “mode's essence is a determinate degree of intensity, an irreducible degree of power; a mode 
exists, if it actually possesses a very great number of extensive parts corresponding to its essence or 
degree of power”.137  
How an infinity of extensive parts can compose the existence of modes: via a certain relation of 
movement and rest 
There seem to be two types of infinity associated with modes. First, for Deleuze “a great number of 
parts” is an infinity particular to modal existence. “It is not from the number of its parts that the quantity 
is infinite, but rather because it is infinite that it divides into a multitude of parts exceeding any 
number.” (My emphasis)138 Second, “insofar as they flow from substance and its attributes”, modes 
“are …quantitative, rather than numerical, strictly speaking.” The “primary modal infinity, intensive 
infinity, it is not divisible into extrinsic parts”. “Modal essences, are not separable one from another.”139 
Extensive infinity relates to modal existence. Modal existence requires an extensive infinity of parts. 
“The essence of such a mode is itself a degree of power; but whatever degree of power constitutes its 
essence, the mode cannot exist unless it actually has an infinity of parts.” In existing, “their essences 
or degrees of power always correspond to a limit (a maximum or minimum)”.140 
Relations of extensive parts, under the influence of the intensive whole, are also continually changing 
through changes brought about by other extensive parts. Therefore: as a whole, and in all their 
relations, they form an infinitely changeable universe, corresponding to God's omnipotence. But in this 
or that determinate relation they form greater or lesser infinite wholes, corresponding to this or that 
degree of power, in other words, to this or that modal essence.141 
So, how can an “infinity of extensive parts … compose the existence of a mode”?142 For Spinoza, they 
do so in a certain relation of movement and rest. A given mode comes into existence, “when an infinity 
                                            
136 Ibid. 201-202. 
137 Ibid. 202. 
138 “One may note that number never adequately expresses the nature of modes. It may be useful to identify 
modal quantity and number; indeed one must do so, if it is to be opposed to substance and substantial qualities. 
I did so when presenting modal distinction as a numerical distinction. But number is, in fact, only a way of 
imagining quantity, or an abstract way of thinking of modes.” Ibid. 202-203. 
139 Ibid. 203. 
140 Ibid. 204. 
141 Ibid. 204. 
142 Ibid. 207-208. Deleuze spends some time discussing how Spinoza developed his argument, which initially 
focused on simple bodies, here. “The attribute of Extension has an extensive modal quantity that actually 
divides into an infinity of simple bodies. These simple bodies are extrinsic parts which are only distinguished 
from one another, and which are only related to one another, through movement and rest. Movement and rest 
are precisely the form of extrinsic distinction and external relation between simple bodies. Simple bodies are 
determined from outside to movement or rest ad infinitum, and are distinguished by the movement and rest to 
which they are determined. They are always grouped in infinite wholes, each whole being defined by a certain 
relation of movement and rest. It is through this relation that an infinite whole corresponds to a certain modal 
essence (that is, to a certain degree of power), and thus constitutes the very existence of that mode of 
Extension.” (205-6) However, Deleuze points out how there is no such thing as a simple body: all existence is 
composite: “a simple body at least, has then no eternal essence. Its reality seems to be subsumed into that of 
an infinite system of causes". (206) Should one then say that simple extensive parts exist? Should one say that 
in Extension there exist simple bodies? If by this one means existence singly, or as a number together, the 
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of extensive parts enter into a given relation: it continues to exist as long as this relation holds. 
Extensive parts are thus grouped together in various collections on various levels of relation, 
corresponding to different degrees of power.” 
Little does it matter if the component parts of an existing mode are each moment renewed; the 
whole remains the same insofar as it is defined by a relation through which any of it's parts 
belong to that particular modal essence. An existing mode is thus subject to considerable and 
continual alteration: but it little matters, either, that the division between its parts of movement and 
rest, or of speed and slowness of movement, should alter. A given mode will continue to exist as 
long as the same relation subsists in the infinite whole of its parts.143 
Spinoza's theory of existence: The role of ‘mechanical laws’ 
Spinoza's theory of existence involves, then, ”three components: a singular essence, which is a 
degree of power or intensity; a particular existence, always composed of an infinity of extensive parts; 
and an individual form that is the characteristic or expressive relation which corresponds eternally to 
the mode's essence, but through which also an infinity of parts are temporarily related to that essence. 
In an existing mode, the essence is a degree of power; this degree expresses itself in a relation; and 
the relation subsumes an infinity of parts. Deleuze stresses that the subsuming aspect of relation, 
“according to which the parts, being under the domination of one and the same nature, are "forced, as 
this nature demands, to adapt themselves to one another.”144  A modal essence expresses itself 
eternally in this relation.  
But, Deleuze asks, “what is the new sense of this principle as seen from Spinoza's viewpoint?”145 He 
says that, “extensive parts determine one another from outside and ad infinitum”. “A mode comes into 
existence, not by virtue of its essence, but by virtue of purely mechanical laws which determine an 
infinity of some extensive parts or other to enter into a precise given relation, in which its essence 
expresses itself.146 What are these mechanical laws? For Deleuze, in the case of modes of extension, 
“they amount ultimately to the laws of communication of movement”.147  
For Spinoza, composite bodies can form more composite bodies. “Parts come together in different 
relations; each relation already corresponds to a modal essence; two relations combine in such a way 
                                                                                                                                        
absurdity is obvious. Strictly speaking, simple parts have neither an essence nor an existence of their 
own…existence is composed of them: to exist is to actually have an infinity of extensive parts.’ (206) 
143 Ibid. 208. “It must then be recognized that a modal essence (a degree of power) expresses itself eternally in a 
certain relation, with its various different levels. But the mode does not come into existence until an infinity of 
extensive parts are actually determined to enter into this relation.” 
144 Ibid. 209. 
145 Ibid. 209. 
146 Ibid. 209-210. Conversely, “a mode ceases to exist as soon as its parts are determined to enter into another 
relation, corresponding to another essence. Modes come into existence, and cease to exist, by virtue of laws 
external to their essences.” (209-210) 
147 Ibid. 209. In terms of the bigger picture: “If we consider the infinity of simple bodies, we see that they are 
always grouped in constantly changing infinite wholes. But the whole of all these wholes remains fixed, this fixity 
being defined by the total quantity of movement, that is, by the total proportion of movement and rest. But the 
total proportion always remains fixed, while these relations are made and unmade according to the laws of 
composition and decomposition.” 
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that the parts that meet enter into a third relation, corresponding to a further modal essence. The 
corresponding mode thereby comes into existence.”148 
The laws of composition and decomposition determine the conditions in which a relation is actualized - 
that is, actually subsumes extensive parts - or, on the other hand, ceases to be actualized. Whence 
we must, above all, avoid confusing essences and relations, or a law of production of essences and a 
law of composition or relations. It is not the essence that determines the actualisation or the relation in 
which it expresses itself. Hence, Spinoza grounds the system of essences in concrete relations. Such 
“relations are composed and decomposed according to their own laws. The order of essences is 
characterized by a total conformity. Such is not the case with the order of relations. All relations are of 
course combined ad infinitum, but not in just any way. Some given relation does not combine with just 
any other given relation.”149 Importantly Deleuze says that this reliance on concrete relations means 
that to know how these relations alter, bring into existence or destroy modes, that we “have to pass 
through an empirical study of bodies”.150 This empirical study, being a study of relations in relation to 
the modes that they relate to, is the ‘Royal Road’ to practice. Modal existence brings with it practice. 
Also, it means that coming into existence should never be understood “as a transition from possible to 
real”.151 
This idea of modal existence also allows Deleuze to point out that “Spinoza doesn't say that existing 
modes are no longer contained in substance, but rather that they “"are no longer only" contained in 
substance or attribute”, at the same time as affirming immanence, as “extrinsic distinction remains 
always and only a modal distinction”.152 
What A Body Can Do?  
This section again follows Deleuze closely. 
“Most men only feel they exist when they are suffering something. They can bear existence only as 
suffering things: "as soon as [the ignorant man] ceases to be acted on, he ceases to be.”153 Spinoza 
The Expressive Triads 
There are two expressive ‘triads’ that Spinoza indentifies, one following from the other, that compose 
the mode’s existence. The first corresponds to finite modes and comprises: “an essence as a degree 
of power; a characteristic relation in which it expresses itself; and the extensive parts subsumed in this 
relation”. The second modal triad: “the essence as a degree of power; a certain capacity to be affected 
in which it expresses itself; and the affections that, each moment, exercise that capacity”.154 The 
diagram here summarises these two triads. 
                                            
148 Ibid. 211. 
149 Ibid. 211. 
150 Ibid. 212. 
151 Ibid. 213. 
152 Ibid. 214. 
153 Ibid. 226. 
154 Ibid. 217. 
 an affirmative open systems conception of how to design landscape  Connolly, Peter  
xxx 
  
Figure 2: The components of the triads  
The Components of the Triads: An emphasis on the extensive 
These triads show the relationship between components of a mode. They are constructed to stress 
the relationship between the extensive to the intensive, to make the connection between how 
extensive changes affect the mode intensively or change the power produced. The first focuses on the 
extensive parts and the second on (extensive) affections (mixtures, encounters). In terms of parts, for 
instance, “an existing mode actually possesses a very great number of parts. But the nature of 
extensive parts is such that they ‘affect one another’ ad infinitum. From this one may infer that an 
existing mode is affected in a very great number of ways.”  However, “extensive parts do not belong to 
a given mode except in a certain relation”, and “a mode is said to have affections by virtue of a certain 
capacity of being affected”.155  
An existing mode, “has for its part, an essence that is identical to a degree of power; as such, it has an 
ability to be affected a capacity to be affected in a very great number of ways. While the mode exists 
this capacity is exercised in varying ways, but is always necessarily exercised under the action of 
external modes.”156 
Structure and Relation 
 From another perspective, as these triads allow a number of viewpoints, “relations are 
inseparable from the capacity to be affected”. For Spinoza a body's ‘structure’ is the composition 
of its (characteristic) relation. So that Spinoza can consider two fundamental questions as 
                                            
155 Ibid. 217. A horse, a fish, a man, or even two men compared one with the other, do not have the same 
capacity to be affected: they are not affected by the same things, or not affected by the same things in the same 
way.  
156 Ibid. 218. 
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equivalent: “What is the structure of a body? And, What can a body do?” “What a body can do 
corresponds to the nature and limits of its capacity to be affected.”157 
How does God (or Nature) function?  
It may be recalled that to potentia’ (essence) 158 “there corresponds an aptitudo or potesas” (a capacity 
for being affected), and that “there is no aptitude or capacity that remains ineffective, and so no power 
that is not actual”. This second triad connects the concreteness of affections to potentia and potestas. 
At the same time as making this concrete connection the triad also shows that the very concreteness 
of affections is the way that substance / God / Nature functions and that the capacity to be affected 
was eternally and necessarily exercised”.159 With this eternity is how God/Nature functions. It is useful 
to compare God to finite modes to understand further how modes function. 
 God is the cause of all of his affections. 
Unlike finite modes, God (Nature) involves all modal essences and all existing modes and is the cause 
of all of his affections. 
Active and Passive Affections 
A mode's essence is a power; to it corresponds a certain capacity of the mode to be affected. “But 
because the mode is a part of Nature, this capacity is always exercised, either in affections produced 
by external things (those affections called passive), or in affections explained by its own essence 
(called active).”160 (What ‘explained by its own essence’ means is yet to come.) 
Existing modes are different to God (Nature). “These do not exist by virtue of their own nature; their 
existence is composed of extensive parts that are determined and affected from outside, ad infinitum.” 
Every existing mode is affected by modes external to it, and undergoes changes that are not 
explained by its own nature alone. So, its affections and tend to remain passions.161  
For Deleuze, the “great question that presents itself in relation to existing finite modes is thus: Can 
they attain to active affections, and if so, how?” This is, what Spinoza would consider, the ‘ethical’ 
question.162  
Affections 
For God, affections are the modes themselves - modal essences or existing modes. “Their ideas 
express the essence of God as their cause.”163  
                                            
157 Ibid. 218. 
158 The distinction between potestas and potentia is discussed in a number of places. Here it is cited from 
Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy. 98. 
159 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy. 218. The triad shows “how modes express substance, participate in it, 
and even, in their own way, reproduce it. ‘God was defined by the identity of his essence and an absolutely 
infinite power (potentia); as such he had a potestas, that is, a capacity to be affected in an infinity, of ways; and 
this capacity was eternally and necessarily exercised. God being cause of all things in the same sense as cause 
of himself.” (218) 
160 Ibid. 93. 
161 Ibid. 219. Spinoza remarks that childhood is an abject state, but one common to all of us, in which we depend 
"very heavily on external causes”.  
162 Ibid. 219. 
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Passive affections (affectio or effects) 
The affections of modes are different from the affections God: they are “a second degree of affection, 
affections of affections: for example, a passive affection that we experience is just the effect of some 
body on our own”. We discussed these at the start of the chapter as affection ideas, affectio or effects. 
“The idea of such an affection does not express its cause, that is to say, the nature or essence of the 
external body.” Instead, it indicates “the present constitution of our own body, and so the way in which 
our capacity to be affected is being at that moment exercised. An affection of our body is only a 
corporeal image, and the idea of the affection as it is in our mind, an inadequate idea, an 
imagining.”164 
Affectus 
And we have yet another sort of idea of affection. “From a given idea of an affection there necessarily 
fIow "affects" or feelings (affectus). Such feelings are themselves affections. “An idea we have 
indicates the present state of our body's constitution; while our body exists, it endures, and is defined 
by duration; its present state is thus inseparable from a previous state with which it is linked in a 
continuous duration.”165 This was previously discussed in terms of a continuous variation of the power 
of existing. This is not an “abstract intellectual operation by which the mind compares two states”. Our 
feelings (affectus) “are in themselves ideas which involve the concrete relation of present and past in a 
continuous duration: they involve the changes of an existing mode that endures”.166 
Links between states and changes (between types of indication of a body) 
“A mode thus has affections of two sorts: states of the body or ideas that indicate these states, and 
changes in the body or ideas indicating these changes (my emphases). The second kind are linked to 
the first, and change with them: one senses how, beginning with an initial affection, our feelings 
become linked with our ideas in such a way that our whole capacity to be affected is exercised at each 
moment.”167 And unfortunately, “…all this turns, ultimately, on a certain characteristic, of modes, and 
of man in particular: the first ideas he has are passive affections, inadequate ideas or imaginings; the 
affects or feelings that flow from them are thus passions, feelings that are themselves passive.”168 
 An inadequate ideas and passive feelings 
Inadequate ideas produce passive feelings. Linking this back to the discussion associated with 
Spinoza’s method: “an inadequate idea is an idea of which we are not the cause (it is not formally 
explained by our power of understanding); this inadequate idea is itself the (material and efficient) 
cause of a feeling; we cannot then be the adequate cause of this feeling; but a feeling of which we are 
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not the adequate cause is necessarily a passion. Our capacity to be affected is thus exercised, from 
the beginning of our existence, by inadequate ideas and passive feelings.169 
Adequate ideas and active feelings 
In contrast, adequate ideas produce active feelings. “An idea we have that is adequate may be 
formally defined as an idea of which we are the cause; were it then the material and efficient cause of 
a feeling we would be the adequate cause of that feeling itself; but a feeling of which we are the 
adequate cause is an action.”170  
Thus Spinoza can say that "Insofar as our mind has adequate ideas, it necessarily does certain things, 
and insofar as it has inadequate ideas, it necessarily undergoes other things". Hence, the ethical 
question is “linked to the methodological question of how we can become active. How can we come to 
produce adequate ideas?”171 
Existential changes of finite modes, or ‘expressive changes’ are central to Spinoza’s Ethics.172 “These 
changes are of several kinds.”173  
The Characteristics of Nature’s Power 
Powers of suffering 
It seems that Spinoza considered that insofar as a mode’s “capacity to be affected is exercised by 
passive affections, this capacity itself appears as a force or power of suffering. The capacity of being 
affected is called a power of suffering insofar as it is actually exercised by passive affections. The 
body's power of suffering has as its equivalent in the mind the power of imagining and of experiencing 
passive feelings.”174 
Powers of acting 
If the mode comes to exercise, at least partially, its capacity of being affected by active affections…the 
capacity appears as a force or power of acting”. This power of understanding (or knowing) “is the 
power of acting proper to the soul”.175  
The proportions of active and passive feelings 
Overall, “the proportion of active and passive feelings is open to variation, within a fixed capacity of 
being affected”. “For a given essence, for a given capacity to be affected, the power of suffering and 
that of acting” are “open to variation in inverse proportion one to the other. Both together, in their 
varying proportions, constitute the capacity to be affected.”  
                                            
169 Ibid. 220. 
170 Ibid. 220. 
171 Ibid. 220. 
172 De Spinoza, Benedict, Ethics, trans. Curley, Edwin (London: Penguin 1996). 
173 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy. 221. 
174 Ibid. 222. 
175 Ibid. 222. 
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Elasticity 
There is another level of variation. “For the capacity to be affected does not remain fixed at all times 
and from all viewpoints. Spinoza suggests “that the relation that characterizes an existing mode as a 
whole is endowed with a kind of elasticity” depending on age, illness etc. “Such changes”… “in the 
relation that characterizes a body”…and its “capacity of being affected enjoy a margin, a limit” (a 
maximum and a minimum), “within which they take form and are deformed”.176  
There is only a power of action 
Whilst Spinoza gives the impression of two opposing powers, that of suffering and acting he also says 
that “active affections are indeed the only ones that really and positively exercise our capacity to be 
affected.” Hence, the “power of suffering” is really only the disconnection from the power of acting.177  
The physical and ethical views 
Spinoza reconciles two fundamental ways of viewing modes. “In the physical view a capacity to be 
affected remains fixed for a given essence, whether it be exercised by active affections or passive 
ones; a mode is thus always as perfect as it can be. But in the ethical view the power of being affected 
is fixed only within general limits.” This capacity is reduced to a minimum whilst being exercised by 
passive affections, and we “remain imperfect and impotent, cut off, in a way, from our essence or our 
degree of power, cut off from what we can do”.178 
Mechanical, dynamic & metaphysical change 
There are, from a different angle, three realms of expressive changes of a finite mode: they 
consist “not only in mechanical” (physical) “changes in the affections it experiences, but also in 
dynamic changes in the capacity to be affected”, and in ‘metaphysical’ changes of their essence 
itself: while a mode exists, its very essence is open to variation, according to the affections that 
belong to it at a given moment.179,180 
We do not even know of what a body is capable 
Whence the importance of the ethical question. We do not even know of what a body is capable, says 
Spinoza. That is: “We do not even know of what affections we are capable, nor the extent of our 
power. How could we know this in advance? From the beginning of our existence we are necessarily 
                                            
176 Ibid. 222. What is more, its composition, as also its decomposition, passes through so many stages that one 
may almost say that a mode changes its body or relation in leaving behind childhood, or on entering old age. 
Growth, aging, illness: we can hardly recognize the same individual. And is it really indeed the same individual? 
Such limits were discussed earlier in the section on how an infinity of extensive parts can compose the 
existence of modes. Such an example reminds me that whilst Spinoza’s theory of the body is certainly suited to 
more than just the corporeal human body, Spinoza’s examples strongly tend to circle around the corporeal 
body.  
177 Ibid. 225. 
178 Ibid. 225. 
179 Ibid. 226. 
180 “Spinoza’s realisation of the naturalist program is closely analogous (to that of Leibniz). Mechanism governs 
infinitely composite existing bodies. But this mechanism must in the first place be referred to a dynamic theory 
of the capacity to be affected (the power of acting and suffering); and in the last instance to the theory of the 
particular essences that express themselves in the variations of this power of action and passion. In Spinoza as 
in Leibniz three levels may be distinguished: mechanism, force and essence” ibid. 229. 
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exercised by passive affections. Finite modes are born in conditions such that they are cut off in 
advance from their essence or their degree of power, cut off from that of which they are capable, from 
their power of action. We can know by reasoning that the power of action is the sole expression of our 
essence, the sole affirmation of our power of being affected. But this knowledge remains abstract. We 
do not know what this power is, nor how we may acquire or discover it. And we will certainly never 
know this, if we do not concretely try to become active.”181  
Spinoza’s emphasis with the triads and the related argument stresses that metaphysical changes of 
the essence are directly connected to dynamic changes that are directly connected mechanical 
changes which we are able to interact with, if we become active. Spinoza’s drawing out that part of 
being part of Nature means we have ‘our own’ concrete power to engage the power of Nature182 is 
developed further with the help of Nietzsche and American pragmatism in Deleuze’s notion of 
experimentation. It might be said that Spinoza’s conceptions provides the basic aesthetic and practical 
theory for such a model of experimentation, a model of ethical practice. 
Re-establishing the power of Nature 
As Deleuze draws out Leibniz and Spinoza are part of the anticartesian reaction which attempts to re-
establish ‘the claims of a Nature endowed with forces or power,’ whilst holding onto the key 
discoveries of Cartesian mechanism: “the powers of Nature are no longer virtualities referred to occult 
entities, to souls or minds through which they are realized.” Deleuze says that Leibniz formulates the 
antiCartesian program ‘perfectly’: “to counter Descartes by restoring to Nature the force of action and 
passion, but this without falling back into a pagan vision of the world, an idolatry of Nature”.183 
Conatus 
Spinoza differed from Leibniz on the role of ‘conatus’ in modes. For Leibniz, conatus was to do with 
tendencies: to movement and to existence. For Spinoza, “a conatus is …a mode's essence (or degree 
of power) once the mode has begun to exist. A mode comes to exist when its extensive parts are 
extrinsically determined to enter into the relation that characterizes the mode: then, and only then, is 
its essence itself determined as a conatus.…It designates (an) existential function of essence, that is, 
the affirmation of essence in a mode's existence…A composite body's conatus only the effort to 
preserve the relation of movement and rest that defines it, that is, to maintain constantly renewed 
parts in the relation that defines its existence.184…The dynamic characteristics of conatus are linked 
with its mechanical ones. A composite body's conatus is also the effort to maintain the body's ability to 
be affected in a great number of ways.”185 
                                            
181 Ibid. 226. 
182 As Spinoza says, man's power is a ‘part’ of the power or essence of God, but this only insofar as God's 
essence explicates itself through the essence of man. Ibid. 227. 
183 Ibid. 229. 
184 A simple body's conatus can only be the effort to preserve the state to which it has been determined. Ibid. 230. 
185 Ibid. 231. 
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Conatus & desire (and consciousness) 
When a mode is determined to come into existence by a characteristic relation corresponding to a 
degree of power then “this essence is itself determined as conatus or appetite”. “Precisely because 
the modal essence is not a possibility, because it is a physical reality that lacks nothing, it does tend to 
pass into existence; but it tends to perservere in existing, once the mode is determined to exist.” 
Parrallel to the capacity for being affected (potestas) is an ability (aptus) to be affected. Conatus is 
accompanied by consciousness. “Conatus having become conscious of itself under this or that affect 
is called desire, desire is always a desire for something.” 186  “The variations of conatus as it is 
determined by this or that affection are the dynamic variations of our power of action.” “Our conatus is 
thus always identical with our power of acting itself.” 187 
Everything is physical 
So there is in Spinoza “no metaphysics of essences, no dynamic of forces, no mechanics of 
phenomena, everything in Nature is ‘physical’:  
 a physics of intensive quantity corresponding to modal essences;  
 a physics of extensive quantity, that is, a mechanism through which modes themselves come into 
existence;  
 a physics of force, that is, a dynamism through which essence asserts itself in existence, 
espousing the variations of the power of action.” 188 
The complete modal triad is therefore: “a modal essence expresses itself in a characteristic relation; 
this relation expresses a capacity to be affected: this capacity is exercised by changing affections, just 
as the relation is effected by parts which are renewed”.189 Spinoza relies on an “absolutely immanent 
pure causality” through such “physical” means “to endow things with a force or power of their own, 
belonging to them precisely as modes”.190 
To move beyond Descartes, Spinoza has been seeking or discovering ‘physical’ means that makes 
sense of the metaphysical nature of God, or the system of Nature and the universe, such as with his 
notion of the singularity of the individual in absolute infinity, as way to get to real distinction. This 
machinic relation of the infinite or whole to the singular is key to empowering Nature, both in terms of 
the power of beings and the power of understanding. Spinoza sees that this double embrace of infinity 
and singular is the only way to real distinction. A sort of double criticality. The last section connected 
existential changes of finite modes and the physical nature of phenomena as means to see the 
workings of bodies, and hence Nature. The next section finds a connection between movement and 
rest and the very concrete relations of encounters to ‘real ethical difference’. 
                                            
186 Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy. 98-99. 
187 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy. 231. 
188 Ibid. 233. 
189 Ibid. 233. 
190 Ibid. 233. 
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The concreteness of real ethical difference 
Spinoza says that there are two ‘infinite modes of Extension’: movement and rest. and the face of the 
whole universe. Deleuze asks what he means by this? 
Spinoza is here viewing bodies and the universe from the perspective of movement and rest. For 
Spinoza, relations of movement and rest must be considered in two ways: 
 ‘as eternally expressing the essence of modes’ 
From this viewpoint, “movement and rest, in comprising all relations, also contain all essences as they 
are in their attribute.” 191 
 ‘as temporarily subsuming extensive parts’ 
From this viewpoint the “various relations of movement and rest group together changing infinite 
collections of extensive parts. They thus determine the conditions for modes to come into existence. 
Each relation that is actualised constitutes an existing individual.”192  
Spinoza here stresses the wider perspective of “various relations of movement and rest” in the coming 
to be of any mode or individual, and even stresses this by considering that “movement affects 
Extension before the latter has any extrinsic modal parts”.193 
And any particular relation always combines with some other to form: “in a third relation, a further 
individual at a higher level. And this ad infinitum, so that the universe as a whole is a single existing 
individual, defined by the total proportion of movement and rest, comprising all relations combined ad 
infinitum, the collection of all collections under all relations.” This individual is, by its form, the "total 
face of the universe, which, although it varies in infinite ways, yet remains always the same."194 
All relations combine to form this face and they combine according to their own laws. These same 
laws are the mechanical physics of the universe, composition and decomposition, and also determine 
modes to come into existence as discussed in relation to Spinoza’s theory of existence above.195 Such 
relations do not combine in just any way and “cannot be combined with just any other”. 
From the perspective of relations, the ‘order of relations’, “there is a combination of relations in any 
encounter; but the relations are not necessarily those of the bodies that meet. Relations combine 
according to laws; but existing bodies, being themselves composed of extensive parts, meet bit by 
bit”.196 Spinoza is here drawing attention to the concreteness of encounters. Two bodies do not just 
meet abstractly, they meet bit by bit, and hence the relations of encounter are not the same as the 
                                            
191 Ibid. 235. It is enough to recall that there is never any movement on its own, but only ever movement and rest 
together. It is worth highlighting that Spinoza considers movement and rest as being equally part of the attribute 
of Thought as it is part of the attribute of Extension. 
192 Ibid. 236. 
193 Ibid. 235. 
194 Ibid. 236. ‘facies totius universi’ 
195 Whence we must, above all, avoid confusing essences and relations, or a law or production of essences and a 
law of composition or relations. It is not the essence that determines the actualisation or the relation in which it 
expresses itself. Relations are composed and decomposed according to their own laws. The order of essences 
is characterized by a total conformity. Such is not the case with the order of relations. All relations are of course 
combined ad infinitum, but not in just any way. Ibid. 209. 
196 Ibid. 237. 
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relations of the bodies that meet. To understand the function of the order of relations for Spinoza we 
need to understand a little about the three orders of the Order of Nature. 
The Order of Nature, three (sub) Orders of Nature (and the ‘Common Order of Nature) 
In any existing mode there are components: 
 its essence as a degree of power; 
 the relation in which it expresses itself; 
 the extensive parts subsumed in this relation. 
“To each of these components there corresponds an order of nature”: 
 the order of essences is determined by degrees of power… “each essence agrees with all others, 
all being comprised in the production of each”. 
 the order of relations is an order of composition functioning according to laws. “It determines the 
external conditions for modes to come into existence.” 
 the order of encounters is “an order of local and temporary partial agreement and disagreement. 
Existing bodies meet in their extensive parts, bit by bit.” 
Though it is the laws of the order of relations that determined when a mode comes into existence, it is 
the order of encounters that effectively determines:  
 the moment when a mode comes into existence; 
 the duration of its existence; 
 the moment of its death or destruction. 
Spinoza defines the order of encounters as the ‘Common Order of Nature’, as the order of ‘extrinsic 
determinations’ and ‘chance encounters’ and as the ‘order of passions’. “It determines the affections 
we experience each moment, which are experienced by external bodies we encounter.” Spinoza calls 
it ‘fortuitous’. The “laws of composition” order of relations and the order of essences do not determine 
which bodies meet and how.197 The order of encounters has its own necessity. There are two sorts of 
encounters. 
The two sorts of encounters 
i. Joyful passions 
The first sort occurs “when I meet a body whose relation combines with my own. A body whose 
relation is preserved along with my own is said to ‘agree with my nature’, to be ‘good’, that is, ‘useful to 
me’. It produces an affection that is itself good, which itself agrees with my nature. The affection is 
                                            
197 Ibid. 239. If we consider a body with a definite given relation, it must necessarily encounter bodies whose 
relation cannot combine with its own. and will always eventually meet one whose relation destroys it's own. 
Thus there is no death that is not brutal, violent and fortuitous; but this precisely because each is altogether 
necessary within the order of encounters. 
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passive because it is explained by the external body, and the idea of the affection is a passion, a 
passive feeling. But it is a feeling of joy as it is produced by an object that is good for me… a joyful 
passion….It increases or aids our power of action.” (Remember… “passions are always the mark of 
our impotence…they cut us off from our power of action”) “They are passions insofar as the power of 
action has not increased to the point of being active…we are still cut off from our power of action.”  
But…” 
our passive feelings involve some degree, however low, of our power of action. Indeed any 
feeling at all determines our essence or conatus. It thus determines us to desire, that is to 
imagine and to do something that flows from our nature. When the feeling affecting us itself 
agrees with our nature, our power of action is then necessarily increased or aided. For the joy is 
added to the desire that follows from it, so that the external thing’s power encourages and 
increases our own. Conatus, being our effort to persevere in existence, is always a quest for what 
is useful or good for us; it always involves some degree of our power of action, with which it may 
be identified.” “We do not cease to be passive, to be cut off….but we tend to come nearer to this 
power. Insofar as the feeling of joy increases our power of action, it determines us to desire, 
imagine, do, all we can in order to preserve this joy and the object that procures it for us.”198 
ii.  Sad passions 
The second sort of encounter involves “a body whose relation cannot combine with my own…and 
produces in me a passive affection which is itself contrary to my nature…the idea of such an affection 
is a feeling of sadness, a sad passion”.199 
Can we naturally have good encounters? 
We have so far discussed “two chains of affections, joyful and sad, corresponded to the two sorts of 
encounter, good and bad. But this is still an abstract view. If one takes account of the concrete factors 
of existence, one sees a constant interplay between the two chains”, with “the two sequences … in 
constant interaction”, and with these, “our power of action never ceases to vary”.200 
The question is, once we exist is there any chance of us naturally having good encounters, and 
experiencing the joyful affections that follow from them? The chances are in fact slight enough. In 
speaking of existence, we must not consider essences or degrees of power absolutely (there is no 
contest between essences as such);201 “nor must we consider abstractly the relations in which these 
express themselves. For an existing mode always exists as already affected by objects in partial and 
particular relations: it exists as determined to this or that.”202 
There thus seems “very little chance of our naturally having good encounters… This is hardly 
surprising, as Nature is not constructed for our convenience, but in a ‘common order’ to which man, as 
a part of Nature, is subject.” However, he offers a way forward, in that: “the opposition of actions and 
                                            
198 Ibid. 240-241. 
199 Ibid. 240-241. 
200 Ibid. 243. 
201 Ibid. 242. 
202 Ibid. 244. 
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passions should not conceal the other opposition that constitutes the second principle of Spinozism: 
that of joyful passive affections and sad passive affections. One increases our power, the other 
diminishes it. We come closer to our power of action insofar as we are affected by joy.” 203 
Joyful passive affections offer some hope. “The ethical question falls then, in Spinoza, into two parts: 
How can we come to produce active affections? But first of all: How can we come to experience a 
maximum of joyful passions?”204  
What is Evil? (or rather, what is bad and good?) 
“Beyond Good and Evil” . . . at least this does not mean “Beyond Good and Bad”,205 Nietzsche 
Spinoza’s discussion of what is evil provides a useful way to introduce his conception of ethical 
evaluation, a conception that is an ethics of Nature. In this discussion he focuses on the three orders 
of Nature.  
“In the order of essences…evil is nothing also. Consider our death or destruction: our relation is 
decomposed, ceases, that is, to subsume its extensive parts. But these extensive parts are in no way 
constituents of our essence; our essence itself, having its full reality in itself, has never presented the 
least tendency to come into existence. Once we exist, of course, our essence is a conatus, an attempt 
to persevere in existence. “So if it be asked what evil amounts to in the order of relations, one has to 
reply that evil is nothing.” 
“For there is nothing, in the order of relations, but composition. It cannot be said that the combining 
of some relations or others is an evil: any combination of relations is good from the viewpoint of the 
relations combined, that is, simply from the positive viewpoint.” “Nothing is evil from Nature’s 
viewpoint. Lacking nothing while the mode does not yet exist, the essence is deprived of nothing when 
it ceases to exist.” 206 
There is also no evil in the order of encounters: “any existing mode is as perfect as it can be, given 
the affections that exercise its capacity to be affected and cause it to vary within the limits compatible 
with existence”.207 
For Spinoza, the very idea of good and evil is the measure of our misunderstanding of natural laws; 
the idea of rewards and punishments reflects only our ignorance of the true relation between an act 
and its consequences; Good and Evil are inadequate ideas, and we form conceptions of them only to 
the extent that our ideas are inadequate. But because there is no Good or Evil, this does not mean 
that all distinctions vanish. There is no Good or Evil in Nature, but there are good and bad things for 
each existing mode.208  
For Spinoza, the moral categories of Good and Evil disappear, but this does not mean that all things 
and beings are equal. “There are increases in our power of action, reductions in our power of action. 
                                            
203 Ibid. 245. 
204 Ibid. 246. 
205 Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy. 22. 
206 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy. Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy, 249. 
207 Ibid. 252. 
208 Ibid. 254. 
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The distinction between good things and bad provides the basis for a real ethical difference, which we 
must substitute for a false moral opposition.” 209 Such a distinction is the basis for an immanentist 
ethics. 
The Ethical Vision of the World 
The common ‘moral’ view of the relationship between the soul and the body is not true philosophy 
according to Deleuze. 
In this model the soul, in its eminent way, has ‘higher duties’ and must command the body. The body’s 
power, is therefore either a ‘power of execution’ or ‘the power to lead the soul astray’. “The moral view 
of the world appears in a principle that dominates most theories of the union of the soul and body: 
when one of these acts the other suffers.”210 For Deleuze, such a view does not appreciate the power 
of either. 
The moral view tends to rely upon ideas of essence and value. What is our essence? In a 
morality it is always a matter of realising the essence. This implies that the essence is in a state 
where it is not necessarily realised, that implies that we have an essence….Now, how can this 
essence which is only potential, be realized? By morality. To say that it is to be realized by 
morality is to say that it must be taken for an end. The essence of man must be taken for an end 
by existing man. Therefore, to behave in a reasonable way, i.e. to carry out the essence is the 
task of morality. Now the essence taken as an end is value. Note that the moral vision of the 
world is made of essence. The essence is only potential, it is necessary to realise the essence, 
that will be done insofar as the essence is taken for an end, and the values ensure the realization 
of the essence. 211  
Such values are not just based on Being… 
…morality always implies something superior to Being; what is superior to Being is something 
which plays the role of the One, of the Good, it is the One superior to Being. Indeed, morality is 
the enterprise of judging not only all that is, but Being itself. Now one can only judge Being in the 
name of an authority higher than Being. 212 
The soul relies on values to judge Being. Ethics is interested in the existing and the singularity of the 
existing. Morality looks past this to find essences that are in the name of Being but supplied by 
something outside of Being and used to judge Being. There are two sides to this process. There is the 
judgment of existence by what is not existing and, probably more importantly, there is the deferral 
away from the powers of the existing. The former can be clearly recognized and identified, in say an 
                                            
209 Ibid. 254. 
210 Ibid. 254. 
211 Deleuze, Gilles, "Lecture on Spinoza 21/12/1980," (Seminars given between 1971 and 1987 at the Universite 
de Paris VIII Vincennes and Vincennes St-Denis). Vincennes(1980), 
http://www.webdeleuze.com/php/texte.php?cle=190&groupe=Spinoza&langue=2, Accessed 28 August 2009. 
212 Ibid. 
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analytical manner, the latter can only be embraced in its singularity, and it can only be affirmed.213 
Deleuze calls this whole ensemble, morality.214 
This ensemble relates not only to ‘serious’ philosophical questions or important personal issues but to 
everyday actions and perceptions. To be moral is to rely on preconceptions from outside being which 
defer us from even noticing potentials or that such preconceptions are seamlessly habituated into our 
very way of being in the world, what we notice, see, feel, hear, do, think or what we do not notice, see, 
feel, hear, do, think… Most morality works before consciousness. In this sense, we strongly tend to 
live in a moral world. It may be better to think about preconceptions, structurings or lenses that come 
from outside, of everyday life as lived, rather than ideas given to us eminently or from ‘above’. This 
starts to take us back to Deleuze’s observation that we suspect that Spinoza’s Ethics has ‘nothing to 
do with morality’. It tells us a great deal about morality and the issues with morality, but Spinoza’s 
sense of ethics is not there to be compared directly with morality, as counter-morality, as it takes away 
the power and scope of Spinoza’s ethics, being instead, a ‘pure ontology’. 215  This is not being 
academically pedantic; it is about affirming the pragmatic power of Spinoza’s ethics. It is about 
changing perceptions and actions. 
Where such an ensemble relies upon the soul having an eminence, the notion of parallelism, instead, 
considers that “what is a passion in the mind is also a passion in the body, what is an action in the 
mind is also an action in the body”. 216 There is no eminence of the soul in parallelism, or “any 
transcendence of a God who might base one series on the other”. 
To understand the power of the soul we need to embrace the object of the soul, which is the human 
body. So, if a body is more capable than another of doing many things then the mind is more capable 
than another of perceiving many things. “To think in terms of power, one must consider the matter in 
relation to the body.” “The question, ‘What can a body do?’ must be taken as a model.”217 This does 
not mean that the soul or Thought is relegated somehow, but just that conscious thought is replaced 
by a thought capable of reaching the necessity of things, the powers of the existing. This is a 
“devaluation of consciousness relative to Thought. If we consider that the actions and passions of the 
soul accompany the actions and passions of the body then this “amounts to an ethical vision of the 
world”, one where we have substituted ethics for morality.218 
The pragmatics of Natural Right 
Spinoza owes a great deal to Hobbes’ conception of natural right, which was thoroughly opposed to 
the classical conception of natural law. Hobbes’ conception recognizes the world we live in as a 
Nature, which like Spinoza, is not just there for our convenience. Deleuze outlines various 
characteristics of that the classical conception, including that it:  
                                            
213 In a sense, the former, given that there is a comparative reference, can be judged, and latter can only be 
evaluated. This means that even within ethics that critique of morality will tend to ‘easier’ or fit into our 
expectations than affirmation of Being. 
214 Deleuze, "Lecture on Spinoza 21/12/1980". 
215 Ibid. 
216 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy. 256. 
217 Ibid. 256. 
218 Ibid. 257. 
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 “defines a being’s nature by its perfection” (ie. man is naturally reasonable and social)’;  
 considers “the state of nature” (in contrast to Hobbes)….”as a life in “conformity with nature in a 
‘good’ civil society”;  
 considers “duties as primary and unconditional”…and that “natural powers are only potential” … 
and “require an act of reason to realise them to ends they serve”; and that,  
 “this grounds the authority of the wise man”…who is “best judge of order of ends, duties, etc.”219 
Against this conception Hobbes’ four basic theses are: 
that the “law of nature is no longer referred to a final perfection but to an initial desire…to the strongest 
appetite; detached from the order of ends, it is deduced from appetite as its efficient cause” (my 
emphasis): 
 that “reason enjoys no privilege…(and) “also…nobody is born reasonable…nobody is born a 
citizen….nobody is born religious”; 
 that “power or right is unconditional and primary….(and that) duties (are) always second to the 
affirmation of our power, to the exercise of our power, the preservation of our right”, and that; 
 my power is always actual…(and) depends on affections”. “Nobody has the authority to decide 
my rights…(and) everyone in the state of nature….judges what is good or bad” themselves etc. 
“Renunciation of our right therefore happens through our own consent…from fear of evil or hope 
of greater good. The principle of consent (pact or contract) becomes the principle of political 
philosophy and replaces the rule of authority”.220 (my emphasis) 
In this schema, in contrast to the classical conception, the state of nature is something out of our 
control and “is not viable as long as the natural right corresponding to it remains theoretical and 
abstract. In the state of nature I live at the mercy of encounters. The passive affections are 
predominantly sad and reduce my power of action.”221 How to operate viably in a state of nature? 
Ethics & the Art of Organising Encounters 
For Spinoza, there is a great difference between “seeking what is useful through chance” and “seeking 
to organise what is useful (proper or true utility)”. To produce a viable way of living in the state of 
nature “requires striving to organize encounters”. This obviously, “has its limits…we cannot avoid all 
bad encounters”.222 
This requires embracing that there “is in Nature no Good nor Evil, but there is ethical difference”. 
Ethical difference “relates to the kind of affections that determine our conatus”. “The free, strong and 
reasonable man is in possession of a power of action and the presence in him of adequate ideas and 
                                            
219 Ibid. 258-259. 
220 Ibid. 259-260. 
221 Ibid. 260. 
222 Ibid. 261. 
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active affections.” However, man tends to “have only those passions that derive from their inadequate 
ideas and cut themselves of from their power of action.223  
For Spinoza, there seem to be “two stages of reason and freedom: increasing our power of action by 
striving to experience a maximum of joyful passive affections”; when our power of action has so 
increased that it becomes capable of producing active affections.224 The “man who is to become 
strong and reasonable and free tries to experience joyful passions” then “strives to extricate himself 
from chance encounters and the concatenation of sad passions to organise good encounters, 
combine his relation with relations that combine directly with it, unite with what agrees in nature with 
him…all in such a way to be affected with joy”.225 
As well as this two stage process, “reason, strength, freedom…are inseparable from a development, a 
formative process, a culture.” This involves a “slow learning” of what agrees with us in nature… “a long 
formative process”. The art of organising encounters is both the two stage process or reason and 
freedom and it is the “long formative process” of “slow learning”.226 It also requires a positive attitude 
to the state of nature. 
The state of reason has a complex relation to the state of nature.  
The “state of nature is not subject to the laws of reason: reason relates to the true utility of man”. 
Nature has no regard for man’s preservation. It “comprises an infinity of laws concerning the universe 
as a whole of which man is but a small part” yet the state of reason is not of another order than the 
state of nature.227 “Reason demands nothing contrary to Nature: it demands only that everyone 
should love themselves, seek what is useful to themselves, and strive to preserve their being by 
increasing their power of action.” The state of reason is inseparable from the formation of “a higher 
kind of body and a higher kind of soul”. These higher essences “already strive …to make their own 
encounters correspond to relations that are compatible with theirs. A reasonable being may in this 
sense be said …in its way said to reproduce and express the effort of Nature as a whole”. 228 
Associations of men and the city 
In the art of organising good encounters, where man combines his relation with relations that combine 
directly with him and unites with what agrees in nature with him, Spinoza spends considerable time 
discussing two realms of encounters involving two realms of powers, which will not be discussed here 
in any useful detail: associations with men and the city—the reasonable association and the good city. 
For Spinoza, in terms of what is most useful to man, man is most useful to man and associations of 
men is for him the first place to focus the effort to organize encounters. In terms of the city, the city 
tends not to be a reasonable association but Spinoza describes the city as a ‘collective person’, with a 
common body and soul, a ‘multitude’ which is guided by ‘one mind’. It tends “toward the end that 
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sound reason teaches all men to pursue”. Of course not all cities are like this and Spinoza outlines 
what makes a good city, in terms of natural rights.229 
How to have possession of our power of action? 
How to have possession of our power when “the conditions in which we have ideas seem to condemn 
us to only experience passive affections.” “The affections that naturally exercise our capacity to be 
affected are passions that reduce it to a minimum, and cut us of from our essence or our power of 
action.” However, there is, according to Deleuze, “a glimmer of hope”. There are “two kinds of 
passions and” even though “all passions cut us off” from our power of action they do to different 
degrees. “Joyful passions” as opposed to sad passions “lead us closer to our power of action.”230 
“The Primary question of the Ethics is thus: What must we do in order to be affected by a 
maximum of joyful passions? For Spinoza “reason” and the “very slow empirical effort” of reason 
“make it possible.” “Reason in the first principle of its development or in its initial aspect is the 
effort to organize encounters in such a way that we are affected by a maximum of joyful passions.” 
“Reason is the power of understanding”...”belonging to the soul”. “Joyful passions agree with reason 
and lead us to understand, or determine us to become reasonable.” However, “it is not enough for our 
power of action to increase”.231 How to find the means through the accumulation of joyful passions to 
“at last experience active affections” of which we are the cause? The second principle of the Ethics 
is thus: “what must we do in order to produce active affections?” 
“Active affections...are necessarily joyful” as there is no active sadness “since all sadness is the 
diminution of our power of action; only joy can be active. So, if our power of action increases to the 
point that we come into full possession, our subsequent affections will necessarily be active joys.”232 
“ Active Joy is ’another’ feeling than passive joy”. However, Spinoza suggests “that the distinction is 
one of reason alone. The two feelings differ only in their causes. Passive Joy is produced by an object 
that agrees with us, and whose power increases our power of action, but of which we do not yet have 
an adequate idea. Active joy, in contrast, we “produce by ourselves, it flows from our power of action 
itself, follows from an adequate idea in us”.233 
Spinoza says that “to the extent that passive joys increase our power of action, they agree with 
reason” and since reason is the soul’s power of action, “those joys that are active are born of reason.” 
So that from every passive joy there “may arise an active joy distinguished from it only by its cause”.234 
                                            
229 Ibid. 266-267. 
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231 Ibid. 274. 
232 Ibid. 274. 
233 Ibid. 274. 
234 Ibid. 275. Michael Hardt describes this as the ‘spark that sets the ethical progression in motion’. Hardt, Gilles 
Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy. 98. 
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Common notions:235 How to have possession of our power of action? 
Central to gaining possession of our power of action are the ‘common notions’. Common notions 
identify how bodies agree and form a ‘community of composition’.  
“Consider two bodies that entirely agree, two bodies, that is to say, all of whose relations can be 
combined: they are like parts of a whole, the whole exercising a general function in relation to these 
parts, and the parts having a common property as belonging to the whole. Thus two bodies that agree 
entirely have an identical structure. Because all of their relations may be combined, they have an 
analogy, similarity or community of composition”.236 
“One must in fact take account of the "whole" formed by the two bodies, not with one another 
directly, but together with all the intermediary terms that allow us to pass from one to the other. 
As all relations are combined in Nature as a whole, Nature presents a similarity of composition 
that may be seen in all bodies from the most general viewpoint.”237 
This is presented as an aesthetic challenge. 
Spinoza/Deleuze want to affirm the centrality and reality of relations over what we tend to understand 
as unitary parts and matter. In this regard, “it is only relations that change in the universe as a whole, 
whose parts remain the same.”238 
Deleuze draws attention to what Spinoza discovers as being central to this problem of how to gain 
possession of our power. “We thus arrive at what Spinoza calls a “common notion.”” “A common 
notion is always an idea of a similarity in existing modes”. For him there are two types of “common 
notions”. 
                                            
235 A useful and straightforward account of agencement (assemblage) which is equally a useful account of 
common notions, event, sense and becoming, and points to their relation, is John Phillip’s short essay on the 
translation of the term agencement, part of which is include here. “The most direct connection that agencement 
has for Deleuze would be to his work from the late 1960s on the philosophy of Spinoza and the Common 
Notion.  It also has a very precise correspondence to the notions of event, becoming and sense, which Deleuze 
discusses at length in other works of the same period.  A common notion represents the situation when two or 
more bodies have something in common.  All bodies have in common the states of extension, motion and rest; 
but when two or more bodies come into contact or otherwise enter into a relationship they form a 
composition.  A common notion is the representation of this composition as an independent unity.  The unity, for 
instance, of a poison and the body poisoned can be regarded as a state of becoming and an event which is 
reducible to neither the body nor the poison.  The body and the poison, rather, participate in the event (which is 
what they have in common).  Deleuze brings together readings of several sources, including Lewis Carroll’s 
Alice, the philosophy of the Stoics and the writings of surrealist Joë Bousquet, to explore the character of unities 
like this in terms of their eventness, their sense (sens in the senses of both direction and meaning) and their 
becoming.  While Alice is growing larger she is in a state of becoming both larger than she was and yet not as 
large as she will be.  The state of becoming regarded as a compositional unity thus affixes the two senses of 
being-larger-than and being-smaller-than.  This being between, and the paradoxical senses it produces, can be 
brought into contact with the Stoics who regarded, for instance, the state produced when a knife cuts through 
flesh as a separate, abstract state, which Deleuze develops in terms of the event.  The wound as an event 
which brings the knife and the flesh together can be reduced to neither knife nor flesh.  A third sense is 
produced that corresponds precisely to Spinoza’s common notion, and which gives rise to the second order 
conceptual level of ‘adequate ideas’.  Knowledge of the world would thus be formed of second order ideas: 
concepts that are adequate—a good fit—to the unities composed by bodies in connection.” Phillips, John, 
"Agencement: On the Translation of Agencement by Assemblage, an Extract from “Logic of Knowledge,” 
“Agencement/Assemblage,” “Deconstruction,” Theory Culture and Society, Vol. 23, Nos. 2 and 3 (March-May 
2006), Special Issue on Problematizing Global Knowledge. 97-101, 108-111, 194-195. 
,"  http://courses.nus.edu.sg/course/elljwp/deleuzeandguattari.htm. Retrieved 8 June, 2011  
236 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy. 275. 
237 Ibid. Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy, 275. 
238 Ibid. 275. 
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“The less universal (but also the most useful) are those representing a similarity of composition 
between bodies that directly agree and this from their own viewpoint” (Deleuze’s emphasis). One 
common notion, for example, represents, according to Spinoza, “what is common between a human 
body and to certain external bodies”. “Through such notions we understand agreements between 
modes: they go beyond an external perception of agreements observed by chance to find in a 
similarity of composition the necessary internal reason for an agreement of bodies”. This is the more 
immediate, practical and aesthetic type of common notion. (achieve commonality and seeing from 
‘within’…agree) 
“At the other extreme the most universal common notions also represent a similarity or community 
of composition, but now between bodies that agree from a very general viewpoint, and not from their 
own viewpoint. They thus represent "what is common to all things." For example extension or 
movement and rest - that is, the universal similarity of relations as combined ad infinitum from the 
viewpoint of Nature as a whole.” Such notions allow the practical notions to function, and in this sense 
are aesthetic and practical also.239 
These notions, according to Spinoza, also have their use, for they allow us to understand 
disagreements themselves, giving us a necessary internal reason for them. In fact, they allow us to 
determine the viewpoint beyond which a very general agreement between two bodies ends; they show 
us how and why opposition appears when we adopt a ‘less universal’ viewpoint on these same two 
bodies. We are able, by making an experiment in thought, to vary a relation up to the point where the 
corresponding body takes on a nature in some sense ‘contrary’ to its own; we can thereby understand 
the nature of disagreements between bodies with these or those relations. 
The distinction from transcendental terms (and the ‘procedures of common sense’) 
It is important to understand, in the sense of ‘to experience’, what a common notion is. Common 
notions are not the result of logical argument and can only be created and experienced. It is equally 
important to know what they are not. 
 “Spinoza distinguishes common notions from transcendental terms (being, thing, something) or 
universal notions (genera, species, man, horse, dog)”. However, for Spinoza common notions are 
universal, “more or less universal” according to their “degree of generality”. So, for Deleuze, “one must 
                                            
239 Deleuze highlights that the ‘more universal’ notions, not being immediately practical, allow us to affirm the 
functioning of the ‘least universal’. With the more universal common notions “Spinoza is only showing that if we 
form common notions, they are necessarily adequate ideas. The cause and order of their formation is still 
unknown to us, as is their practical nature and function”. Ibid. 281. From here Deleuze draws out that each type 
of notion requires the other to function: “In Part Two of the Ethics Spinoza considers the speculative content of 
common notions: he supposes them given or potentially given; it is thus natural for him to proceed in a logical 
order from the most universal to the least universal. At the opening of Part Five he analyzes the practical 
function of common notions, supposed given: the function consists in such notions being the causes of 
adequate ideas of affections, that is, of active joys. The principle applies to the most universal common notions 
as to the least universal, and one can thus consider all common notions taken together, in the unity of their 
practical function”. Ibid. 286. Hence, together, these two types of common notions provide a useful corrective 
model of theory or the use of theory in practice, and of which it might be said that Spinoza and Deleuze are 
primarily focused upon, systems of such notions that facilitate planes of operation. 
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then suppose that Spinoza is not attacking what is universal, but only a certain conception of abstract 
universality”, and “certain conception of abstract determination of genera and species”.240 
An abstract idea had two aspects that reflect its inadequacy: 
“it retains only the gross sensible differences between things”: “we choose a sensible 
characteristic that is easily imagined; we distinguish objects possessing it from those that do 
not”.241 
A sensible differential characteristic (that is selected) is extremely variable…accidental.” For example, 
“Man as an animal of erect stature.” Such an account could have been a ‘rational animal”, a 
‘featherless bipod’ etc. “on all accounts abstract ideas are thoroughly inadequate…they are images’ 
“that are not explained by our power of thinking but involve impotence: images that do not express the 
nature of things but indicate the variability of human constitution”. 
This is not just a philosophical point. Spinoza is “attacking the procedures of common sense”.242 
Spinoza proposes that we focus on structures rather than sensible forms or functions. A structure is a 
system of relations between parts of a body. So, Deleuze warns us, we should be careful to avoid two 
dangerous interpretative errors. The first error with respect to the common notions would be 
“overlooking their biological sense in favor of their mathematical sense”. “In other words, we should 
remember that common notions refer principally to a physics of bodies, not a logic of thought”. The 
second interpretative error we might make with respect to the common notions would be “overlooking 
their practical function” in favor of their philosophically “speculative content”.243 
Common notions and expression 
“Common notions are ideas that are formally explained by our powers of thinking and that, materially, 
express the idea of God as their efficient cause”.244 They are explained by our power of thinking 
                                            
240 Ibid. 277. 
241 We pass over minor differences because ‘objects become confused once their number exceeds the capacity 
of the imagination’. Ibid. 278. 
242 And the Aristotelian tradition where Aristotelian-influenced biology attempts to define genera and species 
through differences. 
243 Spinoza’s senses of  ‘speculative reason’ and ‘practical reason’ both relate to and differ from how they are 
conventionally understood in the history of philosophy. The Wikipedia summation of these gives a flavour of 
how these terms have tended to be understood in discussions of the history of philosophy. ‘Speculative reason 
or pure reason is theoretical (or logical, deductive) thought (sometimes called theoretical reason), as opposed 
to practical (active, willing) thought. Speculative reason is contemplative, detached, and certain, whereas 
practical reason is engaged, involved, active, and dependent upon the specifics of the situation. Speculative 
reason provides the universal, necessary principles of logic… 
Practical reason, on the other hand, is the power of the mind engaged in deciding what to do. It is also referred to 
as moral reason, because it involves action, decision, and particulars.’ Even in the eighteenth century 
‘Speculative philosophy’ ‘did not mean speculative in the sense of fanciful dreaming’ but theoretical as opposed 
to practical.  
244 The "efficient cause" of an object is equivalent to that which causes change and motion to start or stop (such 
as a painter painting a house) (see Aristotle, Physics II 3, 194b29). In many cases, this is simply the thing that 
brings something about. For example, in the case of a statue, it is the person chiseling away which transforms a 
block of marble into a statue. This is the cause of change, and as such is commonly used in modern 
conceptions of change, as well as cause-and-effect. Spinoza’s use of ‘efficient cause’ obviously both fits such a 
notion and is foreign to the whole conception that tends to come with such a notion. 
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because, being in us as they are in God, they fall within our own power as they fall within the power of 
God”. 245 
For Deleuze ‘several important consequences follow from this. The first adequate idea that we have 
“is a common notion, the idea of something common”. It is “explained by our power of understanding 
(the soul’s power of action). We are therefore active insofar as we form common notions”. They mark 
the point in “which we enter into full possession of our power of action”. Here we are entering the 
“second stage of reason”. To form common notions is ‘to use reason’ and in doing so come into 
possession of our power of action, and in doing so “we become reasonable beings”. 
“A common notion is our first adequate idea…it leads directly to another adequate idea. An adequate 
idea is expressive, and what it expresses is the essence of God.” “Any common notion gives us direct 
knowledge of God’s eternal infinite essence. Any adequate, that is to say, expressive idea, gives us 
knowledge of what it expresses, that is adequate knowledge of God’s essence”.246 “The common 
notion provides us the means to construct for ourselves an adequate idea”.247 
How do we come to form common ideas? 
How do we come to form common ideas? How to “break the concatenation of inadequate ideas to 
which we had seemed condemned?” “Common means not just common to two or more bodies...but 
something common also to minds capable of forming an idea of it.” “Common notions can be more or 
less common to different minds.”248 “How do we arrive at our power of action?”249 
This cannot be solved from the speculative viewpoint. For Spinoza this a practical problem. “There is 
an effort in forming them...(in us as they are in God) ...but how do we form them?”250 This relates 
directly to our experience of joyful affections. We must begin from the least universal. The most 
universal has “no inductive principle in the affections we experience”. “When we experience a joyful 
affection ...it induces us to form the corresponding common notion”.251 So, to come to form common 
notions from joyful affections and involves on one hand ‘our effort’ and on the other such engagement 
‘induces us’. Therefore, Spinoza’s schema, according to Deleuze, begins with the passions and yet it 
is “not enough just to accumulate joyful passions, in order to become active”.252Joyful “passions 
increase our power of action but never to the point we become active”. Such feelings must: First 
become secure by avoiding all sad passions. Then we must “break out of the mere concatenation of 
passions, even joyful ones”. “We must then...with the aid of joyful passions form the idea of what is 
common to some external body and our own...this idea, this common notion is adequate”. “This is the 
second stage of reason...” and “only then do we understand and act and be reasonable...not through 
an accumulation of joyful passions but through a genuine ‘leap’ via the aid of such accumulation”. 
                                            
245 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy. 279. 
246 Ibid. 279-280. 
247 Hardt, Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy. 97. 
248 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy. 280. 
249 Ibid. 281. 
250 Ibid. 281. 
251 When we encounter a body that agrees with our own, when we experience a joyful passive affection, we are 
induced to form the idea of what is common to that body and our own’. Ibid. 282. 
252 Ibid. 283. 
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Again there is an action and an inseparably related automatism. As discussed, “a mind that forms an 
adequate idea is the adequate cause of the ideas that follow from it…this is the sense in which it is 
active”.253 “A feeling ceases to be a passion once we form a clear and distinct (adequate) idea of it”. 
And “there is no affection of the body which we cannot form an adequate idea of. A common notion is 
always an idea of something positive”. The practical function of common notions is... “being the cause 
of adequate ideas of affections, that is, of active joys”.254 
So the process of forming common notions operates in this way: “First...seek experience of maximum 
joyful passions”. Then... “use joyful passions to form corresponding common notions”. 255  These 
“strengthen our ability to avoid bad encounters…and put us in possession of our power of action and 
understanding”. Third... “we become capable of forming more universal notions...but common notions 
are all the more useful for being less universal”. The process operates not only with an immediately 
practical focus but also a process of understanding and constructing the principles of the process, 
common notions and the gaining possession of our power. For Deleuze, “there is whole learning 
process involved in common notions, in our becoming active”.256 
The three kinds of knowledge: Imagination, Reason (Common Notions), Beatitude 
The three different kinds of knowledge are also “different ways of living” and “different modes of 
existing”.257 
The First Kind of Knowledge ‘Imagination’ is “constituted by all inadequate ideas and passive 
affections in their concatenation”. It “corresponds to the” (presocial and precivil) “state of nature” 
where “I perceive objects through chance encounters, and by the effects they have on me. “In the 
state of nature I live at the mercy of encounters”.258 “Such an effect is but a sign, a varying indication. 
Such knowledge is via vague experience” and relates to the random character of encounters”. Here 
we know only Nature’s ‘common order’, 259  know only the effects of encounters between parts 
according to purely extrinsic determinations. 
But the civil state, the social and civil world beyond the state of nature, “also belongs to the first kind of 
knowledge”. “Already in the state of nature, imagination forms universal abstract ideas, which retain 
                                            
253 Ibid. 285. 
254 “... even in the case of a body that does not agree with our own, and affects us with sadness, we can form an 
idea of what is common to that body and our own; the common notion will simply be very universal, implying a 
much more general viewpoint than that of the two bodies confronting each other. It has nonetheless a practical 
function: it makes us understand why these two bodies in particular do not agree from their own viewpoint”. “But 
when a very universal notion makes us understand a disagreement, a feeling of active joy again flows from this: 
an active joy always flows from what we understand...it ceases to be a passion”… and “… therefore follows the 
basic pattern of the earlier schema”. Ibid. 287. 
255 We can find in the accumulation of passive joys “the opportunity to form common notions from which flow 
active joys”. The “increase of our power of action thus presents us with the opportunity of coming into that 
power, or of becoming truly active...we therefore become capable of forming common notions even in less 
favourable cases”. 
256 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy. 288. 
257 Ibid. 289. 
258 Ibid. 260. 
259 ‘the order of extrinsic determinations’, ‘chance encounters’ and ‘the order of passions’. It is also the order of 
encounters. This order is ‘perfectly determinate’. All is ‘necessary within the order of encounters’. Beyond the 
order of encounters are the ‘order of relations’ and the ‘order of essences’. Such a typology of orders is practical 
in that thought tends to inhabit one at a time and the power of the latter two come from their interaction. It is 
important in practice to affirm the particular order that one is engaged with. Ibid. 237. 
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this or that sensible characteristics of an object”. “The characteristic is designated by a name, which 
serves as sign either for objects resembling the first, or for objects habitually linked with it”. But along 
with language and the civil state a second sort of sign develops, which is imperative rather than 
indicative. Signs appear to tell us what we must do to obtain a given result.” 260 This is ‘knowledge by 
hearsay’. 
Any law appears to us in a moral form insofar as we have only an inadequate knowledge of it. A law is 
a moral type when we make its effect depend on an imperative sign...rather than on the constitutive 
relations of things. Signs of revelation constitute a third type of sign (religion of the prophets, religion of 
the first kind or of imagination) 
The Second Kind of Knowledge ‘Reason’ corresponds to the state of reason: “a knowledge of and 
through common notions”. Knowledge of the second and third kinds teach us to “distinguish the true 
from the false”.261 With common notions we enter “into the domain of expression”. These are the first 
adequate ideas. “The expression of Nature replaces signs, love replaces obedience”. “The common 
notions give us knowledge of the positive order of Nature as an order of constitutive relations by which 
bodies agree with, and are opposed to, one another”. “All our knowledge expresses God, when it is 
governed by common notions”.262 
However, Deleuze points out that “they do not constitute the essence of any particular thing”. They are 
only a means of reaching an adequate knowledge of the characteristic relations of bodies, of the 
combinations of these relations and of the laws of composition”.263  
Imagination and necessity 
Spinoza stresses that “common notions apply only to things that can be imagined”.264 Imagination has 
tendencies that need to be taken seriously. The “feeling toward something we merely imagine (a 
passion) is” or can be (my addition) “stronger than the feeling we experience when we believe the 
thing to be necessary”, and this is important given Spinoza’s claim that “everything is necessary”.265 
The common notions, however, “allow us to understand the necessity of the agreements and 
disagreements between bodies”. “The more we understand things as necessary the less we feel the 
strength of intensity of passions rooted in imagination. Imagination is subject to a law according to 
which it initially asserts the presence of its object, is then affected by causes that exclude such a 
presence, and enters into a kind of ‘vacillation’ thinking of its object only as possible or contingent”. 
“The process of imagining …contains within it the principles of its own dissipation over time”.266 
In contrast, ‘reason’s law’ is to form common notions. These are “ideas of properties which we always 
regard as present. Reason here satisfies the demands of imagination better than imagination itself”.267 
Imagination “carried along by its fate, which is to be affected by varying causes, doesn’t manage to 
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263 Ibid. 291. 
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267 Ibid. 295. 
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maintain the presence of its object”. 268  Reason does not only “diminish the relative strength of 
passions”, “the active feelings born of reason or of common notions are in themselves stronger than 
any of the passive feelings born of imagination”. By imagination’s law, a feeling is so much the 
stronger, the more causes act together to provoke it. But a common notion, by its law, applies or 
relates to several things, or images of things easily associated with them: it is therefore frequent and 
lively”. 
“Necessity, presence and frequency are the three characteristics of common notions”. These 
characteristics “ensure that the notions in a certain way impose themselves on the imagination, either 
reducing the intensity of passive feelings, or guaranteeing the liveliness of active ones”. According to 
Deleuze the “common notions use the laws of imagination to free us from imagination itself. Their 
necessity, presence and frequency allows them to intervene in the movement of imagination, and 
divert its course to their own ends”. Deleuze suggests that there is a “general harmony of imagination 
and reason”.269 
Common notions and the idea of god 
“The second kind of knowledge does not amount to a condition of any knowledge, but to a condition of 
our knowledge, insofar as we are finite existing modes composed of a soul and a body”.270 Common 
notions and the idea of God are closely related. Common notions “lead us to the idea of God” “They 
necessarily ‘give’ us knowledge of God, and that without them we would not have such knowledge.”271 
Common notions are adequate ideas, ideas that are expressive. “What they express is God’s very 
essence. The relation of the idea of God to common notions is one of expression. Common notions 
express God as the source of all the constitutive relations of things.” Active feelings, active joys, flow 
from common notions, and “they do so accompanied by the idea of God”. The love of God is the joy 
that accompanies common notions and the idea of God is “the basis of religion of the second kind”. 272 
So, to bring us back to previously discussed methods: “we cannot start from the idea of God” but must 
get there as quickly as possible. This involved beginning “from what was positive in some idea we 
had”. We then “strove to make that idea adequate”. It “was adequate when … it expressed its cause” 
(formal being). When it expressed its cause “it also expressed the idea of God as determining that 
cause to produce such an effect”. The Ethics develops upon such methods with the idea of God being 
a “more concrete means” than “what is positive in some idea”.273  
So, now, from The Ethics onwards: 
we start from what is positive in a joyful passion; this determines us to form a common notion, as 
our first adequate idea. We then form more and more general common notions, which together 
constitute the system of reason: but each common notion, on its own level, expresses God and 
                                            
268 Ibid. 296. 
269 Ibid. 296. 
270 Ibid. 296. 
271 Ibid. 297. 
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leads us to knowledge of God. Every common notion expresses God as the source of the 
relations combined together in the bodies to which the notion applies.274 
Each notion leads us to, and expresses, the idea of God, which Deleuze says, plays a “pivotal role” in 
Spinoza’s system.275 And, in relation to the idea of God, Spinoza ‘announces’ that besides the second 
kind of knowledge there is a third. The second kind “determines us” as a “driving force” to “enter into 
the third, to ‘form’ the third”. And “only the idea of God can explain the transition”. As a part of the 
process of reaching the highest form of knowledge, the idea of God “changes content in the third kind 
of knowledge”. It, now, “affects our entry into the domain of ‘real beings’ and their connection”. The 
third kind of knowledge is now defined as proceeding from “an adequate idea of the formal essence of 
certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things”. “Ideas of the third kind 
are defined by their singular nature.” As such they “give us knowledge of particular essences as these 
are contained in God himself.” So, more than just deducing characteristic relations, as common 
notions do, we “must first know the relation” to be able to “know the essence”. Common notions 
therefore “constitute the conditions in which we attain the third kind of knowledge”. The idea of God 
now determines us to “’form’ the third kind of knowledge. To enter into a direct vision”, which Deleuze 
later terms a ‘percept’ (my emphasis). This is a direct vision of the essence of a singular things. 
 
Connecting to our Power of Understanding as the Way to Connect to the Power of the World 
 
Third Kind of Knowledge (Beatitude): Connecting to our Power of Understanding as the Way to 
Connect to the Power of the World 
 The penultimate chapter of Deleuze’s text, in the spirit of the supreme happiness or blessedness of 
Beatitude, draws Spinoza’s schema together at its highest point, with a particular emphasis on … our 
own power 
Characteristics of Essences 
The third type of knowledge relates to eternal essences: “knowledge of God’s (Nature’s) essence, of 
particular essences as they are in God, and as conceived by God”. 276  Essences have various 
characteristics:277 
 They are particular and “irreducible to one to another”. 
 Each is a “real being…a degree of power or intensity”.  
 The third type of knowledge allows us to understand how God (Nature) is involved in an essence. 
 Each essence agrees with the all others. As “all essences are involved in the production of each”. 
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 This agreement is both singular and absolute, “of each essence with the others”. In connecting to 
the singularity of an essence the mind cannot help but be “determined to know still more things, 
and desire more and more such knowledge”.  
 Essences are expressive of all of the others in the process of its production and God (Nature) as 
the process (principle) itself. 
 In terms of epistemological parallelism: “each essence is a part of God’s power”, and is 
“conceived through God’s essence itself, insofar as God’s essence is explicated through that 
essence”. 
The three elements of Third Type of Knowledge 
The highest knowledge has three elements.278 An adequate idea of: 
i. “ourselves and our own essence”. Everyone forms an idea of their own essence, their power of 
action, the essence of their body; 
ii. “ the greatest number of possible things”; 
iii. of God (Nature), “as containing all essences, and comprising all in the production of each (and so 
in the production of our own essence in particular)”. 
Joy, Desire, Love 
From these three ideas – of myself, things and God (Nature) – flow joys, desire and love. All that we 
understand within the third type of knowledge we “understand on the basis of conceiving of our own 
(body’s) essence”. The third type of knowledge has no other formal cause than our power of 
understanding. 
From the “joy that flows from an adequate idea of ourselves is born a desire…to know ever more 
things in their essence”….and, “above all, a love”, a love of God (Nature) for in “the third type of 
knowledge the idea of God is the material cause of all ideas. “For from this kind of knowledge there 
arises joy, accompanied by the idea of God as cause.” The concrete fluctuation of the idea of God 
takes us all the way through the process of understanding to Beatitude. 
Distinguishing the joys of the third kind from the joys of the second 
The second kind of knowledge gives us adequate ideas to the extent of giving us “ideas of what is 
common to our own body and external bodies”, and these are explained by our own essence. But they 
do not provide an adequate idea of ourselves and of other things. The third type of knowledge 
provides “adequate ideas of ourselves and of other things as they are in God (Nature), and as 
conceived by God”. The joys of the third type imply the full possession of our power of understanding, 
which has a “particular qualitative difference characterized by the degree of power or intensity of our 
own essence itself.” 
Spinoza “is now able to distinguish two forms of the mind’s activity, two expressions of the power of 
understanding: to conceive things (second kind of knowledge) and to conceive the body’s essence 
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(third type of knowledge), ‘and beyond these nothing else pertains to the mind’s essence’. Both of 
these expressions are active as they are explained by our power of understanding, and hence they 
are innate. Whereas passive affections are adventitious, being produced from outside. 
There are ‘difficulties’ in ‘coming upon’ or ‘finding’ the innate. Common notions and the joys that flow 
from them are innate, but “this does not stop them having to be formed, and formed either more or 
less easily, and so being more or less common to different minds”.279 This difficulty arises as we are 
born, “cut off from our power of action or understanding”. Importantly, Deleuze stresses that it is only 
in existence that we come into our own power of action and understanding and that it is a part of our 
Nature but we must in a sense become adequate to our own power. For Spinoza, “we must in 
existence, come into what belongs to our essence” (my emphasis). The concreteness of this process 
is emphasised in that we can’t, “in particular, form common notions…unless we find a starting point in 
joyful passions which initially increase our power of action”.280 
So, it is more than just everything is understood ‘on the basis of conceiving of our own (body’s) 
essence’: 
Ideas of the third kind are not only explained by our essence, they consist of the idea of this 
essence itself, and of its relations (its relation to the idea of God, its relations with the ideas of 
other things). From the idea of our essence as formal cause, and the idea of God as material 
cause, we can conceive all ideas as they are in God. In the third kind of knowledge we form ideas 
and active feelings that are in us as they are immediately and eternally in God. We think as God 
thinks, we experience the very feelings of God. 281 
The radical nature of this formulation is the closeness or intimacy with all of existence that Spinoza 
describes. Not only close but internal, immediate, actual and direct without intermediary. All of Nature 
is internally understood, and Nature is this understanding. 
The Role of the Idea of God: the internal mechanism of understanding 
One of the things that is as central as it is confusing in reading Spinoza or Deleuze’s Spinoza is the 
role of idea of God in understanding and why, and how, it all in the end comes down to an internal 
relation within thought, and the thought of our own body’s essence in particular. That knowledge 
comes down to an internal relation of thought is based on “the complex status of the idea of God or 
the infinite intellect.” In summary form the answer is that “the idea of God objectively comprehends 
substance and the attributes, but must be formed as a mode under the attribute of thought.”282 To 
understand this we need to understand that for Spinoza, the idea of God is God’s idea as it is in us. 
How does the idea of God have this power?  
This involves two relationships. The first is between the attribute of thought and another attribute, so: 
‘that whatever follows formally from God’s infinite nature… follows objectively from the idea of God (‘in 
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God from his idea’) in the same order and with the same connection. So that the idea of God has a 
power equal to that which it represents, as has already been discussed, however the idea of God (and 
all of the other ideas that follow from it) must itself have a formal being and this formal being “can only 
be a mode of the attribute of thought.”283 Here, idea of God has two parts, if you like, “the idea of God 
is the idea in its objective being…and the infinite intellect is the same idea considered in its formal 
being”. The idea of God (and all of the other ideas that follow from it) have to be formed and it is in 
relation to the infinite intellect that it is formed. This forming results from the idea of God becoming 
adequate to the infinite intellect and so to God’s infinite nature. The relationship, the forming, occurs 
within the mode of the attribute of thought. 
Reaching the third kind of knowledge 
We do appear to “reach the third kind of knowledge”, however, this “transition” is “only an appearance; 
in reality we are simply finding ourselves as we are immediately and eternally in God”. For Spinoza, 
“the mind has had eternally the same perfections which, in our fiction, now come to it”. Which is 
another way of saying that on one hand we naturally possess this potential to know, but tend to be 
disconnected from it and must apprentice ourselves to the use of it to gain the power of it. “Beatitude” 
are “those joys that follow from ideas of the third key”. These joys no longer just increase our power of 
action but “derive absolutely from our essence, as it is in God, and as conceived by God.” 
The idea of God, which belonged to the second kind of knowledge through “its relation to the common 
notions that express it”, now leads us out of the second kind of knowledge and reveals a ‘new content 
of knowledge”, not common properties, but “God’s essence, my essence and all the other essences 
that depend on God”.284 Our essence is a ‘part’ of God, in the sense of being an “expression and 
explication”, just as the idea of our essence is “a part of the idea of God, only to the extent that God’s 
essence explicates itself through ours”.285 
The importance of existence and the relation to eternity 
Beatitude can only be achieved during our existence itself. And according to the ‘strict order’ starting 
from inadequate ideas, moving through common notions and finally resulting in the joys that flow from 
ideas of the third kind, beatitude. However, in duration, to have only active joys is a ‘vain hope’ and ‘all 
we can strive for’ is the greatest proportion of active to passive kinds of feelings and hence more of 
what increases our capacity to be affected than decreases it. 
It has been discussed how a body exists in duration and has extensive parts in the relation that 
characterises it. To the parts of the body ‘there corresponds faculties of the soul’ and some of these 
are ‘faculties of experiencing passive affections’. This includes ‘imagination’ which ‘corresponds to the 
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actual imprint of some body in our own’, and ‘memory’, ‘to the succession of imprints in time’. These 
correspond to the power of suffering and exists in duration.286 
“Extensive parts belong to an essence within a certain relation and during a certain time; but they do 
not constitute that essence.” This essence is of a different nature. It is “a degree of power or intensity, 
an intensive part”. A particular essence is a physical reality, “an intensive reality, an intensive 
existence”. It exists in time. However, the “essence has in itself an eternal reality or existence”, which 
does not exist in duration. Deleuze points out that Spinoza “actually says” that essence is conceived 
“by a certain eternal necessity”. “If an idea in God expresses the essence of this or that body, it is 
because God is the cause of essences; it follows that an essence is necessarily conceived through 
this cause.” 
A body exists in duration “as long as it possesses extensive parts” and it also has an “eternal intensive 
part (a degree of power)”. The soul also has extensive parts – and also “an eternal intensive part, 
which is so to speak, the idea of the body’s essence”. The soul thus has a faculty, a power, “the power 
of understanding things through the third kind of knowledge”. “Insofar as it expresses the body's actual 
existence in duration, the soul has the power to conceive other bodies in duration: insofar as it 
expresses the body's essence, it has the power to conceive other bodies” in eternity. Thus we can 
have “direct experience” of the soul’s eternity. “This idea is just the idea that expresses the body’s 
essence; to the extent that we form it, to the extent that we have it, we experience that we are eternal.” 
Experience is essential to achieve eternity. Existence is “conceived as a kind of test”, not a moral one, 
but a physical one, “like that whereby workmen check the quality of some material, of a metal or of a 
vase”.287 While in existence what matters is the relative proportion of eternal intensive parts of our 
composition versus extensive parts. The more we know of the second and third kind of knowledge the 
greater the proportion of our intensive part. “Such is the difficult path of salvation.” It is the “path of 
expression itself: to become expressive – that is to become active; to express God’s (Nature’s) 
essence”.288  
Spinoza’s Concept of Nature 
Nature, Man & the three forms of Expression 
The concept of expression, for Deleuze, implies a rediscovery of Nature. It applies to: 
i. God (Nature), insofar as God (Nature) expresses himself in the world. 
ii. True ideas, insofar as true ideas express God (Nature) and the world. 
iii. Individuals determined as singular essences, insofar as singular essences express themselves in 
ideas. 
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Being, Knowing and Acting (or producing). 
The concept of immanence, “the immanence of what expresses itself in its expression”, allows 
expression “to penetrate into the deepest things”.  
It at once gives back to Nature its own specific depth and renders man capable of penetrating into this 
depth. It makes man commensurate with God, and puts him in possession of a new logic: makes him 
a spiritual automaton equal to a combinatorial world.289 
Universal Being: Absolute infinity 
Spinoza shows that absolute infinity as a nature is “constituted of all the infinite forms that introduce 
distinction into the absolute without introducing number”. These forms “are the expression of the 
absolute”. God (Nature) is constituted by these forms; “he expresses himself in these forms, these 
attributes”. In relation to absolute infinity, Spinoza (with Leibniz) discovers intensive quantities or 
quantities of power that transform procedures based on experience, “by introducing into them 
expressivity”. 
Knowledge and ideas 
Knowledge is discovered to be a kind of expression. Representative content and psychological 
consciousness are replaced by an immanent content and an ‘explicative formalism’. “The spiritual 
automaton presents the unity of this new form and new content.” 
Individual action 
The individual is no longer a composite of soul and body supposed to exist in a relation of real 
causality. This has been replaced by the ‘noncausal correspondence’ of parallelism. Deleuze 
conjectures that real causality might be a subset of the world of noncausal correspondences and 
might ‘presupposes it’. The soul and body’s relation depends on noncausal correspondence. 
Expression ‘appears’ to account for this. As expression brings a correspondence and a resonance into 
series that are altogether foreign to one another (body and soul) then ‘real causality is a species of 
expression’. The body and soul as expressions both give expression to the same thing that is 
expressed “by establishing in each of the varying series the same concatenation of causes and 
effects”. Expression is found in the individual’s ‘soul and body’…’passions and actions’ and ‘causes 
and effects’. The individual is an ‘expressive centre’. 
Univocity 
Univocity applies to: 
 The attributes – as both what constitutes the essence of substance and ‘what contains modes 
and their essences’. 
 Causation – as God (Nature) “is the cause of all things in the same sense as he is cause of 
himself”. 
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 Ideas – as “common notions are the same in a part as in the whole”. 
These three figures of the univocal combine in an idea of the third kind. The “whole theory of 
expression supports univocity” and the importance of it is that Being (God/Nature) becomes an “object 
of a pure affirmation” which is “realized in an expressive pantheism or immanence”. 
What is expressed? 
The notion of expression is triadic: what expresses itself, the expression itself, what is expressed. So, 
expression cannot be referred “either to causality within Being, or to representation in ideas, but goes 
beyond both, which are seen to be particular cases of expression”. Real causality occurs in the soul 
and the body but noncausal correspondence relates soul and body. Similarly and object and an idea 
don’t have a relationship of representation but both express “something that is at once common to 
them”: “the absolute in two of its powers, those of thinking and knowing, and being and acting”. Idea 
and object enjoy an expressivity “over and above representation”. “What is expressed intervenes as a 
third term” that “makes distinctions infinitely more real and identity better thought”. “What is expressed 
is sense: deeper than the relation of causality, deeper than the relation of representation.”290 
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DELEUZE’S CONCEPTION OF OPEN SYSTEMS, 
DIFFERENCE & THE AESTHETICS OF AFFECT 
The concept of expression is all important.  291 James Williams 
Deleuze is unrepentantly aesthetic. 292 Steven Shaviro 
Deleuze carries his baggage with him. 293 Michael Hardt 
 
Difference in Itself 
Williams book charts a course through Difference and Repetition that emphasizes certain things: 
aesthetics, significance - these are equally in the text but submerged in the language. Just as it is 
easy to miss the centrality of the aesthetic for Deleuze in Difference and Repetition it is for different 
reasons (tha particular emphasis) that it is easy to miss the aesthetic in A Thousand Plateaus. My text 
largely follows the route that Williams takes through Difference and Repetition. 
'Representation' is replaced by the expression or actualization of Ideas, where this is understood in 
terms of the complex notion of 'different/ciation'.294 Deleuze: 
After all, is not Spinoza's Ethics the great book of the BwO? The attributes are types or genuses 
of BwO's, substances, powers, zero intensities as matrices of production. The modes are 
everything that comes to pass: waves and vibrations, migrations, thresholds and gradients, 
intensities produced in a given type of substance starting from a given matrix. 295 
Difference in Itself: the relationship between the determinate and the indeterminate 
A central problem for Deleuze is to define or, more precisely, determine 296  ‘difference’ “without 
defining it in terms of identity or representation” or “as a meaningless chaos”.297 This is the challenge 
of the chapter titled Difference in Itself. He begins this chapter with an example that sets the stakes for 
the challenge.  
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…or is …difference the only moment of presence and precision. Difference is the state in which 
one can speak of determination as such. The difference 'between' two things is only empirical, 
and the corresponding determinations are only extrinsic. However, instead of something 
distinguished from something else, imagine something which distinguishes itself - and yet that 
from which it distinguishes itself does not distinguish itself from it. Lightning, for example, 
distinguishes itself from the black sky but must also trail it behind, as though it were distinguishing 
itself from that which does not distinguish itself from it. It is as if the ground rose to the surface, 
without ceasing to be ground….Difference is this state in which determination takes the form of 
unilateral distinction. We must therefore say that difference is made, or makes itself, as in the 
expression 'make the difference'….In truth, all the forms are dissolved when they are reflected in 
this rising ground. It has ceased to be the pure indeterminate which remains below, but the forms 
also cease to be the coexisting or complementary determinations. The rising ground is no longer 
below, it acquires autonomous existence; the form reflected in this ground is no longer a form but 
an abstract line acting directly upon the soul. When the ground rises to the surface, the human 
face decomposes in this mirror in which both determinations and the indeterminate combine in a 
single determination which 'makes' the difference. 
How to be conceptually and aesthetically adequate to such difference, to difference? It would be very 
easy to read Difference and Repetition as intellectualist. This passage asks us to embrace the reality, 
power and significance of difference.  
The passage is meant to shock us into realising that difference, to connect with difference, to be 
adequate to difference is something that seems to have been out of our grasp, not affirmed and is 
something to achieve. That it probably has not been conceptualised, not been affirmed, and is 
certainly not as commonly understood as being about what is different between two things. That it 
works by itself, but that by itself involves, variously, the whole world, involves a whole indeterminate 
part of the world, the world as process or production, where what is determinate involves what is 
indeterminate with no separation, even if what is indeterminate is not visible to us. That this process of 
the world is about significance, about making a difference, making the difference, not just, as it would 
seem, (academically) recognising the difference of something from other things. That there is no way 
to separate out the physical from the soul. The determination combines determinations and the 
indeterminate. 
For a ‘thing’ to be determined, according to Deleuze, “it cannot be distinguished from a chaotic state, 
where chaotic does not mean without order”.298 This is the conceptual problem that is more than 
anything an aesthetic problem. Ontologically, a thing is determined by the indeterminate that is 
inseparably part of the determinate and of the production of the determinate. Epistemologically, the 
indeterminate must be part of the determinate and this is an aesthetic act, challenge, task. As Williams 
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says, in reference to the first two paragraphs of the chapter, which contain the above passage, that 
Deleuze uses images and examples that depend on the backdrop of indeterminacy, rather than other 
determinate things.299 For Deleuze, determinacy in this sense, is ‘cruelty’. “So difference in itself is 
vivifying, in the sense that to live is to be determinate, but that living intensity has an indistinct ground 
as its condition.”300 
As with his book on Spinoza Deleuze in Difference and Repetition seeks a univocal ontology.  
This is, as with Spinoza, the realm of Nature and individuals. Substance as ‘cause of itself’ and 
‘therefore necessarily infinite’. Self-organisation is not just self-causing but self-causing because 
infinite and this transforms the common conception of self-organisation, makes it expressive. For 
univocity the same structure of being that governs what is infinite also governs what is finite. There is 
nothing outside of the world, outside of immanence, in Spinoza’s sense, that governs what happens in 
the world, as equivocists and common sense would have it. It is just this immanence which common 
sense strongly tends to fail to affirm. 
In Difference and Repetition Deleuze moves through various important philosophical conceptions that 
each, according to Deleuze, fail to affirm difference. Aristotle’s conceptions are important to common 
sense and thinking. His conception of difference, to summarise greatly, relates to the correct 
distribution into sets. The role of thought is to distribute individuals into sets and subsets, defined by 
more and less general concepts accordingly. Judgment 301 is what functions to distribute individuals 
into sets – judgment as ‘common sense’ – and judgment is what divides such sets into hierarchies – 
‘good sense’. “Judgment depends on representations since the individual we are faced with, in fact or 
imagination, is subsumed under a representation for judgment to take place.”302 Conceptual identity, 
categories, representation, essences, judgment, the proper and therefore all part of the same system. 
Such a system is problematic as it does not allow us to ‘think difference itself’, subsumed by ‘the four 
shackles of mediation.’ These involves “a tendency to subordinate it (difference) to resemblance (from 
the point of view of perception), to opposition (from the point of view of predicates), and to analogy 
(from the point of view of judgment). In other words, we do not think difference in itself.” 303 
Rather than a well-defined thing with recognizable limits, to be is to be an ‘individual’, a ‘pure 
variation’. The notion of the individual, as an expression of the whole of Nature, is common to 
Expressionism and Philosophy, Difference and Repetition and all of the way through to A Thousand 
Plateaus. It is the individual, as a product of  ‘intensity’ and ‘sensation’ that Difference and Repetition 
heads towards. Being is not a category it is an individual or the individuation of Nature.  
In reaction to the idea that the distinction between things relies on categories of existence he contrasts 
two different types of distribution: ‘sedentary’ and ‘nomadic’. Nomadic distribution provides a means of 
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understanding distinction which “does not depend on different categories of existence”.304 Sedentary 
distribution 305  operates through judgment “by allocating things to different pre-established 
categories”.306 “To be is not to be a well-defined thing with recognizable limits – on the contrary, it is to 
be a pure movement or variation in relation to well-defined things.”307 “Nomadic distribution is resistant 
to external or general hierarchies since the things that distribute themselves cannot be compared 
legitimately to one another – that is, they are not measurable according to the categories they are 
supposed to fit into.” 308  Though Williams does not point to the spatial aspect of this, nomadic 
distribution comes with its own space, whereas, the only space that might exist for sedentary 
distribution would be an ‘abstract space’. Nomadic space is produced with what is distributed in it. The 
distribution is the production of this space, an occupation which is a production. Sedentary distribution 
fails to affirm the production of space and objects as a co-production. This distinction, as Williams 
points out, returns as two types of space, smooth and striated, in the much more pragmatically-
experimentally oriented A Thousand Plateaus. To point forward, smooth space is a ‘space of affects’ 
and can only be understood ‘in the middle’, ‘in the workshop’ and via ‘legwork’. This distinction also 
reappears less directly in the notions of territory, segmentarity, assemblage and as Williams points 
out, the nomadic war machine. 309  The nomad is an important political notion for Deleuze and 
Guattari. 310   Williams points out that, in comparison to the pragmatic emphasis of A Thousand 
Plateaus, Difference and Repetition has a ‘strongly ontological function’. 
Being is univocal and the 'is' is said of all things in the same way because all things distribute 
themselves and are only answerable to themselves in overcoming their internal limits and the way 
they become fixed. In other words, any fixed definition of categories of existence cannot account 
for the way in which things evolve and have evolved outside those categories. 
Williams stresses the categorical and evolutionary dimension of the nomadic, whereas the univocity 
(Immanence) of A Thousand Plateaus makes much more explicit the whole space (spatiotemporal) 
aspect of the nomadic. This is important but not as embraced in Difference and Repetition.  
For Deleuze, to account for the individuality of individuals requires talking account of the whole spatio-
temporal distribution, in the nomadic sense, that produces what appears to be separate things 
understood via categories. ‘Individuation precedes matter and form, species and parts, and every 
other element of the constituted individual’.311 How to understand individuals without recourse to pre-
existing categories, whether by identify, analogy, resemblance or opposition? 
                                            
304 Williams, Gilles Deleuze's Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction and Guide. 65. 
305 The world of representation presupposes a certain type of sedentary distribution, which divides or shares out 
that which is distributed in order to give 'each' their fixed share… Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. 303. 
306 Williams, Gilles Deleuze's Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction and Guide. 65. 
307 Ibid. 64. 
308 Ibid. 65. 
309 ‘The nomadic war machine is a nomadic distribution in a smooth space undoing a fixed, well-determined 
striated space – that is a space given an external ordering that always returns to be undone again.’ ibid. 66. 
310 Unfortunately, the rhizome and nomad are easily romanticized, and it is only an understanding of these in 
terms of the concreteness of affects and problems that embraces how concrete and practical Deleuze and 
Guattari’s notions are. It is this concreteness that also allows avoiding the tendency to understand their ideas in 
terms of change, indeterminacy-as-not-fixed, flexibility, which I will discuss in the conclusion and is implicit in 
this section. 
311 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. 38. 
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Here is where Deleuze returns to Spinoza and expression: 
Spinoza organises a remarkable division into substance, attributes and modes. From the opening 
pages of The Ethics, he shows that real distinctions are never numerical but only formal - that is, 
qualitative or essential (essential attributes of the unique substance); and conversely, that 
numerical distinctions are never real, but only modal (intrinsic modes of the unique substance and 
its attributes). The attributes behave like real qualitatively different senses which relate to 
substance as if to a single and same designated; and substance in turn behaves like an 
ontologically unique sense in relation to the modes which express it, and inhabit it like 
individuating factors or intrinsic and intense degrees. From this follows a determination of modes 
as degrees of power, and a single 'obligation' for such modes: to deploy all their power or their 
being within the limit itself….With Spinoza, univocal being…becomes a truly expressive and 
affirmative proposition.312 
Expression as intensive power is the means by which the whole of Nature functions through 
individuation. However, Spinoza does not go far enough. For Deleuze: 
Nevertheless, there still remains a difference between substance and the modes: Spinoza's 
substance appears independent of the modes, while the modes are dependent on substance, but 
as though on something other than themselves. Substance must itself be said of the modes and 
only of the modes.313 
As Williams summarises, “only Nietzsche overcomes the equivocal definition of being and its relation 
to judgment by insisting that being is only the modes”. Deleuze’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s notion of 
the ‘eternal return’ that the only form of being is becoming and that only difference becomes. There is 
no substance or attributes, only modes. What this means will be discussed further in the section on 
repetition. What is important here is that there is no substance or other real or guiding power outside 
of the modes, outside of the relations between virtual and actual,314 of worldly relations, and that 
distinction, individuality emerges in such worldly relations. Such individuality emerges as power. 
Nature, as worldly relations produces individuating instances of power. ‘Repetition’ is involved in this 
production. 
The philosophical point that Deleuze makes about philosophical reliance on equivocity attack can 
obscure the practical implications for his attack. It is not just that we should get rid of equivocity but 
that we must come to terms with what it means to embrace univocity. The philosophical point should 
quickly become subsumed by the whole challenge and practice of immanence. 
Difference now can be affirmed as something that is part of worldly relations, something that is at play 
in, as Williams says, the ‘genesis and production’ of entities. However, it is easy to think of entities as 
‘well-defined’ entities, corporeal entities for instance. The important ‘entities’ for Deleuze have some 
                                            
312 Ibid. 40. 
313 Ibid. 40. 
314 It might be said that the sedentary involves focusing on the actual at the expense of the virtual and that the 
nomadic is an embrace of the virtual within the actual.  
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sort of relationship to ‘well-defined entities’ but are instead individuating individuals, instances of 
power, variations of power, produced by Nature. 
So, not only does difference undermine categories ‘it is something powerful in itself’. ‘Organic 
representation’, of parts, sub-parts, the proper and essences, is incapable of dealing with the evolving 
and variable power of difference, which relies on a chaotic and indeterminate ground that is forever 
beyond representation.315 To determine difference is not to employ representation according to the 
‘requirements of representation’ or ‘organic representation’, 316  but to employ representation in a 
manner that captures the determinate power and the indeterminate ground together, in their 
variability—as it is only in them being together that they have, and ‘we’ have any of ‘their’ power and, 
though it is not clear so far, indeterminacy (of power). Again this is nothing like ‘self-organisation’ as 
popularly understood. 
The Aesthetics of Difference: How to experience difference? 
What distinguishes the map from the tracing is that it is entirely oriented toward an 
experimentation in contact with the real. 317 
 
…experimentation as the operation” on the plane of consistency…nomadism as the movement318 
 
you don’t know what you can make a rhizome with…so experiment…… That’s easy to say.319 
 
Not wisdom, caution. In doses. As a rule immanent to experimentation: injections of caution. 
Many have been defeated in this battle. Is it really so sad and dangerous to be fed up with seeing 
with your eyes, breathing with your lungs, swallowing with your mouth, talking with your tongue, 
thinking with your brain, having an anus and larynx, head and legs? Why not walk on your head, 
sing with your sinuses, see through your skin, breathe with your belly: the simple Thing, the 
Entity, the full Body, the stationary Voyage, Anorexia, cutaneous Vision, Yoga, Krishna, Love, 
Experimentation. 320 
Deleuze discusses Hegel and Leibniz’s conceptions of difference, which I will not discuss in any detail 
here. However, Aristotle, Hegel and Leibniz’s conceptions are important for the development of 
Deleuze’s conception of difference. 
                                            
315 ‘Beyond representation’ should not be seen as beyond what can be pictorially or linguistically represented but 
an entry point into the world of affects and difference, which cannot be represented, yet representations can be 
employed in a manner that expresses and dramatises them. The way that Deleuze (and Deleuze and Guattari) 
employ terms means that a more casual reading, which collectively the discourse of design seems to take, of 
their work seems to fall back on common sense understandings of the terms. Ie. Multiplicity is taken to mean 
many things or diversity. Such a common sense understanding is what seems shared across many and most 
concepts. 
316 I have chosen to use Deleuze’s phrase ‘organic representation’ to avoid the polemical and absolutist sense of 
just using ‘representation’, as Deleuze is not against the use of representation per se, just the uses related to 
‘organic representation’ or the ‘requirements of representation’.  
317 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. 
318 Ibid. 
319 Ibid. 
320 Ibid. 
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For Deleuze, “there is a crucial experience of difference…”. Difference must be affirmed. The 
affirmation of difference must come before identity and the other shackles of mediation and organic 
representation. Organic representation works against affirmation. For Williams, “there is an aesthetics 
of difference that escapes (organic) representation” and that “there is a right way and wrong way of 
experiencing” difference. As will be seen in the discussion of repetition this experience is ‘passive’, it 
happens outside of consciousness. It is involuntary. Which does not mean we just let such experience 
happen. “We have to work in a certain way in order for a fundamental experience of the multiplicity of 
pure differences, or the absence of facts to be expressed in us”.321 As Williams, and others, point out 
the French word experience contains the equivalent of the English senses of both experience and 
experiment. That “all experience is an experiment”, and that to experiment is to experience or require 
experience, an experience outside of what we consciously experience, and requiring consciousness to 
get to.322 Consciously escaping consciousness. So, the ‘crucial experience of difference’ involves a 
“corresponding experiment: every time we find ourselves confronted or bound by a limitation or an 
opposition, we should ask what such a situation presupposes. It presupposes a swarm of differences, 
a pluralism of free, wild or untamed differences; a properly differential and original space and 
time…”323 So, experimentation involves experience but not all experience involves experimentation. 
Experimentation involves ‘working in a certain way’ to get to an involuntary or passive dimension of 
experience where ‘the multiplicity of pure differences’…can ‘be expressed in us’. In Deleuze’s 
Spinoza.., experimentation is a ‘slow learning’. In Difference and Repetition it comes across as a 
practice or an art. The later A Thousand Plateaus notion of rhizome, explicitly associated with 
assemblages and experimentation, takes experimentation from the theory of what experimentation is 
to the principles of how to experiment. All of Deleuze’s uses of experiment share the practice of the 
aesthetics of difference and experience.  
Deleuze wants to associate experience and experiment with the concreteness of everyday experience 
but does not want the reader to lapse into the common conceptions of experience and experiment. 
Experience is no longer “the experience by a self of a set of objects”. It is the “temporary coming 
together of an infinite set of pure differences into areas of more or less clarity and obscurity, according 
to the experiment”. Deleuze wants to avoid the “sense of experience as an opposition” between 
experience and the experienced.324 An “experience does not lie in the opposition of subject and object, 
or experiencer and experienced, but in a coming together that requires neither subjective nor objective 
identity”. It is to see what is produced when what we understand as subject and object (and the world) 
come together. Where something of what we understand as subject and object and world are part of 
something else. For Deleuze, something greater but not beyond. It requires a certain way to get to be 
able to, to construct, experimentation. Another important qualification he makes is that ‘any treatment 
of difference that begins with a negation’ (for example, with movement or change defined as the 
negation of fixity) ‘cannot approach difference as pure movements’. Difference is also simply not a 
                                            
321 Williams, Gilles Deleuze's Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction and Guide. 76. 
322 Ibid. 76. 
323 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. 50. 
324 Williams, Gilles Deleuze's Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction and Guide. 76. 
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negation of identity. It is not a non-identity nor is difference what-is-different-from-something-else. 
“Difference must be affirmed in itself.”325 Difference in a becoming must be affirmed in itself. 
Nietzsche’s eternal return is important to the experience of difference. Affirmation “is an action that 
allows pure difference to return and where only pure difference returns”. Affirmation “cannot involve 
the conscious representation of” a thing “to be affirmed or of the subject of the act of affirmation”. It 
must not become secondary to consciousness representations and “to the demand that the 
represented thing coincide with (organic) representation”.326 
How to avoid conscious (organic) representation? For Deleuze, key concepts and understandings 
must be ‘dramatised’ “in order for other individuals to sense them and work with them, rather than 
understand them in a pure intellectual manner”. Dramatisations are meant to transform understanding 
through a sensation.327  
 ‘Ideas’ and Problems: How can difference interact with well-defined things? 
As Williams points out the section on Plato “the problem that Deleuze is responding to is: How can 
pure difference interact with actual well-defined things when the former are radically different from the 
other”’ 328  “Plato gave the establishment of difference as the supreme goal of (his) dialectic.” 329 
Deleuze’s method parrallel’s Plato’s and he accepts Plato’s structure of inquiry: 
The four figures of the Platonic dialectic are…: the selection of difference, the installation of a 
mythic circle, the establishment of a foundation, and the position of a question-problem 
complex.330 
Deleuze, however, questions the third part of this structure, and argues that it lets the structure down. 
Plato chooses identity as his foundation and for Deleuze, identity is the wrong foundation. It should be 
based on difference. Plato differs from Aristotle in seeing difference as being about selection: ‘which is 
best?’ Deleuze also sees difference as about selection. “Platonic and Deleuzian selection is about 
making differences out of valuations... How do you select without making recourse to prior identifiable 
oppositions and contradictions? ”331 
The foundation for Plato, which for him is Being,332 is the idea. Deleuze reinterprets this concept and 
hence gets it to ‘perform a different role in a similar structure’. ‘Actual things cannot be equal to the 
idea’, but they can participate in it to greater or lesser degrees’. When Deleuze’s work is ‘inspired by 
                                            
325 Ibid. 77. 
326 Ibid. 78. 
327 ‘The role of dramas is to specify concepts by incarnating the differential relations and singularities of an Idea.’ 
Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. 218. This will make more sense once Deleuze’s concept of Idea is outlined 
in the following section on Plato. Sensation and repetition are central to specifying concepts or understandings. 
Intensity itself dramatizes, and ‘we’ can utilize the dramatization of intensity ‘ourselves’. 
328 Williams, Gilles Deleuze's Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction and Guide. 80. 
329 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. 67. 
330 Ibid. 66.  
331 Williams, Gilles Deleuze's Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction and Guide. 80. For Plato, ideas 
exist outside the universe and real existing things have a relationship with ideas. The idea is ‘the thing itself’ 
‘and the whole of Platonism… is dominated by the idea of drawing a distinction between ‘the thing itself’ and the 
simulacra’. (Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. 66). The aim was to select the faithful copies of ideas rather 
than distorted copies.  
332 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. 64. 
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Spinoza the term participation is replaced by expression (when it is inspired by Nietzsche it becomes 
affirmation). Actual things allow the idea to return and do so well or poorly’. The idea allows for 
selection: “the selection of the ideas that return and the selection of the actual things that allow those 
ideas to return well”. Deleuze sees such selection as being inseparable from a problematic structure, 
and describes this second selection “as a test that takes the form of a question and a problem”.333 
“Neither the problem nor the question is a subjective determination marking a moment of insufficiency 
in knowledge. Problematic structure is part of objects themselves, allowing them to be grasped as 
signs”.334 “A problem shows a tension at the level of ideas that cannot be resolved, only participated 
with, affirmed or expressed well.’ There is an ‘essential problematic structure which is the ground of all 
things”.335 
In contrast to Plato’s ideas as both being outside the universe and participating with existing things, 
Deleuze’s ideas ‘do not have an identity – they are ‘multiplicities of differences and problems’ in the 
here and now.  
Thus, in parallel to Plato's structure of selection, mythical circle, ideal foundation and problems, 
we find Deleuze's structure of selection through affirmation or expression, of eternal return and 
dramatisation, of ideas as multiplicities of pure differences and problems.336 
For Deleuze, ideas outside the universe do not exist. Conceptual identity, categories, and essences as 
traditionally conceived as if they exist beyond the here and now. They are abstractions and their 
abiding presence in common sense defers attention from the here and now. Selection must instead 
abandon such reassuring reference points and abandon itself to a selection in relation to the 
expression of differences in a given actual situation, “with a view to maximizing their number and 
intensity…”337 Such a selection should select in relation to differences, and in doing so, get us to also 
depart from fixed identities and values.  
To abandon identity and representation is to open us up to “a multiplicity of differences and problems” 
in the here and now, both as the interaction of conditions in the here and now and in the products of 
such interactions. As Deleuze says, “the conditions of real experience’ and how they are expressed in 
us ‘outside of consciousness”. 
Though Deleuze only sketches out his ideas about evaluation and problems in the Difference chapter, 
pointing forward to other sections of this book. If there is no solid reference point or ground or 
foundation, such as Plato’s ideas, how is such selection made? How is such a selection made when 
difference has been presented as a continually varying multiplicities and pure movements? It is in the 
following chapter of Deleuze’s book that he argues that it is through repetition that “things become 
located in space and time” 338  and in relation to problems. Reality emerges through a perpetual 
process of problematising, which is part of life. 
                                            
333 Williams, Gilles Deleuze's Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction and Guide. 81. 
334 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. 63-64. 
335 Williams, Gilles Deleuze's Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction and Guide. 81. 
336 Ibid. 82. 
337 Ibid. 82. 
338 Ibid. 83. 
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Repetition for Itself 
The concept of repetition allows Deleuze to begin to explain how things become determined and what 
the exact role of difference is in that process’ and how selections can and are made.  
Williams asks “how do things acquire any determinacy at all, given the founding role of pure 
difference?” ‘Things’ might mean ‘well-constituted’ common sense things or affects / assemblages. 
Repetition plays a key role in how both are produced. Repetition is a very ambiguous term and I will 
try to short-circuit how misleading it can be. 
This involves how things come to be and also how we know them to be. Both being and understanding 
in Spinozan terms.  
As Williams says “if the concept of Difference allows Deleuze to move away from fixed definitions and 
values, the concept of repetition allows him to develop the machinic and materialist aspect of his 
philosophy”. 339  As has already been discussed the experience of difference is ‘passive’ and 
involuntary, outside of consciousness, and can be approached more weakly or more strongly, in right 
and wrong ways. Not only does repetition happen to us it also “underlies the illusion of fixed identities” 
of things and selves. Such underlying processes “cannot be thought of in terms of identities or 
objective facts”. 340  
Williams, in a separate essay 341  discusses how objects are not things but processes, and that 
identities and facts cannot come close to how objects therefore function. 
For Deleuze there are “three passive syntheses of time at work in all events understood through the 
concepts of Difference and Repetition”.342 He comes to these three passive syntheses through three 
‘deductions’. 
There are three involuntary dimensions of our experience of difference 
Repetition, for Deleuze is “the universality of the singular” and “stands opposed” to generality.343 As 
such repetition suggests itself to be nothing like our common idea of repetition as the repeating of 
some-thing. 
First Passive Synthesis Of Time: Habit (Or Expectancy) 
Repetition changes nothing in the object repeated, but does change some- thing in the mind 
which contemplates it. 344  
The conditions for reality, objects and what is experienced are according to Deleuze processes, and 
these cannot be just mapped onto a space. They are about time but not time spatialised or to be 
understood in scientific terms. They are about the production of space and time and times. Nor are 
                                            
339 Ibid. 84. I have substituted ‘machinic’ for ‘mechanistic’, as this seems closer to Deleuze’s intention. 
340 Ibid. 85. 
341 Williams, James, "Object in Manifold Times: Deleuze and the Speculative Philosophy of Objects as 
Processes," Cosmos and History 7, no. 1 (2011). 
342 Williams, Gilles Deleuze's Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction and Guide. 86. 
343 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. 1. 
344 Ibid. 70. 
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they conscious, projected or intended. Nor subjective or objective. Deleuze’s starting point for 
engaging with such processes is what he terms the ‘living present’.345 Williams, elsewhere, clarifies 
that: 
An object is not a well-delimited thing in space-time, but rather a process of selection. An object is 
not a thing that is picked out or selected. The object is a selection that picks out and selects past 
and future series346 within a process. For the past, this selection gives greater and lesser degrees 
of significance to series within a contraction in the present. The processes operating from the 
present on the past are selection and contraction. Selection means changes in degree. 
Contraction means a transformation of a past series according to a change in the present.347 The 
present here is therefore not an instant or an eternal present, but rather a transformation across 
series with a focal zone. Loosely we can call this zone the living present. An object is therefore a 
process concentrating past and present through its living present, where life must not be 
associated with human life or even biological processes, but rather simply with a selection.348 
Deleuze is to begin with interested in a certain form of contraction, where ‘living things show or 
experience what Williams calls ‘expectancy’ and shows that there is a relationship between 
expectancy and repetition. Deleuze looks at Hume's example of the repetition of couples of events AB 
AB AB AB A…, “where we come to expect B to follow A; and Bergson's example of a clock striking a 
particular hour, for example, 4 o'clock A A A A, where we expect the fourth strike to follow the third”.  
In the former example, each case or objective sequence AB is independent of the others. The 
repetition … changes nothing in the object or the state of affairs AB. On the other hand, a change is 
produced in the mind which contemplates: a difference, something new in the mind.349 
What is the relationship between expectancy and repetition? “Repetition is not a property of the 
repeated things since there is no causal relationship between different members of the series.” 
“Repetition is not an objective property” – it is something ‘in’ the experiencer. This something can be 
understood “in terms of a contraction of previous instances in later ones, thereby creating an 
expectancy”. This happens ‘passively’ or non-consciously/involuntarily. Expectancy is created by 
passively contracting previous instances of AB. This type of repetition passively produces an 
“unconscious relation to the future”.350 The condition for the “lived present is the passive synthesis of 
time where the past is synthesized, or contracted, in the present as a behaviour towards the future” – 
which Deleuze calls ‘habit’ – and it is habit which “gives the present a direction from past to future”. 
                                            
345 A term, which Deleuze borrows with variation from Bergson who borrows it with variation from Edmund 
Husserl. 
346 The notion of ‘series’ is discussed later in the section titled: ‘Deleuze’s Differential system. 
347 ‘This is by no means a memory, nor indeed an operation of the understanding: contraction is not a matter of 
reflection. Properly speaking, it forms a synthesis of time. A succession of instants does not constitute time any 
more than it causes it to disappear; it indicates only its constantly aborted moment of birth. Time is constituted 
only in the originary synthesis which operates on the repetition of instants. This synthesis contracts the 
successive independent instants into one another, thereby constituting the lived, or living, present.’ Deleuze, 
Difference and Repetition. 70. 
348 Williams, "Object in Manifold Times: Deleuze and the Speculative Philosophy of Objects as Processes." 71. In 
this essay Williams critiques Manuel Delanda’s version of Deleuze’s conceptions by arguing that taking a realist 
/ scientific interpretation of Deleuze ignores that objects are a manifold of processes and cannot be fully 
understood outside of becoming.  
349 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. 70. 
350 Williams, Gilles Deleuze's Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction and Guide. 87. 
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For Deleuze, for there to be such expectation means that there is such synthesis. The latter 
experience has a relation to former experiences. ‘Active syntheses’, or conscious syntheses, such as 
memory or understanding rely upon and are inseparable from such passive syntheses. Such 
expectation does not just occur from one thing following another, and this starts to point toward a 
strong conception of heterogeneity, but “it is also a matter of expecting a particular conjunction of 
independent or even a great number of unconscious things to ‘come together to form a unit”.351 
Deleuze starts to draw out the implications of habit and expectancy. “Any interaction with a thing is 
accompanied by the expectation that the thing will maintain some degree of consistency”. Any relation 
to a thing presupposes such habit-produced consistency. More radically, “a thing is not sensed unless 
it is sensed as repeated”. Experience depends on contraction. 
Williams outlines the different types of passive syntheses, listed here in order of which ones are 
presupposed by the preceding ones: 
 passive synthesis of time as condition (as already mentioned); 
 passive synthesis of repetitions of sensations into a sense. “A sense is an umbrella thrown over 
many different sensations”; 
 passive synthesis of different sensations into the sensation of a thing. ‘The different sensations 
associated with a thing are brought together so that we sense the thing as a whole’.  
On top of this there is active synthesis, which we operate consciously, which is conscious thought, 
which presupposes the passive syntheses. 
Williams gives the example of a chair. The active consideration of a chair presupposes passive 
syntheses of time to allow you to identify what it is. The particular sensations of the various and 
entwined senses (sight, touch, smell, hearing, the proprioreceptive sense…) are synthesized into an 
overall sensation of the chair. “Without passive synthesis there would be no chair”. This changes what 
it means to identify something. Through time, “things do not have a fixed identity but must be thought 
of as the synthesis of varying sensations”, a synthesis where the consistency of the identity is one 
where common sense makes it seem as though there is just a stable thing that is a chair but that it is 
lived as a particular individual synthesis of varying sensations.352 The consistency comes from the 
particularity of the synthesis – of a particular individual. 
Signs, repetition, experimentation and difference 
Deleuze’s idea of life involves relations between different levels of synthesis in an individual. Each 
level contains ‘signs’ of others “where a sign is only an indication, something like a presentiment”.353 
Life involves combinations of levels of passive syntheis with active synthesis. “A rich domain of signs 
which always envelop heterogenous elements and animate behaviour.”354 “The different levels of 
                                            
351 Ibid. 87. 
352 Ibid. 89-90. 
353 Ibid. 90. Compare to Massumi…. 
354 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. 72, quoted in Williams, Gilles Deleuze's Difference and Repetition: A 
Critical Introduction and Guide. 90. 
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synthesis are only conditions for one another, not causes”. They involve “heterogonous elements” and 
“cannot be explained in terms of causal relations” but interference between levels. It is not till later in 
Difference and Repetition that the notion of ‘intensity’ allows us to see how there can be 
communication between heterogeneous things, and between different levels. 
So what does this mean for an active engagement with signs? Firstly, signs disappear if we 
consciously try to know them. We need to ‘let them work through us’. This points to Deleuze and 
Guattari’s notion of ‘following’ found in A Thousand Plateaus. As Williams’ points out, “habits cannot 
emerge out of activity but only out of contemplation, where contemplation means creative, 
experimental acts indirectly triggering events on different levels. Contemplation belongs to the 
imagination and not to the understanding.”355 Such experimentation with signs is outside of the scope 
of just the conscious self. A repetition on each level is not a repeating of something but a variation – a 
change produced in the (unconscious/virtual/involuntary) mind – that must be understood in terms of 
pure difference. “All an act can do is introduce further variations and see what comes from it.” 356 “Acts 
or events on one level change other levels in equally unpredictable and open-ended ways.” Signs set 
an individual in motion in a certain way “but they do not determine the outcome of that motion”. They 
give a sense of the relations at play on a certain level. The variation of repetition is the key to the 
chapter on repetition. It is not variation as change in the actual. The term ‘repetition for itself’, being 
the title of the chapter, stresses the passive, machinic nature of repetition. Repetition is not repetition 
of something but of difference. “An open variation that occurs in the individual.” “Acts must experiment 
in the light of an individual and the signs that work through its sensations”, and this “must be led by the 
imagination”. Repetition is really only the alteration of relations between differences, the determination 
of those relations through their alteration. The living present is therefore a multiplicity of 
contemplations – “as the relation of a series of contractions of pure differences through repetition”. 357 
Second Passive Synthesis Of Time:…..Memory (Time as a pure past) 
The second passive synthesis that Deleuze deduces is that of ‘memory’ and constitutes time as a 
‘pure past’. Where he took expectancy as the given in the previous deduction, in the second deduction 
he takes the way in which any present passes. As Williams says: 
this is no longer the forward-looking expectancy, but the backward-looking sense of something 
falling away, yet still remaining. Let's call it the sense of archiving to capture the sense of passing 
into stock but as something different (It's gone...). That which passes into stock is, to some 
degree, lifeless, with respect to the living present it falls away from, but it is still open to return as 
something from the past - as archive. 
This type of memory is not our everyday sense memory as involving conscious work on traces. It is 
not a re-collection. It is not about ‘triggers’, conscious or not, that bring something to consciousness. 
Instead, this is what Deleuze calls a ‘pure past’, and as Williams says, it is “where all events, including 
                                            
355 Williams, Gilles Deleuze's Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction and Guide. 91. 
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those that have sunk without trace, are stored and remembered as their passing away, independent of 
human activity and the limitations of physical records”.358  
For Deleuze, “it is with respect to the pure element of the past, understood as the past in general, as 
an a priori past, that a given former present is reproducible and the present present is able to reflect 
itself.”359  
The meaning of pure here should be related to the sense of a difference in itself and to Deleuze's 
concept of the virtual as opposed to the actual. His aim is to show that the passing away of the 
present presupposes all the ways in which pure differences are expressed in the present in such a 
way as to make us sense that the present is passing or to make anything pass away. 
The sense of passing away occurs, according to Deleuze, as there must be an aspect of the past in 
any present passing away for there to be the sense of it passing away, otherwise there would be a 
miraculous jump from the present to the past. Such a passing away is also accompanied by “that 
which explains that sense”. The past aspect of the present is an inseparable part of the present. More 
than this, according to Williams, “when a present, accompanied by a past, has past away it becomes a 
past event for any future present”. Not only this but “any present passes away in relation to any 
present that went before it because the past that accompanied those former presents also 
accompanies later ones”,360 so that for Deleuze, ‘all of the past coexists with the new present in 
relation to which it is now past’.361 So the passive synthesis of all the past, “as past elements of all 
presents is an a priori condition for the present passing away”. “The pure past …pre-exists the 
present”. This synthesis involves no activity and hence is passive. 
So, why is this significant? 
Firstly, it is distinctly different from the first synthesis of time, in that the first synthesis is “a contraction 
of a series of distinct elements” whilst the second is “the contraction of the whole past”.362 The present 
is grounded by the pure past, which consists of all the varying degrees of contraction. “The present 
can be the most contracted degree of the past” on “different co-existing levels”. “The pure past must 
be all of the past but must also be amenable to change through the occurrence of any new present.”363  
The existence of a pure past provides the means for a life to acquire consistency “through the 
relations between its apparently heterogenous elements in a relatively consistent arrangement of the 
pure past”. It also provides connections between different individuals “through the virtual thought of as 
a pure past”.364 The existence of the pure past also provides a means for passivity to not be seen as 
deterministic. The passivity of the pure past provides a different sense of action, not one where our 
conscious thought directs our actions but as our actions allows us to alter the “localities we are 
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passive to”. Conscious activity opens and closes different paths. However, we cannot simply choose 
something from the past to be passive to. 
Third Passive Synthesis Of Time:…..Memory (Time as a pure past) 
How does anything gain specificity and how do we know what to do and how do we gain a strong 
understanding of activity?  
Deleuze bases his understanding of the third synthesis of time on his understanding of Kant’s critique 
of Descartes’ deduction of ‘I exist as a thinking thing’ from ‘I think’ where he shows that the ‘I exist’ is 
undetermined – and that we cannot know how it is determined but we can know how it is determinable 
and this must occur in time. Deleuze applies his conclusions concerning time to this conclusion. The 
given ‘I that thinks’ of whatever given ‘must be placed in time as passive’.365 
We could have thought that the given and apparently well-determined activity of thinking was to 
be the foundation for thought and philosophy but it is shown to be secondary and illusory from the 
point of view of a condition that it is passive to. The synthesis of time is the condition for activity 
and out of the reach of activity.366 
The synthesis of time is the transcendental element, the virtual, the condition for activity that 
distinguishes Deleuze’s treatment of the transcendental from Kant’s.  
The Deleuzian dialectic takes a given with the wider existence implied by it. This is followed by a 
search for the condition of that wider existence - that is, by a search for what makes the undetermined 
ground of a well-determined given determinable. In other words, given a particular sensation ‘I think' or 
'I expect’… (or any other sensation)… “we cannot draw further conclusions regarding existence … 
except by searching for the necessary conditions for the particular sensation”… (What forms do 
thinking or expectation or the sensation presuppose?)... “This is the transcendental element of the 
method. However, it is taken further in the dialectic through the application of the conditions to the 
original given - what was taken as well determined is reviewed and extended in the light of the 
conditions” … (thinking and expectation and any other sensation are not secure grounds and their 
status as well-determined must be reviewed in the light of the conditions). The dialectic moves to a 
more complete determination of the given but at the price of undermining its status as given (Williams 
considers that Deleuze has two preoccupations or ‘principles’ that have to be attended to in Deleuze’s 
method, what he terms, ‘connecting’ and ‘forgetting’).367 
So, where Kant seeks a foundation free of concepts and sensations, a ‘pure intuition’, Deleuze’s 
foundation, his given, an individual’s particular sensation, is replete with sensations and concepts. In 
the light of the conditions of the well-determined given the well-determined given is ‘completed’ by the 
conditions. 
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On top of the sensation of ‘expectancy’ and ‘archiving’ is a third sense. The third passive synthesis 
introduces the sensation of the openness of the future with respect to the two previous senses. “When 
we create a new work we drive into the future that must be, in some way, independent of what has 
already occurred.”368 
For Deleuze, in the drive forward to the future and in the struggle to make it different from the 
past and the present, there is an implied sense of the possibility of that difference. Let's call it 
chancing, to reflect the sense of openness but also of risk. … We are passive with respect to this 
sense of chancing - it does not have to be a conscious component of out creative acts. But it 
must be there, where we move toward the new as opposed to further occurrences of the known 
or of the same. Its absence would be betrayed by a pointlessness … or an inability to adapt. … 
The third passive synthesis of time is the condition for actions that drive toward the new.369 
Becomings 
For Williams, following Deleuze, the new results from the eternal return of difference – and this is the 
realm of becomings370 - and the The Logic of Sense provides the examples and the inspirations for 
examples that Williams draws upon. From The Logic of Sense itself: 
When I say, “Alice becomes larger”, I mean she becomes larger than she was. By the same 
token, however, she becomes smaller than she is now. Certainly, she is not bigger and smaller at 
the same time. She is larger now; she was smaller before. But it is at the same moment that one 
becomes larger than one was and smaller than one becomes. This is the simultaneity of a 
becoming whose characteristic is to elude the present.371 
According to Williams, “you are not different from other humans because you differ in this or that 
actual characteristic but because your thoughts and sensations, the way you change, express a 
different relation of intensities and, therefore, ideas.”  
How does this third form of repetition, these becomings, different from the first two? Williams provides 
examples, for instance:  
the boundaries of an animal's territory come from the repeated prowling and marking of its 
perimeter. Or we acquire an accent from the repetition of particular intonations. Neither the actual 
territory nor the accent exist prior to the repetitions. Deleuze identifies this first repetition with 
habit. A second repetition explains recognition and its relation to memory. We come to recognise 
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an actual thing and assign a fixed identity to it because habitual repetitions, recorded in memory, 
lead us to have a fixed representation of things. I recognise my territory and its fixed limits 
because I have a representation of it that has emerged from repetitions stored in memory… The 
third type of repetition explains how things change in relation to virtual becomings, to difference in 
itself. The first two repetitions are, in fact, illusory when viewed as final accounts. According to 
Deleuze, repetition in habit and memory are only possible on a background of virtual differences.  
There is not only the repetition of the prowl round the territory and the memory of that prowl but a 
further infinite series of other repetitions that the particular territory abstracts from: the changing 
cycles of weather, the repeated paths of other animals, the cycle of aging of the animal, the flux 
of seasons, the encroachment of civilisation that beats to human and mechanical rhythms, the 
ebb and flow of conflicting desires and emotions, the mutation of vegetation and species. In terms 
of these other series, each member of any given series is not the same as the others but different 
- each member is an individual. That difference, the change that runs through a repeated series, 
cannot be thought of in terms of a description of the actual relations between the position of two 
members with respect to the infinite number of other series since this cannot be grasped372 
So, there is a shift from repetition of the same things to a difference without repetition. Deleuze 
emphasizes, against common sense, that “the condition for what we commonly understand as 
repetition in habit and memory is, in fact, the continuity afforded by the variation of an intensity in an 
idea or sensation.”373  
The marking of the same territory takes place against the background of a variation in intensities 
between one parade and another (becoming hot, becoming thirsty, becoming fear, becoming 
impotent). It is these variations that give life, understood as the first two repetitions, intensity and 
value, but also risk and error.374 
Newness involves infinite perplication and a synthesis that works off and departs from this 
perplication. 
Characteristics of the third synthesis 
This synthesis – involving a sensation of the drive toward the new - has three characteristics: 
from the point of view of a sensation of moving towards the new, the present cuts us off from the past 
and projects us into a completely different future. 
the feeling that nothing will be the same any more presupposes the past, that the past will not return 
any time – and so this cut assembles the ‘whole of time. “The action that performs this cut in time, 
therefore becomes a symbol for time as a whole.”375 
with respect to this cut time is put into two series: forms that do not return and remain in the past and 
‘forms that return with the cut and are relived with it’. As Williams asks ‘How can time be cut in the 
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present and yet also be a whole in terms of the relation of past to the future?’376 For Deleuze this must 
be understood as the workings of the eternal return of difference, where identities or the same fall 
away and the only thing that returns is difference. The eternal return is the “condition for the sensation 
of the drive into the new” and future off from the past. In Deleuzian phraseology, it thus “thus brings all 
of time into play because it consigns all identified events to the past and makes all of the future events 
different from all of the past”…it “conjures up all of time” by the drive into the new taking reference 
from the separation from all of the past. “But it only does so when pure differences return, when 
identity is consigned to the past forever and where there is the sensation of the new free of 
sameness.”377 “Eternal return affects only the new”378 The sensation of driving forward is a sign of 
newness. 
The three syntheses of time together account for Deleuze’s philosophy of time. It provides a way for 
him to explain how:  
 how things acquire consistency without conscious activity and natural law (first passive 
synthesis) 
 all things are connected but in a non-causal manner (second passive synthesis) 
 the virtual and actual are necessarily related but without being reduced to one another (third 
passive synthesis). 
So, his philosophy includes both linear and non-linear time. Both the time of the actual and the time of 
that which is required to complete the actual. This allows Deleuze to account for how “actual events 
alter the pure virtual past and select pure differences that return eternally. The scope of an actual 
event goes much wider than its causal linear effects and causes. It alters the significance of the past 
and its power to return in the future.”379 
So, passivity, the three syntheses, are conditions for action in the present. Deleuze find a way to avoid 
the separation of passivity and activity. He avoids perception or sensation being passive and thought 
being active, for instance. “Rather, the priority given to passivity over activity means that action must 
take account of the passive syntheses that it presupposes.” How to allow or facilitate passivity into the 
structures of activity? How to consciously connect to passivity?  
Deleuze needs to show how passivity and activity are related and he “uses Freud to explain this 
special form of interaction”. For any object presented to us or action: 
there is a virtual object, a particular synthesis of the pure past and a selection of pure differences 
according to eternal return. Any action on the given object implies consequences at the level of 
the virtual object, though this relation is not a causal one. The re-arrangement of the syntheses at 
the level of the virtual object are of a different order from the causal relations at the level of actual 
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objects. The consequences at the virtual level are then played out again at the level of the 
actual.380 
To have a “complete view or understanding of the object we have to operate a dialectical synthesis 
that goes from the actual to the virtual.”381  
The structures are the transcendental conditions for the actual object as something intense, significant 
and in movement. The dialectical synthesis must itself be a creative experimental process involving 
actual acts and objects because any act can only be the expression of a passive synthesis and never 
its accurate representation or understanding due to the asymmetry between the levels in terms of the 
relation they imply within each other. 
The actual can be grasped but it is incomplete. “The virtual cannot be grasped but only operated on” 
and “the effects of this operation can only be grasped in the actual”. This is an affirmation, again, of 
the need to concretely experiment. It is more than this as well.  What is beyond consciousness for 
Deleuze, which Freud would call the unconscious, is different from consciousness. “It concerns 
problems and questions which can never be reduced to the great oppositions or the overall effects that 
are felt in consciousness.”382 It is the realm of the significance of what seems actual. It is the realm of 
the problematic. So, given a particular sensation we can only complete in relation to the virtual.  
So, when Deleuze asks us to experiment with an actual thing, it is not to destroy it as an actual thing 
that we can understand and be certain of. Rather, it is to extend that knowledge through a feeling for 
the connections, selections and changes implied in that given. 
For Deleuze the sensations of individuals are the ground for determining conditions. 
Against Common Sense 
The chapter titled ‘The Image of Thought’ is Deleuze’s critique of an ‘image of thought’ that tends to be 
presumed about the form that thought should take. It starts with this critical aim and by the end of it is 
about how to create. Deleuze’s thought is encompassed both of these dimensions. Earlier in the 
Difference and Repetition Deleuze describes his dialectical method. In summary: 
Critique  
The reciprocal search for actual and virtual conditions 
The search for completeness in terms of reasons determined by conditions 
The dice throw, or creative and destructive forgetting, that that moves beyond what is already 
discovered or expressed. 
The negative/critical and positive/experimental are equally important parts of his method.  The critical 
shows how we tend to fall back into illusion, into identity, hence the necessity for both constant critique 
and new creation. 
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He approaches this via describing a series of postulates that explain why “there is an attraction to 
thinking in terms of identity and in terms of a priority of identity over difference in its relation to 
repetition”.383 Why do we tend to miss the essence of Difference and Repetition described here? 
Deleuze’s target might seem to be philosophers but the image is in “the everyday common sense and 
goods sense that philosophers can seem to support” if they are not engaging in the sort of 
experimentation that Deleuze champions. 
To motion beyond this image of thought and to put it I context for Deleuze the true role of philosophy 
or thought (of whatever sort) is to connect with what he calls ‘Ideas’, which are not ‘ideas’ as we 
normally think of them. They are not identifiable things in the mind but are “relations between things in 
the virtual that are the condition for the evolution of actual things” (my stress). So Ideas are the 
condition of change in our actual ideas. Ideas do not have a fixed identity, cannot be known, only 
sensed and known partially as they are expressed. The elements of Ideas are pure differences “that 
cannot be identified only deduced on the basis of sensations”.384 Earlier in the book Deleuze deduced 
Ideas from sensations, for example, the sensation of expectation. So, why is the illusion of identity so 
strong? 
His propositions: 
1. ‘Everybody knows’ 
There is a presumption that concepts are defined by other concepts. i.e. that you define a concept by 
reference to other concepts. Deleuze shows that there will always be subjective or implicit 
presuppositions for any concept – that is presuppositions “that must appeal to feelings and sensations 
rather than to further concepts and propositions”.385 These are of the form of “everybody knows”. His 
attention is on “moral feelings” about thought. The assumption that “everybody knows” “rests on two 
moral feelings about thought”: 
that is – in principle – “thinkers seek out what everybody knows”, and, 
in principle – “what is known ought to be accessible to everyone”.  
These are moral as they assume that – in principle – “it is how thinkers and thought ought to be, 
independent of how they’ actually ‘are’”.386 This encourages the view that there are shareable thoughts 
that we want to share. For Deleuze, instead, this view must be challenged and that thought really only 
emerges with individuals. 
2. Common Sense & Good Sense 
Deleuze’s next postulate: “thought is a common sense that crosses between the different faculties of 
the same self. Furthermore, there is a good sense allied to this common sense that allows for different 
thinkers to share the same common sense”.387 
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3. Recognition 
Different faculties are united by the faculty of thought through the faculty for recognition.388 This is a 
faculty that transcends all others by operating within all of them “whilst remaining distinct from all of 
them”.389 We are able to judge a thought when we are able to recognize it. We can judge a sensation 
when we are able to recognize it. With the image of thought, thought depends on the conscious 
subject’s faculty of recognition. The problem with the faculty of recognition is that it compares the new 
to what is already known or already experienced. “Recognition discounts the new as pure difference, 
whereas Deleuze wants to affirm it through his creative third synthesis and his appeal to the eternal 
return of difference.” 
4. Recognition depends on Representation  
To be able to recognize the object of a faculty, 
depends on representation defined in terms of an identity that we can conceive of, an analogy 
that we can judge, an opposition that we can imagine and a similarity that we can perceive. Each 
of these aspects corresponds to an application of representation to different faculties. These are 
the four shackles of mediation mentioned earlier. In terms of the understanding, it depends on the 
identity of the concept …For judgement, it depends on analogy … In terms of the imagination, it 
depends on oppositions…Whereas, for perception, it depends on similarities.’390  
Each refers or defers to identity and defers from that which cannot be defined in terms of or in relation 
to identity. As such reality in terms of Difference and Repetition is hidden.  
Thought escapes the model of recognition when sensation forces thought to take place. This is 
not an activity of recognition but the ‘passivity of a fundamental encounter…It is a sign that forces 
us to think with a problem...The force of a problem, as independent of the questions and solutions 
of recognition, is that it goes beyond any past solutions stored in memory. It is a problem because 
it does not yet have a solution and because it does even allow for solutions that cancel it out. 
Deleuze is opening up a different conception of problems here. A problem is sensed through signs 
and sensation. It submits faculties to violence. The resultant discord compels us to think in new ways, 
beyond representation, if we let ourselves hold onto what has been opened by the violence and not let 
us fall into representation. 
Deleuze criticizes the ‘transcendent’ faculty of recognition (our ability or tendency to recognize) as 
other faculties tend to depend on it and on relating everything to identities and away from difference. 
In contrast Deleuze priveleges the ‘transcendental’, the virtual which can only be sensed and compels 
us to search for the conditions of the given. Forces or invites us to experiment and so send the faculty 
into an evolution beyond its limits to reveal the faculty’s relation to the past and to open up the future 
of the faculty. The secure foundation is replaced by sensations and sensibility, which set things in 
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movement. What is recognised is not only an object but also the values attached to an object (values 
play a crucial role in the distributions undertaken by good sense). 391 
[5/6 Not discussed here.] 
7. Truth & Falsity relate to problems not solutions 
Deleuze gives some attention to analytical philosophy as a way to explore the opposition between 
recognition and sensibility. He is critical of this tradition for “privileging designation over sense with 
respect to truth”.392 His notion of sense (or the expressed of a proposition) is that it is a problem. It 
has, unlike in the analytic tradition, little to do with a meaning that can be explained by simpler 
component parts. Sense as a problem is resistant to analysis, non-conceptual and cannot be broken 
down into predicates or components parts.  
Williams argues that these discussions are useful for starting to get a hold of Deleuze’s idea of sense 
– which he sees as a “set of questions and problems and their set of responses and solutions”. This 
only starts to make sense when we realize that his idea of problems has shifted: a problem is not 
logical or cognitive or reliant on “what we know to be the case”. 393  
This conception resists the seventh postulate: where truth and falsity are said to apply to solutions 
rather than problems themselves. In this conception it is wrong “to think that solutions are simply true 
of false solutions to a problem. Instead a solution makes some aspects of a problem more clear and 
others more obscure”. So, against this postulate, Deleuze “holds that, as opposed to solutions, 
problems must be thought of as true or false”. A “false problem is either overdetermined – that is, it 
allows its solutions to be judged in terms of truth and falsity – or it is undetermined – that is, it does not 
lead to a complex set of responses or solutions at all”.394 Problems are part of the genesis of thought, 
they accompany thought when it emerges or changes.  
To understand his notion of problems requires an understanding of his idea of Ideas. Before that it can 
be said that  
A true problem brings together the four opposed strands of Deleuze's dialectics and, thereby, it follows 
the principles of connecting and forgetting. A problem connects things to their conditions, both actual 
and virtual. It does so with as great an extension as possible. It generates critical positions with 
respect to positions that restrict that extension or hide those conditions. It creates new concepts that 
allow for the conditions to be expressed with as great an intensity as possible.395 
According to Deleuze: 
What is missed [by the definition of problems in terms of a field of possible solutions] is the 
internal character of the problem as such, the imperative internal element which decides in the 
first place its truth or falsity and measures its intrinsic power: that is, the very object of the 
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dialectic or combinatory, the 'differential'. Problems are tests and selections. What is essential is 
that there occurs at the heart of problems a genesis of truth, a production of the true in thought.396 
As Williams notes, the term ‘intrinsic power’ ‘brings value’ (or significance) ‘into problems’. Also, a 
problem cannot be simply solved as problems allow for many different responses, “each of which 
solves the problem on its own terms but only in a limited way with respects to the problem as a 
whole”.397  Each solution “is correct on its own particular terms but not on those of others”. The 
problem, in terms of this power or extension, allows for or opens up a multiplicity of responses and a 
multiplicity of other problems that it is related to. For Deleuze, “the conditions under which the problem 
acquires the maximum of comprehension and extension must be determined, conditions capable of 
communicating to a given case of solution the ideal continuity appropriate to it.”398 So a problem 
produces an internal communication. It is also changed by each particular solution. 
8. Learning is an essential part of problems. 
Deleuze shifts the emphasis back from fields of solutions to problems and does this in terms of what 
he terms ‘education’, which has direct implications for education as we know it but is here focused on 
an “education of the senses”.399 Learning is not about knowledge ‘or even fixed capabilities’ as its 
goal. It is an essential dimension of problems. “Problems can only be learnt and only learning allows 
us to follow on from problems.” 
Deleuze is careful to distinguish knowledge as the learning of something, of a skill or facts, say, 
and learning as a process of apprenticeship with no fixed objective content. This absence of 
content is conveyed in the sense of the term 'apprenticeship to signs' or to problems and Ideas. 
To learn is to learn how to be sensitive to and respond creatively to signs and problems, as things 
that necessarily go beyond what is known or what can be done in a given situation. This 
sensitivity and creativity are linked – no sensitivity without creation.400 
For Deleuze, learning is by its nature experimental and he gives some attention to learning to swim as 
an example of the “apprenticeship to signs”. Such education involves learning how to do something 
new for us. “Some thing new cannot simply be facts or skills since they are the result of going from 
one state to a new state.” Learning is, instead, is independent of these results. It is to engage with 
what allows the new to emerge. This is a “violent training, a culture or paideia which affects the whole 
individual”. This is not conscious learning but a learning of the ways that we unconsciously or 
involuntarily connect with things. For instance, the processes involved in how our particular bodily 
abilities connect with water’s particular properties. In Deleuze’s language: 
 to learn to swim is to conjugate the distinctive points of our bodies with the singular points of the 
objective Idea in order to form a problematic field. This conjugation determines for us a threshold 
of consciousness at which our real acts are adjusted to our perceptions of the real relations, 
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thereby providing a solution to the problem…As a result, 'learning' always takes place in and 
through the unconscious, thereby establishing the bond of a profound complicity between nature 
and mind…Method is the means of that knowledge which regulates the collaboration of all the 
faculties. …Culture…is an involuntary adventure, the movement of learning which links a 
sensibility, a memory and then a thought, with all the cruelties and violence necessary…401 
The only way to connect with the new is to learn what it is to enter into a relationship with something 
that you have not entered into a relationship with before, to learn what comes of this relationship and 
what is involved in this relationship and what is involved in what comes of this relationship, and this is 
what it means to experiment. 
Ideas, the Synthesis of Difference & Problems 
To this point Deleuze has been seeking to conceptualise how to the determine difference – how to 
provide the ground or to explain difference – so as to affirm difference. This requires connecting what 
is indeterminate, being part of the determinate, to the determinate with no separation. The concept of 
repetition allowed Deleuze to explain how difference becomes determined, where repetition is not the 
repeating of anything but the alteration of the relations of difference. This has been done on the basis 
of a given sensation (i.e. of expectation etc.) and searching for the necessary conditions of this 
sensation and then the reapplication of these conditions to the given to review its status as well-given 
and extend it in the light of the conditions. Then moving to a more complete determination. This 
investigation has been moving toward how the sensations of individuals are the ground for 
determining conditions.  
His aim is to move beyond the limitations of the image of thought to the expression of pure 
differences. Chapter 4 gives an account of how difference is determinable (how we can determine it) 
and how it must be thought of as determined (the power of the difference affirmed), as well as 
indeterminate (not finally pinned down and inseparably connected to the indeterminate that 
determines the determinate).  
This requires giving more detail to the virtual things that specific actual things are determined by. It 
does this by describing what Ideas are. It relates Ideas to problems, events and moves toward the 
following chapter by suggesting how the sensations of individuals finally determine difference. 
The Problem of Determination 
Throughout Williams’ book he refers to Deleuze’s insistence on two principles, that we both connect 
and forget. This happens through ‘individuals’, which are not well-defined human beings. 
On the contrary, the individual is a thing where thought takes place as an event but not 
necessarily the conscious thought of a human being. The individual is a take on the whole of 
reality, where reality is not restricted to actual things that we can show or identify in the world. 
                                            
401 Ibid. 136 & 137. Order of quotes altered. 
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The individual is, rather, a series of processes that connect actual things, thoughts and 
sensations to the pure intensities and ideas implied by them.402 
Deleuze’s insistence on immanence implies certain tasks. To connect and forget means that any 
individual is a temporary answer to an event where it must be responded to but where it “reappears in 
that response”. This reappearance is part of the problem, just as ‘we’ are not independent from 
problems. The temporariness of responses is not a limitation. “Furthermore, it is not as if we can grasp 
the problem as a whole in our consciousness”. This is because problems and ideas go beyond any 
faculty. 
What are Ideas? 
Deleuze introduces Ideas in relation to problems not certainties. “Ideas are the condition for the 
problematic nature of things…Ideas are insuperably problematical in that they do not allow for 
solutions once and for all but for partial solutions that pose the problem in a novel way.”403  
In the first part of the chapter Deleuze seeks to explain how an Idea can be “at the same time, 
undetermined, determinable and determined according to an ideal of infinite determination”. The real 
object of an Idea is a problem (i.e. how to design very large subdivisions to maximize public life) is not 
something we can experience. Being a problem it is ‘something that can be expressed by an unstable 
set of contradictory questions and answers’ and involves tensions between various dimensions. “As 
an abstract that takes experience and knowledge beyond its bounds”, this “idea is undetermined. But it 
is determinable in terms of experiments that attempt to express the idea and temporarily resolve the 
problem in an actual’ operations.”404 The idea can then be thought of in terms of determination through 
the ideal of an infinite determination – through an infinite set of experiments. 
It should be stressed again that Ideas and problems are not intellectual or logical things. A problem 
might be about how to master the crossing of a busy road, how a grass sward survives changing 
seasonal circumstances, how an ant carries objects much larger than itself over variable ground and 
into its hole or how to approach a drawing task. 
Problematic Objective Unity (Refer To Figure Below) 
For Deleuze, and sticking to his aim of immanence, there is an “internal problematic objective unity” of 
the undetermined, the determinable and the determination. “By objective unity, Deleuze means that 
the object of the undetermined Idea (the problem), the objects through which it is determinable” 
(actions with actual objects) and the ideal of infinite determination (the perfect way through infinite 
experiments) complete one another, in the sense of responding to what the others must presuppose. 
As the ideal problem is never finally resolvable in any actual object the unity is itself problematic. The 
ideal of how to design very large subdivisions only gives a direction to the actual search for the best 
way forward. Any actual designing, if it connects to (or contributes to connecting to) the ideal of the 
problem, will always be an unsatisfactory solution “to the problems contained’ in the idea of how to 
                                            
402 Ibid. 6. 
403 Ibid. 140. 
404 Ibid. 141. 
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design very large subdivisions…”, unsatisfactory in itself yet opening onto further connection.  This 
unity involves its own immanent affirming communication. With respect to problems the object of 
experience and the ideal of infinite determination are internal to the Idea. They “form an indivisible 
whole with respect to problems”.405,406 The object of experience and the ideal of determination are 
‘generated by the Idea and by the indeterminate, which is part of the Idea. 
 
 
Figure 3 Deleuze’s conception of how difference is determinable 
Ideas As Multiplicities 
Due to the detailed ‘technical’ nature of this section the text will closely follow Williams’ 
account.  
Deleuze investigates mathematics as a means to introduce “two key elements of his approach to 
Ideas: an Idea can only ever be approximated through constructs that reveal aspects of its internal 
                                            
405 Ibid. 143. 
406 I cannot help but make mention of Quatramere de Quincey’s notion of typology being an ‘indestructible whole’ 
and Rossi’s notion of typology being about experimentation. Architectural typology  
seems to often be presented as improper in the recent discourse. 
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relations; the method of approximation is dialectical and must be thought of in terms of the 
indeterminate-determinable-determination structure outlined’ earlier”.407  
This does not mean that all Ideas and problems must be thought of as mathematical. Rather, 
mathematics provides us with an exemplary model for Ideas in terms of reciprocal determination, 
the determination of significant points and a principle of complete determination. Like equations 
and their differentials, Ideas and problems, as expressed in actual things, reveal one another's 
significant points. They determine one another reciprocally. They must be thought of in terms of a 
principle of complete determination - that is, through ever more extensive relations of reciprocal 
determination and more complete calculation of significant points.408 
As Williams says it is misleading to think that Deleuze’s problems will be solved by mathematical 
equations. It is more that mathematics provides a means to understand how a problem is an endless 
challenge that requires continual attempts to reveal its significant points and from different 
perspectives. 
Deleuze uses mathematics as an inspiration to think his conception of Ideas. More positively he 
considers Ideas to be “multiplicities”, and that “everything is a multiplicity insofar as it incarnates an 
Idea”.409 “Twelve is not a multiplicity…nor an infinity of identities such as series of natural numbers”. 
Instead, “a multiplicity is a variety, that is something that captures a variation rather than a fixed 
number or structure”. 410 It is like a “continuous function” such as y =
  
1
x  where the continual change in 
one factor is correlated with a continually different change in another. Ideas are multiplicities of 
continuous functions. 
Deleuze defines an Idea as an “n-dimensional well-defined and continuous multiplicity”411 where the 
“dimensions is the number of variations and where the variations are continuous, that is involve no 
discrete steps”. 412  Dimensions are “the variables or co-ordinates upon which a phenomenon 
depends”.413 Williams points out how Deleuze shifts away from a mathematical definition to three 
“philosophical conditions” for the definition of a continuous multiplicity: 
the elements are not identifiable forms, concepts or functions; 
                                            
407 Williams says: ‘Broadly, Deleuze is interested in the property of equations as determinable through differential 
equations that reveal significant points of the first equation. Moreover, the equation and its differentials are in a 
relation of reciprocal determination - that is, in different ways, the equation determines the differential and the 
differential determines the equation. Finally, a principle of complete determination can be found in the 
determination of an equation through successive differentiations and integrations, as well as through the 
drawing up of groups of equations that allow for a 'more precise distinction of the roots of an equation', in Galois 
theory, for example. It is worth noting how this interest in mathematics reflects the important distinction drawn in 
Deleuze's work between facts and significance. … In the case of equations, it leads to an emphasis on the 
significant points of an equation, for example, where a change in curvature occurs, as opposed to a concern 
with solutions to the equation - that is, the different values taken by y for given values of x. It may be very 
straightforward to calculate the values of y for a given x but very difficult to approximate significant points or 
even to discover what significance is for a given equation in relation to other mathematical problems or to 
problems in science and engineering that require mathematical modeling.’  
408 Williams, Gilles Deleuze's Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction and Guide. 144. 
409 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. 182. 
410 Williams, Gilles Deleuze's Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction and Guide. 145. 
411 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. 182. 
412 Williams, Gilles Deleuze's Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction and Guide. 146. 
413 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. 182. 
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the elements can only be identified through their reciprocal relations (Z is only identified through the 
way that variation in X varies in relation to variation in Z). Reciprocal relations refers to reciprocal 
relations between differential relations. Daniel Smith clarifies what such:  
interrelation of differential relations involves. Such a relation establishes a relation ‘between 
elements that themselves have no determined value, but that nevertheless are determined 
reciprocally in the relation’ i.e. dy/dx =-x/y (the expression of a curve and its trigonomic tangent)’. 
This is a differential relation. ‘The elements of these relations are undetermined, being neither 
real nor imaginary: dy is completely undetermined in relation to y, dx is completely undetermined 
in relation to x. Yet they are perfectly determinable in the differential relation into which they enter 
and by which they are reciprocally determined. This differential relation, in turn, determines a 
singular point, and it is the set of these that determines the topological space of a given 
structure.414  
“a particular multiplicity or set of such reciprocal relations must become actual in diverse 
spatiotemporal relations. The elements of that multiplicity must be actually incarnated in varying terms 
and forms.”415 
The elements that Deleuze refers to are pure differences. “The virtual is the totality of Ideas and 
intensities. Actual things incarnate and presuppose Ideas and, therefore, pure differences but they do 
so through the mediation of intensities” (which is still to be discussed). 416  So, what are pure 
differences? “Pure differences are continuous variations that cannot be fixed in terms of forms, 
concepts or functions.” They cannot be accurately identified with a concept or a thing. However, they 
can be identified through their relation to one another as expressed in actual things. What this means 
is that: 
when actual things vary in an identifiable and significant way, where identifiable means that we 
can identify a change and where significant means that the change involves a correlation of at 
least two differences, we can deduce, at least, that two pure differences are related to form an 
Idea.417 
This change, this correlation, is accompanied by an actual expression in a sensation that 
accompanies the actual concrete situation. When we experiment and sense signs by trying to innovate 
through them “we incarnate relations of pure differences”. This is nothing like a hypothesis based on a 
series of observations. It is instead a “matter of triggering the variations” that are involved in the 
creation with an actual local sensation so as to be able to experiment with how these relations may be 
expressed anew or extended etc. It also allows you be aware of the denial of those relations and 
variations. “Ideas defined as multiplicities are critical and creative tools that are themselves, expressed 
                                            
414 Smith, Daniel W., "Deleuze's Theory of Sensation: Overcoming the Kantian Duality," in Deleuze: A Critical 
Reader, ed. Patton, Paul (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996). 52. 
415 Williams, Gilles Deleuze's Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction and Guide. 146. ‘The multiplicity is, 
therefore, a structure of elements defined as: things in continuous variation resistant to identification; relations 
between those elements; relations between those relations and actual relations; and relations between the 
elements and actual forms and terms.’ 
416 Ibid. 146-147. 
417 Ibid. 147. 
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through critical and creative work”418 and the relationship to the necessary conditions of the actual 
signs. Critique allows us to forget those things that hide or defer us away from Ideas, and creative 
expressions allow us to move beyond what can be discovered by critique. To relate this back to 
Deleuze’s discussion on repetition: passive synthesis occurs when pure differences, variations, and 
their relations “become incarnated in actual relations”.419 
Perplication 
Williams points out how key terms developed in Difference and Repetition also function in his other 
work, from that time onwards. The more pragmatic AThousand Plateaus does not depart from the 
conceptions of Difference and Repetition; it just changes the perspective. According to Williams, the 
consistency of terms in Deleuze’s work suggests that Difference and Repetition is the “keystone to his 
work”.420A Thousand Plateaus is a book that presumes a great deal which is not obvious to someone 
who has only engaged with it alone. To engage with the earlier work, especially Expressionism and 
Philosophy and Difference, transforms A Thousand Plateaus. 
The first of these concepts, perplication, Deleuze describes in terms of ‘differentiation’. An Idea 
differentiates itself by being a ‘differently lit’ part of the whole of Ideas. These darker and lighter parts 
are various interrelations of Ideas, which will be explained in terms of how different intensities envelop 
each other or fold and unfold into one another.421 Perplication is according to Williams “characterised 
by properties that are beyond the scope of the sciences”.422 
Event 
“The concept of the event is the most important property of perplication, taking it beyond the grasp of 
the sciences.”423  An event is not just something that happened or the occurrence of something 
defining. Events rely on the interaction of Ideas and whose occurrence reveal interrelations beyond 
the tendency to identify Ideas with what belongs most clearly to them and with the tendency to see 
apparently separate things as such. An event is "about changing intensities in relation to sensations 
accompanied by a re-arrangement of the perplication of ideas”.424 They challenge our established 
ways of thinking or states of affairs. An event is individual in that “a sensation within an individual is 
the sign of an ideal event”. It is the first sign or sensation “that something anomalous is significant”. 
They are signs of change, of unexpected or unpredictable change – and there is no limit on when 
events might happen. 
                                            
418 Ibid. 148. 
419 Ibid. 150. 
420 Ibid. 150. 
421 Williams’ notes on p.151 that the metaphor of the fold allows Deleuze a way to move beyond the 
misinterpretations that tend to go with the (clarity/obscurity) light and shadow metaphor. I agree with Williams. In 
that it strongly suggests that differences are simply present and they are just lit up or not. The idea of the fold 
moves away from this. The idea of the fold may not move far enough away from this however. 
422 Williams, Gilles Deleuze's Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction and Guide. 153. 
423 Ibid. 153. 
424 Ibid. 154. 
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Vice-Diction: How to act 
Vice-diction is understood as a “way to work with the Ideal events that are creating an individual by 
replaying them”.425  It is Deleuze’s way of “living with the way virtual Ideas and, therefore, pure 
differences condition our actions”.426 
In the attempt to reveal the Ideal events determining and determined by actual events, vice-
diction must accord with the two main aspects of Ideas - that is, their interrelation through clarity 
and obscurity as changed according to different envelopments of intensities and as signified by 
sensations. In order for a sensation to appear, there must be a disruption of settled identities and 
that disruption expresses a perplication of the whole of Ideas.427 
Dimensions of vice-diction: 
To be able to connect to everything and forget all identities requires connecting and forgetting to be 
thought in terms of the event. An event allows us to express the relationships between the 
connections between Ideas and also how they transform each other. Vice-diction is the process of the 
“creation of actual events that throw an Ideal problem into greatest clarity with respects to all of its 
components”.428  
“Vice-diction is, therefore, a response to irresolvable problems in two ways. First, because problems 
come out of the tensions between Ideas, as method, vice-diction must seek to map those tensions as 
carefully as possible. Second, because the nature of that tension lies in Ideal events, where distant 
and obscure connections undo apparently clear Ideas, vice-diction must seek to obliterate the illusion 
of fixity in Ideas and actual things”429 
Vice-diction, by being in relation to the event is experimental from the start and clarifies and opens out 
the accepted notion of experimentation. It “is already a creative selection at the level of the mapping 
out and a mapping out at the level of the creative 'solution'”.430 
As we are ‘part’ of the individuals caught in webs of conflicting feelings and imperatives we “have to 
act in such a way as to allow the problem, and how we shall follow on from it, to appear or to become 
expressed in us”.431 
According to Williams, the procedure of vice-diction involves individuals learning how to create in such 
a way that they are a “perspective on the whole of reality’ but also that an individual’s sensations 
“express an intense and singular transformation of that reality”. Stated broadly and simply: “individuals 
have to create with the Ideas and ideal events that create them”. This involves expressing “those 
Ideas and events in new ways, experimenting with new events and combinations of Ideas”.432 
                                            
425 Ibid. 155. 
426 Ibid. 157. 
427 Ibid. 155. 
428 Ibid. 155. 
429 Ibid. 155-156. 
430 Ibid. 167. 
431 Ibid. 168. 
432 Ibid. 157. 
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This brings us back to Deleuzian dialectics, whose principles apply to vice-diction – where any 
practical situation requires us to: 
 critically engage with how representation hides the real conditions of the situation;  
 search for those conditions;  
 search with an aim of completeness;  
 go beyond those conditions and representation through creative destruction.433 
These four dimensions are interdependent and require each other. Any particular engagement with 
one of these principles should be in ‘compliance’ with the other principles.  
Deleuze is particularly interested in learning, an infinite learning, one concerned with how we respond 
to problems. “We learn to respond well to problems by experimenting with cases of solutions which, 
thereby, reveal the conditions of the problem.”434 So, learning is indirect. This model of learning brings 
together the four principles described above. 
Individuals and questions 
For Deleuze, the individual is a singular set of Ideas. It is his ground for the transcendental deductions 
and he explores an account of reality in terms of singular individuals in his penultimate chapter. “All 
thought and all reality must begin with individuals that have nothing identifiable in common.” Deleuze 
would no doubt see a direct relation to Spinoza’s open systems-oriented claim that “as substance” is 
“cause of itself”, it “is therefore necessarily infinite”.435 Singularity and absolute infinity go together, not 
just for “real distinction” but for determining problems. Deleuze opposes the singular to abstract 
universality, and that the individual is his starting point.  
Such individuals are “determined by questions that they cannot avoid – that is imperative 
questions”. 436  The use of the word ‘question’ is misleading as what Deleuze is referring to are 
‘questions’ driven by sensations rather than conscious or intellectual deductions. Such questions are 
more like imperatives or tendencies that an individual is inseparable from and which they must 
respond to. i.e. how a grass sward interacts with local environmental shifts; the tendency of outer 
suburban developments to move away from the provision of public transport.  
These imperative questions have certain characteristics: 
 They cannot be eliminated through empirical response. (if this is x, then this means y) 
 They ‘put the questioner into question’: they are about becoming. 
                                            
433 ‘We learn to respond well to problems by experimenting with cases of solutions which, thereby, reveal the 
conditions of the problem.’ 
434 Williams, Gilles Deleuze's Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction and Guide. 171. 
435 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy. 343. 
436 Williams, Gilles Deleuze's Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction and Guide. 161. 
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 They unite what is becoming with what it becomes with – the world is “essentially, questionable, 
problematical”.437 
Questions are not about subjects and objects, they “arise with and for…individuals”. The starting 
points for such questions are the same as previously, sensations (such as expectation). “Each of 
these sensations must be understood as a question in Deleuze’s terms”.438 What is coming? How do I 
engage with it? etc. These questions are more important than certain foundations. A foundation is 
replaced by “an aleatory point at which everything becomes ungrounded, instead of solid ground”.439 
How this can provide for or contribute to a way of acting is discussed in the next chapter. 
Deleuze’s Account of Reality 
Deleuze’s account of Reality: The Asymmetrical Synthesis Of The Sensible 
As an origin, Deleuze argues, sensation has a 'privilege'440 (DR, p. 144). This is the privilege of 
intensity. 'On the path which leads to that which is to be thought, all begins with sensibility. Between 
the intensive and thought, it is always by means of an intensity that thought comes to us'. This 
privilege of intensity or sensation is due to the fact that the encounter which forces it into the 
transcendent exercise, pushes it to its own limits, is somehow already itself, itself insofar as it is 
difference itself.441  
Intensity & Significance 
For Deleuze, according to Williams (and very different to Manuel De Landa), the scientific account of 
reality is incomplete without ‘philosophical’ work on conditions. Deleuze’s investigations reveal aspects 
of reality beyond the scope of scientific approaches. This, according to Williams, is because reality 
involves ‘disparities’ between its orders: “between the universe as an object of enquiry (measurable, 
identifiable differences) for the sciences and the transcendental conditions for that universe” 
(immeasurable differences). The latter allows the former to come about and change in terms of their 
significance.  
Difference is not diversity. Difference is given, but difference is that by which the given is given, 
that by which the given is given as diverse.442 
“Actual identifiable diversity presupposes a history and context of significance.” This significance is 
new and incomparable because it is a “change beyond all established measure”. Intensity is what 
produces a change that cannot be measured or captured as an identity.443 So, there is never pure 
                                            
437 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. 195, quoted in Williams, Gilles Deleuze's Difference and Repetition: A 
Critical Introduction and Guide. 162. 
438 Williams, Gilles Deleuze's Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction and Guide. 162. 
439 Ibid. 163. 
440 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. 144. 
441 Simont, Juliet, "Intensity, Or: The Encounter," in An Introduction to the Philosophy of Gilles Deleuze, ed. 
Khalfa, Jean (London: Coninuum, 1999).  43. 
442 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. 222. 
443 Metcalf clarifies: “Difference [intensity] is not diversity [extensity].  Diversity is given, but difference 
[transcendental condition of real experience] is that by which the given is given, that by which the given is given 
as diverse….each intensity is already a coupling in which each element of the couple refers in turn to couples of 
elements of another order, thereby revealing the properly qualitative content of quantity.  We call this state of 
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sense data. “Purity conceals varying intensities of significance…All phenomena are related to 
intensities beyond measure.”444  
Every phenomenon is composite because not only are the two series which bound it 
heterogeneous but each is itself composed of heterogeneous terms, subtended by 
heterogeneous series which form so many sub-theories.445  
Intensity functions in the virtual and significance is produced by virtual causes.446 These causes are of 
a different order than physical actual causes. 
Individuals & Intensity: Beyond Good Sense 
Deleuze is not against science, and science is not his target, rather he is being critical of certain habits 
of thought that are associated with or “follow from the scientific approach to the world”. Such habits 
become part of ‘good sense’ – defined by our tendency to distinction and distribution (our “faculty of 
distinction and distribution”). Such good sense tends to treat the world as collections of separate, 
separable identifiable objects. To embrace the active role of difference we instead need to work with 
individuals. The habits of good sense are to be criticized because they “turns us away from the 
significance of difference – that it generates change” (beyond all established measure).447  
To think beyond identifiable objects, to embrace the active role of difference, is to embrace individuals 
– fields or complexes of Ideas, intensities and actual things.448 To think beyond the world of good 
sense involves “showing that intensity, the imperceptible, does not have to be thought of as something 
that must be identifiable and recognised, only sensed by that which has no final identity - the 
individual”.449 
Significance in Space: Sensations as Signs of Intensity 
Deleuze pays attention to how space cannot be fully understood in scientific explanation-oriented 
terms. 450  Explanation cannot account for how space involves “radically different sensations of 
significance”. In another (transcendental) deduction Deleuze argues that there must be something 
                                                                                                                                        
infinitely doubled difference which resonates to infinity disparity.”  So, this coupling that is enveloped by 
intensive difference at the sub-representative level must not be confused with the form-matter coupling at the 
level of extensive representation. Metcalf, Beth, "Sub-Representative Domain (Part 1):  Individuation,"  
http://users.rcn.com/bmetcalf.ma.ultranet/index.htm.  
444 Williams, Gilles Deleuze's Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction and Guide. 167. 
445 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. 222. 
446 “Every phenomenon flashes in a signal sign system.” Ibid. 222. 
447 Williams, Gilles Deleuze's Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction and Guide. 170. 
448 Deleuze gives significant attention to outlining how individuals as multiplicities of varying elements in the actual 
and virtual, like difference, become cancelled out by good sense and the way it identifies objects into classes. 
Just as good sense produces the ‘universal object’ as that which can be recognized it also produces the 
‘universal self’, ‘defined according to its faculty of recognition’. Ibid. 170. 
449 As Williams notes it is at this point that Deleuze has brought together a number of his preoccupations: his 
critique of habits acquired with science; his critique of the image of thought based on recognition; his emphasis 
on creativity and the new with respects to the relation between Difference and Repetition and the elimination of 
that creativity in good and common sense. Ibid. 170 
450 De Landa, in contrast employs non-experiential physical science examples to communicate the nature of 
intensity, such as the boiling of water. 
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expressed in the space, beyond the well-orderedness of it, that is the condition of this significance. 
Why is a particular orientation or distance significant to individuals? 
Intensity is the condition for this significance. Intensity causes both individuality and what is significant 
to the individual. This cause functions differently from physical cause-and-effect type cause. Thus 
“Deleuze believes that we cannot explain why a particular cause is significant without referring the 
order of physical causes to the order of intensities.”451 Deleuze points out that in the “extended order” 
(of good sense) in which they are explicated, “constitutive differences” tend to be cancelled out – and 
that qualities are produced in this extended order which are signs of these differences.452 He wants to 
show that signs and significance exist in actual space and that to explain this we need to do so in 
terms of intensity as “cause”. 
He begins by noting that the sensation of depth is different from its length – “that is though any sensed 
or expressed depth is measurable as length, that measure does not fully account for the significance 
of depth”. The significance of intensities is a significance for individuals. All extensions make sense in 
relation to individuals. “The intensity of depth makes it a sign for individuals. Extension comes out of 
and relies upon depth.” This is the sense in which intensity produces extension. Depth it turns out is 
the “ultimate and original” “heterogenous dimension” that produces extensity. 
So distance in any space depends on sensations or expressions of depth that, themselves, must 
be intensities. The use of both sensation and expression is important since Deleuze's argument 
does not rely on a phenomenology or psychology of sensation but on sensation viewed as a sign, 
as defined according to his distinction of actual and virtual, where the virtual is the realm of 
intensity and the actual the realm of depths and distances. His argument relies on changes that 
cannot be explained through reference to distance and that, therefore, express depth. But these 
need not be a matter of consciousness or intentionality - a behaviour or an adaptation are also 
signs of depth.453  
Deleuze elaborates on the difference between his approach and both phenomenological and 
materialist-scientific approaches. As part of this he demonstrates how depth, like time, relies on 
passive syntheses. “We are able to move from distance to depth through habit.” For example, in 
learning how to do long-jump after successive long jumps “we come to know how far we can jump, as 
opposed to seeing far marks as perhaps frightening depths”.454 The passive synthesis of memory 
provides depth with its intensive aspect. “Distances becomes depths and remain depths through the 
passive synthesis of all earlier depths in memory”. The passive synthesis of time provides the sense of 
future for depth. All earlier depth is presupposed in the creation of newness in space. 
                                            
451 Williams, Gilles Deleuze's Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction and Guide. 172. 
452 As per Deleuze’s style, ‘tends to be cancelled out’ in the extended order of good sense does not mean that it is 
cancelled out tout court but that it is cancelled out from the perspective of good sense and the extended order 
that it produces or ‘sees’. As per his style the emphasis on cancelling out in this example is much more easily 
grasped than the alternative he is proposing. This can be very mis-directing for first time readers. 
453 Williams, Gilles Deleuze's Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction and Guide. 173. 
454 Ibid. 174. 
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Hence, depth must be understood independently of extension – and that extension, actually, arises 
out of depth.455 “We do not have a full understanding of an extension until we relate it to the intensities 
that give rise to it – that make it matter – and to the intensities that are transforming it – that make it 
matter now and into the future.”456 All past and future and co-existing intensities must be involved in 
any particular extensity. Any particular extensity in time must be connected up to all space and time, 
actual and virtual. There is no good reason “to separate any given extension from all past” (and future) 
“sensations of depth because the intensities that are most clearly at work in any given extension are 
related” more or less obscurely, “to all other intensities”.457 
Deleuze describes the difference between extension and depth. First, judgments of depth and 
distance do not depend on the size of objects, but the depth around them. Second, depth is a matter 
of intensities of sensation eg. The gradation of shadows allows us to sense distance in a landscape. 
“We perceive distance because we have sensed depth.” Again, there is a reciprocal determination 
between extension and intension. Williams suggests that Deleuze’s statement – “intensity is both the 
imperceptible and that which can only be sensed” – is “not the paradox that it seems”.458 
…intensity can be perceived as qualities in extension (this shade of red), but we never sense the 
intensity that allows us to perceive that shade since it varies in what it can make us sense with 
the quality according to the contexts in which it is expressed. That is, the sensations associated 
with that quality vary according to the other qualities that are present, according to the actual 
objects they appear with and according to the individual they appear in. This shade of red may 
appear at different depths depending on what other shades it accompanies - it may arouse 
different passions depending on the shapes in which it appears and the other colours and words 
associated with it. These different contexts 'have an effect' on the intensities expressed through 
them because they bring different intensities into relations of greater and lesser clarity and 
obscurity.459 
Different actual (experienced) relations of qualities imply and correlate with different syntheses of 
intensities, hence of pure differences or of multiplicities of pure variations. This correlation is what 
Deleuze refers to with the title of the chapter: the “Asymmetrical Synthesis of the Sensible’. The 
“sensations that allow us to order actual things imply syntheses of virtual intensities that cannot be 
fully rendered as actual and these syntheses are the reason sensations and orders are significant”. 
The causal relations between actual things and sensations is not mirrored in the re-arrangement of 
relations between intensities. Hence, the asymmetry. This opens onto Deleuze’s version of how to 
account for sense, which cannot be accounted for through the actual alone. 
                                            
455 The production of extensity by intensity can, and is, easily misunderstood as just the physical production of 
extension. How Nature produces the physical world or how urban processes (Nature) unfold and how intensity 
(Nature) produces extensity – though all part of the workings of Nature / open systems - are not the same thing 
and to see it this way seems to be an issue in the design world. It seems that such ways of speaking often get 
taken in this physical-production sense. There appears to be an understandable reason for this, which will be 
discussed in relation to Manuel Delanda later in this section. 
456 Williams, Gilles Deleuze's Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction and Guide. 174. 
457 Ibid. 174. 
458 Ibid. 176. 
459 Ibid. 176. 
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Space is defined by individuals and their intensities. For instance, heights only make sense and 
change in their sense due to changes in intensities. Intensities produce space and only depend on it” 
(height) “as a necessary condition for its measure”. 
Intensity & ‘Commonality’ 
Deleuze’s notion of the individual and intensities also allows him to conceptualise what is in ‘common’ 
between different individuals. 
Heights mean radically different things for the sufferer of vertigo and the insouciant mountain 
climber. They inhabit different spaces and the measured relation between those spaces cannot 
account for that difference or for the relations that hold between the differing senses of height and 
other wider structures and sensations. The world of the sufferer of vertigo is ordered differently 
and makes sense differently from the world of the mountain climber. 460  
However, these worlds are related through the intensities they express in different ways and through 
the relations involved in the different significances of depth. So, as these worlds are related through 
the space of intensities, they can only communicate with each other, beyond the limits of common 
sense, through creating new sensations that synthesise new intensities i.e. “related through their 
different dramatizations of the whole of Ideas”. 461 
Three Characteristics Of Intensity 
Deleuze describes three characteristics of intensity that gives it a necessary relationship to the actual 
but which make it “resistant to being fully thought in terms of the actual”.462 
1. “Intensity includes the unequal in itself” 
For Deleuze, “in mathematical accounts of quantity there is something like depth, that escapes 
measure, that “cannot be annulled” or related to other measures”.463 That which cannot be related to 
other measures is intensity and is a necessary aspect of quantity – which is the essence of measuring. 
So, that which is the essence of measuring cannot be separated from that which escapes measure in 
terms other than itself. 
That it can seem that cardinal (1, 2, 3…) and ordinal (first, second, third…) numbers are “the same” 
can be taken to mean that cardinal numbers (relating to order and quantity) can be deduced from and 
include ordinal numbers (order only). However, for Deleuze, this is wrong. A “space measured 
according to cardinal numbers only ‘includes’ ordinal properties thanks to intensity – the sensation of 
order rather than measure”. So, Deleuze argues, intensity is unknowable, but only in a specific way – 
“it cannot be measured according to a single principle” – it cannot be annulled.464  
                                            
460 Ibid. 178-179. 
461 Ibid. 188. 
462 Ibid. 178. 
463 Ibid. 178-179. 
464 Ibid. 180. ‘Conversely, the sensation of order can only be expressed in a space measured thanks to cardinal 
numbers – that is spatially represented order implies distances (first by this much).’  
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As Rolli summarises, “The first feature marks what cannot be cancelled in differences in quantity: the 
intensive magnitude envelops or interiorises an essential, irreducible inequality that can be 
homogenized but still insists within the depths of its homogenised manifestation.”465 For Deleuze, “It 
represent difference in quantity, that which cannot be cancelled in difference in quantity or that which 
is unequalisable in quantity itself: it is therefore the quality which belongs to quantity”.466 
2. “Intensity affirms difference” 
In Deleuze’s account of events, imperceptible changes (the sensation of intensity) are important. Such 
changes do not need some sort of grid to reference to for their significance to be communicated. 
“Intensities understood as changes, however small, are affirmed themselves”. This is the “profound” 
affirmation of difference. Intensity affirms difference. “Since intensity is already difference, it refers to a 
series of other differences that it affirms by affirming itself.”467 Intensity “makes difference an object of 
affirmation"468. There is no relative magnitude or scale to intensity – these will however appear when 
they are related to measures such as distance. “Intensities are the condition for sensation and for 
significance such as depth…If there is sensation, if there is significance, then there must be a change 
and that change matters in itself”.469 
3. The implicative self-reference of Intensity 
As Williams puts it in relation to intensity and signs: “intensities cannot be grasped in terms of 
mathematical measures. They have to be thought of as indivisible with respect to measure, but 
divisible with respect to “the configurations they take on with respect to other intensities”.470 These 
changes can be understood in terms of ‘envelopment’. There is a change in actual things associated 
with a change in configuration of intensities. Together these changes form a sign. The change in 
intensities involves different intensities enveloping each other in new and different ways. The singular 
nature of intensities results from intensities involving one another in different ways. This means that in 
“the relation of the whole of actual things to the whole of intensities and to the whole of Ideas” these 
shifts in involvement involve shifts in how they cover and uncover each other.  
Ideas are multiplicities of pure varying relations of relations. Ideas are interconnected and form areas 
of clarity and obscurity. These changes relate to and effect changes in actual things. The Idea that is 
expressed is accompanied by an actual sensation, a change in actual relations and the intensities 
have been reconfigured. 
As Rolli says, with more emphasis on the relationship to passive synthesis and spatial individuation, 
that “intensity is not only implicated in quality, but it is primarily implicit in itself, that is, implicative and 
implicated. This implicative self-reference of intensity happens in differential and continuous (passive) 
syntheses which drive forward the actualisation processes of virtual manifolds and, as processes of 
individuation, make them concrete”. So, he parallels his treatment of temporal synthesis on the “plane 
                                            
465 Rolli, Marc, "Deleuze on Intensity Differentials and the Being of the Sensible," Deleuze Studies 3(2009). 44. 
466 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. 232.  
467 Ibid. 234. 
468 Ibid. 234. 
469 Williams, Gilles Deleuze's Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction and Guide. 182. 
470 Ibid. 183. 
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of individuation” as spatial synthesis and repeats the distinction between virtual and actual 
multiplicities. 
Deleuze here draws out how intensity functions, in contrast to extensive length, as ‘distance’. 
‘Within intensity, we call that which is really implicated and enveloping difference; and we call that 
which is really implicated or enveloped distance. For this reason, intensity is neither divisible, like 
extensive quantity, nor indivisible, like quality. 471  So, distance is indivisible and involves 
asymmetric relations ‘that, in distinction to extensive lengths or stretches, is not put together out 
of discrete, homogeneous parts’.472 
Sensation, The Individual & Individuation 
Eternal Return, Intensities & the role Of Sensation 
Sensations are ‘signs’ of a reconfiguring of intensities. With respect to Nietzsche’s eternal return it is 
intensities that return in the sense of being reconfigured with sensation. As intensities are what returns 
– when reconfigured by sensation and reflecting how sensations reflect how changes matter – then 
eternal return is the eternal return of difference. Williams echoes Deleuze in saying that “we only think 
with difference when a sensation associated with an intensity sets that thought in motion, putting 
actual thought in touch with an Idea.” The importance of sensations should be obvious. “Thought must 
be open to sensations that cannot be recognized or measured.” Individuals are constituted by 
intensities that they presuppose and must be open to the creativity that they can liberate. Sensation is 
central to such thought, creativity and practical action. Only difference, intensities, ideas, and these, 
via sensation allow us to both “connect and forget” – via the method of a “dialectic combining critique, 
the search for transcendental conditions, completeness and creation”.473 Sensation as the expression 
of intensities is the only way to connect to difference.  
The Individual & Individuation 
Deleuze’s notion of the individual is a series of inseparable and interdependent processes involving 
Ideas, intensities, sensation and actual things. The individual allows Deleuze a way to escape the 
tendency to generalisation and universality and away from difference. For Williams,  
the real individual is set in motion by sensation, expresses Ideas, falls into actual identity. It is a 
take on the whole of Ideas, bringing some into greater clarity, throwing others into obscurity. The 
real individual is driven by sensations that signify a reconfiguration of intensities, a change in 
which intensities envelop others and which are enveloped. It is the site of creation, movement in 
                                            
471 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. 237: ‘The divisibility of extensive quantities is defined in the following 
manner: by the relative determination of a unit (this unit itself never being indivisible but only marking the level 
at which division ceases); by the equivalence of the parts determined by the unit; by the consubstantiality of the 
parts with the whole which is divided. Division can therefore take place and be continued without any change in 
the nature of what is being divided. By contrast, when it is pointed out that a temperature is not composed of 
other temperatures, or a speed of other speeds, what is meant is that each temperature is already a difference, 
and that differences are not composed of differences of the same order but imply series of heterogeneous 
terms.’ 
472 Ibid. 237. 
473 Williams, Gilles Deleuze's Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction and Guide. 184. 
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Ideas and a reconfiguration of intensities expressed in the destruction of the identity of an actual 
thing and the formation of new identities.474 
Sensations are central to individuals. They emerge as they express the changing envelopment of 
intensities. An individual is the whole world under a singular perspective, where this singular 
perspective is defined “through the processes that make the individual – its sensations and how they 
express Ideas and intensities and transform actual identities” and things.475 
As previously discussed “individuation precedes matter and form, species and parts, and every other 
element of the constituted individual”.476 Individuation is a process that produces an individual and to 
affirm the individuality of the individual requires not seeing individuation as separate from the 
individual.477 
Affirming the nature of the individual starts to affirm the ability to connect to pure difference. However, 
Williams points out that as the individual is an expression of the whole of Ideas that it is not just a 
matter of voluntarily choosing to connect to pure difference.478 Hence the need to experiment. 
The overall process of individuation has two interdependent dimensions, differenciation and 
differentiation, which together Deleuze titles “differentiac/tion”. This process goes from Idea to actual 
thing (differenciation) and from actual thing to Idea (differentiation). Ideas and actual things are 
reciprocally determined. They co-determine each other and together determine the whole process. “An 
actual thing only acquires determinacy in terms of genesis and evolution by expressing an Idea. 
Conversely, an Idea only acquires the determinacy of clarity and obscurity by being actually 
expressed.”479 
                                            
474 Ibid. 185. 
475 Ibid. 186. 
476 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. 38. 
477 ‘When the living being is considered as an individual, there are two ways in which it can be conceived. There 
is the substantialist viewpoint, which conceives the unity of living being as its essence, a unity that it has 
provided for itself, is based on itself and is created by itself; a unity that will vigorously resist anything that is not 
itself. There is also the hylomorphic viewpoint, which regards the individual as having been created from the 
conjunction of a form and some matter. If we compare these two approaches, we can see there is a clear 
opposition between the self-centered monism of substantialist metaphysics and the bipolarity depicted by 
hylomorphism. But despite this opposition, these two ways of analyzing the real nature of the individual have 
something in common: in both cases, there is the assumption that we can discover a principle (cause or 
process) of individuation, exercising its influence before the actual individuation itself has occurred, one that is 
able to explain, produce and determine the subsequent course of individuation. Taking the constituted individual 
as a given, we are then led to try to recreate the conditions that have made its existence possible. However, 
when the problem of individuation is formulated in terms of the existence of individuals, we find that a 
presupposition has emerged warranting further explanation. This presupposition points to an important aspect 
of the solutions that have been given to this problem, and it has surreptitiously determined the course of 
research dealing with the principle of individuation: that it is the individual qua the already constituted individual 
that is the most noteworthy reality, the one to be explained. Where this attitude prevails, the principle of 
individuation is sought only insofar as it is able to account for the characteristics of the individual exclusively, 
without allowing for this principle's necessary relation to other influences on the being as a whole, which could 
be equally important to the emergence of this individuated being. Research carried out under these 
assumptions accords an ontological privilege to the already constituted individual.’ Simondon, Gilbert, "The 
Genesis of the Individual," in Incorporations, ed. Crary, Jonathon; Kwinter, Sanford (New York: Zone Books, 
1992).  297-298. 
478 Williams, Gilles Deleuze's Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction and Guide. 185. 
479 Ibid. 187. 
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So far Williams, following Deleuze, has not described how Ideas come to be determined – how 
particular ideas come to be related to actual things. Without knowing this we cannot understand how 
Deleuze’s ‘structure’ relates to everyday life, actual situations and how to act. 
The function of Sensation 
“The answer lies in sensation and intensity” in the (non-sequential) two part process of individuation. 
First, “where there is a particular” (changed) configuration of intensities in the virtual, there is a coming 
into clarity and obscurity of Ideas”. Second, “where there is sensation, there is an expression in the 
actual of a particular” change of “configuration of intensities”. For Deleuze,  
Intensity is the determinant in the process of actualisation. It is intensity which dramatises. It is 
intensity which is immediately expressed in the basic spatio-temporal dynamisms and determines 
an 'indistinct' differential relation in the Idea to incarnate itself in a distinct quality and a 
distinguished extensity.480 
Sensations move the actual and identities and reconfigure intensities. “Intensity creates sensation and 
lights up Ideas. Ideas give sense to sensation and sensations express Ideas.”481 Williams argues that, 
for Deleuze, “sensation is only a matter for individuals or, more precisely, individuation” which for him, 
is “the process through which individuals emerge with sensation”.482 Deleuze refers to dramatization in 
relation to sensation. Dramatisation involves sensation. “An Idea must be dramatized in particular 
sensations for it to be expressed in actual situations. Without such sensations, there is no creative 
movement in the actual – sensation is the sign that something has changed, both at the level of Ideas 
and at the level of actual things”.483 The individual “is singular because it has singular sensations that 
express its individual take on the whole of Ideas”. Deleuze has shown that intensity cannot be 
measured by an outside measure, cannot be calibrated beyond itself to an outside measure and 
hence identities. So, “intensity can only be a matter of sensation”.484 
With an individual Ideas are expressed in actual situations, however such an expression is 
‘incomplete’ and cannot be seen as a “way of thinking through the tensions in the Idea, the Idea as 
problem, until it is given an intensity in the sensations of an individual.” Both the Idea and the 
“objective situation have to be articulated through the individuation of a thing for which the Idea is a 
problem and for which the situation is a spatio-temporal given”.  
Individuation is a series of inseparable and interdependent processes involving Ideas, intensities, 
sensation and actual things. As such it connects what happens in the actual to the relevant 
interactions of the virtual relations involved in what happens in the actual. We only think with 
difference through openings provided by sensation. Sensation allows an individual to grasp the 
relevant relations and interrelations of relations involved in Ideas and the interrelation of Ideas in the 
individual. Emerging through events and vice-diction sensation allows the individual to be understood 
                                            
480 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. 245. 
481 Williams, Gilles Deleuze's Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction and Guide. 187. 
482 Ibid. 188. 
483 Ibid. 186. 
484 Ibid. 188. 
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as a take on the whole world through being a take on the whole of Ideas. Sensation does one thing – 
but in this it performs many functions. It connects an individual to the whole world – the world relevant 
to the problem and Ideas. It connects to the whole of ideas in way that connects to the way that the 
whole of Ideas relate to each other and the problem. Sensation enables a relation and connection 
between the most immediate and obvious factors of a problem and the most obscure factors whose 
relevance is yet to be discovered. Sensation connects the individual to the various relevant 
dimensions of a problem, where the problem is a set of tensions between various dimensions of the 
problem. Sensation provides a means to investigate these tensions and directs how to act in relation 
to these tensions. Sensation provides a means to evaluate the relative relevance, significance, 
effectivess and risk of any thing under consideration. Sensation provides the means to start to gauge 
all of this through the eternal return of difference. Sensation opens onto experimentation as the leap 
into the self-referential, open and openly interactive world of the individual. At the very least sensation 
incites speculation and speculation opens further sensations. 
As Williams says there is a “necessary relation between significance and the concepts of Ideas, 
intensities and sensations. Significance, change and cause must be thought of in terms of the relation 
of the whole of Ideas to a change in intensities and to a sensation in an individual”. Anything can be 
significant and can be thought of as an important cause, so long as it is accompanied by a sensation 
expressing a change in intensities and Ideas, independent of what change occurs…To be part of a 
sensation and of the expression of intensity and Ideas is enough and no external measurement of 
value can stand as a more important determinant of significance. 
Signs  
What Deleuze calls a ‘sign’ is not a recognizable object nor even a quality but constitutes, as Smith 
says, the limit to the “faculty of sensibility”. This is not beyond the nature of the individual, which 
enables, or is set up for, signs to be sensed. An individual is such a sensing machine. For the 
individual, for what Deleuze calls aesthetics, a sign is the very “being of the sensible”. It can only 
achieve this when “we apprehend that which in the sensible … can only be sensed, the very being of 
the sensible: difference, potential difference and difference in intensity as the reason behind 
quantitative diversity.”485 
                                            
485 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. 57. In the first section ‘Meaning is Force’ in Massumi, Brian, A User's 
Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia: Deviations Form Deleuze and Guattari  (London: The MIT Press, 
1992). Massumi describes what a sign is, or rather, how it functions (p.3), and it worth quoting this at length: He 
begins.. “A phenomenon is not an appearance, or even an apparition, but a sign, a symptom which finds its 
meaning in an existing force.” (Here, Massumi quotes Deleuze from his Nietzsche and Philosophy, p.3) He goes 
on… “Take wood. A woodworker who sets out to make a table does not pick just any piece of wood. She 
chooses the right piece for the application. When she works it, she does not indiscriminately plow into it with the 
plane. She is conscious of the grain and is directed by it. She reads it and interprets it. What she reads are 
signs. Signs are qualities (color, texture, durability, and so on). And qualities are much more than simply logical 
properties or sense perceptions. They envelop a potential - the capacity to be affected, or to submit to a force 
(the action of the plane; later, the pressure of salt shakers and discourteous elbows), and the capacity to affect, 
or to release a force (resistance to gravity; or in a nontable application, releasing heat when burned). The 
presence of the sign is a contraction of time. It is simultaneously an indicator of a future potential and a 
symptom of a past. It envelops material processes pointing forward (planing; being a table) and backward (the 
evolution of the tree’s species; the natural conditions governing its individual growth; the cultural actions that 
brought that particular wood to the workshop for that particular purpose). Envelopment is not a metaphor. The 
wood’s individual and phylogenetic past exists as traces in the grain, and its future as qualities to be exploited. 
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Deleuze’s phraseology often tends towards suggesting paradoxes. A sign is unsensible according to 
Deleuze, but it is only unsensible “from the point of view of recognition and common sense”. A sign is 
“only accessible to the faculty of sensibility”. For Deleuze this points to a “pure aesthetic” lying at the 
limits of sensibility. 486 A sign has two aspects and directly relates to what an Idea is. Smith describes 
an Idea as “a virtual multiplicity of genetic elements, and the systems of connections of differential 
relations that are established between them”. Such relations are actualized in “diverse spatio-temporal 
relationships”. A sign, for human related individuals, is an ‘effect’ of such elements and relations 
entering into relation “as a function of our body”.487 As Smith points out “the notion of the differential 
Idea finds its complement in the concept of intensity: these elements and relations are necessarily 
actualized in an intensive magnitude”. The second aspect of the sign is that when an “intensity 
reaches a given order or magnitude…these relations are organized in consciousness” as a “quality”.488 
So, sensations “thus present a double aspect: they necessarily refer to a virtual and implicated order 
of constitutive differences, but they tend to cancel out those differences in the extended order in which 
they are explicated.” 489 
Spinoza’s Conception of Intensive Quantites (including Affects) 
Re-emphasising Intensive Quantities 
Williams’ account of Deleuze’s structure of reality importantly stresses perplicatory significance, which 
can easily be missed in the convolutions of the argument and somewhat technical sounding language 
of Difference and Repetition (and certainly in Delanda’s account).  
Williams seems to downplay, in comparison to the later work of Deleuze and Deleuze & Guattari, the 
importance of intensive quantities in his version of Difference and Repetition. Difference and 
Repetition places great importance on intensive quantities but does not dwell on the nature of 
intensive quantities themselves. The emphasis in Williams is more on how intensive quantities fit into 
the greater schema and on the perplications involved in the production of intensive quantities. His 
account plays down how intensive quantities, which cannot be separated from perplicatory 
significance, and is the quantity of this significance – just as the perplicatory, quantity on quantity, 
force on force, is the quality of the significance. This significance – being both quantity and quality – 
where the latter is in terms of the former - is nothing like linguistically-oriented conceptions of meaning. 
It might be worth it to briefly recap Deleuze’s work from Expressionism in Philosophy, from the same 
year to remind us of Deleuze’s conception of the nature of intensive quantities, even if this would 
                                                                                                                                        
On a first, tentative level, meaning is precisely that: a network of enveloped material processes. ‘A thing has as 
many meanings as there are forces capable of seizing it.’ The presence of the sign is not an identity but an 
envelopment of difference, of a multiplicity of actions, materials, and levels. In a broader sense, meaning even 
includes the paths not taken. It is also all the forces that could have seized the thing but did not. It is an infinity 
of processes.’ 10-11. 
486 Smith, "Deleuze's Theory of Sensation: Overcoming the Kantian Duality." 34. 
487 Ibid. 35. 
488 Duffy, Simon, "The Logic of Expression in Deleuze's Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza: A Strategy of 
Engagement," International Journal of Philosophical Studies 12, no. 1 (2004). 241. ‘A quality covers over or 
subordinates intensity insofar as it fills extensity, or ‘occupies this extensity, either in the form of a qualitas’, a 
primary physical quality, ‘or in the form of a quale’, a secondary perceptible quality’. The quotations in this quote 
are from Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy. 232. 
489 Smith, "Deleuze's Theory of Sensation: Overcoming the Kantian Duality." 36-37. 
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develop further in later work.490  Such a revisit also allows us to be reminded of aspects of intensive 
quantities that can be easily ignored or forgotten, and to allows us to make more substantial and 
important connections between Difference and Repetition and Expressionism in Philosophy. 
After this we will return to further elaborating on the place of intensive quantities in Difference and 
Repetition. To remind the reader, the conception of intensive quantities in Expressionism in 
Philosophy is in terms of “modal essences”. 
Spinoza’s Conception of Intensive Quantities: Modal Essences 
Modal essences are intensive quantities - For Spinoza, following Duns Scotus: “modal essences are 
intrinsic modes or intensive quantities” distinguished … from one another as different degrees of 
intensity”. The difference of being of modal essences “is at once intrinsic and purely quantitative; for 
the quantity here in question is an intensive one”. This quantitative distinction is “no mere appearance, 
but an internal difference, a difference of intensity.491 A degree of power is a difference in itself. It is 
already a difference. “The intensive quantity is made of differences.”492 
Intensive quantities – as degrees of power - express the absolute (Nature)- So that each finite 
thing must be said to express the absolute, according to the intensive quantity that constitutes its 
essence, according, that is to the degree of its power’. In Spinoza, “individuation… is…. quantitative 
and intrinsic, intensive”.493  
Intensive quantities are part of an infinite system of singular and particular essences - 
“Intensive quantity is infinite” and the “system of essences an actually infinite series”.494  “Modal 
essences are thus…inseparable…characterised by total agreement…but” (are) “singular and 
particular and distinguished from one another intrinsically”. “All essences are involved in the 
production of each…since the series is actually infinite”.495 
intensive quantities are apprehended as singular unities - Yet in this “concrete system”… “each 
essence is produced as an irreducible degree, necessarily apprehended as a singular unity”.496 
Modal essences – intensive quantities – have an expressive power, and express the power of 
Nature - For Deleuze, modal essences are parts of this system because they are intensive. “They are 
not all contained in each, but all are comprised in the production of each.” As such, a modal essence 
“has an expressive power”. This contributes significantly to the Spinozist problem of how to move from 
the infinite to the finite.497  
                                            
490 The original discussion can be found in the section in this thesis titled: ‘The function of intensity in the   infinite 
system: quantitative modal individuation’. 
491 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy., 196. 
492Deleuze, Gilles, "Lecture on Spinoza 12/12/1980," (Seminars given between 1971 and 1987 at the Universite 
de Paris VIII Vincennes and Vincennes St-Denis).(1980), 
http://www.webdeleuze.com/php/texte.php?cle=23&groupe=Spinoza&langue=2, Accessed 28 August 2009..   
493 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy. 197 
494 Ibid. 197-198. 
495 Ibid. 197-198. 
496 Ibid. 197-198. 
497 Ibid. 197-198. 
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Modal essences – intensive quantities - are an irreducible part of God’s power. Thus modes are in 
their essence expressive: they express God’s essence, each according to the degree of power that 
constitutes its essence.498 
Intensive quantities, as modal essences, are ‘physical’ (in the sense of being modal essences.) 
’Quantities’ here refers to “intensive modal quantities” or modal essences or degrees of power.499 “A 
modal essence is a physical reality, a pure physical reality.” “Essence, qua essence, has an 
existence.”500 
Types of Intensive Quantities (Affects) 
In his work of 1991, translated in 1994 as, What is Philosophy? Deleuze considers intensive quantities 
or affects and percepts as “blocs of sensation”.  
Percepts are no longer perceptions; they are independent of a state of those who experience 
them. Affects are no longer feelings or affections; they go beyond the strength of those who 
undergo them. Sensations, percepts, and affects are beings whose validity lies in themselves and 
exceeds any lived….The work of art is a being of sensation and nothing else: it exists in itself. 
The artist creates blocs of percepts and affects, but the only law of creation is that the compound 
must stand up on its own. The artist's greatest difficulty is to make it stand up on its own. 501 
Such beings – sensations, percepts and affects - are now seen as autonomous or tending toward 
autonomy. 
In the introduction to Critical and Clinical, Daniel Smith, in a footnote, briefly and importantly charts a 
shift in terminology of affect.  
We might note here a shift that seems to take place in Deleuze's terminology. In Spinoza, an 
"affection" (affectio) indicates the state of a body insofar as it is affected by another body, while 
an "affect" (affectus) marks the passage from one state to another as an increase or decrease” in 
the body’s power as a function of its affections.  
According to Smith, “This terminology, which Deleuze analyzes in detail in Expressionism in 
Philosophy: Spinoza is retained throughoutA Thousand Plateaus. In The Movement lmage and What 
is Philosophy?, however, Deleuze replaces these terms with perception and affection respectively, 
reserving the word affect for the pure qualities or power that are extracted from affections and achieve 
an autonomous status”.502 
Smith identifies a more autonomous conception of affect in What is Philosophy? (which is also in 
Critical and Clinical). He seems to draw on the glossary inA Thousand Plateaus to identify the relevant 
terminology inA Thousand Plateaus. However, notions such as: assemblage, free action, line of flight, 
                                            
498 Ibid. 198. 
499 Ibid. 198-9. 
500 Ibid. 191. 
501 Deleuze, Gilles and Guattari, Felix, What Is Philosophy? , trans. Tomlinson, Hugh and Burchill, Graham 
(London: Verso, 1994 (original French edition 1991)). 164. 
502 Deleuze, Gilles, Essays: Critical and Clinical, trans. Smith, Daniel W. And Greco, Michael A. (London: Verso, 
1998); ibid. 181.  
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refrain, nomadism, smooth space, haeccity, rhizome, plane of consistency, a becoming, matter, 
phylum, line are all constructed to affirm autonomy. So, whilst Deleuze and Guattari have an explicitly 
autonomous conception of affect in What is Philosophy they have a blatantly implicit array of 
autonomous conceptions inA Thousand Plateaus. Indeed compared to A Thousand Plateaus the 
autonomous examples of affect in What is Philosophy? seem closer to the embodied-oriented affects 
of Spinoza that the different perspective on affect of the latter book. A Thousand Plateaus wants to 
find affect wherever. It attempts to embrace affect without assuming that you start with a body. 
Returning to Deleuze and Guattari’s What is Philosophy? Here they characterize three ‘monumental 
types’ or ‘varieties’ of compounds of sensations, each one increasingly more autonomous than the 
previous one: 
the vibration, which characterizes the simple sensation (but it is already durable or compound, 
because it rises and falls, implies a constitutive difference of level, follows an invisible thread that is 
more nervous than cerebral);  
Harmonies are affects. Consonance and dissonance, harmonies of tone or color, are affects of 
music or painting. Rameau emphasized the identity of harmony and affect.503  
the embrace or the clinch (when two sensations resonate in each other by embracing each other so 
tightly in a clinch of what are no more than ‘energies’);  
withdrawal, division, distension (when, on the contrary, two sensations draw apart, release 
themselves, but so as now to be brought together by the light, the air, or the void that sinks between 
them or into them, like a wedge that is at once so dense and so light that it extends in every direction 
as the distance grows, and forms a bloc that no longer needs a support). Vibrating sensation-s-
coupling sensation-opening or splitting, hollowing out sensation.504 
In his earlier, 1981 work on the painter Francis Bacon, (translated in 2003 as The Logic of Sensation), 
Deleuze says, with more emphasis on Nietzsche, that “every sensation is intensive, it implicates within 
itself a difference in quantity between unequal forces; it is thus necessarily synthetic, effecting a 
passive and asymmetrical synthesis between forces”. 505  Here, with the help of Daniel Smith’s 
summary, he develops a similar typology of asymmetrical syntheses as in What is Philosophy?506  
 ‘Vibration’, ‘or the Connective synthesis: the construction of a single series’. A vibration 
“characterizes a simple sensation”…itself “already composite, since it is defined by a difference of 
intensity that rises and falls, increases or decreases, an invisible pulsation that is more nervous that 
cerebral.” In painting “colour is discovered as the differential relation upon which everything else 
depends”. 
                                            
503 Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy?164. 
504 Ibid.168. 
505 Deleuze, Gilles, Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation, trans. Smith, Daniel W. (London: Continuum, 1988 
(original French edition 1981)). 234. 
506 Smith, "Deleuze's Theory of Sensation: Overcoming the Kantian Duality." and Patton, Paul, ed. Deleuze: A 
Critical Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996). 29-56.  
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“Resonance, or Conjunctive synthesis: the convergence of (at least) two series”. “The second type 
of synthesis, more complex, is that of resonance.” In this case two Figures (not objects) “or 
sensations…confront each other…and thereby made to responate together in a single ‘matter of fact’ 
in order to make something appear that is irreducible to the two: this sensation, this Figure”. The new 
Figure …”internalizes the difference between the two sensations”. “The two sensations are coupled 
together…something new is produced.” 
“Forced movement, or Disjunctive Synthesis:507 the affirmation of divergent series”. The most 
complex of these is what Deleuze calls a “forced movement”. These are no longer couplings of 
sensations but “distensions of deviations”. In Bacon’s triptychs three separated Figures function 
together to produce a “single matter of fact”. “The Figures achieve such an extraordinary amplitude 
between them the limits of sensation are broken: sensation is no longer dependent upon a Figure per 
se, but rather the intensive rhythm itself becomes the Figure of the triptych”. For Smith, these are 
“pure beings of sensation” and the artwork that produces them “a functional machine” and for Deleuze 
the question for the work of art is…”How does it work? (experimentation)”.508 
For this I will draw upon the work of Deleuze himself in Difference and Repetition, Deleuze’s Spinoza, 
Mark Rolli and Daniel Smith. In effectively downplaying intensive quantities he also downplays some 
of the concreteness of the processes involved, which are important for the argument of this thesis.  
Someone who knows Deleuze (& Guattari) might be able to read intensive quantities – and becoming, 
affects and later, assemblages509 – into Williams’ account. However, to affirm what open systems do 
requires affirming that significance is never separate or should not be seen as separate from affect. 
Intensive quantities are also important for clarifying the nature of significances as well.  
Deleuze’s Notion of Open / Complex Systems 
It is true that on the path which leads to that which is to be thought, all begins with sensibility. 
Between the intensive and thought, it is always by means of an intensity that thought comes to 
us. The privilege of sensibility as origin appears in the fact that, in an encounter, what forces 
sensation and that which can only be sensed are one and the same thing, whereas in other 
cases the two instances are distinct. In effect, the intensive or difference in intensity is at once 
both the object of the encounter and the object to which the encounter raises sensibility.510  
How this section functions 
Deleuze specifically considers the type of systems he is examining as complex systems511 and it 
seems worthwhile characterizing how he believes such systems function. The most compressed 
outline he provides on pages 277-278 requires some explanation even if the reader has already given 
                                            
507 According to Zourabichvili, Disjunctive synthesis or becoming is ‘the main operator of Deleuze’s philosophy, as 
it is the movement if difference as such’, Zourabichvili, F. (2003). Le vocabulaire de Deleuze. Paris: Viveiros De 
Castro, Eduardo, "Intensive Filiation and Demonic Alliance "  http://nansi.abaetenet.net/abaetextos/intensive-
filiation-and-demonic-alliance-e-viveiros-de-castro.  
508 Smith, "Deleuze's Theory of Sensation: Overcoming the Kantian Duality." 45-47. 
509 To be fair, Williams gives attention to becomings, mainly through examples from the Logic of Sense. 
510 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. 145 
511 Deleuze specifically refers to the types of systems he is examining as ‘complex systems’ on p.256. 
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significant attention to the preceding text. This section starts with a compressed version of his account 
so as to hold the various elements of his conceptual system together in their relations and this will be 
followed by taking the key terms and elaborating on them in a manner where the interrelations with 
each other are clarified further – usually in the form of how Deleuze discusses such terms in relation to 
related other terms – employing extended quotations to hold onto the terms in relation to their related 
terms and charcterisations from other texts. Deleuze actually discusses the type of system he is 
describing as a “differential system”. What is discussed here will assume some things from the 
previous text and will focus on that which has been less discussed.  
Deleuze’s Differential System (a compressed account)512 
“Systems in which different relates to different through difference itself are … intensive; they rest 
ultimately upon the nature of intensive quantities, which precisely communicate through their 
differences. The fact that conditions are necessary for such communication to take place (small 
difference, proximity, etc.) should lead us to believe …in the particular properties of intensive 
quantities which may divide, but do so only in changing their nature according to their own particular 
order. …In short,” such systems “must be described with the help of notions which, from the outset, 
appear very different from the categories of representation: 
 the depth or spatium in which intensities are organised;  
 the disparate series these form, and the fields of individuation that they outline (individuating 
factors);  
 the 'dark precursor' which causes them to communicate;  
 the linkages, internal resonances and forced movements which result; 
 the constitution of passive selves and larval subjects in the system, and the formation of pure 
spatio-temporal dynamisms;  
 the qualities and extensions, species and parts which form the double differenciation of the 
system and cover over the preceding factors; 
 the centres of envelopment which nevertheless testify to the persistence of these factors in the 
developed world of qualities and extensities. … No series enjoys a privilege over others, none 
possesses the identity of a model, none the resemblance of a copy. None is either opposed or 
analogous to another. Each is constituted by differences, and communicates with the others 
through differences of differences. Crowned anarchies are substituted for the hierarchies of 
representation; nomadic distributions for the sedentary distributions of representation. 
We saw how these systems were sites for the actualisation of Ideas. An Idea, in this sense, is 
neither one nor multiple, but a multiplicity constituted of differential elements, differential relations 
between those elements, and singularities corresponding to those relations.… “The eternal 
return concerns” only such systems.513 
                                            
512 The wording of this description is as per the original. Some parts have been omitted. 
513 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition.126. 
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For it is not figures already mediated and related to representation that are capable of carrying 
the faculties to their respective limits but, on the contrary, free or untamed states of difference in 
itself; not qualitative opposition within the sensible, but an element which is in itself difference, 
and creates at once both the quality in the sensible and the transcendent exercise within 
sensibility.514  
Deleuze is interested in an element that is difference, that which: goes beyond the “already mediated”; 
carries “the faculties to their respective limits”; creates the quality in the sensible, and creates “the 
transcendent exercise within sensibility”. So, to assert, Deleuze’s interest is equally ontological as 
aesthetic, and ontological in being aesthetic.  
This element is intensity, understood as pure difference in itself, as that which is at once both 
imperceptible for empirical sensibility which grasps intensity only already covered or mediated by 
the quality to which it gives rise, and at the same time that which can be perceived only from the 
point of view of a transcendental sensibility which apprehends it immediately in the encounter.515 
The relevant terms 
i. Depth and ‘Spatium’.  
Spatium is the intensive spatium: Deleuze clarifies the relation with extensity: “Extensity can emerge 
from the depths only if depth is definable independently of extensity. The extensity whose genesis we 
are attempting to establish is extensive magnitude, the extensum or term of reference of all the 
extensio. The original depth, by contrast, is indeed space as a whole, but space as an intensive 
quantity: the pure spatium.”516 He describes how spatium is beyond the reach of the empirical principle 
(measurement): “Moreover, while the laws of nature govern the surface of the world, the eternal return 
ceaselessly rumbles in this other dimension of the transcendental or the volcanic spatium.”517 It is not 
that there is depth as something that exhibits some intensity, as might be supposed by Deleuze’s 
discussion of depth versus length. Depth, for Deleuze, when affirmed is spatium. This is more radical 
than it first appears. 
ii. ‘The Disparate’ (Disparate series).  
“We call this dark precursor, this difference in itself or difference in the second degree which relates 
heterogeneous systems and even completely disparate things, the disparate.” 518  See previous 
discussion of the disparate in the body text for a fuller account of the disparate. For Deleuze,  
Intensity is the form of difference in so far as this is the reason of the sensible. Every intensity is 
differential, by itself a difference. Every intensity is E - E, where E itself refers to an e - e, and e to 
t - t etc.: each intensity is already a coupling (in which each element of the couple refers in turn to 
couples of elements of another order), thereby revealing the properly qualitative content of 
quantity. We call this state of infinitely doubled difference which resonates to infinity disparity. 
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517 Ibid. 241. 
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Disparity - in other words, difference or intensity (difference of intensity) - is the sufficient reason 
of all phenomena, the condition of that which appears.519  
It is easy to think of the disparate abstractly as relations of intensive relations aside from the 
particularity of these relations. It is important to remember that the disparate is not just a set of 
abstract relations in relation to each other infinitely, but involve the ‘heterogeneous’ and disparate 
nature of the dimensions of disparity, and that there are elements of dissymmetry – high/low, 
front/back, up/down etc. 
iii. ‘Series’ (Disparate series)  
For Deleuze, from Williams’ study of the Logic of Sense,520 “series are not essentially series of objects 
or substances, they are variations independent of objects and not limited by them. The variation 
comes first, not the varied object or connected substance”.  
In relation to series that are more organism or human-relevant, “if a viewing or organizing 
consciousness is essential for setting up the series, if the series are for that intentionality, then this 
latter becomes primary and the focus should turn to the intentionality that stands in relation to series 
(that which intends toward them and thereby determines them, while being determined in return)”.521 
A series is “a disjunctive synthesis running in different ways across two interdependent but irreducible 
sides of reality: on sense and expression522; virtual and actual; surface and depth”. A disjunctive 
synthesis is a “transforming addition that connects by creating differences”.523  
Deleuze is opposed to rules and laws defining series. “They are processes to be observed, or better, 
lived through.” Patterns may be deduced in them but these are “secondary to series as something 
sensed and expressed”.524 
iv.  ‘Fields of Individuation’ - Deleuze’s ideas about individuation owe a great deal to Gilbert 
Simondon: 
who has shown …that individuation presupposes a prior metastable state - in other words, the 
existence of a 'disparateness' such as at least two orders of magnitude or two scales of 
heterogeneous reality between which potentials are distributed. Such a pre-individual state 
nevertheless does not lack singularities: the distinctive or singular points are defined by the 
existence and distribution of potentials. An 'objective' problematic field thus appears, determined 
by the distance between two heterogeneous orders. Individuation emerges like the act of solving 
such a problem, or - what amounts to the same thing – like the actualisation of a potential and the 
establishing of communication between disparates. The act of individuation consists not in 
suppressing the problem, but in integrating the elements of the disparateness into a state of 
coupling which ensures its internal resonance. The individual thus finds itself attached to a pre-
                                            
519 Ibid. 222. 
520 Williams, Gilles Deleuze's Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction and Guide. 25-26. 
521 Williams, James, Gilles Deleuze's Logic of Sense  (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008). 26. 
522 As has been noted by commentators sense and expression are entwined but not the same thing. 
523 Williams, Gilles Deleuze's Logic of Sense. 27. 
524 Ibid. 26. 
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individual half which is not the impersonal within it so much as the reservoir of its singularities… 
In all these respects, we believe that individuation is essentially intensive, and that the pre-
individual field is a virtual-ideal field, made up of differential relations.525  
What are the concrete processes of actualisation in the greater field of individuation (with the intensity 
relations intrinsic to it)?  “What carries out . . . the element of potentiality in the idea”.526 For Deleuze, 
“it must be a matter of spatial-temporal dramatisation, but one grounded in intensity and its 
relationships”.527  
The answer lies precisely in the intensive quantities. Intensity is the determinant in the process of 
actualisation. It is intensity which dramatises. It is intensity which is immediately expressed in the 
basic spatiotemporal dynamisms and determines an ‘indistinct’ differential relation in the idea to 
incarnate itself in a distinct quality and a distinguished extensity.528 
Deleuze draws a “parallel between intensity’s explication movement and the idea’s differenciating 
movement”. 529  Intensity is only able to function in the process of explication if it functions 
independently of the results of explication. This is possible as there is an “ontologically primary order” 
of implication530 “characterized by idiosyncratic mode of processing”.531 
“The essential process of intensive quantities is individuation. Intensity is individuating, and intensive 
quantities are individuating factors”.532 The individuation processes are the actualisation processes 
that can be described against the background of intensity relations. They establish a field of 
communication or a system of signalising for heterogeneous series, so that the immanent structures of 
experience can get ‘signs’ to flash and qualities to generate.533  
v. ‘Individuating Factors’  
For Deleuze, “It is notable that extensity does not account for the individuations which occur within it.” 
He presents key asymmetries as “individuating factors” which express themselves in extensity.  
“No doubt the high and the low, the right and the left, the figure and the ground are individuating 
factors which trace rises and falls, currents and descents in extensity”. Their power tends to be 
obscured in extensity so that we can no longer understand. 
                                            
525 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. 246. 
526 Ibid. 221. 
527 Rolli, "Deleuze on Intensity Differentials and the Being of the Sensible." 41. 
528 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. 245. 
529 ‘We speak of differenciation in relation to the Idea which is actualised. We speak of explication in relation to 
the intensity which 'develops' and which, precisely, determines the movement of actualisation.’ ibid. 246. 
530 “Intensities presuppose and express only differential relations; individuals presuppose only Ideas.” Ibid. 252. 
531 Rolli, "Deleuze on Intensity Differentials and the Being of the Sensible."41. 
532 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. 246. 
533 ‘For this reason, the logical relation of causality is inseparable from a physical process of signalling, without 
which it would not be translated into action. By 'signal' we mean a system with orders of disparate size, 
endowed with elements of dissymmetry; by 'sign' we mean what happens within such a system, what flashes 
across the intervals when a communication takes place between disparates. The sjgn is indeed an effect, but an 
effect with two aspects: in one of these it expresses, qua sign, the productive dissymmetry; in the other it tends 
to cancel it.’ibid. Every phenomenon flashes in a signal-sign system. In so far as a system is constituted or 
bounded by at least two heterogeneous series, two disparate orders capable of entering into communication, 
we call it a signal. The phenomenon that flashes across this system, bringing about the communication between 
disparate series, is a sign.’ ibid. 222. 
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where their power comes from, since we no longer know that they express the original depth. It is 
depth which explicates itself as right and left in the first dimension, as high and low in the second, 
and as figure and ground in the homogenised third. Extensity does not develop or appear without 
presenting a left and a right, a high and a low, an above and a below, which are like the 
dissymmetrical marks of its own origin. The relativity of these determinations, moreover, is further 
testimony to the absolute from which they come.534  
Individuating factors are the factors involved in individuation. “We call individuating factors the 
ensemble of these enveloping and enveloped intensities, of these individuating and individual 
differences which ceaselessly interpenetrate one another throughout the fields of individuation.”535 
Refer also to the note on “centres of envelopment.” 
vi. ‘Dark precursors’  
“Centres of envelopment are also the dark precursors of the eternal return.”536 
vii. The ‘communication’ of (individuating factors) 
A ‘signal’, strangely named that it is, is a system of orders of disparate size. As Deleuze says, “we call 
this state of infinitely doubled difference which resonates to infinity disparity.”537  
This ‘disparity’ is not discussed as such in Williams but in Deleuze it seems to have two dimensions: “it 
is correlated with…: differences of level, temperature, pressure, tension, potential, differences of 
intensity…”538 And such differences, secondly, correlate with each other or are made to correlate with 
each other, to produce “differences of intensity”.  
“Disparity - in other words, difference or intensity (difference of intensity) - is the sufficient reason of all 
phenomena, the condition of that which appears.”539 Bio-physical gradients, asymmetries and shifts 
are made to communicate with each other and to whatever other intensities that are drawn in with 
them through the process of individuation. Individuation co-relates them together. 
Every individuating factor540 is already difference and difference of difference. It is constructed upon a 
fundamental disparity, and functions on the edges of that disparity as such. That is why these factors 
endlessly communicate with one another across fields of individuation, becoming enveloped in one 
another in a demesne 541  which disrupts the matter of the Self as well as the form of the 1. 
Individuation is mobile, strangely supple, fortuitous and endowed with fringes and margins; all 
                                            
534 Ibid. 229. 
535 Ibid. 254. 
536 Ibid. 274. 
537 Ibid. 257. 
538 Ibid. 222. Whilst Deleuze mentions physical science types of differences (alongside ‘level’, ‘potential’) here his 
many other studies, including that of Bacon stress that differences of intensity are not at all restricted to the bio-
physical and that it is only through the individual that such bio-physical differences become differences for the 
individual. 
539 Ibid. 257. 
540 ‘It is notable that extensity does not account for the individuations which occur within it. No doubt the high and 
the low, the right and the left, the figure and the ground are individuating factors which trace rises and falls,  
currents and descents in extensity.’ Deleuze, 229 ‘Extensity does not develop or appear without presenting a 
left and a right, a high and a low, an above and a below, which are like the dissymmetrical marks of its own 
origin.’ ibid. 229. 
541 Noun: Possession of land as one's own, domain, territory of the sovereign… 
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because the intensities which contribute to it communicate with each other, envelop other intensities 
and are in turn enveloped. 
The Unequal produces sensation. “The reason of the sensible, the condition of that which appears, is 
not space and time but the Unequal in itself, disparateness as it is determined and comprised in 
difference of intensity, in intensity as difference.”542 
viii. ‘Forced movements’  
Forced movements have already been discussed in terms of the different types of syntheses and refer 
to the more autonomous syntheses, disjunctive syntheses – becomings, affects and percepts and 
assemblages. Deleuze provides a more detailed account of how “forced movements” function in the 
chapter titled ’Repetition for Itself’:  
once communication between heterogeneous series is established, all sorts of consequences 
follow within the system. Something 'passes' between the borders, events explode, phenomena 
flash, like thunder and lightning. Spatio-temporal dynamisms fill the system, expressing 
simultaneously the resonance of the coupled series and the amplitude of the forced movement 
which exceeds them. The system is populated by subjects, both larval subjects and passive 
selves: passive selves because they are indistinguishable from the contemplation of couplings 
and resonances; larval subjects because they are the supports or the patients of the dynamisms. 
In effect, a pure spatio-temporal dynamism, with its necessary participation in the forced 
movement, can be experienced only at the borders of the livable, under conditions beyond which 
it would entail the death of any well-constituted subject endowed with independence and 
activity.543 Thus we see that: these systems are not defined only by the heterogeneous series 
which border them, nor by the coupling, the resonance and the forced movement which constitute 
their dimensions, but also by the subjects which populate them and the dynamisms which fill 
them, and finally by the qualities and extensities which develop on the basis of such 
dynamisms.544 
ix. ‘Passive selves and Larval Subjects’  See previous footnote.  
According to John Protevi, “…selves are contemplations. Contracting contemplations or habits or 
organic syntheses draw a difference from repetition.” Protevi quotes Deleuze: “The self does not 
undergo modifications, it is itself a modification – this term designating precisely the difference drawn 
[from repetition]”.545 “Deleuze is going to call each snapshot of a dynamic series of modifications, each 
‘drawing of a difference from repetition,’ the ‘larval subject.’”546 “The larval subject is the individual in 
                                            
542 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. 223. 
543 Ibid. 119. 
544 Ibid. 120. 
545 Protevi, John, "Larval Subjects, Autonomous Systems, and E. Coli Chemotaxis," (Department of French 
Studies, Louisiana State University, 2010). 13. Permission to cite this unquoted essay has been granted. 
Deleuze quotation from page 79 of Difference and Repetition. 
546 Ibid. 13. 
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the process of individuation and hence tied to a metastable field in an ongoing process of 
‘transduction.’”547  The notion of ‘transduction’ is a Simondonian548 notion and denotes a process –  
be it physical, biological , mental or social - in which an activity gradually sets itself in motion, 
propagating within a given area, through a structuration of the different zones of the area over 
which it operates. Each region of the structure that is constituted in this way then serves to 
constitute the next one to such an extent that at the very time this structuration is effected there is 
a progressive modification taking place in tandem with it. The simplest image of the transductive 
process is furnished if one thinks of a crystal, beginning as a tiny seed, which grows and extends 
itself in all directions in its mother-water. Each layer of molecules that has already been 
constituted serves as the structuring basis for the layer that is being formed next, and the result is 
an amplifying reticular structure. The transductive process is thus an individuation in progress. 
Physically, it might be said to occur at its simplest in the form of a progressive iteration; however, 
in the case of more complex domains, such as those of living metastability or psychic 
problematics, it might progress at a constantly variable rate and expand in a heterogeneous area. 
Transduction occurs when there is activity, both structural and functional, which begins at a 
center of the being and extends itself in various directions from this center, as if multiple 
dimensions of the being were expanding around this central point. It is the correlative appearance 
of dimensions and structures in a being in a state of preindividual tension, which is to say, in a 
being that is more than a unity and more than an identity, and which has not yet passed out of 
step with itself into other multiple dimensions. The ultimate terms at which the transductive 
process finally arrives do not preexist this process.549 On the contrary, it expresses the primordial 
heterogeneity of the two levels of reality, one larger than the individual - the system of metastable 
totality - the other smaller than it, such as a piece of matter. Between these two primordial orders 
of magnitude the individual develops through a process of amplifying communication of which 
transduction is the most primitive form, one already present in the physical individuation.550  
For Deleuze, “there is not a subject who synthesises. Rather, there are syntheses from which subjects 
are formed; these subjects are not persons but points of relative stability resulting from connection, 
what Deleuze refers to as ’larval subjects’”.551 A larval subject seems to be a way to view syntheses in 
terms of the subjects which might be formed. 
x. Spatio-temporal dynamisms  
Deleuze asks:  
How is the Idea determined to incarnate itself in differenciated qualities and differenciated 
extensities? What determines the relations coexisting within the Idea to differenciate themselves 
in qualities and extensities? The answer lies precisely in the intensive quantities. Intensity is the 
determinant in the process of actualisation. It is intensity which dramatises. It is intensity which is 
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549 Ibid. 313. 
550 Ibid. 318. 
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immediately expressed in the basic spatio-temporal dynamisms and determines an 'indistinct' 
differential relation in the Idea to incarnate itself in a distinct quality and a distinguished extensity. 
552 
Beneath the actual qualities and extensities, species and parts, there are spatio-temporal 
dynamisms. These are the actualising, differenciating agencies. They must be surveyed in every 
domain, even though they are ordinarily hidden by the constituted qualities and extensities.553 
Spatio-temporal dynamisms have several different properties: 1) they create particular spaces 
and times; 2) they provide a rule of specification for concepts, which without these dynamisms 
would remain unable to receive their logical articulations; 3) they determine the double aspect of 
differentiation, qualitative and quantitative (qualities and extensions, species and parts); 4) they 
entail or designate a subject, through a ‘larval’ or ‘embryonic’ subject; 5) they constitute a special 
theatre; 6) they express Ideas. It is through all these different aspects that spatio-temporal 
dynamisms figure the movement of dramatization.554  
xi. ‘Centres of envelopment’  
Such centres appear in ‘complex systems’ where series of differences come into relation: “to the 
extent that every phenomenon finds its reason in a difference of intensity which frames it, as though 
this constituted the boundaries between which it flashes, we claim that complex systems increasingly 
tend to interiorise their constitutive differences: the centres of envelopment carry out this interiorisation 
of the individuating factors”.555 In more detail:  
The function of these centres may be defined in several ways. First, to the extent that the 
individuating factors form a kind of noumenon of the phenomenon, we claim that the noumenon 
tends to appear as such in complex systems, that it finds its own phenomenon in the centres of 
envelopment. Second, to the extent that sense is tied to the Ideas which are incarnated and to 
the individuations which determine that incarnation, we claim that these centres are expressive, 
or that they reveal sense. Finally, to the extent that every phenomenon finds its reason in a 
difference of intensity which frames it, as though this constituted the boundaries between which it 
flashes, we claim that complex systems increasingly tend to interiorise their constitutive 
differences: the centres of envelopment carry out this interiorisation of the individuating factors. 
The more the difference on which the system depends is interiorised in the phenomenon, the 
more repetition finds itself interior, the less it depends upon external conditions which are 
supposed to ensure the reproduction of the ’same’ differences….As the movement of life shows, 
Difference and Repetition tend to become interiorised in signal-sign systems both at once.  
As cited in an earlier footnote: “centres of envelopment are also the dark precursors of the eternal 
return”.556 Centres of development as Ansell-Pearson has shown include the membrane of organisms 
and territorial differentiation. “All life involves individuating closure and this can be established in a 
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number of ways: membrane, skin, a territory, all of which serve to bring into communication an interior 
and an exterior.”557 
xii.  ‘Eternal return’ (Repetition and Intensive Quantities) 
Rolli says that in Difference and Repetition, Deleuze proposes to treat “… the reciprocal relations of 
the Ideal synthesis of difference in the domain of individuation with its fields of intensity as passive 
spatio-temporal syntheses”…and so in “this way the fifth chapter builds a bridge between the fourth 
and the second chapter: the time syntheses of ‘repetition for itself’ articulate the ‘asymmetric 
syntheses’ of the individuation processes that explicate the structurally determined actualisation forms 
of ‘ideas’”. Thus it is no wonder that Deleuze in the fifth chapter focuses above all on the problem of 
space and places these investigations next to his analysis of time. Space, if it can be seen as separate 
from time, has the important role of being the realm of the eternal return of difference through the 
incarnation of Ideas. 
The singularities of reciprocal relations communicate through repetition and this has consequences 
beyond the production of intensive quantities. “What defines the extraordinary power of that …eternal 
return … is the reprise of singularities by one another, the condensation of singularities one into 
another.... Repetition is this emission of singularities, always with an echo or resonance which makes 
each the double of the other, or each constellation the redistribution of another.”558 
Just as differential relations involve reciprocal determination so singular points are made singular in 
relation to others through the “reprise of singularities”. The system functions via the communication 
between singular points in the individual (the individual is an individual through such communication). 
Why Focus On Individuals? 
Williams’ book pays attention, like Deleuze’s, to science. Deleuze mentions Albert Lautman’s idea that 
science always participates in a dialectic that points beyond it. For Deleuze, when science ‘forgets’ its 
‘intimate relation’ to Ideas in the form of problems that loses its power. The field of scientific solvability 
in which a problem is incarnated needs to be understood in relation to the problematic set of relations 
beyond the this field. So “science must be thought of in relation to individuals”. Science and 
knowledge are also important for individuals. Science can help define the actual identities that 
sensations go beyond. Possibly more importantly, science allows us to “determine the space disrupted 
by sensations and by helping us unmask false sensations”. Science also provides facts that can only 
then be accounted for through the actions of individuals. “The sciences can also dramatise Ideas and 
intensities, triggering sensations and opening up the actual to new movements.” Williams points out, 
however, that Deleuze’s definition of Ideas in terms of problems distances “his philosophy from a 
grounding in any particular science”…”Each individual determines a different set of problems in terms 
of the Ideas it brings into clarity and obscurity”. In relation to this he notes that the significance 
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associated with the sensations of problems “has an expressive power on other individuals and their 
problems”.559 
Another relevant problematic associated with individuals is how thinking in terms of individuals opens 
us to the world beyond human identities. “Everything thinks and is thought.” For Deleuze, “there is not 
hierarchy of sensation and expression” and no limits as to where they can occur. Not only does 
everything think and is thought but everything becomes part of everything else, in singular ways. 
“humans, plants, rocks and animals share a common charge in intensities and Ideas” – and hence a 
common destiny.560 When a plant responds to a changing environment or evolves over time the 
sensations involved transform all Ideas. “When individuals open their thought to sensations and, 
hence, to Ideas and intensities, they connect to all things and allow a common charge to run through 
all of them, lighting them in different ways. That opening of thought can only take place through 
experimentation.”561 
Space plays a central role in Deleuze’s account of individuals. Individuals depend on a space that is 
defined by or produced with or as part of individuals. Such a ‘nomadic’ distribution is opposed to 
‘sedentary distribution’ where individuals are distributed in a predefined space. An individuals, instead, 
‘draws up’ and transforms its own space. 
Just as Expressionism in Philosophy Being is univocal and the 'is' is said of all things in the same way 
– and that this way is the individual. “All things are individuals or incomplete parts of individuals”.562 
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MYTHS OF OPEN SYSTEMS ORIENTED DESIGN OF 
LANDSCAPES AND CITIES: A LIST OF PREOCCUPATIONS 
OF RECENT OPEN SYSTEMS ORIENTED LANDSCAPE 
DESIGN ASSEMBLAGES THAT ONLY ‘INDIRECTLY’ 
ENGAGE WITH LANDSCAPE AFFECT 
These are effectively notes from a lecture, and are useful for this thesis for drawing together a list 
of what I term myths of open systems landscape designing, which function as a being a list of 
what I consider ‘indirect’ preoccupations of this discourse – indirect in that they are not directly 
engaging with I am arguing, following Deleuze and Guattari, are the most important products of 
open systems involving (human) organisms – landscape affects 
I will argue that open and complex systems thinking is the dominant influence on designers interested 
in landscapes and cities. I will simply call such approaches ‘open systems-oriented approaches’. As a 
startup conception open systems thinking sees that everything is inseparable from everything else. 
From my experience and research I certainly believe that we must embrace this intensely ecological 
condition. However, it seems to me that – despite the great variety – that there is pretty much a 
dominant open-systems-oriented approach and that it has recurring issues. I will today present a 
collection of what I will mostly call ‘myths’ of open-systems-oriented designing. These are conceptions 
that I have encountered here, in Australia, in the states and in the literature. You should note that 
there is little formal concern in the discourse about what I consider a serious issue. I consider it an 
issue that the tendencies of the dominant mode are not seen as problematic. Historically, this 
approach came to dominance very quickly and has not really been challenged. I would suggest that 
each of these myths point to this dominant conception. I believe that the rich variety, number and 
prevalence of these preoccupations and that that they only indirectly relate to what human-involved 
open systems of the landscape do is serious evidence that there is a problem with the contemporary 
assemblage. There is much to be learnt by examining each of these preoccupations and all of them 
together. Each, even in their problematic way, has something to offer, partly just because so many 
designers have been preoccupied with them, and these designers have developed practices worthy of 
appreciating 
landscape urbanism 
I should certainly stress that there has been a great and valuable productivity in the name of open 
systems – which I will not really talk about here – as that is usually what is talked about – and usually 
under the banner of ‘landscape urbanism’. I guess I want to point towards some things that undermine 
the great potential of embracing open-systems for designers – that undermine the positive things that 
are being investigated – and the potential of this embrace. These myths have certain weakness’ in 
common and what they have in common deserves to be identified, which I hope I can do a little justice 
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to in a not particularly academic manner. I have only discussed the myths that are both important and 
quick to discuss. They are not separate from each other and there are, I think, lots of them. The 
images will not be examined in any detail, they are more indicative. Each myth comes with certain 
design preoccupations, some of which I will list. In most cases it seems that the way that such 
preoccupations are discussed and presented suggests that just by engaging with these 
preoccupations you are engaging with open-systems in a manner relevant to human life – effectively 
just because of such preoccupations. 
movement 
So…the first myth…is that engaging with movement is – effectively - by itself engaging with open 
systems of relevance to human life open systems 
Preoccupations include: 
 Picturing bodily movement in analytical drawings or mappings 
 Analysis where the representations show movement 
 Picturing things which cannot be seen because they are moving or are not soli 
notations 
 Using notations to show movement 
 Representing sequentiality 
 Registering movement or the suggestion of movement in images 
 Using fields of vector-arrows to show direction and frequency etc. of movement 
 Documenting the movements of people in video or photos 
 The belief that video is better than a ‘static’ drawing at working with open systems. 
 Designing designs that have movement as part of the design 
 Managing movement or movement systems 
flows 
Relatedly – it is a myth that engaging with flows is itself engaging with human life open systems. 
Preoccupations include: 
 Representing the location, and possibly quantity/speed/frequency, of flows  
 Representing the paths of invisible bodies in maps ie. The movement of data, capital etc.  
 Representing or referring to transnational flows as if this is engaging with the global forces of an 
open system (or the open system of global forces)  
 Designing with flows 
Related to these two myths is another myth – that you can visualize landscape or urban forces in a 
graphic representation.  
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Whilst there totally reasonable belief that there are urban forces and that these are important or 
central to the landscape and cities – when such a belief wants to become operationalised how such 
forces are thought about tends to become very vague. 
A whole range of preoccupations are employed in the name of ‘forces’. 
 Sometimes it is through using expressionistic linework or the sensuousness of fields of arrow. 
 Movement and flow can be taken as forces. 
 Freezing or taking a cut through a process or movement as a way to visualise forces or 
time. 
 Almost any factor that seems relevant can be included as a force 
 ie social forces might be mentioned and some demographic data provided. (the same can be 
said about the notion of ‘conditions’ 
change 
And further – it is a myth that engaging with change is itself engaging with human life open systems. 
Preoccupations include: 
 Designing with change over time 
 Designing in a way that allows many possibilities to occur over time. 
 Phasing a project over time 
 Catering for or facilitating the evolution of a project over time 
 Designing flexible landscapes or landscapes with flexibility of some sort. 
 Designing landscapes that allow the user to alter them or use them in many ways. 
…and, that it is a myth that ‘engaging with time’ in design is seen as engaging in the open systems 
nature of the landscape – and that engaging with space is seen as static and is not… 
Preoccupations include: 
 The management of design over time 
 Designing a sequence 
 The organisation of a proceeding 
Similarly - it is a myth- that designing with ecological change or succession or ecological services are 
what is what is relevant about ecologies for human life 
Preoccupations include: 
 Setting up the conditions for the alteration of or progression of ecological succession  
 Engaging with ecological change or growth 
 Treating ecologies purely technically 
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indeterminacy 
Myth – that when ‘indeterminacy’ is mentioned – and it often is – it often refers to that which is not 
solid or still:  
Preoccupations include: 
 Conceiving of the indeterminate in design as that which cannot be predicted – or there are many 
options 
 Designing with things that are not solid or still 
 Designing with things that appear and disappear or are temporary or ephemeral 
 Relatedly – when “emergence” or “morphogenesis” are mentioned they tend to refer to the 
appearance or change of a form. 
mapping#1 
Mapping is associated with open / complex systems because of the dispersed spatial and temporal 
nature of such systems. 
mapping#2  
It is however a myth that the overviewing or synoptic power of a map allows a greater ability to engage 
in the workings of open systems – or that open systems can be engaged with just from the map. 
Associated with these myths is a myth that there are two realms – the large-scaled / strategic realm & 
small scaled / life on the ground / material realm—and that the strategic or large-scaled is the realm to 
engage with the open systems workings of the world—or that if the small on the ground material scale 
is seen as important it can effectively can be designed later. So it is given much importance or 
attention. The main game is the large-scaled. And another related myth – that large-scaled mapping 
and the large scaled mapping of flows connects you to the power of global forces . 
On a different tangent – the word myth is not so useful to describe some shifty tendencies – when you 
say something and you actually do something else. Another word for the ability of open systems to do 
things themselves is ‘self-organisatio…It is a common contemporary design tendency that a designer 
might say they are dealing with self-organisation yet the actual preoccupation that follows from this or 
is associated with it - is the development of a (complex) organisation/s (in time and space). 
Preoccupations include: 
 Organising functional or organic systems over time 
 The design of management systems and frameworks 
And……similarly….that in the name of complex systems designers instead set out to produce complex 
organizations – as if complexity itself is engaging with open systems. 
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Open systems are continually being confused with relatively closed systems. 
It should be said that it seems – without a strong idea about open systems – that it is difficult to make 
the distinction between open systems involving humans and systems and organizations that are part 
of the human landscape. 
A couple of other funny conceptions are where designs are presented as valuable contribitions to 
open systems designing just because they ‘display’ change or complexity. 
atomisms 
Coming back to self-organisation  or emergence – such notions are  often communicated through 
examples such as ant and bee colonies or bird-flocking & boids – and that, following Deleuze, such 
self-organisation functions through ‘local connection’ and that the workings of ‘local connections’ are 
generally understood as a small number of simple relationships between neighbouring entities or 
agents which together produces emergent organisations at a ‘higher level’ – and that such a model 
has been very influential for the understanding of design problems involving urban and landscape 
situations in such schools as the AA, where a small number of ‘local condition’ rules are extracted 
from the landscape and from them often gigantic orders are constructed. Whilst such conceptions are 
fascinating and useful for understanding certain types of self-organisation -  it is a myth that they are 
able to engage in the open system functioning of real landscapes – being wildly more heterogeneous 
and than boids 
Repton 
There has been some attention to the scenographic tendencies of our culture – a tendency that 
effectively sees the world in visually sensuous ways and cuts it of from the processes of the world.  It 
is, however, a myth – that so-called ‘traditional’ landscape architecture having been influenced by the 
picturesque - was restricted or largely restricted to the scenographic – and that change, movement & 
flows of contemporary designing has gone beyond outside the scenographic. 
Garden City 
It has been graphically realised – maybe first by Marx and Engels studies of places like Manchester 
and Patrick Geddes and more recently and forcefully, Koolhaas - that designers cannot simply 
imagine a future and then realise it – that the city does what it wants and it seems that all we can do is 
follow it or try to engage with what it wants to do –  
Patrick Geddes 
Firstly, that there are desires of urban planners and designers and orders laid down by planners and 
designers and there are obvious examples where the growth or changes in urban form or land-use 
goes way beyond this. Designers are understandably and particularly fascinated with the more 
extreme cases of these – often vast in scale: 
 out of control mega-cities – Lagos, China, Mexico City 
 unplanned spontaneous settlements (eg Edge Cities) 
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 deindustrialisation and suburbanisation (Detroit and other older US cities, Dallas) 
 the production of sprawl 
 informal settlements and slums,  
Secondly, there are urban orders that are obviously not working from some top-down or overlain order 
and are obviously working from some known or mysterious bottom-up relationships between such 
things as negotiations between neighbouring units – or between construction, movement and 
topography…eg. 
 organic medieval cities and hill towns 
…relatedly - and that at a usually smaller scale there are instances where it is obvious or evident – 
through visible objects or traces - that the way that human’s occupy, appropriate, use or transform 
space goes way beyond the orders lain down by urban planners and designers 
eg. 
 homeless appropriations 
 skaters occupying a space 
 spontaneous street sellers and other small spontaneous capitalist mechanisms / instances 
 that ‘goat tracks’ or mapped ‘desire lines’ involve self-organisation and formal paths do not 
Such phenomena are very important to examine – there is something, in a sense, ‘pure’ about them… 
The particular myth I want to highlight that is associated with such fascinations and preoccupation is 
that that the ordered city of planners and traditional designers does not involve self-organisation and 
the following do. It is a myth that where it is obvious that the urban growth and change, appropriation 
and transformations of space are visibly evident that such examples involve self-organisation and that 
- effectively - that what are considered ordered cities, most of our everyday cities, the suburbs etc. do 
not involve self-organisation. 
Stan Allen 
Related to this is the idea – reflected in Stan Allen’s book Points and Lines and his mat buildings 
buildings – is that if we set up an organisation in the right way that we might, if we are clever and lucky 
– achieve self-organisation –--- suggesting that the world is basically ordered and that self-
organisation only happens in certain places and times – and that most of our cities and designing is 
not self-organisational. 
Delanda 
It is a Myth that open and complex systems are (exclusively) a scientific realm 
(and that Manuel Delanda’s very very influential scientifically oriented conception of Deleuze and 
Guattari’s ideas is the best way for designers to understand Deleuze and Guattari’s ideas - and hence 
the best way to understand open systems. 
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Deleuze and Guattari’s ideas have been very influential in open system thinking about cities and 
landscapes – but it seems that the particular way their ideas have been introduced to the 
environmental design disciplines owes a great deal to the ideas of Manuel Delanda’s version of their 
ideas – one that interprets their ideas in scientific terms. Delanda’s notions support the Wikipedia 
version of open systems. Anyone who pays significant attention to the ideas of Deleuze and Guattari 
and do so in relation to examples would, I would suggest, see Deleuze and Guattari’s work quiet 
differently. It has taken till recently for philosophers to critique Delanda’s scientific conception of 
Deleuze and Guattari. Delanda pays scant attention to such things as becoming, affects and sense – 
which are central to Deleuze and Guattari.  
In terms of open systems Leibniz and Spinoza were, in the seventeenth century, important figures in 
the development of a scientific understanding of open systems through their investigations of the 
implications of infinity and that the world as one continuous substance in time and space. However, 
especially in the case of Spinoza his most important contributions are understandings of open systems 
that involve affect and sense and are hence outside of the realm of science. There was a non-
scientific interest in open systems from the beginning of open systems – and these two different 
interests were effectively focused on different realms of open systems. For some reason – somewhat 
to do with Delanda – we have overlain the scientific version on realms  - the design of cities and 
human spaces - which are almost certainly better understood in non-scientific ways. This relates to the 
next myth 
Directly aligned with this scientism of recent design thinking is a fascination with not being ‘subjective’ 
and that this in turn is understood as being about being ‘objective’ through the use of data, quantities 
and information. Data and quantities can certainly play a strategic and major role in drawing out the 
significance of such things as urban tendencies and is indispensible for working with closed systems – 
yet it is a myth that they are adequate for engaging in humanly open systems.  
One final Myth – which is related to the one above: 
Machinic Landscape 
Koolhaas and Deleuze and Guattari have been highly critical of attempts to produce cities that match 
some human essence or ideal or ideal criteria and guidleines - and that such attempts are moral – and 
that this is often taken to mean that it is futile to try to make a difference. This often is, I would suggest, 
associated with, on one hand going with the flow of development or capitalism and seeing where this 
will lead - and/or being more preoccupied with how such work fits into architectural or landscape 
urbanist discourse. It is true that open systems strongly tend to function outside of established 
understandings and categories. But it is a myth that open systems provide no way to work toward 
making a difference. In terms of promoting or at the least not helping with such tendencies - Ciro Najli, 
of the AA in this text, invokes designers to go ‘beyond the social’. Whilst this might be taken to mean 
beyond our current conceptions of the social and that we should be engaging in the anonymous 
functioning of the world, ala Deleuze and Guattari – it instead does not come with any suggestion that 
in the end what is being explored should have something to do with people’s lives, and even that it 
cannot be understood from their perspective. 
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